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MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES,
1923-1942
House — 1923.
Committee on Elections. — Representatives Allen Lawson of Braintree,
Louis L. Green of Cambridge, Frederick: D. Sowle of New Bedford,
Robert H. J. Holden of Shirley, Owen E. Brennen of Lowell, Jambs
F. Sweeney of Holyoke and Michael F. Shaw of Revere.
Napoleon Bergeron and John Hayes v. Charles Ames and
Charles Symonds.
House Document, No. 1122. Feb. 12, 1923. Report by Representatives
Lawson, Green, Sowle, Holden and Sweeney; Representatives Shaw
and Brennen dissenting.
Recount of Votes. — The fact that the original official count was close does not of
itself justify a recount by the House of Representatives.
Same. — Under the provisions of G. L. c. 54, § 135, the registrars themselves
are not required to do the actual counting of ballots at recounts but may employ
assistants whom they deem qualified to assist them.
Same. — The committee on elections of the House of Representatives is per-
mitted or allowed to recount only when there is satisfactory preliminary proof of
such substantial facts or well grounded suspicion as would induce strong conviction
that a fraud or mistake prejudicial to the contestant might appear from such ex-
amination.
The Committee on Elections, to whom were referred the peti-
tions of Napoleon Bergeron and John Hayes, that each be de-
clared elected as a Representative from the Twelfth Essex Repre-
sentative District (see House, Nos. 393 and 562), have considered
said petitions, have heard the evidence with the arguments of
counsel, and submit the following report : —
At the state election, November 7, 1922, in the Twelfth Essex
Representative District, comprising Wards 2 and 5 in the city of
Lynn, of five candidates, two were to be elected. By the original
count each received the number of votes following : —
Charles Ames 3,272
Arthur Barker 205
Napoleon Bergeron ....... 2,372
John Hayes 2,293
Charles Symonds 2,364
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A petition for a recount was duly filed by Charles Symonds, and
on November 12, 1922, the Board of Registrars recounted the
ballots and declared the result to be —
Charles Ames 3,270
Arthur Barker 205
Napoleon Bergeron ....... 2.342
John Hayes ........ 2,318
Charles Symonds ....... 2,370
Mr. Napoleon Bergeron then filed a petition in the House of
Representatives, House Bill No. 395, reading: —
The undersigned, citizens of Lynn, Massachusetts, respectfully
represents that at the election held on November 7, 1922, in Wards
2 and 5, in Lynn, comprising the Twelfth Essex Representative
District, the petitioner was one of the candidates for the office of
Representative to the General Court from said district.
The count of votes by the election officers cast at said election
from said district gave to Charles W. Ames, 2,272, Napoleon
Bergeron, 2,372, Charles Symonds, 2,364, John Hayes, 2,293, and
to Arthur Barker, who was a candidate for election upon " stick-
ers," 205, — the two highest being elected, Charles W. Ames
and your petitioner, Napoleon Bergeron. Upon the recount of
Wards 2 and 5 in Lynn, by the registrars of voters of the City
of Lynn, upon the petition of Charles Symonds, the vote was de-
clared to be Charles W. Ames, 3,270, Charles Symonds, 2,370,
Napoleon Bergeron, 2,342, John Hayes, 2,318, and for Arthur
Barker, 205 votes. The registrars of voters declared Charles W.
Ames and Charles Symonds to be the successful candidates.
There was much confusion at the recount. It started at 2
o'clock p.m. and continued until 11.30 o'clock p.m. Many of the
clerks assisting the registrars were inexperienced. During the time
they were recounting these votes they were also recounting the
votes cast for United States Senator in all the wards in the city
of Lynn. There were ballots marked upon the sticker for Arthur
Barker which were between Charles Symonds' and Arthur Barker's
name intended for Arthur Barker but counted by the registrars
for Charles Symonds. In Ward 5, Precinct 7, the registrars on
the recount made a change in favor of Charles Symonds of 21
votes. The agent of your petitioner asked permission to examine
the tally sheets for this precinct, but the registrars would not per-
mit her to do so. When the votes were recounted the tally sheets
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were not replaced in the ballot boxes at once but were kept in the
pockets of the clerks assisting the registrars, from three to six
sheets at a time. During the recount of Ward 5, Precinct 2, there
was no loss or gain for either your petitioner or Charles Symonds,
yet upon the tally sheet your petitioner was declared to have
lost 5 and Charles Symonds to have gained 7. Whereupon the
agent of your petitioner requested an opportunity to examine this
tally sheet. He was told by one of the registrars that "he did not
have time to bother with it now." In the recount of ballots of
Ward 5, Precinct 5, your petitioner was declared to have lost 7,
with no gain for any other candidate. Agent of your petitioner
requested the clerk who was recounting these ballots to count them
over to verify, if possible, the loss of the 7 votes. The clerk de-
clined to count them over. In W^ard 5, Precinct 5, a defective
ballot was counted by the registrars in favor of Charles Symonds.
The tally sheets were loosely handled, affording an opportunity
for fraud or mistake. In making the tabulation the clerk would
read aloud from the tally sheets to one of the registrars, who would
then place figures upon the tabulation sheet without making any
comparison of the tally sheet to the tabulation sheet which offered
an opportunity for figures to be transposed and not entered cor-
rected. At said recount your petitioner duly accepted the wrong-
fully counted ballots.
It was the opinion of those present at the recount, about 30
people, Republicans and Democrats, that the recount showed no
material change and that Napoleon Bergeron was in fact elected.
Wherefore your petitioner prays that such action may be taken
as may be necessary so that he may be declared elected as Repre-
sentative to the General Court from the said Twelfth Essex
Representative District and be seated in place of said Charles
Symonds.
Mr. John Hayes likewise filed a similar petition, House Bill No.
562, as follows: —
Respectfully represents John Hayes of Lynn, in the County of
Essex and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, that at the State
election held on Tuesday, the seventh day of November, A.D.
1922, your petitioner was a candidate for election to the House of
Representatives of said General Court for the Twelfth Essex
Representative District, comprising Wards 2 and 5 in said Lynn.
Upon the face of the returns made by the various precinct
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officers it appeared that Charles W. Ames, Republican, received
3,272, Napoleon Bergeron, Democrat, 2,372, Charles Symonds,
Republican, 2,364, and John Hayes, Democrat, 2,293.
On the recount by the registrars and assistants, November 12th,
called for by Charles Symonds, the following returns were made : —
Bergeron 2,342, a loss of 30
Symonds 2,370, a gain of 6
Hayes 2,318, a gain of 25
Therefore, inasmuch as the conditions existing under which said
recount was made were irregular by reason of the fact that the
candidates were denied their rights to supervise the recounting
inside the rail, and that no provision was made for a proper verify-
ing of the tabulation, one man having full control, a condition
which made a member of the City Council, who was present at the
recount, refuse to certify to its correctness;
Also the fact that through generally poor conditions correct
tabulation was impossible, I being an eye-witness of where a mis-
take of more than a hundred was made, an error from which your
petitioner feels he suffered a loss that would have assured his
election
;
AYhorefore, your petitioner prays your Honorable Body that
he be declared by your Honorable Body to be the duly elected
representative for the Twelfth Essex Representative District, in
accordance with the facts as set forth in said petition.
All parties in interest were notified that a hearing would be held
at the State House, Wednesday, January 17, 1923, and by virtue
of an order passed in the House of Representatives on January 16,
1923, the board of registrars of the city of Lynn were summonsed
to appear, with all papers material to the issue.
At the hearing both petitioners and the sitting member were
represented by able and learned counsel ; the petitioners by Philip
I. Kiley, Esq., of Lynn, and the sitting member by Earl C. Jacobs,
Esq., of Lynn.
In view of the fact that the two petitions involved the same sub-
ject matter, it was agreed by counsel and your committee that
both petitions would be considered together.
The several reasons alleged for a recount in both petitions, so
far as material, may be grouped as follows: —
1. There was much confusion at the recount, due in part to the
counting of ballots for United States Senator in all wards.
2. Many of the clerks assisting the registrars were inexperienced.
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3. Certain ballots were' counted for Charles Symonds when they
belonged to Arthur Barker.
4. The petitioners had no opportunity to examine the ballots
and the tally sheets in that they were prevented from going be-
hind the guard rail to supervise the recounting.
5. The tally sheets were loosely handled by the registrars.
It is quite natural that there should be some confusion at a re-
count when the original figures were so close. Because they were
close, however, does not of itself justify a recount.
Mass. Contested Election Cases, Loring and Russell, Ed.
1853-85.
Burt v. Babbitt, 174.
Austin v. Sweet, 189.
Newell v. Coffin, Ed. 1903-1922. 15.
There was no evidence tending to show the registrars or their
assistants were hampered because of whatever confusion that
existed, much less was there any evidence of a change in the result
on account of it.
Secondly, it was alleged that many of the clerks assisting the
registrars were inexperienced. There is no provision of law re-
quiring experienced persons to recount ballots. In this particular
instance, however, the assistants, comprising as they did one
gentleman who had performed work of this sort on several occa-
sions and two well-known lawyers, were well qualified. The Com-
mittee asked the Attorney General on January 25, 1923, whether
the registrars of a city or town must personally do the actual re-
counting.
His opinion in part states : —
G. L., c. 54, p. 135, provides for a recount of ballots by the
registrars, and in that section it is stated that " registrars of voters
may employ such clerical assistance as they deem necessary to
enable them to carry out this section." Unless the clerical assist-
ance is to be in the recounting of the ballots, it is difficult to find
any need for any such authorization, having in mind the things
required by said section. Assuming, therefore, that you wish to
know whether the registrars only must do the counting of the
ballots, I advise you that those employed by them under the pro-
visions above quoted may, under their supervision, do in whole or
in part the actual counting.
6 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES— 1923.
Thirdly, the charge was made that certain ballots were counted
for Mr. Symonds when they belonged to Mr. Barker. On this
point the testimony of one of the petitioners, Mr. Bergeron, is valu-
able. In answer to his counsel he testified that he did not know
whether any ballot that he protested on the ground that it was
wrongly counted was not marked "defective." There was no
evidence that if a ballot was counted wrongly that it was not set
aside and marked " defective," and in the absence of any specific
evidence we cannot assume a single ballot was erroneously counted.
The election machinery of the city of Lynn cannot be discredited
except upon well-grounded charges or facts.
Fourthly, the charge was made that the petitioners had no
opportunity to examine the ballots and the tally sheets. General
Laws, chapter 54, section 135, provides that each candidate " shall
be allowed to be present and witness such recount, either in per-
son, accompanied by counsel, if he so desires, or by an agent
appointed by him in writing."
The petitioners claim they should have been given the oppor-
tunity of placing two persons at every table where the recounting
was carried on. There were seven tables, and the petitioners
further claim that these tables were inside of a guard rail, beyond
which they or their agents were forbidden to go. The tables, with
the exception of one, were placed lengthwise and parallel to the
rail; there was a counter with his back to the rail and another
one on the opposite side of the table. The petitioners or their
agents state that when the person on the" opposite side of the
table counted the ballot, it was impossible to note the crosses
thereon. Much conflicting evidence on this point was intro-
duced. There was evidence that in order to avoid confusion and
delay a public announcement was made by the registrars of
voters that unless there was objection a certain person would
represent the Democratic party and another the Republican
party within the rail. Neither petitioner then disagreed, and the
registrars assumed, and we think rightly, that all present acqui-
esced. The Attorney General in the aforementioned opinion on
the question of whether unauthorized persons have a right to go
behind the guard rail states —
There is no provision of law, such as exists in regard to voting
places at primaries or elections, which requires registrars to set
up a guard rail. The statute requires that each candidate shall
be allowed to be present and witness such recount, either in per-
son, accompanied by counsel, if he so desires, or by an agent
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appointed by him in writing. It»is a question of fact in each in-
stance whether such opportunity to be present and witness such
recount has been afforded. Your Committee find as a fact that
the petitioners or their agents could have seen each cross on every
ballot and the figures on the tally sheets had they taken the
opportunity.
That the tally sheets were loosely handled, your Committee
cannot agree with the petitioners. That there was opportunity
for a mistake cannot permit us, in the absence of any supporting
evidence, to assume that one was in fact made. The great pre-
ponderance of the evidence shows that an agent representing each
side could have examined and checked each tally sheet when the
figures were added on the machine. Mr. Hayes, in his petition,
alleges that he was "an eye witness of where a mistake of more
than a hundred was made." It is true that this mistake was made
on the adding machine by one of the registrars. This, however
was immediately discovered, the machine cleared, and the figures
totalled correctly. The registrar who made the mistake con-
vinced your Committee that it was an arithmetical error, cor-
rected at once.
In order to give the petitioners every possible consideration,
your Committee inquired into all phases of the recount, to ascer-
tain whether there might be any specific reason on the broad
ground of carelessness to justify a recount, for many prior cases
in the House of Representatives as well as adjudications of the
Supreme Judicial Court conclusively rule that your Committee
on Elections is permitted or allowed to recount only where there
is satisfactory preliminary proof of such substantial facts or well-
grounded suspicion as would induce strong conviction that a
fraud or mistake prejudicial to the contestant might appear from
such examination.
• Mass. Contested Elections Cases, L. & R. Ed. 1853-85.
Rice v. Welch, 128.
Graves v. Edson, 196.
Greene v. Bridgman, 216.
Taylor v. Carney, 228.
Lambert v. Forrestall, Ed. 1903-22, 32.
In following this desire, your Committee went fully into the
procedure of the registrars. It seems that at recounts in the city
of Lynn blanks are never counted in checking the total number of
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votes. Your Committee feel that the best system would require
the counting of blanks to account for every ballot. That the best
system was not used, however, cannot lead your Committee to
find that the petitioners were in any way prejudiced, especially in
view of the testimony of the City Clerk, who stated that every
cross on every ballot was accounted for with the exception of one,
thereby affecting the result in no manner.
Although the petitioners offered no testimony that assistants to
the registrars were not sworn, your Committee felt that if this
would justify a recount it was a point worthy of consideration, so
an opinion of the Attorney General was sought. In response, he
wrote : —
I do not find any statutory requirement to that effect, such as
exists in the case of election officers. I am therefore of the opinion
that they need not be sworn.
Your Committee finds, therefore, that the methods and pro-
cedure of the board of registrars of the city of Lynn was cus-
tomary, regular, impartial and for the best interests and con-
venience of all parties concerned. We find that the allegations
in the petitions of Messrs. Napoleon Bergeron and John Hayes
have not been sustained and we recommend that each be given
leave to withdraw.
Allen Lawson.
Louis L. Green.
Frederick D. Sowle.
Robert H. J. Holden.
James F. Sweeney.
Minority Report.
.
We, the undersigned members of the House Committee on
Elections, are unable to agree with the report of the majority
members. We feel that the evidence presented by the petitioners
was such that would warrant a recount of the ballots. We feel
further that the methods and procedure of the board of registrars
was not customary, regular, impartial or for the best interests and
convenience of all parties concerned.
Michael F. Shaw.
Owen E. Brennen.
[Report accepted, February 14. — House Journal, p. 294.]
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House — 1925.
Committee on Elections. — Representatives Robert H. J. Holden of Shirley,
Thomas H. Bilodeau of Boston, William H. Hearn of Boston, George
F. James of Norwood, Richard J. McCoBMiCK of Haverhill, Edward F.
Wallace of Boston and James T. Welch of North Adams.
Ox the Election of William F. Madden.
House Document, No. 1249. March 25, 1925. Report by Representatives
Holden, Bilodeau, James, McCormick, Wallace and Welch; Repre-
sentative Hearn dissenting.
Death of Candidate. — The word "person" as appearing in General Laws, chap-
ter 54, section 12S, means living human beings. A candidate for election who was
dead on election day is not a person within the meaning of the constitution or the
statutes.
House of Representatives. — The House of Representatives shall be the judge of
the returns, elections and qualifications of its own members.
General Court. — The power to pass upon the election and qualification of its
own members is vested exclusively in each branch of the Great and General Court.
No other department of the Government has any authority under the constitution
to adjudicate upon this subject.
Constitution. — Article 14 of the amendments to the constitution provides: "in
all elections of civil officers by the people of this Commonwealth, whose election is
provided for by the constitution, the person having the highest number of votes
shall be deemed and declared to be elected." The word "person" means living
human beings.
The Committee on Elections, to whom was referred the matter
of the return, qualification and election of William F. Madden of
Boston to membership in the House as Representative from the
Fifteenth Suffolk District, having heard all the evidence sub-
mitted by the claimant and that rendered by the remonstrant,
Martin S. Kilgallon, and the arguments of counsel for each, hereby
submits the following reports : —
At the election held on November 4, 1924, the voters of the
Fifteenth Suffolk District were entitled to elect two Representa-
tives to the General Court. The names of Joseph M. Ward and
William A. Canty, both of whom were Democratic candidates,
were the only names printed on the official ballot as candidates for
Representative from this District. William A. Canty died on the
morning of November 3, 1924, the day before the election. His
death was known that morning in the office of the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, who ruled, that if the ward committee empowered
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to fill the vacancy would file with him before five o'clock on that
afternoon, the name of a candidate for the office made vacant by
the death of William A. Canty, he would reprint all the ballots for
the District.
The Secretary of the Commonwealth, however, was not notified
that the vacancy had been legally filled and the ballots appeared
in their original form. The death of Canty was announced on
the day it occurred in at least two Boston newspapers of large
circulation, on the front page; the headline announcement in one
of these papers being six columns wide. A representative of the
latter newspaper testified that tins paper was off the press and
ready for distribution shortly after three o'clock in the afternoon.
At a rally held in the Lowell School in that district on the same
evening one of the speakers paid a tribute to Canty in a short
address, after which the audience stood in silence for a minute
out of respect to his memory.
William F. Madden, hearing of Canty's death on the afternoon
of November 3rd, decided to run on stickers for the place left
vacant by the death of Canty. Charles Dunlap also decided to
be a candidate. On election day both Madden and Dunlap had
representatives at the polling booths in the eleven precincts in
the district distributing stickers on their behalf. These repre-
sentatives, of whom Madden had two at each precinct in ad-
dition to those stationed there by Dunlap, were instructed to
inform the voters that William A. Canty had died, and to distrib-
ute stickers on behalf of the candidates they represented. On
election day 9,916 persons from this district went to the polls.
The vote cast was as follows :—
Joseph M. Ward . 5,317
William A. Canty 2,942
William F. Madden 1,165
Charles Dunlap
. . .
. . 487
Scattering ........ 5
There were 7,952 blanks cast.
The Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Boston
filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth a certificate of the
election of Joseph M. Ward and William A. Canty, although
Madden had caused to be filed with them a copy of the record of
Canty's death. A duplicate certificate was issued to WTard but
no duplicate was issued in the case of Canty.
On November 20, 1924, Madden petitioned the Supreme Judi-
cial Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Board of Elec-
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tion Commissioners of the City of Boston to issue to him a certifi-
cate of his election. The respondents (The Board of Election
Commissioners) filed an answer denying Madden 's right to such
a certificate. On December 19, 1924, an agreed statement of
facts was filed signed by the attorneys for Madden and the Board
of Election Commissioners. This agreed statement of facts is as
follows : —
1. The petitioner (William F. Madden) is a citizen of the City
of Boston, and a resident in the Fifteenth Suffolk District. He is
and was on November 4, 1924, duly qualified, if elected, to hold
the office of Representative in the Great and General Court from
the said District.
2. The respondents on November 4, 1924, and ever since were
the duly qualified and acting Board of Election Commissioners
of the City of Boston.
3. At the State Election held November 4, 1924, there were
to be elected from the Fifteenth Suffolk District two Representa-
tives to the Great and General Court.
4. Among the candidates for the position were William A.
Canty, Joseph M. Ward, William F. Madden, and others whose
names are not now material.
5. William A. Canty died early on the morning of November 3,
1924, the day before election. His name had been printed on
the official ballot on election day without any indication on such
ballot that he was not living. He had been a well-known resident
of the District and a member of a family who had lived there
for many years and who were themselves well-known people. The
fact of his death was generally known throughout the district and
notices of his death were prominently printed in all the papers.
Similar notices appeared in all of the papers of November 3, 1924.
On Election Day the supporters of the petitioner with the knowl-
edge that the name of William A. Canty was still on the official
ballot, and for the purpose of making certain that no votes should
be cast for him in ignorance of the fact that he was not living,
stationed two persons near each of the eleven polling places in
the ward. These persons were instructed to inform each voter
as he or she approached the polling booth of the fact of William
A. Canty having died.
The case was argued before the full bench of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court on January 13, 1925, by Madden's attorney. The
attorney for the respondents made no argument and submitted
no brief. The court by its decision filed January 30, 1925, directed
the Board of Election Commissioners to issue to Madden a cer-
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tificate of his election. See Madden v. Board of Election Commis-
sioners of the City of Boston, January 30, 1925.
This certificate was issued and has been filed with the Speaker
of this House by Madden who now claims the right to be seated.
The evidence presented before your Committee on Elections
differed very little from the facts as set forth in the agreed state-
ment of facts filed in the Supreme Judicial Court, and upon which
this court made its decision. The claimant produced many wit-
nesses who testified that they informed a large number of voters
as to Canty 's death. It appeared that they were unable to warn
every voter, but that in their conversation with the voters they
approached they found very few voters who did not know of
Canty's death before coming to the polls. Very little evidence
was produced before your Committee to show that the voters did
not know of Canty 's death at the time they voted, and, in fact,
the great preponderance of evidence before your Committee was
in accord with the evidence submitted to the Supreme Judicial
Court on the agreed statement of facts. There was no evidence
presented to the Committee which indicated any fraud or force
or undue influence was exercised on the voters in the District.
The great weight of the evidence as given was to the effect that
the death of Canty was generally known to the voters of his
District and was specifically called to the attention of a large
number of them on Election Day at the polls.
Chapter 1, Section 3, Article 10, of the Constitution provides:
"The House of Representatives shall be the judge of the returns, elections
and qualifications of its own members as pointed out in the Constitution."
The case of Dinan v. Swig, 223 Mass. 516, holds that the courts
can take no part in determining the qualifications of the members
of the Great and General Court. "The power to pass upon the
election and qualification of its own members thus is vested ex-
clusively in each branch of the Great and General Court. No
other department of the Government has any authority under the
Constitution to adjudicate upon that subject."
Article 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution provides:
"in all elections of civil officers by the people of this Common-
wealth, whose election is provided for by the Constitution, the
person having the highest number of votes shall be deemed and
declared to be elected." The Board of Election Commissioners
were required to make a certificate to the Secretary of the Common-
wealth of "election of persons appearing to be elected." See Gen-
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eral Laws, chapter 54, section 128: The word " persons" means
living human beings. This was decided in the case of Sawyer v.
Mackie, 149 Mass. 269, and is reaffirmed in Madden v. Board of
Election Commissioners of the City of Boston, January 30, 1925.
Canty, who was dead, was not therefore a person within the mean-
ing of the provisions of the Constitution or the statutes with regard
to elections, which apply to this case.
General Laws, chapter 53, section 14, provides a method for
filling vacancies in the event of a candidate's death. By providing
such a method the statutes recognize that the name of one who is
dead has not a place on the ballot and that ballots cast for a dead
candidate cannot be counted. General Laws, chapter 54, section
42, provides that on the ballot at the end of the list of candidates
for each office, blank spaces equal to the number of candidates to
be elected shall be left so that a voter may write in other names
than those that appear on the ballot. This statute recognizes the
possibility of other candidates than those whose names appear on
the ballot.
In the case of Peabody v. School Committee of Boston, 115 Mass.
383, the court says: ". . . and that while the Constitution, so
far as it contains any provisions which are applicable, is to be the
guide, the decisions of either House upon the questions whether any
person is or is not entitled to a seat therein cannot be disputed or
revised by any court or authority whatever."
Accordingly, although the action of this House is final with re-
gard to the qualifications and elections of its members, it is bound
by the provisions of the Constitution so far as they are applicable.
In Chapter 1, Section 3, Article 10 of the Constitution, supra,
coupled with the words which give to the house the power to judge
the right of a person to sit therein, is the specific direction — "as
pointed out in the Constitution." It seems clear therefore that
the house, in exercising this power, is bound to follow the terms of
the Constitution from which its own power comes. Madden, who
was the living person having the highest number of votes for sec-
ond place, is by the Constitution itself entitled to his seat in the
House, and the House being bound by the Constitution should
recognize this right.
This case is distinguished from the case of Bowker et al in Loring
& Russell, Massachusetts Election Cases, page 282, as in that case
the voters voted for a living person who later turned out to be
disqualified, and did not as in this case vote for a dead man who
under the law is not a "person."
Upon the weight of the evidence and the provisions of the Con-
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stitution your Committee feel that Madden should be seated in
the House, and therefore recommend that the petitioner be de-
clared one of the duly elected Representatives from the Fifteenth
Suffolk District.
Robert H. J. Holden.
Thomas H. Bilodeau.
George F. James.
Richard J. McCormick.
Edward F. Wallace.
James T. Welch.
Minority Report.
While I agree substantially with the findings of fact contained
in the majority report, I cannot agree with the conclusion.
The sole intent of the constitution and statutes is to provide for
and assist in the carrying out of the will of the majority and to pro-
vide the method by winch such a mandate can be secured. In the
matter under consideration such a mandate cannot be secured with-
out a special election.
No construction should or can be placed upon the Constitution
or statutes which would serve to set up barriers against the pro-
curing of such an expression or against its fulfillment.
I need not remind the House of the danger of establishing a
precedent such as would obtain were the majority report adopted.
I recommend the adoption of the following order : —
Ordered, That the Speaker issue a precept giving notice that a
vacancy exists in the membership of the House from the Fifteenth
Suffolk District, and appointing a time for an election in said dis-
trict to fill the vacancy.
William H. Hearx.
[Report accepted March 26. — House Journal, p. 635.]
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House — 1929.
Committee on Elections. — Representatives Arthur P. Crosby of Brookline,
John J. Irwin of Medford, John V. Kimball of Maiden, Leslie W.
Sims of Maynard, William H. Hearn of Boston, Joseph N. Roach of
North Adams and Francis Kearney of Fall River.
Harold M. Bradbury v. Timothy D. Sullivan.
House Document, No. 1078 (see 962). Feb. 27, 1929. Report by Represent-
atives Arthur P. Crosby, Leslie W. Sims, John V. Kimball and John
J. Irwin; Representatives William H. Hearn, Joseph N. Roach and
Francis Kearney dissenting.
Corrupt Practice. — The distribution of a circular letter to the voters criticising
the personal character or political action of a candidate for election which contains
a false statement and is designed or tends to injure or defeat such candidate and
which letter does not bear the name and residence of a duly registered voter as
required by law will warrant the unseating of a member of the House of
Representatives.
Same. — The making and filing of a false return of moneys contributed or
expended for the purpose of securing an election will warrant the unseating of a
member of the House of Representatives.
The committee on Elections, to which was referred the petition
of Harold M. Bradbury alleging that the sitting member, Timothy
D. Sullivan, is morally unfit to occupy the seat held by him as
Representative from the Second Middlesex District, which dis-
trict comprises wards 4, 5 and 6 in the City of Cambridge, and
praying that said Bradbury be declared the duly and legally
elected member for said district and be given the seat of said
Sullivan, the sitting member, having considered said petition,
as well as all the evidence submitted by the petitioner in support
of his petition and all the evidence offered by the sitting member
and the arguments of counsel on behalf of each, and after having
given the same thorough and careful study, hereby submits the
following report : —
Both the petitioner and sitting member were represented by
counsel, the petitioner by Arthur D. Hill, Esq., Faneuil Adams,
Esq., and Herbert B. Harris, Esq., and the sitting member by
Harry F. R. Dolan, Esq. In accordance with the order of the
House, F. Delano Putnam, Esq., Assistant Attorney General,
kept in touch with the hearings and placed his services at the dis-
posal of the committee.
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It appeared from the official returns which were put in evidence
that the number of ballots cast for Representative in the Second
Middlesex District at the election held on November 6, 1928, was
as follows : —
Names and Residences of Candidates.
Harold If.
Bradbury,
32 Rocking-
ham Street.
Edward J.
Gurry,
4 Bell Court.
Ralph N.
Hamilton,
9 Cottage
Street.
Timothy D.
Sullivan,
390 Broad-
way.
Blanks.
Ward 4, Prec. 1 . 146 179 144 233 190
4 2 . 267 241 293 320 305
4 3 . 452 295 547 317 457
4 4 . 520 262 571 274 431
4 5 . 444 255 498 311 392
1 . 287 362 354 344 277
2 . 443 291 545 269 346
5 3 . 389 389 451 311 328
5 4 . 346 446 348 230 300
6 1 . 267 311 270 336 282
220 259 251 232 220
6 3 . 250 391 240 453 306
6 4 . 137 521 164 616 310
4,168 4,202 4,676 4,246 4,144
From these figures it appears that said sitting member, Timothy
D. Sullivan, received seventy-eight (78) more votes than the
petitioner.
The petitioner alleged : —
I. That the sitting member, Timothy D. Sullivan, was guilty
of violating the Corrupt Practice Law of this Commonwealth, in
that the said Timothy D. Sullivan was guilty of issuing or causing
to be issued through the United States mail, in the course of his
campaign for election as representative in said Second Middlesex
District, a circular letter to the voters of said district, which cir-
cular letter the said Sullivan intentionally caused to be printed or
distributed, and which was designed or tended to injure or defeat
the petitioner for election to the office of Representative by criticis-
um his personal character or political action: and that said circular
letter did not bear the name and residence of a duly registered
voter of the city of Cambridge in accordance with the require-
ments of the Corrupt Practice Law of this Commonwealth.
II. That the said Timothy D. Sullivan, the sitting member,
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was guilty of making or publishing or causing to be made or pub-
lished in the aforesaid circular letter a false statement in relation
to the petitioner, who was a candidate for election to the office of
Representative from the aforesaid Second Middlesex District,
which statement was designed or tended to injure or defeat the
petitioner.
III. That the aforesaid circular letter was accompanied by a
reprint of a newspaper editorial, which reprint did not bear the
date of its original publication and was not signed by any voter
who is responsible therefor, in accordance with the Corrupt Prac-
tice Law of the Commonwealth.
IV. That the said Timothy D. Sullivan, the sitting member,
made a false or incomplete return of the moneys contributed or
expended for the purpose of securing or in any way affecting his
election to the seat now held by him.
A copy of the circular letter referred to in "I" and "II" above
follows : —
HAROLD M. BRADBURY
Bolts the Republican Party on Two Important Issues.
Reprint from Journal of the House of Representatives, 1927, pages 536, 539, 540,
541, 542.
Lord's Day Commercialized Sports.
The Bill to permit certain outdoor sports and games on the Lord's Day
(printed as Senate, No. 113) was considered, the question being on ordering
it to a third reading.
Mr. Stearns of Lowell moved that the bill be amended by striking out all
after the enacting clause, and inserting in place thereof the following: —
Chapter one hundred and thirty-six of the General Laws is hereby amended
by adding thereto the following section : — Section 29. In any city or town
which shall accept the provisions of this section in the manner provided in
section twenty-six, it shall be lawful, notwithstanding the previous provisions
of this chapter, to conduct sports and games between the hours of two and
six in the afternoon of the Lord's Day, except those prohibited by section
twenty-eight of this chapter, at which admission fees are charged or collec-
tions taken and remuneration paid and received, and for any pejrson to wit-
ness, be present at, sponsor, promote, carry on and assist directly or indirectly
in carrying on, and take part in, such lawful sports and games; and it shall
be lawful for any person interested or engaged in, or witnessing such sports
or games to pay and receive remuneration therefor, and for such person to
charge and pay admission fees or to take up or contribute to collections. Said
games or sports shall be conducted as provided in sections twenty-two, twenty-
three and twenty-five. The voters of any city or town which has accepted
the provisions of this section shall be entitled to have such provisions resub-
mitted as provided in section twenty-seven.
After debate the main question was ordered, on motion of Mr. Standish of
Stoneham.
On the question on the adoption of the amendment moved by Mr. Stearns,
the sense of the House was taken by yeas and nays, at the request of Mr.
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Kirkpatrick of Holyoke; and on the roll call 98 members voted in the affirma-
tive and 129 in the negative, as follows: —
Bradbury
votes
with these
Democrats
to
desecrate
the
Lord's Day
Yeas.
Airola, Augustine
Akeroyd, William A.
Anderson, George P.
Ashton, Thomas N.
Barker, William H.
Birmingham, Leo M.
Bradbury, Harold M., Rep.
Brodbine, Conde J.
Buckley, John P.
Byrne, Garrett H.
Carr, Thomas H.
Casey, William
Chase, Chester W.
Clark, Francis P.
Cloutier, Henry
Coakley, Daniel J.
Cook, D. Herbert
Coutu, Azarie Z.
Coyne, Francis X.
Crockwell, Richard D.
Crowley, Frank D.
Derham, John S.
Dionne, Oscar U.
Doyle, Andrew P.
Finnegan, Joseph
Fitzgerald, Peter J.
Foley, Maurice E.
Foote, Charles R.
Ford, John
Fox, Isadore H.
GafTney, John P.
Gallagher, Owen A.
Ganley, Arthur F.
Garofano, Tony A.
Garrity, Hugh H.
Granfield, Patrick E.
Grossman, Joseph B.
Gurry, Edward J.
Hagan, James E.
Hall, Lemuel C.
Halliwell, John
Hanrahan, Bernard F.
Hathaway, Louis E.
Healy, Jeremiah J.
Heara, William H.
Hefferon, Thomas J.
Hickey, Francis J.
Hickey, William P.
Holden, Charles S.
Holmes, Newland H.
Irwin, John J.
Johnston, Richard E.
Jones, John A.
Jordan, Michael H.
Kelley, Charles A.
Kelley, Edward J.
Kelley, Francis J.
Kennedy, Thomas S.
Kirkpatrick, William E.
LaBrecque, Alfred N.
Lamoureux, Wilfrid J.
Lane, Thomas J.
Leyden, Joseph W.
Logan, Joseph A.
Lomasney, Martin M.
Mahler, James E.
McCarthy, William H.
McCulloch, Elmer L.
McDonough, Timothy J.
McLaughlin, Bennett V.
McMenimen, George C.
McNulty, Anthony A.
Moriarty, Daniel F.
Murray, Patrick E.
Nestor, Patrick F.
O'Kane, Joseph N.
Olander, Edwin L.
O'Neil, Bernard J.
Powers, Walter G.
Rafter, Francis E.
Roach, Joseph N.
Sawyer, Roland D.
Silverman, William M.
Sparrell, Ernest H.
Stearns, Frank K.
Stevens, Ralph
Sullivan, Charles S., Jr.
Sullivan, Edward J.
Sullivan, Lewis R.
Tobin, Maurice J.
Torrey, James A.
Twohig, James J.
Warren, James E.
Webber, Harold B.
Wellen, William H.
Welsh, Patrick J.
Woekel, Carl A.
Woolfenden, Lawrence T.
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Nays.
These
Republicans
were
regular
and
upheld
the
dignity
of the
Sabbath
Adams, George I.
Ager, George B.
Albro, Harry B.
Allen, George L. L.
Ames, Charles W.
Andrews, J. Willis
Atwood, Harrison H.
Austin, Clinton E.
Avery, Edward
Babcock, Josiah, Jr.
Baldwin, William A.
Barker, Elliott R.
Barnes, Benjamin
Bartlett, Edwin N.
Bateman, Thomas R.
Beck, John E.
Bennett, William A.
Bentley, James D.
Bigelow, Albert F.
Blanchard, Arthur F.
Brainerd, Frank A.
Briggs, George E.
Brooks, George F.
Brooks, Martha N.
Bullock, Albert W.
Burgess, John K.
Carman, Julius F.
Chandler, Jeremiah K.
Clark, Ezra W.
Clemons, Maynard E. S.
Crosby, Arthur P.
Davison, William J.
Dean, Ernest J.
Dearborn, Hiram N.
Dennett, George A.
DesChenes, Louis N. M.
Dewar, Burt
Donaldson, M. Sylvia
DuBois, William L.
Duffie, Harold R.
Dunkle, Horace E.
Dyson, Henry T. G.
Eaton, Frank W.
Ellenwood, Louis
Erickson, Sven A.
Estabrook, Archibald M.
Estabrook, Henry A.
Fall, Howard
Gerrish, Charles E.
Gilman, George A.
Goodwin, Angier L.
Green, Louis L.
Griggs, Fred D.
Hale, C. Wesley
Hall, Albert Harrison
Hansen, Arthur A.
Haskell, Ernest W.
Hays, Martin
Hodgdon, Lyman A.
Holden, Robert H.J.
Hollis, Arthur W.
Holmes, Charles H.
Holmes, John
Hosie, Horace W.
Hurley, Joseph L.
Hutchinson, Fred A.
Ingalls, Alfred W.
James, George F.
Jewett, Victor Francis
Johnson, G. Adolph
Johnston, Thomas H.
Jones, Arthur W.
Joy, John Kendall, Jr.
Keith, Roland M.
Kyes, John F.
Larson, Joseph L.
Leonard, Arnold
Leonard, Robert S.
Little, Charles J.
Luitwieler, Clarence S.
MacGregor, Allan B.
Martin, Joseph
McCormick, Richard J.
McKay, Willard S.
Meins, Carroll L.
Moore, Wilbert T.
Nutting, Edward H.
Osborne, Frank W.
Pehrsson, Herman
Penshorn, George
Perry, Francis H.
Perry, Joseph Earl
Peters, Lewis H.
Pike, Chester A.
Potter, Albert L.
Power, Edgar F.
Pratt, C. F. Nelson
Rice, Harry C.
Ripley, Henry F.
Robbins, Edward J.
Rockwell, Henry D.
Saltonstall, Leverett
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Sandberg, Edward J.
Sauter, John
Scott, Frank O.
Scott, John F.
Seamans, Richard D.
Sessions, William J.
Shattuck, Henry L.
Shaylor, Charles H.
Snow, Walter H.
Spear, Elmer E.
Standish, Lemuel W.
Stone, J. Sidney
Symonds, Charles
Thomas, J. Valentine
98 yeas; 129 nays
Thomas, William F., Jr.
Urquhart, Herbert W.
Wadsworth, Eliot
Walker, Irving E.
Walker, Wilford A.
Warrield, Frank W.
Warner, Andrew C.
Washburn, Kendrick H.
Washburn, Slater
Wheelwright, Ralph
Whidden, Renton
Worrell, Thomas J.
Wylie, Willard O.
Therefore the amendment was rejected.
The House then refused to order the bill to a third reading.
Federal Constitution Repeal of the 18th Amendment
Mr. Twohig of Boston moved that the vote be reconsidered by which the
House, at the preceding sitting, refused to order to a third reading the Bill to
ascertain the will of the people of Massachusetts with reference to the repeal
of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
to the amendment of the federal statutory provisions for the enforcement
thereof (House, No. 194).
After debate the sense of the House was taken by yeas and nays, at the
request of Mr. Twohig; and on the roll call 105 members voted in the affirma-
tive and 128 in the negative — Harold M. Bradbury, the wet, voted yes.
Clarence DeMar, famous marathon runner, says: —
"I do not believe in commercialized Sunday. The drinking, gambling, pro-
fanity and other evils in which some of the crowd indulge should certainly be
kept out of our Lord's day, of all the week, the best."
Edward Dawes,
1010 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge.
And a copy of the reprint of a newspaper editorial referred to
in "III" above, follows: —
Reprint of Editorial, "Cambridge Chronicle"
Is He a Republican?
Councillor Bradbury is a candidate for one of the Republican nominations
for representative. We don't understand why he runs as a Republican. The
people of his district, which is strongly Republican, have had experience with
him, and have found him wholly unreliable, politically. They have had a right
to expect that when Republicans, equal in every way to Democrats, needed his
support, they would have it. Instead, he has given his vote for Democrats.
For example, when Mr. Stratton was a candidate for president of the council,
he voted for Mr. Barrett, and as a reward received exceptional committee
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appointments. He voted against the confirmation of Clement G. Morgan as
a library trustee. His vote was almost always available in support of the
Lehan-Coady-Hogan combination. When members of the city government
were unpaid, car tickets were furnished to them for riding to and from the
city hall. He favored providing them for present members, who now receive
salaries. The measure was distinctly a raid on the treasury.
With this record, we see no reason why any Republican should support his
candidacy. There are several other candidates— all tried Republicans. We
have no suggestion to make as to the choices between them, but we can see no
reason why any Republican should vote for Mr. Bradbury. In fact, we do
not see why he should run on the Republican ticket. Why didn't he seek the
Democratic nomination and get it from the men he has trained with at the
city hall?
These, together with "IV" above, the petitioner claims are
violations of the Corrupt Practice Law as defined by G. L. c. 55,
§ 34, as amended or changed by Sts. 1922, c. 269, and Sts. 1926,
c. 101.
I.
As to the first allegation, it was admitted by the sitting mem-
ber that he prepared said letter for publication, took it to the
Bunker Hill Press for printing, caused it to be mailed to approxi-
mately two thousand Republican voters in said district to be
received the day before election. The sitting member testified
that he had the permission of one Edward Dawes to use his name
in connection with said letter; that he had known said Dawes for
some time previous to the publication of said letter; that he did
not think at all what effect it would produce on the voters, and
that he instructed the Bunker Hill Press not to disclose the fact
that he had given the order for printing said letter.
Assistant Attorney General Gerald J. Callahan, called by the
petitioner, testified that an alleged violation of the Corrupt Prac-
tice Law by the sitting member was called to his attention and
that he made some investigation of the matter and had occasion
to interview John Edmund Dawe about the middle of December
last at his office in the State House; that said Dawe in response
to a question stated that his own name was not Edward Dawes
but was John Edmund Dawe ; that the name in the circular letter
was not his; that he had never authorized the use of his name on
any such circular; that the whole affair was a complete surprise
to him; that he knew nothing whatever about it; that while he
was properly named as John Edmund Dawe, he was called and
known as Eddie Dawes ; that he asked him, the Assistant Attorney
General, if he would use every effort at his command to clear his
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name of the connection with the circular latter; that a copy of the
circular had been shown to him by a neighbor who lived in the
same apartment; that he was very much excited on seeing his
name or a name similar to his on the circular, the reason for his
excitement being that his wife was ill at the time and his wife did
not want him mixed up in a political campaign; that his excite-
ment was principally due to the fact that it was a surprise to him
and that he knew nothing of it and that he knew Mr. Sullivan
slightly. The Assistant Attorney General further stated that
within a week Mr. Dawe came back to his office, as he recalled it,
with some other man; that he volunteered the information that
his original story to him was incorrect and that he came on his own
initiative for the purpose of correcting his original story and telling
the truth ; that he told him (the Assistant Attorney General) that
he was standing on some street in Cambridge shortly before the
election in the evening; that Mr. Sullivan met him on the street
and asked him, Dawe, if he would come up to Sullivan's office;
that he complied with that request and went up to an office which
Mr. Sullivan ran or in which he had desk room; that Mr. Sullivan
showed him a paper written in longhand and asked him, Dawe,
if he would consent to the use of his name on this circular; that
Mr. Sullivan informed him that it was a circular about Bradbury
and that he glanced at the writing— longhand — on some sheets
of paper but did not read it in full; that he then said to Mr. Sulli-
van: "Is this the truth? Is the writing on this paper the truth
about Bradbury?"; that Mr. Sullivan said: "It is. That is the
truth"; that thereupon he, Dawe, said: "All right, as long as it is
the truth, I will consent to the use of my name on it."; that he,
Dawe, didn't know why his name was written as Edward Dawes
instead of John Edmund Dawe, except that, being known as Eddie
Dawes, he figured that Mr. Sullivan put his name down in that
way, changing the proper name to Edward; that he, Dawe, knew
nothing whatever about the reprint from the Cambridge Chronicle
and didn't authorize the use of his name on that in any manner;
that in the interim between his first conversation with me and his
second conversation with me he had talked with Mr. Sullivan and
had discussed to some extent this matter with him; that in answer
to a point blank question why he came in and changed his story,
he stated again, that his wife's illness was responsible for his first
story, the reason being that if he admitted that they used his
name his wife would hear about it in some manner and would be-
come nervously affected and possibly aggravate her illness. Mr.
Callahan stated that his, Dawe's, second appearance at his office
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was wholly voluntary and that he did not request him to come in
again.
The petitioner produced several witnesses who testified that the
circulation of said letter and said reprint adversely affected the
total vote for said petitioner, some of said witnesses placing the
total votes lost by said petitioner thereby as high as four hundred;
the petitioner also produced other witnesses who testified that they
refrained from voting for him on account of said letter and reprint.
John Edmund Dawe, called by the sitting member, testified
that he was a registered voter in said district; that he lived at
1010 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge; that he was commonly
known as Edward Dawes and was the person whose name ap-
peared on said letter. He was vague and somewhat contradictory
as to how long he had known the sitting member, once saying that
he was introduced to him at the time the circular letter was being
prepared, and again that he had known him for some time prior
thereto. He testified that he had given the sitting member the
right to use his name. He admitted that the testimony of the
Assistant Attorney General was correct as stated by him.
We find that the sitting member intentionally caused said cir-
cular letter to be printed and distributed as alleged with the inten-
tion to injure or defeat the petitioner; that said Dawe told the
truth at the time of his first interview with the Assistant Attorney
General, and that he did not know of the existence of said letter
until after its appearance in the hands of the Republican voters of
said district; that he never authorized the use of his name thereon;
that said circular letter did not bear the name of a duly registered
voter of the city of Cambridge in accordance with the require-
ments of the Corrupt Practice Law of this Commonwealth; and
that the said letter injured the petitioner in his campaign for elec-
tion to the office of Representative from said district.
n!
As to the second allegation, we find that the sitting member
made and published in the aforesaid letter several false statements,
which are obvious upon examination and comparison with the
Journal of the House for the year 1927, which said statements were
designed or tended to injure your petitioner.
III.
As to the third allegation, the sitting member testified and ad-
mitted that he caused to be printed and distributed with said letter
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a reprint of the newspaper editorial from the "Cambridge Chroni-
cle," a copy of which is above set forth, from which reprint he had
caused the original date to be stricken out.
We therefore find accordingly and further find, as becomes ob-
vious upon examination, that said reprint was not signed by any
registered voter who was responsible therefor in accordance with
the Corrupt Practice Law of this Commonwealth.
IV.
As to the fourth allegation, the sitting member testified and
admitted that when he filed his original return under oath as re-
quired by law of the moneys contributed or expended in connec-
tion with his election, he knew that it was false in regard to any
payment or obligation to the Bunker Hill Press and to the receipt
of fifty-eight dollars, being the proceeds of a whist party, and
ninety (90) dollars received from Mayor Quinn of Cambridge.
The sitting member explained that he purposely omitted from
his sworn statement the amount due said Press in order to shield
Mr. Dawe; that he omitted the amount received from the whist
party through inadvertence and as he believed it was inconse-
quential, and that he did not think it necessary to report the
amount received from Mayor Quinn. The sitting member ad-
mitted filing an amended return, but it did not appear from his
testimony that said amended return corrected all the false state-
ments contained in the original return. It was in evidence that
Edward J. Gurry, the other Democratic candidate in the second
district, reported in his return the receipt of fifty-eight dollars
from said whist party and also the receipt of forty dollars from
Mayor Quinn, which was given him at the same time the ninety
dollars was given the sitting member.
We find on his own admission the sitting member made a false
return of the moneys contributed or expended for the purpose of
securing his election to the seat he now holds. It follows that on
all the evidence we find that the sitting member, Timothy D.
Sullivan, should be unseated and that his seat should be declared
vacant.
Arthur P. Crosby.
Leslie W. Sims.
I concur in the above report but believe that the petitioner,
Harold M. Bradbury, should be seated in the place of the sitting
member, Timothy D. Sullivan.
John V. Kimball.
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I concur with the above report with the exception of the first
finding under first allegation.
John J. Irwix.
We dissent from the majority report of the committee.
William H. Hearx.
Joseph N. Roach.
Francis Kearney.
[Report recommitted March 5, 1929. — House Journal, p. 443.
Mr. Sullivan later resigned. Vacancy declared to exist and
special election ordered. — House Journal, p. 466.]
\
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House— 1933.
Committee on Elections. — Representatives Burt Dewar of Maiden, Chairman,
Martin Hays of Boston, Maynard E. S. Clemons of Wakefield, Clerk,
Hiram N. Dearborn of Somerville, Daniel F. Moriarty of Lowell,
Anthony R. Doyle of Worcester and Eugene H. Giroux of Somerville.
GlLMARTIN V. DESCHENES.
House Document, No. 1217. Feb. 20, 1933. Report by all the committee.
Ballots. — The intent of the voter is the determining factor in the counting of
any ballot.
Recount of Ballots. — Where evidence is produced to show that a sufficient
number of ballots were tampered with to affect the result of an election, the com-
mittee will recount the ballots.
The House Committee on Elections, to whom were referred
the following petitions : —
House, No. 336, Petition of John J. Gilmartin that the seat occupied in the
House of Representatives by Louis N. M. DesChenes of the Eleventh Worces-
ter Representative District be declared vacant;
House, No. 825, Petition of John J. Gilmartin that he be declared one of the
duly elected members of the House from the Eleventh Worcester Representa-
tive District; and
House, No. 826, Petition of Louis N. M. DesChenes for an investigation
of the entire proceedings in connection with the nomination and election of
Representatives from the Eleventh Worcester Representative District;
submit the following report : —
The Committee held public hearings January 26 and 30, and
on February 1, 2, 3 and 6, 1933, at which the petitioner and the
sitting member were present. The petitioner, Gilmartin, was
represented by counsel, Joseph E. Casey, Esq., of Clinton, Massa-
chusetts, and the sitting member was represented by the follow-
ing counsel: Thornton K. Ware, Esq., and Everett H. Dudley,
Esq., of Fitchburg, Massachusetts, and Arthur D. Hill, Esq., of
Boston, Massachusetts.
The Committee heard all evidence which either side desired
to be presented, some of the witnesses being summoned through
the Committee and some presented by the parties themselves.
The strict rules of evidence were not adhered to. The sitting
member at his request made a statement.
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At the conclusion of the testimony of witnesses, which included
that from a handwriting expert, Mr. Wilbur F. Turner, furnished
by the petitioner Gilmartin, and after hearing full arguments
by both sides, the Committee proceeded to inspect, examine and
count all of the ballots cast in the Eleventh Worcester Repre-
sentative District, consisting of Wards 2-A, 2-B, 2-C, 3-A,
3-B, 4, 5, 6-A and 6-B, in the city of Fitchburg, and the town
of Lunenberg, — in all, a total number of 12,712 ballots.
With the exception of Ward 2-B in Fitchburg, which will be
hereinafter referred to, no irregularities were alleged or found
by the Committee to exist in the total number of ballots cast in
this representative district, this district being a double district
and the representative candidates at the election of November
8, 1932, being—
Louis N. M. DesChenes.
Henry A. Estabrook.
John J. Gilmartin.
Robert E. Greenwood.
In general, the allegations on which the petitions are all founded
are that irregularities appeared. The substance of the petition
of Gilmartin, and also that of the sitting member, DesChenes,
was to the effect that ballots had been tampered with and that
the conduct of the election had been carried on improperly,
both parties alleging and admitting that fraud was perpetrated
in this election, principally through illegal tampering with ballots.
The Committee summoned the City Clerk of Fitchburg and
the Town Clerk of Lunenburg to appear and produce all of the
ballots, which ballots were produced at the several hearings
when desired by the Committee.
In Precinct B of Ward 2, hereinbefore referred to, 1,850 ballots
were cast, and these required special report in detail because of
what the Committee found. Because of the apparent departure
from regularity in the marking of the ballots in this Precinct B
of W7ard 2, each member of the Committee examined each of
these ballots, and, in addition, required the handwriting expert,
Mr. William E. Hingston, whom the Committee had employed,
to give his opinion after subjecting such ballots as were referred
to him to microscopic examination. From its own individual
personal examination, aided by the opinion of the expert, the
Committee reports on these particular ballots cast in Ward 2-B as
follows : —
All the evidence satisfied the Committee that the voters duly
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and properly cast their ballots in this Precinct, but after the
ballots were taken from the ballot box certain marks in the nature
of crosses and certain erasures over obliterated but discernible
crosses appeared. There was a marked resemblance in many
of the crosses opposite the name of the candidate DesChenes
which would possibly come under at least three types, and which
occurred in so many places that the Committee unanimously
found that in each of these types they were made by a person
other than the voter who originally marked the ballot.
The erasures were so numerous that the Committee was unan-
imous in the conclusion that because of their conjunction on
the same ballot with crosses of the aforesaid types against the
name of DesChenes they were made after the original voter had
cast his ballot in an attempt to destroy and nullify in that partic-
ular the act of the voter. While standing alone, a single cross,
or, perhaps, several crosses erased as herein set forth would not
have persuaded the Committee to have counted them for the
candidate opposite whose name they appear, the Committee felt
bound for the reasons heretofore set forth to find that they were
a part of a fraudulent scheme to increase the number of ballots
to be counted for Mr. DesChenes and decrease the number of
ballots to be counted for Mr. Gilmartin. In every case, however,
the Committee in counting these erasures has not only been able
to discern individually the original cross under the erasure oppo-
site the name of Gilmartin, but was unanimously of the opinion
that the original cross so partially erased was made by the voter
and conformed to the other crosses on the ballot with the excep-
tion of the cross opposite the name of candidate DesChenes, and
in every instance the handwriting expert employed by the Com-
mittee fortified and agreed with the opinion of the Committee
members.
The Committee followed the accepted rule that the intent
of the voter was the determining factor in arriving at its con-
clusion in reference to its interpretation and counting of every
ballot.
No evidence was presented to connect either Mr. Gilmartin
or Mr. DesChenes with the wrongdoing which occurred in the
tampering of these ballots.
In the counting of more than 10,000 ballots in this Representa-
tive District outside of Ward 2-B, the Committee found not
more than two erasures in the Representative contest, but in
this particular precinct, where the erasures occurred to the extent
in some instances of 30 out of 50 ballots set up in one block,
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together with the insertion of a cross of one of these three types,
no other conclusion is possible than that it was part of the
fraudulent scheme.
The foregoing treats of the principal subject of the whole con-
troversy and the matters referred to the Committee. In the
petition of Mr. DesChenes there appeared matters relating to
alleged fraudulent election practices. The Committee finds that
there was circulated a possibly misleading circular respecting
Mr. DesChenes' legislative record, but the Committee finds the
sending of such circular was not sufficient to affect the election
or its decision.
A photostatic copy was made of two ballots, each showing
erasures hereinbefore referred to, as well as what has been called
types of irregular crosses, which will be exhibited to the House
at the hearing on this report.
There were 18 ballots in Ward 2-B which would more or less
answer the description hereinbefore related which plainly showed
they had been tampered with.
On these 18 ballots the Committee was divided as for whom they
should be counted. Even if all were resolved to be properly cast
by the voter for Air. DesChenes, it would not change the result.
On all other matters the Committee was unanimous.
The Committee finds therefore that the total number of votes
cast at the election of November 8, 1932, for Representative in
the Eleventh Worcester Representative District was as follows : —
Louis X. M. DesChenes ...... 5,533
Henry A. Estabrook ...... 5,821
John J. Gilmartin ....... 5,591
Robert E. Greenwood ...... 5,485
Blanks '.
. . 2,994
The Committee recommends the adoption of the following
resolution: —
Resolved, That John J. Gilmartin of Fitchburg was duly elected one of the
Representatives to the General Court from the Eleventh Worcester Repre-
sentative District, at the election held November S, 1932, and that he is en-
titled to and is hereby given a seat in this chamber.
Mr. DesChenes resigns.
[Report as amended accepted February 28. — House Journal,
p. 392.]
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Senate — 1935.
Special Committee on Elections. — Hon. Joseph R. Cotton of Lexington, Hon.
John D. Mackay of Quincy, Hon. Theodore R. Plunkett of Adams,
Hon. James P. Meehan of Lawrence and Hon. John S. Sullivan of
Worcester.
P. Gerard Cahill v. George G. Moyse.
Senate Document, No. 434. Feb. 13, 1935. Majority Report by Hon.
Joseph R. Cotton, Hon. John D. Mackay and Hon. Theodore R.
Plunkett. Minority Report, Senate Document No. 437, by Hon.
James P. Meehan and Hon. John S. Sullivan.
Elections. — Irregularities in the voting lists when officials fail to comply with
the statutes in absence of fraud cannot operate to disfranchise the voters.
Ballots. — Mere failure of a ballot to show a cancellation mark does not invalidate
the vote.
Same. — Failure to count unused ballots does not affect the validity of a recount.
Senate. — While the powers of the Senate are plenary in determining election
contests affecting membership therein, the comity and respect due to the decisions
of a coordinate department of the government require it to follow the decisions
of the Supreme Judicial Court.
Recount of Votes. — The Senate will not recount the votes unless satisfactory
preliminary prooi of such substantial facts or well-grounded causes of suspicion
as would induce a conviction that fraud or substantial mistakes existed.
The Special Committee on Elections, to whom was referred
the petition of P. Gerard Cahill (Senate, No. 406) that he be de-
clared the duly elected Senator from the Fifth Middlesex District
instead of the present sitting member, Honorable George G.
Moyse, having held hearings on the same, at which were sub-
mitted evidence and -arguments of counsel on behalf of each
party, report as follows : —
The petitioner, both in his petition and in the presentation of
his case, has attacked the regularity of the election for various
events occurring in different municipalities in the district. There
is no claim made or evidence of fraud; in fact, fraud is disavowed
by the petitioner. Nor is there any claim that any voter or offi-
cial committed any act of irregularity with any intent or desire
to injure or to aid either candidate.
The specific claims of irregularity are the following: —
(1) In the Town of Concord. — (a) That the names of some
three hundred and forty-seven persons who had never signed the
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register nevertheless appeared on the voting list. All these irregu-
larities happened at least twenty-four years ago. There was
evidence that before that time the town clerk, acting as registrar
of voters, had the citizens sign a card instead of the register.
There is absolutely no claim these three hundred and forty-seven
persons were not fully qualified to be voters, and could and did
write their names on the cards, but the officials were lax in not
having them sign the register as the law requires.
(6) That there were many names appearing on the voting list
that did not appear on the assessors' list. This is a condition
prevailing in nearly all of the towns of the district, and without
doubt in most of the municipalities of the State to a more or less
degree. In many cases of this type of irregularity there is legal
and proper explanation for such discrepancies, namely, that the
voter moved into the town after April first, and, having been
there six months, could register before the election in November;
the existence of clerical errors on the assessors' list; and further
omissions from the assessors' list, entered later on the supple-
mentary list.
Assuming, however, that there were many irregularities of this
type without legal explanation, the failure of officials to observe
the requirements of the statutes in matters of this kind cannot
operate to disfranchise the voter. Such requirements are held to
be directory and not mandatory. Cheney v. Coughlin, 201 Mass.
204.
The statutes specifically provide two methods for clearing a
voting list of names improperly thereon. One is under section
forty-eight of chapter fifty-one of the General Laws, which pro-
vides that fourteen days at least before an election any citizen
may file a petition to purge the list; and second, the vote may
be challenged at the time it is being cast. Neither remedy was
invoked by the petitioner in any instance. One can realize the
difficulty of discovering which candidate gained by this type of
vote.
(2) In the Town of Watertown. — The claim was made that in
precinct four, two hundred and nine uncancelled ballots were
counted for the sitting member. This evidence, introduced by
the petitioner, was more than refuted by the evidence of a Mr.
Sheridan, the legal adviser for the petitioner at the recount, to
the effect that he was present during the entire recount, that the
observers reported all irregularities to him, and that he did not
see any ballot but what bore some mark of having gone through
the ballot box.
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Admitting that there were some uncancelled ballots, the case
of Swift v. Ouincy, 281 Mass. 271, decides that mere failure of a
ballot to show a cancellation mark does not invalidate the vote.
Because of this claim of uncancelled ballots, the petitioner re-
quested the committee to examine and count the unused ballots
in this precinct four. He offered no affirmative facts that any-
such examination would divulge any irregularity. Here, again,
Mr. Sheridan testified that no request for count of unused ballots
was made by the petitioner in this town, although there was evi-
dence that Mr. Moyse asked for such count and afterwards
waived it when the petitioner did not insist on his part. Peti-
tioners' reliance on this score seemed to be the fact that there
was a request for a count of unused ballots in his petitions for
recount. It has been recently held by our Supreme Judicial Court
that failure to count unused ballots does not affect the validity
of a recount. Clancy v. Wallace, 288 Mass. 563.
(3) In the City of Walthayn. — Petitioner claims that in one pre-
cinct two Republicans were checking at one table at the recount;
that a tally sheet was shown to outsiders at the rail, and that lead
pencils were used by the counters. There is no claim that any of
these irregularities affected the result of the voting.
It is not within the province of a Committee on the Elections to
review the actions of other boards, tribunals or election officers,
any more than it is to relieve candidates of the consequences of
their own acts or omissions. On the other hand, while the powers
of the Senate are plenary in determining election contests affect-
ing membership therein, the comity and respect due to the de-
cisions of a co-ordinate department of the government require it to
follow the decisions of our Supreme Judicial Court as to the effect
of whatever irregularities may be disclosed. We do not, of course,
condone the non-observance by any public official of duties placed
upon him by statute, even though such duties are only directory.
In these particular municipalities the irregularities claimed should
be corrected by the officials themselves, or by their superiors.
To subject elections to intolerable and perplexing technicalities,
not material to the real merits of the controversy, would thwart,
rather than secure true expression of, the popular will. That a
disregard of technical requirements disclosed by the evidence in
this case does not operate to disfranchise is well established by-
decisions of our courts.
We do not find satisfactory preliminary proof of such substantial
facts or well-grounded causes of suspicion as would induce in our
minds a conviction of fraud or mistake prejudicial to petitioner.
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We feel sure that further examination would not produce anything
more substantial than already disclosed, as the petitioner was
given considerable scope in setting forth his objections.
Section 131 of chapter 54 of the General Laws, Tercentenary
Edition, says: —
A violation by a public officer or election officer of laws relative to providing
ballot boxes, blank forms and other apparatus or to the care and preservation
thereof, or to the manner of canvassing and counting votes, shall not invalidate
any record or copy of a record or certificate made by a city, precinct or town
clerk, or affect the title of a person declared to be elected to office.
Nothing in the evidence submitted in this case would justify a
finding that the result of the election was not otherwise than in
accordance with the expressed will of the voters.
For the foregoing reasons we recommend that the petitioner
have leave to withdraw.
Joseph R. Cottox.
Johx D. Mackay.
Theodore R. Pluxkett.
[Report accepted February 18. — Senate Journal, p. 270.]
Minority Report.
The minority of the Special Committee on Elections to whom
was referred the petition of P. Gerard Cahill that he be declared
the duly elected Senator from the Fifth Middlesex District instead
of the present sitting member, Honorable George G. Moyse, hav-
ing held hearing on the same, at which were submitted evidence
and arguments of counsel on behalf of each party, report as fol-
lows: The petitioner, both in his petition and in the presentation
of his case, has attacked the legality of the election for various
events occurring in different municipalities in the district. There
is no claim made or evidence of fraud; in fact, fraud is disavowed
by the petitioner. But we feel that it is unnecessary for the
petitioner to prove fraud in order to have this committee take
action. Dennet v. Sullivan, Howard Election Cases, page 40. We
deem it immaterial whether any voter or official committed any
act of irregularity with any intent or desire to injure or to aid either
candidate.
The specific claims of illegality are the following: — (1) In the
Town of Concord. That the names of some 347 persons who
never signed the register nevertheless appeared on the voting
list. The petitioner offered to prove and at all times was ready
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to prove that the persons who voted, without right to vote, in
Concord, have disfranchised themselves by their own neglect to
comply with the statutes, the opportunity having been given
them so to do about the year 1914, at which time the register
had been made available for all persons who had failed to sign.
247 Mass. 583, at 587: "The inevitable consequence of these
settled propositions is that no one is entitled in fact or in law to
vote unless he possesses all the qualifications required by the
Constitution, and has complied with all the reasonable regulations
imposed by the General Court to prove his possession of those
qualifications and to cause his name to be put on the voting list.
. . . Such rules and regulations must be observed before one
can become a legal voter under the Constitution." Consequently,
there is no such thing as a de facto voter in Massachusetts. A
person is either a voter dejure or not a voter at all. Signing cards
is not signing the register. Signing the register is a reasonable
and just regulation imposed by the General Court, and, under
the above decision, must be complied with. As to the petitioner
making no claim that these persons in Concord were not fully
qualified to be voters, such a claim would be entirely irrelevant
to the present controversy, the point of which is not whether these
persons are qualified to be voters, but whether these persons are
fully qualified voters. We feel that they are not fully qualified
voters, and that in entering a polling booth and casting a ballot
on November 6, 1934, each of these persons did so without right.
The petitioner adduced evidence with regard to the voting
lists of Acton, Lincoln, Concord, Sudbury and Stow, to show that
about 255 persons were carried on the voting lists who had not
been assessed. No evidence was adduced by the defendant to
rebut this, hence we may take it as a proved fact that 255 persons,
more or less, in casting ballots, did so without right. We are not
concerned in this case with the prevalence of this situation.
General Laws, chapter 51, section 8: "If a male resident in a
city or town, except in one having a listing board, on January
first was not assessed for a poll tax, or if an exempted soldier or
sailor or a woman in such a city or town was not listed under
section four, such person shall, in order to establish his right to
be assessed or listed, present to the assessors before the close of
registration a sworn statement that he was on said day a resident
of such city or town, and a sworn list of his polls and estate. If
the assessors are satisfied that such statement is true, they shall
assess or list him, as the case may be, and give him a certificate
thereof." Therefore it is quite apparent that failure to become
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assessed is the fault of the person who fails to become assessed,
and not the fault of the officials, and it is also apparent that
these voters have disfranchised themselves and have not been
disfranchised by the failure of any official to act.
The defendant made much of the fact that the petitioner did
not avail himself of the remedy provided by chapter 51, section
48, of the General Laws. No evidence, however, was introduced
to show that the petitioner knew, at the time set by the statutes
for purging the lists, that these conditions existed. On the con-
trary, evidence was adduced to show that he did not have such
knowledge. It is fundamental in our law that laches, or delay,
cannot be imputed to one who is without knowledge, and, further-
more, laches cannot be valid as a defence where the defendant
has not changed his position because of the delay. Nudd v. Powers,
136 Mass. 273, at 276, decision by Justice Holmes: "The defence
was put wholly on the ground of laches. The delay of the plaintiff
in not proceeding is not a sufficient reason for rejecting the bills.
It does not appear that the defendants have made any change
in their position on the faith of plaintiff's quiescence, or, if they
have, that they have any right to attribute it to that cause."
As there is no knowledge of the wrong committed, and no refusal
to embrace opportunity to ascertain facts, there can be no laches.
With regard to the town of Watertown, we contend that the
Swift case is not applicable in the matter under consideration,
because in the Swift case the precise point now raised was not
in issue, namely, the right to have unused ballots counted. Neither
is the Clancy case, for the same reason.
The mere fact that there were uncancelled ballots is an affirma-
tive fact which we feel should have justified the majority of the
committee in calling for and examining both the protested and
the unused ballots in Precinct 4 of Watertown, especially as no
evidence was adduced to show that any breakdown had occurred
in the mechanism of the ballot box in that precinct.
The allegation as to the irregularities in the town of Watertown
was supported by the evidence, under oath, of William Norcross,
Clarence Dealtry, P. Gerard Cahill, and James H. Sheridan, who
brought out that during the recount of the votes cast in the
election, a considerable number, claimed to be two hundred and
nine, more or less, of the ballots were uncancelled. This is sus-
tained by documentary evidence in the form of the original notes
made by Mr. Sheridan in his capacity as counsel for Mr. Cahill
at the Watertown recount, which notes were identified by Mr.
Sheridan as his own and were submitted as an exhibit. One of
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the original recount petitions for the town of Watertown was
adduced in evidence, showing that the recount of the uncancelled
ballots was requested in the recount petition. Mr. Cahill testified
that he asked for a recount of said unused ballots and that no
recount of the unused ballots was ever made.
The allegation as to the irregularities in Precinct 2 of Ward 4
of the city of Waltham was supported by the testimony of Mr.
John F. McGann, who testified as to the occurrence of the irregu-
larities alleged in the petition, and his testimony was substantially
corroborated by the testimony of Warden Thomas Steele and
Clerk William Gallagher of the said Precinct 2 of Ward 4 of the
city of Waltham. Mr. Steele admitted, under oath, that viola-
tions of section 69 of chapter 54 and section 105 of chapter 54
had occurred during the counting of the ballots after the polls had
closed, and also that the election officials were permitted to use
lead pencils in the counting of the ballots in violation of section
104 of the said chapter 54 of the General Laws. We believe that
these are facts which should have justified the majority of the
committee in calling for and examining the unused ballots in Pre-
cinct 2 of Ward 4 of Waltham.
Under the Massachusetts statutes the Senate is the sole judge
of the qualifications of its members. It is the court of last appeal.
The Senate has full power to inquire as minutety as it wishes into
the election of one of its members. This power carries with it
correlatively the duty to inquire into every phase upon which the
petitioner adduces sufficient evidence to justify such inquiry. We
believe that there was sufficient evidence to justify such an in-
quiry.
But assuming that we can dispense with the consideration of
the Watertown and Waltham situations, nevertheless we feel
that it has been conclusively demonstrated that a sufficient num-
ber of persons, not fully qualified voters, to have affected the
result of the election were permitted to vote. In all such cases
both the House and Senate have declared the seat in question
vacant and have ordered a precept for a new election.
Chesterfield, Cushing, Storey and Josselyn, page 7.
Sheffield and Mount Washington, Cushing, Storey and
Josselyn, page 46.
Concord, Cushing, Storey and Josselyn, page 85.
Western, Cushing, Storey and Josselyn, page 144.
Mdhuen, Cushing, Storey and Josselyn, page 428.
Webster, Cushing, Storey and Josselyn, page 526.
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Williamstown, Cushing, Storey and Josselyn, page 573.
Ashfield, Cushing, Storey and Josselyn, page 583.
Pierce v. Brown, Loring and Russell, page 92 (House,
No. 1860).
Palmer v. Howe, Loring and Russell, page 145 (see
editorial note, pages 149-151).
Claflin v. Wood, Loring and Russell, page 353.
Mansfield v. Hutchings
y
Russell Election Cases, page 3.
This case involves no question of disfranchisement, because
only a duly qualified voter can be subjected to disfranchisement,
other persons having no vote, and the persons with whom we are
concerned in this case all cast ballots without right, not being
legally qualified voters. Never having been legally qualified vot-
ers, they cannot, in the nature of things, be disfranchised.
Mr. Francis W. Warren, town clerk of Stow, testified that the
Board of Registrars of that town had no assessors' list and never
had one to go by in establishing the voting list; that he and the
other members of the Board personally knew the 595 voters of
the town, and depended on their memory and guesswork in estab-
lishing the legality of the voters. When asked if he had in his
possession a list of names of persons in the town of Stow who are
listed or assessed over twenty years of age, he answered in the
affirmative. When asked when the list was prepared for him he
answered, "Between seven o'clock last night and two o'clock this
morning." When asked when was the last time that the assessors
made up a list of persons over twenty years of age for the voting
list, he said he did not know. So far as the town of Stow is con-
cerned, the Board of Assessors had nothing to do with the prepa-
ration of the voting list.
According to the testimony of one of the members of the Board of
Registrars of Voters in the town of Concord, there has never been
a meeting of said Board in that town, to his knowledge, for a great
many years.
The reason for the failure to comply with the statutes governing
elections, recounts, and registration of voters is apparent when it
is learned that for years the political life of the towns in this Com-
monwealth has been dominated by and in the control of one politi-
cal party; that the officials of the various towns, selected from the
said political party, secure in their control, ignored the protests of
those voters not within their party,, and conducted the elections
and carried out their own ideas of registration and qualifications
of voters without qualms of conscience or fear of punishment for
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their infringement of the statutes of the Commonwealth. It was
not ignorance of the law but disrespect for the law that apparently
governed their actions.
The time has come in our Commonwealth when there should be
some directing and controlling force to oversee the actions of our
election officials, especially in the registration of voters; and
enough "teeth" should be put into the election laws to prevent
further recurrence of this utter disregard and disrespect for law,
as evidenced by this hearing.
To direct these irregularities to the Senate, with the view to
enacting legislation for the correction of these conditions, is the
purpose of this minority report.
Sen. James P. Meehan.
Sen. John S. Sullivan.
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Senate — 1935.
Committee on Elections. — Hon. Joseph R. Cotton of Lexington, Hon. John
D. Mackay of Quincy and Hon. Theodore R. Plunkett of Adams.
Joseph B. Clancy v. Albert Cole.
Senate Document, No. 531. June 5, 1935. Report by all the committee.
Recount of Votss. — Blank ballots. The omission to count the blank ballots
does not affect the accuracy of the count of the ballots actually cast for competing
candidates.
Same. — The underlying reason for a recount is that the will of the voters as
manifested by the ballots actually cast shall be truthfully and exactly found out
and established.
Same. — After an official recount has been held, a further recount by the Senate
will not be made unless and until there is error or fraud shown of a type that would
change the result. Unless such is shown, the will of the voters must be presumed
to have been carried out.
Report of Committee on Elections on the Petitions of Joseph B.
Clancy that he be Seated as the Duly Elected Senator from the
First Essex Senatorial District (Senate, Nos. 50 and 4-08).
Your Committee held eleven public hearings and fifteen wit-
nesses were examined under oath. Both parties and their Attor-
neys were present throughout the hearings.
The petitioner, Joseph B. Clancy, who was the Democratic
candidate, and the sitting member, Albert Cole, who was the
Republican candidate, were the only candidates for the office of
Senator from the First Essex District at the elections held Novem-
ber 6, 1934.
The District is composed of the city of Lynn and the towns of
Nahant and Swampscott. According to the returns of the election
officers the petitioner, Clancy, was shown to be elected by 267
votes.
November 8, 1934, the sitting member, Cole, filed petitions
for recount in Lynn. According to that recount, in connection
with the returns on recounts from the two towns, the sitting
member, Cole, was shown to be elected by 5 votes.
Thereupon the petitioner, Clancy, filed a writ of mandamus
in the Supreme Judicial Court against the Election Commis-
sioners of Lynn, alleging certain irregularities. There was a
reservation and report by the single Justice to the Full Bench.
This report included an agreed statement of facts duly signed by
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Frank L. Simpson and Harry C. Mamber as Attorneys for said
Clancy, by Herbert Parker as Attorney for said Cole and by
Patrick F. Shanahan and John M. Cashman as Attorneys for
Board of Election Commissioners of Lynn.
The Supreme Court filed an opinion in the case December 18,
1934, dismissing the petition filed by said Clancy. Later said
Clancy filed this Senate petition.
From the agreed statement of facts, contained in the Supreme
Court pleadings, we report certain conditions pertaining to the
conduct of the recount, which conditions were also supported
by the evidence adduced under oath at our committee hearings.
The said agreed statement of facts states : —
8. The recount of ballots in said city of Lynn above referred to was con-
ducted at tables in the Chamber of the City Council of the city of Lynn, which
tables were situated inside the railing separating the space usually occupied
by City Councillors when in session from an outer space in said Council
Chamber. This railing was approximately 60 feet long and was approximately
at a height of about 3 feet from the floor. There was a gate through said rail-
ing affording an approach from the outer space to that occupied by the tables
of the Councillors. There were 10 of these tables which were used in recount-
ing the votes, each table being approximately 4 feet long. The tables were ar-
ranged in a semicircle and in a line approximately 2 feet inside of said railing,
with a space between the respective tables. The recount was conducted under
the supervision of the Election Commissioners by twenty tellers and two
tabulators, of which tellers and tabulators there were equal numbers of Re-
publicans and Democrats, appointed by said Commissioners. Two tellers
sat at each table, one on the outer side with his back towards the railing and
the other on the inner side facing the railing. The teller who sat on the out-
side with his back to the railing inspected each ballot and called off the votes
recorded thereon, which were tabulated by the teller on the opposite side of
the table. The latter tabulated the votes thus announced, and as each block
of 50 ballots was thus tabulated the block of 50 ballots and the block tally
sheet were delivered to the Commissioners, who in turn delivered the block
tally sheet to two other tellers who in turn tabulated the count of the block
upon a total tally sheet. These latter tellers were also appointed by the Com-
missioners, one being a Republican and the other a Democrat; and the tabu-
lation from the block tally sheets to the total tally sheets was actually per-
formed upon a rostrum in the back of the Council Chamber and within the
railing and approximately 20 to 25 feet therefrom. This rostrum was at an
elevation above the floor of the Council Chamber, and the tabulation of the
total from the block tally sheets was in the presence of but not visible to can-
didates, including said Joseph R. Clancy and said Albert Cole and/or their
representatives.
9. Said Joseph R. Clancy and said Albert Cole were present throughout
all the recount of ballots of all the wards of the city of Lynn, as were also
other candidates for the office of Governor's Council, District Attorney and
Representatives of the General Court, and representatives of said several
candidates. At times there were 13 candidates for the several offices, ballots
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for which were being recounted, as well as representatives of said candidates.
All of said candidates, including said Joseph B. Clancy and said Albert Cole
and the representatives of candidates and members of the public, were re-
quired by the Election Commissioners to remain outside of said railing, and
at times the space outside of the railing was congested by the number of per-
sons attending said recount, including several candidates and their representa-
tives. Although said Joseph B. Clancy requested of said Election Commis-
sioners that he or his representatives be allowed within the railing and at the
tables inside the railing at which the recounts were being conducted, said re-
quest was denied by said Commissioners. Said Commissioners made public
announcement, however, that candidates and their representatives were
entitled to be at the railing in the space outside of said railing, that is, on the
opposite side from that in which the tables were situated. At times the candi-
dates, including petitioner, were at the railing on the outside thereof.
10. As the ballots were read by the teller and the votes thereon publicly
announced by him to his co-teller, said ballots were within the vision of per-
sons outside of said railing. As each block of 50 ballots were inspected and
tabulated the teller who had tabulated the votes thereon publicly announced
the number of the ward and precinct of said block of ballots, the block num-
ber thereof and the result of the tabulation, giving the votes for each candidate
voted for on said ballots. No announcement was made, however, of the votes
as recorded upon the original block tally sheets compiled by the election officers
at the election, though such announcement was requested by the petitioner.
11. Approximately 35,000 ballots were thus recounted in all the wards of
the city of Lynn, under the supervision of the Election Commissioners.
12. The original tally sheets compiled by the election officers at the election
were not exhibited to the petitioner, Joseph B. Clancy, on the occasions above
referred to at which the recounts proceeded, although inspection of said
original tally sheets, both the block tally sheets and the total tally sheets,
were requested of said Election Commissioners by said Clancy. The Election
Commissioners announced publicly, however, that said tally sheets could be
examined at the office of the Election Commissioners after the recounts had
terminated.
In the agreed statement of facts there are also two statements
worthy of special emphasis, to wit : —
15. The recounting of the ballots by the said Board of Election Commis-
sioners was conducted by them honestly and in good faith.
. . . the votes cast in the towns of Swampscott and Nahant are not dis-
puted as between the parties hereto. . . .
The Supreme Court decision specifically disposes of four com-
plaints made by said Clancy by deciding—
1. That the petitions for recount were in proper form.
2. That Clancy had due notice of the recount and was present.
3. That " There was no violation of the statutory requirement
that candidates shall be allowed to be present and to witness the
recount at any table where the recount is being held. Recounts
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ought to be so conducted that the possibility of interference with
the ballots and with those conducting the recount may be reduced
to a minimum. Every right of the petitioner was preserved by
the decision of the Election Commissioners that all candidates
and their representatives should remain outside the rail. Those
standing outside the rail had every reasonable opportunity to
observe each ballot, to verify the recount as it progressed and to
see that no mistakes were made. . . . The regulations adopted
by the election commissioners in view of all the conditions con-
fronting them were reasonable and conduced to the orderly con-
duct of the recount. There was compliance with the statute in
this regard."
4. As to failure to count the blank ballots in Wards 2, 3 and
4, it says: "The omission to count the blank ballots, however,
did not affect the accuracy of the count of the ballots actually
cast for the competing candidates."
Rugc, C.J., discussing in the decision a recount, tersely ex-
presses the fundamental duty of this Committee. He says: "The
underlying reason for a recount is that the will of the voters as
manifested by the ballots actually cast shall be truthfully and exactly
found out and established. . . . The object of election laws,
... is to ascertain the popular will and to secure the rights of
the duly qualified electors."
Your Committee feel that petitioner has had his day in Court
as to certain conditions surrounding the recount, and that the
conclusion of the Court in reference to them should be sustained.
The evidence we heard substantiated the Court's decision in so
far as that aspect of the case was concerned.
A Committee on Elections on the part of the House recounted
Wards 1, 6 and 7 in Lynn in the Willis-McElroy petition. (See
their Report, being House, No. 1963 of this year.)
Their report discloses that in the recount of these three Wards
three errors of importance in tabulating were disclosed, about
15,000 votes being involved. Outside of these three errors, which
we refer to later, the report shows that there was a change made
in the count of individual ballots so that McElroy had a net loss
of one vote and Willis had a net loss of five votes, i.e., a net change
of only four votes.
As to the three more important mistakes, there was one where
21 had been entered for Willis, whereas it should have been 41.
This error has no effect on the case before us.
The remaining two do, and were made in tallying the recount
of two blocks in Ward 7, Precinct 3.
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Block 5 had been entered a second time in place of Block 13,
which latter block had not been entered at all. This double
mistake ran all through the tabulation on the ticket, and in making
the correction in our case we find as follows : —
Clancy. Cole.
Tally entered at the recount : —
.DIOCK O 4 1 3
Block 13 . . . 37 13
Total .... 74 26
Tally corrected : —
Block 5 37 13
Block 13 7 38
Correct totals 44 51
Thus Clancy loses 30 votes and Cole gains 25, a net gain of 55
votes for Cole.
At this point, above 55 gain and the 5 vote lead established by
the recount tabulation means that Cole leads by 60 votes.
There remains for the Committee to deal with the possibility
that the recount was not proper and fair to the voters as to mat-
ters over and beyond that disclosed in the House recount, in the
decision of the Supreme Court and in the agreed statement of
facts. In this direction and to this end the petitioner presented
evidence tending to show—
1. That the chairman of the Election Commissioners was
arbitrary, dictatorial and prejudiced in favor of Cole.
2. That there was confusion back of the rail where the ballots
were being counted to the extent that the checkers made errors.
3. That in nine or ten instances individual checkers gave a
preference to Cole in tallying the votes in some of the blocks of 50.
4. That errors in tabulating were made.
As to these four contentions we find —
1.
John R. Wallace, the Chairman, is a Democrat and had acted
three years as Clerk. The procedure followed by him was pre-
cisely as recounts had been conducted for many years by him
and his predecessor. If he presumed to act for his colleagues with-
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out expressly consulting.them it was done with their knowledge
and consent. It was a delegation of power to him by them rather
than usurping of it by him. In this recount he had a most diffi-
cult situation to contend with, particularly after the first night's
recount, when the lead shifted from Clancy to Cole. On the sec-
ond night Mr. McGlue, representing the Democratic State Com-
mittee, took a very prominent part in " protesting everything,"
and was so aggressive and vociferous in insisting on his right to go
behind the rail that a police officer in charge sent for reserves.
Mr. Wallace's instructions to the assistants, as produced in evi-
dence, was fair to all concerned. His disposition before us as a
witness showed a desire to be helpful in getting at the true facts.
His failure to count blanks in Wards 2, 3 and 4 on the first night,
as evidence of any bad faith, was clearly offset by his willingness
to comply with the law and count blanks as soon as the City
Solicitor advised him, and it was only because the City Solicitor
advised him that he could not reopen the ballots in Wards 2, 3
and 4 that he refrained from counting those blank ballots.
Any arbitrariness or dictatorial tendency on his part resulted
in no harm to Clancy and was only such as any man under the
same circumstances would have been likely to have exhibited.
We do not see wherein he showed any prejudice in Cole's favor.
Adding to the above the agreed statement of facts, admitting
good faith on the part of the Commissioners, we feel that there is
no valid ground for complaint against the recount in this par-
ticular.
There was testimony that Mr. Wallace of the Election Commis-
sion took written protest slips from the observers which protested
the manner in which single ballots had been called; that Mr.
WTallace took them reluctantly, put them in his pocket, and paid
no attention to them. These slips were marked "Ward , Pet.
,
Block , ballot protested by ", and signed by
the observer. Protests of single ballots were always endorsed on
the yellow envelope, as directed by Mr. Wallace, with the name of
the candidate making the protest. The slips were merely memo-
randa to which an Election Commissioner is not required by law
to pay any attention beyond having an endorsement entered,
which was done in every instance. The candidates' rights were
thereby protected and duly recognized.
2.
We find no appreciable evidence as to " confusion" or "com-
motion" behind the rail of a nature that would of itself be liable
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to cause mistakes. All the confusion and commotion were
among the candidates, their workers and the audience observing
the recount. Those behind the rail, of course, as the evidence
showed, often stopped or looked up from their work to observe
when some particular argument got under way, and a certain
amount of excitement must have been communicated to them,
but it did not appear that any left their tables or became ''rattled."
3 and 4.
At each table there was a Republican and a Democrat.
There were some nine or ten specific instances where witnesses
said a vote was erroneously counted for Cole, whereas it should
have been counted for Clancy. In each instance this would make a
2 vote gain for Cole and in one instance a 3 vote gain.
Petitioner's Counsel placed much stress on the evidence of one
Mr. Phelan, who testified that at a certain table the checkers and
Mr. Wallace refused to turn back a ballot and examine it again
when the observer claimed it had been wrongly counted. Mr.
Wallace denied the episode happening. Mr. Murphy, who was the
Democratic checker at that table, denied it and the Republican
checker was not called.
Other witnesses testified with considerable accuracy that be-
cause of ballots being tallied for Cole more than 50 was totaled,
or that a certain set of figures were tallied. We were able to
check this evidence as to its accuracy by examining the recount
tally sheets of the precincts, and in some instances the blocks
where the witnesses had testified that it happened. It appeared
from such a check that the candidate's observers were more con-
fused than the checkers, as the records refuted their testimony.
In short, there seems grave doubt as to errors of this type.
In fact, even making a liberal allowance of these for Clancy,
Cole's lead, shown to be 60, would not have been overcome.
There were also protests as to the judgment exercised in read-
ing single ballots, but no evidence was introduced as to who was
right beyond the fact of the protests having been made by a
Clancy observer. Cole's observers also protested many of this
type. There is every reason to believe that a third examination
of this group of protested ballots by us would not result in a
change. Mr. Wallace observed every one of them, and we do
not feel that any outrage was done or one of the two checkers
representing the two parties would have spoken out or reported
it to the wronged party.
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In conclusion, we find that most of the serious errors occurred
at the original counting of the ballots on election day. That the
recount, accomplishing its purpose as intended by law, discovered
and corrected such errors. That those disclosed since the recount
still give Cole the lead over Clancy, and we find no evidence to
lead us to conclude that other errors would be disclosed by a
third count by us that would change the net result.
After an official recount has been held, a further recount should
not be made unless and until there is error or fraud shown of a
type that would change the result. Unless such is shown, the
will of the voters must be presumed to have been carried out.
Such error and fraud are not sustained by the evidence presented.
The errors that have been disclosed by the evidence we have been
able to correct or fairly estimate, and do not change the result of
the recount as to the final election.
We find that the voters of this District elected the sitting
member, Cole, and therefore recommend that the Petitioner be
given leave to withdraw.
Joseph R. Cotton.
John D. Mackay.
Theodore R. Plunkett.
[Report accepted, June 5, 1935. — Senate Journal, page 952.]
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Committee on Elections. — Hon. Joseph R. Cotton of Lexington, Hon. John*
D. Mackay of Quincy, Hon. Theodore R. Plunkett of Adams, Hon.
James P. Meehan of Lawrence and Hon. John S. Sullivan of Worcester.
Charles C. Warren v. Charles T. Daly.
Senate Document, No. 540. June 5, 1935. Report by Hon. Joseph R.
Cotton, Hon. John D. Mackay and Hon. Theodore R. Plunkett,
being a majority of the committee. Hon. James P. Meehan and Hon.
John S. Sullivan submitted a minority report.
Recount of Votes. — Loss of tally sheets and other irregularities in the conduct
of an election must be so extensive as to warrant the assumption that the will of
the voters has not been truly recorded.
Corrupt Practice.
Xon -political Committee. — The mere fact that a candidate lor election was a
member of a voluntary organization to promote his election does not penalize
him for the neglect of the committee to observe the requirements of the corrupt
practice laws.
Report of the Committee on Elections— As amended, Leave to With-
draw — On the Petition of Charles C. Warren that he be declared
the Duly Elected Senator from the Sixth Middlesex Senatorial
District instead of the Present Sitting Member (Senate, No. 407).
The undersigned, being a majority of the Committee on Elec-
tions to whom was referred the petition of the Honorable Charles
C. Warren, praying that he be declared the duly elected Senator
from the Sixth Middlesex District at the State election held No-
vember 6, 1934, having completed their inquiry, submit the
following report : —
The Committee held public hearings on eight days, during
which time they heard the testimony of seventeen witnesses, and
the arguments of counsel representing said petitioner and the sit-
ting member, the Honorable Charles T. Daly. The former was
represented by Jasper N. Johnson, Esquire, and the latter by
Joseph T. Cummiskey, Esquire. The parties themselves were
in constant or frequent attendance.
The allegations contained in Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12
and 13 of the petition are found to be true; likewise the first
allegation of Paragraph 4. The Committee do not accept, how-
ever, the characterization " pretended" as employed in said Para-
graph 13.
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The petitioner contended that more votes were actually cast
for him at said election than were cast for his rival, but that he
was deprived of the fruits thereof by fraudulent acts committed
in Medford, which city comprises part of the said Sixth District;
and that said fraudulent acts consisted of tampering with ballots
in eleven precincts in said Medford and padding votes of the
sitting member.
This was a serious charge requiring— in justice to the contend-
ing parties and to the cause of decent government— painstaking
attention. Such attention we endeavored to give to the charge,
and every fact and circumstance brought to our attention in con-
nection therewith, realizing that, as stated by the Chief Justice
of our Supreme Judicial Court in a recent case, " scarcely any-
thing can be conceived more vital to the public welfare than free
and honest elections."
From evidence which was not discredited in any material par-
ticular we arrived at the conclusion that the procedure at the
election in Medford was substantially in accordance with the
statutory directions and the general practice. At the opening of
the polls the ballot boxes were examined and found to be empty.
When the ballots had been cast and counted they were placed in
wooden boxes provided for their reception. Each box was locked,
and, as a safeguard against tampering with the lock, a seal was
placed over it, consisting of a piece of adhesive tape on which
was written the date of the election and the name of the City
Clerk, who was a member of the Board of Registrars. The war-
den of the precinct delivered the box to two police officers who
carried it in an automobile to the police station, where a cell was
at the disposal of the election officials for, the purpose of storing
the ballots and paraphernalia used at the election. On the way
to the police station the motor vehicle stopped at the building in
which the City Clerk's office is located. One of the officers re-
mained in the car while the other ascended a flight of steps and
delivered to the City Clerk the keys, books and tally sheets. On
the return of the officer to the car he and his brother officer pro-
ceeded to the police station, where a certain welfare worker who
had been on previous occasions engaged for similar duties by the
City Clerk, and was on this occasion representing the City Clerk,
received the boxes and placed them in the cell. Boxes arriving
from other precincts were received in the same way. The boxes
were placed in the cell, the door was locked by turning and
removing the key. Over the lock was placed a seal bearing the
initials of the City Clerk. The cell door was further made fast
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by two padlocks, with a similar seal placed over each keyhole.
The cell door key was placed in the custody of the officer in charge
of the station and the keys to the padlock remained in the posses-
sion of the City Clerk. After the cell door was locked it could
not be opened without the co-operation of the holder of the cell
door key and the holder of the padlock keys. The door of the
cell was constructed of vertical iron bars set from one and one-
half to four inches apart. The boxes were piled on top of one
another four feet or over from the door.
One witness testified that "it would not be possible to put
your hands through far enough to reach within three or four feet
of the boxes." The personal observation of three members of
the Committee bore out the substantial accuracy of this state-
ment.
The petitioner contended that at the recount it was found that
from a number of these boxes the authentic seals— dated and
signed as stated — had been removed and other seals of somewhat
different material and color and not dated or signed substituted;
that on a certain box the genuine seal remained, but was detached
from the wood at one end far enough to expose the lock.
One William A. Graustein testified to this effect, and stated
further that he distinctly called conditions to the attention of
Republicans and Democrats, including the sitting member.
This rather astonishing testimony was corroborated by Attorney
Johnson. The City Clerk, who testified later, cast a doubt upon
the accuracy of Mr. Graustein's observation, but his own testi-
mony simmered down to this (we quote from the stenographic
record :
—
Q. Can you tell this committee positively as a positive fact and knowledge
that Mr. Graustein did not make these protests that he has testified to about
these individual boxes? A. I wouldn't say that he did or did not, but I
don't remember hearing it.
Q. You don't remember anything about it? A. No.
Upon the evidence we find that the original seals were in fact re-
moved and spurious seals substituted, as alleged by Mr. Graustein
and Mr. Johnson, but no evidence was presented or discovered by
us from which we could determine where, when or by whom the
substitution was made. As to the instance in which the original
seal remained but was loosened at the end so as to expose the key-
hole, we are of the opinion, based upon the testimony of the City
Clerk, that the exposure was due to failure of the glue to hold the
seal in place, resulting in a curling up of one end of the seal far
enough to expose the keyhole.
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It was the further contention of the petitioner that the ballots
contained in the eleven boxes referred to were tampered with, —
specifically that blanks were marked and changed into votes for the
sitting member after the ballots had been cast.
An examination of the ballots cast in three of the eleven pre-
cincts made by us, with the assistance of William E. Hingston, a
well-known expert on handwriting, failed to disclose anything
which he could regard as supporting or tending to support this
contention.
The tally sheet from Precinct 1 of Ward 3, which was supposed
to be sent by the warden by the police officer to the City Clerk,
disappeared somehow, somewhere. The warden testified that he
delivered it to Patrolman Field, who was one of the officers en-
trusted with the duty of transporting the boxes containing the
cast ballots to the police station.
Mr. Field testified that he "took what they gave me" and de-
livered the same to the City Clerk; that he was given three en-
velopes by the warden and delivered them; that while he sup-
posed one of the envelopes contained the tally sheet, he was not
sure about it; that he heard nothing about the loss of the tally
sheet until he was called to testify before us.
This testimony was in conflict with the testimony of the City
Clerk, who stated that he remarked to Officer Field that he had
not brought the tally sheet and that Mr. Field said, "They didn't
give me any;" that he (the City Clerk) thereupon asked the
officer to search the car and "the other articles" when he got over
to the police station and let him know; that he talked with the
Chief of Police and asked the latter to inquire of Officer Field.
The Chief of Police was not called to shed light, if any he had, on
this rather curious conflict in the testimony. We are unable to
account for the disappearance of the tally sheet. Meagre and un-
satisfactory though the testimony of all three witnesses is on this
point, we are unable to accept the theory of petitioner's counsel
that the disappearance of the tally sheet in question was part of a
scheme to commit fraud, there being no direct evidence or com-
pelling circumstances pointing to such a conclusion.
The evidence presented to us left no doubt in our minds that the
recount was conducted honestly. There is a presumption in favor
of regularity and no evidence was adduced to overcome it in this
case.
Another point which the petitioner undertook to establish was
that a certain organization which worked in the interest of the
sitting member violated the Corrupt Practice Act, so called. The
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undisputed evidence establishes this allegation. The facts briefly
stated are as follows: —
About the first of August, 1934, a number of Medford residents,
estimated variously between 135 and 180, organized under the
name of " Democratic Men's Club of Medford, Incorporated"
for the purpose of social intercourse between the members and
to secure the election of Democratic nominees to office at the
approaching State election. The sitting member, Mr. Daly, who
later at the primary received his party's nomination, was a mem-
ber of this organization. Of this there can be no doubt, for officers
of the organization so testified and Mr. Daly made no denial of
that. The members elected a president, a vice-president, a treas-
urer, a secretary, and an executive board of seven members,
one from each ward of the city. Each member was required to
pay one dollar a year for dues. About 200 badges with the words
"Democratic Men's Club of Medford, Incorporated" printed on
them were procured for the use of the members. Notwithstanding
the presence of the word "Incorporated" upon the badges no
charter had been granted to the organization, nor was any charter
applied for. According to the testimony of the president, it was
the intention of the club to apply for a charter as soon as they
procured the money wherewith to pay the required fee of the
Commonwealth. As a means of raising the money one or more
dances were held by the organization. Up to election day the
gross receipts of this organization were $84.55 and it expended
$95.65. It owes $23. This organization, which operated vigor-
ously and with enthusiasm in the interest of the sitting member
and other Democratic candidates, filed no return with the City
Clerk or the Secretary of the Commonwealth. It failed to comply
with the following provisions inter alia of the General Laws: —
Section 4 of chapter 55, which required that it file a statement
with the Secretary of the Commonwealth containing the names
and addresses of the treasurer and chairman and of at least three
additional members, and a statement of the purpose for which
it was organized.
Section 6 of said chapter 55, which forbade receiving, expending,
disbursing or promising money or its equivalent, except as
authorized by said chapter 55.
The treasurer of the club appears from the evidence to have
violated the provisions of said section 4 in failing to file a written
acceptance of his office and receiving and disbursing money,
while the names and addresses were not filed. In short, so far as
the Corrupt Practice Act was concerned the club was an outlaw
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organization. Reference may be had to chapter 56 for the
penalties prescribed for violations.
The extent of the participation of the sitting member in the
activities of the organization was not brought out clearly by the
evidence adduced by the petitioner, and the sitting member
himself volunteered no information on that point. In fact, he
did not testify.
A young man who was attending a recount at Waltham, and
was wearing one of the badges already described, engaged in
conversation with Mr. Graustein, who was attending a recount
as a representative of a certain candidate. In the course of their
conversation the man wearing the badge stated that during the
last eighteen months the club in question had been engaged in
an effort to defeat all Middlesex Republican candidates, including
Senator Warren, and that if it had not been for Mr. Graustein
the club would have "picked them all off," but he added, "but
wo are going through with Warren and Burnett and we have
got Jewett — when you get along with the recount you will find
out what I mean. I don't want to give you any more information
on that."
In answer to a question by Mr. Graustein as to what he (Grau-
stein) should look for this man said, "padding and blanks."
When asked what he meant by "padding," he said, "I don't
care to discuss the matter any further."
The only evidence of this man's connection with the club or the
cause of the sitting member is set forth above. It is not strong
evidence by any means, but taking into consideration the place,
the occasion, the circumstances and the fact that he wore one of
the badges, we think it a reasonable conclusion that he was a
member of the club and working in the interests of the Democratic
candidates. His name, place of abode and other information
concerning him are unknown. His startling remarks would, if
true, indicate the existence of a conspiracy to perpetrate a fraud
upon the public and deprive certain candidates of offices to which
the voters desired to elect them. But the remarks were not made
in the presence or hearing of the sitting member, or, so far as the
evidence shows, in the presence or hearing of any officers or
representatives of the club. No opportunity was then afforded
the club or the sitting member to admit or deny the truth of the
remarks.
Applying to this situation an elementary principle of law, we
deem it our duty to disregard the remarks of the man referred to so
far as substantiation of the petitioner's allegations is concerned.
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Mr. Graustein's recital of the conversation had the effect,
however, of impelling; the Committee into a vigilant inquiry in
regard to the ballots cast in Medford and placed in the boxes from
which the original seals were subsequently removed. Such inquiry
was made as already stated, but nothing was discovered that
might indicate padding or any other tampering with the ballots.
There are 23 precincts in Medford. In 12 of them there was
nothing to indicate — nor was it alleged— that there had been
any removal of the seals placed upon the boxes. In the remaining
11 precincts the original seals were removed and replaced with
other seals somewhat different in substance and color, as herein-
before reported. Notwithstanding our failure to find any evidence
of tampering with the ballots which we examined, we deem it ap-
propriate to submit the following two tables, the first of which
shows the number of blanks reported in each of seven contests in
those 12 precincts, including the Warren-Daly contest, and the
second shows the number of blanks reported in each of said seven
contests in the 11 precincts in which the seals had been removed
and replaced with spurious ones. In the 12 precincts the number
of blanks reported in the Warren-Daly contest was only 9 more
than in the Clerk of Courts contest; 2 more than in the County
Commissioner contest; and not much higher or lower than the
number of reported blanks in any of the other six contests. In
the 11 precincts, on the other hand, it will be observed that the
number of blanks reported in the Warren-Daly contest is lower to
an impressive degree than the number of blanks reported in any
of the other six; while as to the blanks reported in those six the
variance is by no means wide.
Comparison of Blanks in the 12 Preciticts.
Sheriff . . . .
Clerk of Courts
Senatorial (Warren-Daly) .
Councillor .....
District Attorney ....
Register of Deeds ....
County Commissioner (Jewett-Brennan)
1,039
743
961
896
795
889
898
Comparison of Blanks in the 11 Precincts.
Councillor .....
District Attorney ....
Register of Deeds ....
County Commissioner (Jewett-Brennan)
Sheriff
.
Clerk of Courts
Senatorial (Warren-Daly) .
1,105
1,054
1,128
1,068
1,041
1,113
769
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The figures are furnished by the City Clerk of Medford.
(Mr. Brennan, the candidate for County Commissioner, was,
like Mr. Daly, a resident of Medford.)
While we are of opinion that a study of the blanks cast in Med-
ford in the State-wide contests would be of little or no assistance in
arriving at just conclusions, we insert a paper containing a record
of the blanks cast in all contests voted on in the city of Medford,
setting forth in the first column the blanks cast in the precincts
where the seals were intact, and in the second column the blanks
cast in the 11 precincts in which the seals were changed.
12-Precinct
(Seals Intact).
11-Precinct
(Seals Changed).
135 259
341 461
451 497
530 687
684 696
Attorney General 597 571
452 507
654 812
1,039 1.105
898 769
District Attorney 743 1.054
889 1.113
961 1,128
County Commissioner (Jewett-Brennan) 896 1.068
Sheriff 795 1.041
It goes without saying, we think, that the activities of the
Democratic Men's Club of Medford stimulated interest in the
candidacy of the sitting member and contributed to his election,
but to what extent we cannot say. Having operated without com-
pliance with the requirements of the law, the influences of the club
can fairly be characterized as improper or at least illegal influences,
but how far those influences affected the ascertainment of the popu-
lar will and the rights of the voters, we cannot say, and we cannot
indulge in surmise or conjecture in a matter of grave importance
like this.
We have been asked to take cognizance of the fact that the wel-
fare worker, already referred to, who on behalf of the City Clerk
received the ballots |from the police officers and stored them in the
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cell, was in sole control of the boxes from the time they were
brought in until ten o'clock next morning. We incorporate this
information in our report but do not undertake to draw any con-
clusions from it which would reflect upon the individual referred to.
One Anthony A. F. Novelline, chairman of the Democratic City
Committee of Medford, who participated as a member of the Board
of Registrars of Voters which counted in the contest between the
sitting member and the petitioner, was a member of the club
already referred to.
Carl K. Fraser, warden of Ward 3, Precinct 4, acted as a clerical
assistant in sealing the ballots after they had been opened and
opening them in order to count the ballots at the recount. He
also was a member of the said club. We report these facts as
requested by the petitioner.
We submit no recommendation as to the disposition to be made
of the petition, as we feel we have performed our duty in reporting
the facts to the Honorable Senate, where the ultimate responsi-
bility rests. The weight of what we report so far as the decision •
of the Honorable Senate may be concerned would not be en-
hanced by an expression of our opinion.
Joseph R. Cottox.
John D. Mackay.
Theodore R. Pluxkett.
[Report amended and accepted, June 5, 1935. — Senate Journal,
p. 953.]
Minority Report.
• The minority of the Special Committee on Elections to whom
was referred the petition of Charles C. Wrarren that he be de-
clared the duly elected Senator from the Sixth Middlesex Dis-
trict instead of the present sitting member, Honorable Charles
T. Daly, make the following report : —
The petition contains various allegations of fraud and irregu-
larities in the election and recount in Medford. These will be
considered separately herein. It also alleges certain irregularities
in other parts of the Senatorial District, but no evidence was
introduced on this point. November 6, 1934, was election day.
The recount in Medford took place on November 21, 22, 23, 24,
26, 1934.
The petitioner was allowed much latitude in producing evi-
dence. Much, if not most, of his evidence would not have been
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admitted in a court of law. He was not restricted or limited in any
way in the presentation of his case nor was he confined to the
allegations in his bill. The hearing embraced eight public ses-
sions, one of which lasted until late in the evening. In addition
to these sessions, at which the petitioner and the sitting member
were represented by counsel, the Committee inspected the place
where the ballots were kept, and examined the ballots in several
of the precincts, with the assistance of a handwriting expert of
its own selection.
In regard to the allegations in the bill it is advisable to point
out the precaution taken in Medford for the protection of the
ballots. A police officer is assigned to each polling booth; and
during the day he has the key to the official ballot box in which
the ballots are inserted by the voter and canceled. After the
tabulation of the results the block tally sheets and the voting
lists are placed in envelopes, which are sealed and signed by the
precinct officers; the precinct record book is signed by the pre-
cinct officers ; the ballots are placed in a large wooden box used
as an envelope for that purpose ; the box is locked by the warden,
and a fiber strip with one surface gummed is stuck over the key-
hole of the box and joins the top and bottom portions of the box
(the top and bottom are otherwise joined by two hinges); this
fiber seal is signed by the warden and the clerk of the precinct ;
the box containing the ballots, the precinct record book and the
envelopes containing the block tally sheets and the voting lists
are then given to the police officer who, accompanied by another
police officer and riding in the police car, take the precinct record
book and the envelopes containing the block tally sheets and the
voting lists to the City Clerk in his office in the City Building in
Medford Square, and then take the box containing the used bal-
lots to the Police Station, about two hundred feet from the City
Clerk's office, where the boxes are piled on top of one another in
a cell. Medford has no City Hall and the Police Station is the
safest place in Medford to keep the ballots. They have been
kept there for many years past. The City Clerk, of course, was
unable to be at his office to receive the tabulations and at the
Police Station to receive the ballots at the same time. However,
he deputized an agent to act for him in receiving the ballots at
the cell. This man is thoroughly honest and has been used for
the same purpose in the past.
At the election in November, 1934, after the boxes were placed
in the cell, the cell door was locked by the police, who kept the
key to the cell door, and the City Clerk chained the cell door to
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the framework and secured the chain with two padlocks. He then
placed a seal bearing his signature over the keyhole to the cell
door, and seals over the keyholes to both padlocks. He kept the
keys to the padlocks in his own possession. We might state at
this point that in Medford there are 23 precincts; that each box
containing the ballots for each precinct has a lock fitted by a
different key, and that the City Clerk retained possession of these
23 keys.
Every fifteen or thirty minutes day and night a police officer
passes by each cell in the station, including the cell in which the
ballots are kept, and punches a time clock. The bars in the cell
door are spaced between two and one-half and three inches apart.
The rest of the cell is enclosed in brick walls.
On the nights of the recount the Chairman of the Board of
Registrars announced that any one who wanted to might accom-
pany the members of the Board to the Police Station and exam-
ine the cell to see that it was intact. Many representatives of
both parties went along with him. The locks, seals and boxes
were in full viewT of any one who cared to look, and many of them
did so. The three locks, including the cell door lock, were all
still protected by the original seals affixed by the City Clerk "fol-
lowing the election and the boxes were all in place. Three pre-
cinct boxes were taken out the first night for recounting, and when
the boxes were removed the cell was again secured by the triple
lock and freshly sealed. The same procedure followed the return
of the boxes to the cell after each night's recount was over.
The recount was held in the aldermanic chamber in the City
Building. The chamber was divided into two sections by a rail.
Several recounts were to be had on the same evening. In order
to prevent any interference with the officials or any tampering
with the ballots or boxes, and in fairness to all candidates to the
end that the recount should be conducted in a just, impartial
and expeditious manner, the Registrars announced that the
recounts for the various offices would be conducted at different
tables, and that a representative of each candidate for any office
could sit at the table where the recount for that office was being
conducted. Others interested could stand behind those repre-
sentatives. They also announced that due to the large crowd it
would be necessary for each party to select one representative
to go behind the rail where the boxes containing the ballots were
kept so that the boxes and seals might be examined. It was only
natural that there was some confusion before the recount got
under way, but this confusion was due to the crowd and not to
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the recount officials, and the confusion had no bearing upon the
fairness with which the recount was conducted. Republicans
and Democrats were equally represented among the recount
officials. All protests, on ballots or otherwise, were recorded
by the City Clerk, who is ex officio a member of the Board of
Registrars. He is a Republican.
The foregoing is set forth at more length than should be neces-
sary, but it emphasizes the precaution taken by the election and
recount officials in Medford against fraud.
Paragraphs numbered 1 to 6 inclusive in the petition require
no comment, with the exception of the general allegation in para-
graph 4 that the petitioner was duly re-elected. We find that he
was not re-elected. The allegations in paragraph number 7 are
contained in the subdivisions (a) through (/) inclusive, and in
this report we shall first state the allegation as it appears in the
petition and then comment upon it.
(a) Ballot boxes opened after they had been sealed by precinct
officers.
The chief witness for the petitioner was one Graustein, who we
find was a contributor to the campaign expenses of the petitioner.
He is an elderly man who, according to his own statement in
evidence, is "too old for good purpose." The figures used in the
various exhibits introduced by the petitioner were prepared by
him, and what little other evidence was offered by the petitioner
was put in for the most part to corroborate some of Graustein's
statements. Graustein was allowed to go behind the rail for the
Republican candidates where he could inspect the ballot boxes.
He testified that throughout the recount in Medford he protested
eleven out of the twenty-three boxes in Medford because the
official seals had been replaced by other seals; that the other
twelve were properly sealed. He made no written protest nor did
he save any of the seals torn from the boxes, which were thrown
on the floor, so that they might be used as evidence. He was
emphatic that he orally protested the boxes for Ward 1, Precincts
1 and 2, because the seals were not the official seals and were
not signed by the warden and clerk of the precinct. In regard
to these two precincts other witnesses put on by the petitioner
said that they heard Mr. Graustein make the oral protest and
observed that the seals were not the official seals. These were the
first two precincts recounted.
Before proceeding with a narration of contrary evidence, we
wish to point out that the petitioner's own evidence contradicts
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itself on this point. The petitioner introduced several exhibits
and divided the results of the election in Medford into two groups,
— one group of 11 precincts and one of 12 precincts. The alleged
reason for the hand-picked groups is that the 11 precincts are
those in which the seals had been removed from the boxes and
in the remaining 12 precincts the boxes were protected by the
official seal. It is obvious from Mr. Graustein's testimony, and
those who sought to confirm it, if such testimony is honest and
accurate, that Ward 1, Precincts 1 and 2, should be included
among the 11 "bad" precincts, because Graustein and the others
testified that the seals were removed from those boxes. But
exhibit 10, introduced by the petitioner through Graustein,
covers the 12 "good" precincts, and contains Precincts 1 and 2
of Ward 1. Graustein testified on more than one occasion that
there was nothing wrong with the seals on the boxes in the 12-
precinct group. As a further contradiction, the petitioner in
page 8 of his brief refers to Ward 1, Precincts 1 and 2, and states
"in which precincts the boxes containing the ballots cast were
sealed with the original seals bearing the names of the Warden
and Clerk." It is obvious from the context of his brief that this
statement refers to the time of the recount.
Mr. Winslow, the City Clerk, testified that he has been the City
Clerk of Medford for more than twenty years; that most of the
officials who served at the last election were men of much experi-
ence in such work; that all boxes bore the official seals when
they were opened at the recount; that each box was locked in
addition to the seal; that he was in possession of the keys to
these locks; that no one made any written protest about the
seals until several days later; that he recorded all protests at the
time they were made; and that no oral protest was made by
Graustein or any one else about the seals on the boxes at the time
of the recount. Mr. Frazier, Chairman of the Board of Registrars,
testified that he was in charge of the recount ; that all precinct
boxes bore the official seal; that Graustein did not make an oral
protest but on the contrary said in a loud voice, "The seal is on
and the box is locked;" that after tearing the seals from the
boxes he threw them on the floor, because they were of no further
use to his board; that any one who wanted to could have picked
the seals from the floor; that all boxes were locked in addition
to the seal; that all locks at the Police Station cell were sealed
and locked; that the boxes were piled on top of one another in
the cell; that no one made any objection to the seals on the cell
or on the boxes at the Police Station, and that if any objection
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or protest had been made it would have been noted by his
board.
The only time the seals could have been changed was while
the boxes were at the Police Station, and it was impossible, in
the circumstances under which they were protected, to reach
through the narrow spaces between the cell bars and tamper
with the boxes and pile them back on top of one another. The
boxes were locked, there is no dispute about that, and the City
Clerk had the keys in his possession. If the seals on any of the
boxes were not the official seals they could have been preserved
as evidence merely by taking them from the floor after they had
been thrown away. If any protest on the seals had been made
it would have been heard and recorded by the recount officials.
We conclude that no such protest was made. The only protest
in regard to the seals is included in an undated memorandum sent
by the petitioner to the Board of Registrars. The omission of the
date may well have been to mislead the Board as to when it was
submitted, but its context shows that it could not have been
written before the close of the recount on November 24, after
17 of the 23 precincts had been recounted. The petitioner raises
no question on the seals of the remaining six boxes.
Upon all the evidence we find that the seals, boxes and ballots
were not tampered with.
(b) At the so-called recount in said Medford a large number
of identified ballots and other ballots, all appearing to be in the
same handwriting, were counted for the opposing candidate.
The Committee examined the ballots for the precincts most
seriously questioned with the assistance of a handwriting expert,
and we found no evidence to substantiate the allegation that a
number of the ballots appeared to be in the same handwriting.
(c) Ballots cast in said Medford left for a long period of
time out of custody of the City Clerk.
(d) Custody of a ballot box or boxes and keys thereto left in
the hands of unauthorized persons.
The City Clerk retained possession of the keys to the boxes and
to the padlocks on the cell door, and therefore had custody of the
ballots at all times.
(e) After such illegal custody had existed, the count of the
ballots in said boxes varied from 75 to 100 from the original
count of supposedly the same ballots.
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There was no illegal custody as alleged in this paragraph. The
differences in the election and recount figures alleged in this
paragraph did not pertain to the Senatorial contest. We did not
examine other contests, but it is obvious from our inquirj' into
this case that any changes were due to clerical errors.
(/) In Ward 2, Precinct 2, the election officers found and
reported 28 blanks. At the so-called recount the Registrars
found 84 blanks, which had never been voted for any person.
Your petitioner lost 56 votes, which had been found by the
election officers and credited to your petitioner.
The original report of 28 blanks in this precinct was in error.
Since the petitioner raised this point, however, we point out that
he, and not the sitting member, was erroneously credited with
56 votes which had been cast as blanks. This error was properly
corrected at the recount.
Paragraph 8 is a general allegation that because of the irregu-
larities complained of the returns of the election and the recount
failed to report the correct result of the election. We have covered
the irregularities above and find that the sitting member was
duly elected.
Paragraph 9 alleges irregularities in other parts of the district
"in regard to the manner of counting ballots, etc." No evidence
of such irregularities was presented at the hearing, and the pre-
sumption that the election officials did their duty in a proper
manner must stand.
10. The election officials in said Medford failed to keep,
make or use block tally sheets, or, when kept in many cases,
destroyed them before the so-called recount.
11. That in one precinct in said Medford the total tally sheet
was entirely lost, and if any such tally sheets existed in the hands
of the Board of Registrars said Board refused upon request to
allow them to be seen by your petitioner.
In regard to the allegation that the election officials in Med-
ford failed to use block tally sheets, it is sufficient to say that the
Committee was shown twenty-two of the twenty-three block tally
sheets by the City Clerk. The other one was lost, but not until
after the information which it contained had been transferred to
the precinct record book. This disposes of the allegations in
paragraphs 10 and 11. The twelfth paragraph in the petition is
based upon the failure to keep these tally sheets, and since we
have shown that they were kept it is not necessary to comment
further on that allegation.
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13. That as a result of the so-called recount in said Medford,
when some 20,000 ballots were examined, the opposing candi-
date gained 63 votes, whereas your petitioner still retained pre-
cisely the same number of votes as were credited to him in the
original count. This is true notwithstanding the fact that your
petitioner in the course of the pretended recount discovered one
block of ballots containing 32 votes for him which were not origi-
nally credited to him.
The fact that the petitioner had the same number of votes in
the recount as in the election returns is merely a coincidence. He
mentions in the petition that he gained 32 votes in the recount of
one precinct, but he failed to mention that in seventeen other pre-
cincts there were gains and losses for him, the net result of all changes
being nil.
Upon all the evidence we find that there were no irregularities
in the election or recount returns in Medford. The original re-
turns of the election in Medford showed that the sitting member
defeated the petitioner by 2,489 votes, having been credited with
11,862 votes against 9,373 for the petitioner; the recount resulted
in a net gain of 63 votes for the sitting member, thus making his
margin of victory 2,552 votes. Any errors in the original tabula-
tions were merely of a clerical nature, such as must be expected
in view of the fact that the officials on election day are obliged
to work long hours and under more or less pressure in their en-
deavor to make known the result of the election as early as possible.
In view of the serious charges imputed to the election and re-
count officials in Medford by this petitioner we deem it advisable
to record the fact that the City Clerk, the Chairman of the Board
of Registrars, two of the precinct officers and a police officer in
charge of one of the polling booths appeared before this Commit-
tee; we examined the place where the ballots were kept and also
examined the ballots of several of the precincts, and our inquiry
into the matter urges us to commend the election officials of Med-
ford for the excellent manner in which they conducted the elec-
tion and the recount, and protected the ballots in the meanwhile.
The majority of the Committee has stated in its report that it
considers it appropriate to submit two tables showing a compari-
son of blanks in certain contests. We fail to see how it is at all
important to compare blanks in different contests. Obviously,
the blanks should be fewer in those contests more closely fought
and in which the public has a keener interest. This fact is borne
out by the variation in the number of blanks originally reported
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in the last State election in Medford, where the blanks ranged
from 394 in the contest for Governor to 2,144 in the Councillor's
contest.
It will be noted that the majority has used for comparison only
those contests which show a greater number of blanks than the
one we are considering. In all other contests the number of blanks
is fewer than in the one in question.
Blanks, if at all important, must be considered in relation to
the total votes cast. We therefore point out that the percentage
of blanks to total votes in the original count of the Senatorial
contest was 7.2; in the 11 precincts the percentage was 6.6; and
in the 12 precincts the corresponfing percentage was 7.9. This
shows that the variation in blanks was relatively small, and not
at all unusual.
The following chart shows the results of the election in Med-
ford:—
City of Medford — November 6, 1934, Election.
Original Return and Recount Results — Votes for Senator.
I Prepared by the City Clerk.]
Ward. Precinct.
Charles T. Daly. Charles G. Warren. Blanks.
Original. Recount. Original. Recount. Original. Recount.
1 1 590 590 326 327 70 69
2 575 576 149 152 111 107
1 3 761 764 197 199 91 86
2 1 498 500 224 224 59 57
2* 2 476 479 572 513 28 84
2 3 461 464 327 329 74 69
3 1 552 542 362 369 50 53
3 2 734 744 969 908 131 121
3 3 272 271 712 715 41 39
3 4 544 546 371 375 69 63
4 f'-i 540 541 363 363 74 73
4 2 674 680 581 574 57 58
4 3 417 416 311 313 45 44
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City of Medford — November 6, 1934, Election* — Concluded.
Original Return and Recount Results— Votes for Senator— Concluded.
[Prepared by the City Clerk.)
Ward. Precinct.
Charles T. Daly. Charles G. Warren. Blank?.
Original. Recount. Original. Recount. Original. Recount.
634 664 201 233 108 46
2 386 385 113 113 46 47
K oo 842 843 282 287 136 130
5 4 525 527 135 137 61 57
6 I 426 429 629 632 71 65
6 2 397 397 662 663 73 72
6 3 327 329 770 770 62 60
6 4 159 159 571 570 34 35
1 253 255 221 221 44 42
7 2 819 824 325 326 132 126
Total 11,862 11.925 9,373 9,373 1,667 1.603
Our findings on the allegations in the petition should, according
to customary procedure, dispose of the' case. The petitioner,
however, was allowed to examine into the operation of an organiza-
tion known as the Democratic Men's Club of Medford, and he now
argues that this club was a political committee within the meaning
of General Laws, chapter 50, section 1 ; that it violated the election
laws and thus made the election illegal; and that the sitting mem-
ber is a member of that club and for that reason has no right to hold
his seat. The report of the majority of the Committee makes some
reference to this phase of the case so we are obliged to mention it
in this report.
The club was organized in August, 1934, and Medford Demo-
crats were invited to join. Its purpose was to advance the interest
of the Democratic party in Middlesex County. There was no
formality to becoming a member. The dues were SI per year for
those who could afford it. The membership around the time of
election was between 150 and 200. Incorporation was intended,
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but lack of the necessary filing fee postponed this step. The
organization was to have a permanent existence. The sitting
member was a member of the club, but he was not an officer, nor
did he vote to elect any of its officers, nor did he vote for or other-
wise approve any expenditure of money for any purpose whatever.
He was not active in club affairs. His membership was merely
nominal. The total receipts of the club up to the time of election
amounted to $84.55, all of which came from membership dues,
and its expenses for the same period were S95.65.
The petitioner charges that the club's participation in the cam-
paign made the entire election void because its treasurer and chair-
man failed to file certain papers required of them by General Laws,
chapter 55, section 4, and the treasurer failed to file a return of
receipts and expenses under General Laws, chapter 55, section 17.
There is no merit to this charge. The club's activities in the cam-
paign were such as are usually, if not always, conducted by all
clubs or groups organized for similar purposes. If the treasurer and
chairman failed to file certain papers required of them individually
there is no evidence that their failure to file such papers had any
effect on the election. Indeed, it is contrary to reason to believe
that this omission could have had such effect. Furthermore, there
is no evidence whatever that the results of the election were any different
than they would have been if the club had never existed. If the peti-
tioner considered the fifing of the statements as material he had a
right under General Laws, chapter 55, section 22 and section 24,
to compel their filing. He took no action under those statutes,
and he is obviously raising the question at this time in a desperate
attempt to defeat the will of the voters of the Sixth Middlesex
District.
The argument that the sitting member is liable for the acts of
the club because he spoke at a rally which it conducted, if at all
important, is disposed of by our finding that he spoke at such rally
as a candidate for office, and not as a member of the club, and in so
Speaking he received no privilege that was not accorded to any
other candidate of the Democratic party.
The law is well settled that mere membership in a voluntary
association does not make the individual members liable for the
acts of their associates, and liability is not to be inferred from mere
membership. Sweetman v. Barrows, 263 Mass. 349, at 335, and
cases there cited. Responsibility for the acts of such an associa-
tion is based upon the principles of agency and not of partner-
ship. 25 American and English Encyc. of Law, 1137. There is
no evidence in the present contest that the sitting member voted,
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as a member of the club, to disburse any money in the recent
election. In the absence of such vote he incurred no responsibility
for any of the debts contracted by the club. Ray v. Powers, 134
Mass. 22, at 25. The election laws impose certain duties and
obligations upon the treasurer and chairman of political com-
mittees and against certain members who act in behalf of such a
committee, but there is nothing in the election laws of the Com-
monwealth which impose a duty on any one merely by virtue of
his membership in an organization such as the Democratic Men's
Club of Medford.
The object of elections is to ascertain the popular will and not
to thwart it. The object of election laws is to secure the rights of
duly qualified electors and not to defeat them. This must be borne
in mind in'the construction of such statutes, and the presumption is
that they are enacted to prevent fraud and to secure freedom of
choice, and not by technical obstacles to make the right of voting
insecure.
Swift v. Milton, 281 Mass. 264, at 269.
We are conscious of the task imposed upon us, and we have
therefore considered all the questions involved, and all the evidence
presented, with the greatest of care. The scope of the petition was
widened to make it possible for the petitioner to present any and all
evidence for the purpose of establishing his contentions. He has
been given every opportunity to present his case in its entirety for
the purpose of sustaining the burden of proof which the law im-
poses upon him.
In the light of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the result of
the election in question was the honest and unmistakable expres-
sion of the will of the majority of the people voting in the election
of November 6, 1934, in the Sixth Middlesex District, and that the
will of the people thus manifested shall prevail.
We recommend that the petitioner be granted leave to with-
draw.
James P. Meehan.
John S. Sullivan.
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House — 1935.
Committee on Elections. — Representatives Burt Dewar of Maiden, James
M. McCracken of Needham, Hiram N. Dearborn of Somerville,
Jeremiah J. Healy of Natick, Clarence L. Luitwieler of Newton,
James F. Tobin of Salem and Anthony R. Doyle of Worcester.
Cyrus C. Rounseville v. J. Dolan Hathaway.
House Document, No. 1873. Mar. 11, 1935. Report by all the committee.
Recount of Votes. — Where evidence of fraud in the marking and counting of
ballots appears to be extensive the committee will proceed to count the ballots.
Ballots. — Uncompleted crosses on ballots, check marks instead of crosses and
crosses between candidates' names and party designations do not constitute fraud.
Recount of Votes — Fraud. — On a recount of the ballots it appeared that
crosses and other irregularities on the ballot appeared to have occurred after the
voter marked the same and where evidence satisfactory to the committee showed
that persons other than those authorized to count the ballots had access to the
same prior to the final count, and where over marked crosses appeared on certain
ballots, and marks were made on the ballots that appeared to be made after the
voter marked the same sufficient evidence of fraud existed to justify a recount
by the committee of the House.
The Committee on Elections, to which was referred the petition
of Cyrus C. Rounseville that he be declared elected as Repre-
sentative from the Twelfth Bristol District, which comprises
Wards 6 and 8 of Fall River and the town of Westport, submit the
following report : —
The petition (House, No. 382) is as follows: —
To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts in General Court assembled.
The undersigned Petitioner, a citizen of the city of Fall River, in the county
of Bristol, respectfully represents upon information and belief, as follows : —
That he, together with Joseph E. Theberge, were the duly nominated Re-
publican candidates for election as representatives to the General Court of
Massachusetts in the Twelfth Bristol District, comprising wards six and eight
of the city of Fall River and the town of Westport, at the election held Novem-
ber 6, 1934;
That at the same election Hector L. Ballard, Jr., and J. Dolan Hathaway
were the duly nominated Democratic candidates for the same offices in said
district
;
That at the election held in said district on said November 6, 1934, the result
of said representative contest, as first determined by the boards of registrars
of voters, was that said Theberge received 5,091 votes, said Hathaway re-
ceived 4,568 votes, your Petitioner received 4,521 votes and said Ballard
received 3,710 votes;
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That a petition was duly filed requesting a recount of the ballots for repre-
sentatives in the said Twelfth Bristol District and as a result of said petition,
said boards of registrars held recounts;
That said recounts resulted in changes and corrections in the number of
votes received by the four candidates, said Theberge gaining 38 votes, said
Hathaway gaining 65 votes, your Petitioner gaining 79 votes and said Ballard
gaining 22 votes, so that as a result of said recounts the total number of votes
received by each of the four candidates was declared to be as follows: — Said
Theberge 5,129, said Hathaway 4,634, your Petitioner 4,600 and said Ballard
3,732;
That some of the ballots in said election contain a cross made by pencil in
the square opposite the name of said Hathaway, and that said crosses were
made by a person or persons other than the voters who marked and deposited
the ballots, and that said crosses were made after the ballots had been de-
posited, and that they were made for the purpose of aiding by fraud in electing
said Hathaway to the office of representative to the General Court
;
That at the counting of the ballots after the closing of the polls at said
election held on November 6, 1934, persons other than duly appointed election
officers, were engaged in counting and tabulating the votes cast;
Wherefore, Your Petitioner prays that such action, including a recount of
ballots, be taken so that he may be declared elected as representative to the
General Court from the said Twelfth Bristol Representative District and be
seated in place of said Hathaway.
Cyrus C. Rounseville,
782 Rock Street, Fall River.
This district is entitled to two representatives. At the State
election held November 6, 1934 —
Hector L. Ballard, Jr., Democrat,
J. Dolan Hathaway, Democrat,
Cyrus C. Rounseville, Republican,
Joseph E. Theberge, Republican,
were candidates for representative.
Each received, according to the returns made to the Secretary
of State after a recount had been held, the following vote: —
Ballard. "Hathaway. Rounseville. Theberge.
Fall River, Ward 6 . 2.192 1,907 1.306 2,425
Fall River. Ward 8 1,294 2.440 2.656 1,995
Westport 248 286 637 708
Total 3,734 4.633 4,599 5.128
On the face of the returns, Hathaway and Theberge were de-
clared duly elected, and a certificate of election was issued to
each of them. Hathaway, whose election is being contested, was
apparently elected by 34 votes.
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The protested ballots (37 in number) were represented by this
list, which was submitted to the Committee as evidence by the
petitioner.
Protested Ballots.
Recount of ballots, held in Council Chamber, City Hall, Fall
River, Massachusetts, November 14 and 15, 1934, for election of
Representatives to 12th Bristol District:—
Wabd. Precinct. Block. Counted. Protested by —
6 A 6 Rounseville and Theberge. Hathaway.
6 E 7 Rounseville and Theberge. Hathaway.
6 E 20 Hathaway and Theberge. Rounseville.
8
8
8
A
A
B
7
1
13
As marked.
As marked.
Rounseville.
18 ballots in block protested by
Rounseville.
6 ballots in block protested by
Rounseville.
Hathaway.
8 C 11 Rounseville. Hathaway.
8 D 12 Blank. Hathaway.
8 D 6 Ballard and Hathaway. Rounseville.
8 E Blank. Rounseville and Hathaway.
8 E 14 Blank. Rounseville.
8 F 17 Rounseville. Hathaway.
8 F 16 Hathaway. Rounseville.
8 F 8 Hathaway. Rounseville.
8 F 9 Blank. Rounseville.
The Committee held public hearings on January 16, 17, 18
and 22 and on February 8 and 12, 1935, at which the petitioner
and the sitting member were present.
The petitioner, Cyrus C. Rounseville, was represented by coun-
sel, William E. Fuller, Esq., of Fall River, Massachusetts. The
sitting member was represented by the following counsel: John
F. Farrell, Esq., of Fall River, Massachusetts, and Charles H.
McGlue, Esq., of Boston, Massachusetts.
The Committee heard all evidence which either side desired to
present. All the witnesses were summoned through the Commit-
tee. Strict rules of evidence were not adhered to.
The petition of Cyrus C. Rounseville alleges that fraud was
perpetrated in this election through illegal tampering with the
ballots.
The petitioner also claimed that the election had been carried
on improperly, in that persons other than duly appointed election
officers handled and assisted in counting ballots.
70 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES L935.
At the public hearings, the above-mentioned ballots protested
at the recount held in Fall River and individually marked by the
Board of Registrars there (37 in number) were available as evi-
dence to both the petitioner and the opponent.
On January 16, 17 and 18, the petitioner presented evidence by
testimony of the Clerk of Precinct A, Ward 8 of the city of Fall
River, that persons other than duly appointed precinct officers
handled ballots at the State election held there on November 6,
1934.
Protested ballots from Precinct A of Ward 8 were introduced
as evidence at the time, and testimony substantiating the alleged
fraud was given by a handwriting expert, Mr. Townsend H. Hing-
ston, furnished by Cyrus C. Rounseville.
The petitioner rested his case as far as evidence was concerned
on January 18. On January 22, the opposition was heard. Mr.
Farrell finished the introduction of evidence on the same day,
with the exception of that of Mr. Ravenscroft, who was Warden
of Precinct A, Ward 8, Mr. Ravenscroft had previously been
summoned by the petitioner, but owing to illness was unable to
appear. He later testified before the Committee on February 8
at a public hearing, and corroborated testimony previously given
by the Clerk of the Precinct that persons other than duly ap-
pointed election officers handled and helped count ballots.
At the conclusion of testimony by witnesses, with the excep-
tion of Mr. Ravenscroft, the Committee went into executive
session on January 22, and unanimously voted to inspect and
examine the ballots in Precinct A of Ward 8 of the city of Fall
River.
The Committee summoned the City Clerk of Fall River and
the Town Clerk of Westport to appear and produce all of the
ballots in this district. These ballots were available for the Com-
mittee during their different hearings.
On January 24, the Committee inspected and examined all of
the ballots in Precinct A of Ward 8 with the aid of testimony
given by the handwriting expert, Mr. Wilbur F. Turner, who was
hired by them.
Owing to the conclusive evidence of fraud in Precinct A of
Ward 8, the Committee, desiring to be fair to all parties inter-
ested, unanimously voted to inspect, examine and count all of
the ballots in the Twelfth Bristol District, consisting of Wards 6
and 8 of the city of Fall River, with a total vote of 9,982, and the
town of Westport, with 1,177 votes, in all a total of 11,159
ballots.
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In the counting of 10,546 ballots in this district, outside of
Ward 8, Precinct A, in Fall River, the Committee found certain
irregular ballots, limited in number, such as uncompleted crosses,
check marks used instead of crosses, crosses between candidates'
names and party designations, but no fraud.
Before completing the count of the ballots in Precinct A,
Ward 8, the Committee held a public hearing on February 8,
when Mr. Ravenscroft testified. Closing arguments were made
by Mr. Fuller for the petitioner and Mr. Farrell for the sitting
member. On request of Mr. McGlue, a later public hearing was
held on February 12, 1935, for the introduction of further evi-
dence. When no evidence was presented, the public hearings
were closed. The Committee then went into executive session,
and completed the count of the ballots.
The fraud was confined to ballots in blocks 1 to 7, inclusive, in
Ward 8, Precinct A, Fall River.
Evidence was presented before the Committee at public hear-
ings that a person other than a duly appointed election officer
handled the ballots in the counting of these blocks.
The Committee was satisfied that the voters in this precinct
duly and properly cast their votes at this election, but after the
ballots had been taken from the box certain marks in the nature of
crosses were made on the ballots by a person other than the
original voter. These crosses were made by a harder and lighter
pencil than that used to make the other crosses on the ballot.
Greater pressure was used, and the indentations not only showed
on the fold under the crosses but were transferred to another fold
of the ballot, showing that the fraud was committed after the bal-
lots were folded and blocked for counting;.
Original fraudulent crosses were made in a great many instances
after the name of the sitting member, and in some few instances
after the name of the petitioner. In other cases, fraudulent over-
marking of crosses occurred. It was apparent that in these over-
marked cases two crosses had been made in the square opposite the
candidates' names one with a dark pencil and one with a light pen-
cil, one superimposed over the other. After the Committee had
counted all the regular ballots in this District special attention
was given to the examination, inspection and counting of the
irregular ballots, also the faudulent ballots (64 in number).
Each one of these ballots has been examined individually by
every member of the Committee, and from their personal examina-
tion, assisted by the testimony of the handwriting expert, Mr.
Turner, they arrived at their conclusions.
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The Committee followed the accepted rule that the intent of the
voter was the determining factor in arriving at its conclusion in
reference to its interpretation and counting of every ballot.
In spite of the presence of fraud, the intent of the original voter
could be determined.
No evidence has been presented, and no allegations have been
made, and the Committee has never entertained even a suspicion
that either Mr. Hathaway or Mr. Rounseville were connected
with the fraud.
The Committee was unanimous in its conclusions on all the
irregular and fraudulent ballots, with the exception of nine; and
on six of these nine the vote was six to one.
Exhibit. Committee Vote. Dissenting Vote.
51 Six members voted 2 blanks. One member voted Hathaway and blank.
126 Six members voted Rounseville and One member voted 2 blanks.
blank.
141 Six members voted Hathaway and One member voted Rounseville and
blank. blank.
149 Six members voted Theberge and blank. One member voted Rounseville and
Theberge.
3 Six members voted Theberge and blank. One member voted Hathaway and The-
berge.
4 Six members voted 2 blanks. One member voted Rounseville and
blank.
8 Five members voted Theberge and Two members voted Rounseville and
blank. Theberge.
12 Four members voted Rounseville and Three members voted 2 blanks.
blank.
13 Four members voted 2 blanks. Three members voted Rounseville and
blank.
This shows that on these nine ballots the Committee —
On 6 were divided 6 to 1.
On 1 were divided 5 to 2.
On 1 were divided 4 to 3.
On 1 were divided 3 to 4.
If every dissent taken by any member or members of the Com-
mittee, which might favor the sitting member, were granted, it
would make no change in the final result reached by the Committee.
The Committee having counted and examined every ballot
cast, with one Democrat and one Republican working together,
made their own record of the count on each block as it was handed
to the counters by the City Clerk of Fall River, who was present
every minute the Committee was in session, whether at a public
hearing or in executive session.
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Exhibit A.
Loss and Gain of Both Candidates.
Hathaway. ROUNSEVILLE.
Recount. CommitteeCount. I Recount.
Committee
Count.
Ward 6, Precinct A:
12 U
Ward 6, Precinct C:
Block 17 14 15 - -
Ward 8, Precinct B:
Block 1 20 19
Block 8 48 49
38 39
Ward 8, Precinct D:
37 38
Ward 8, Precinct E:
Block 1 41 42
Block 5 41 42
Block 14 44 45
Ward 8, Precinct F:
Block 9 18 19 33 34
Ward 8, Precinct D:
Block 12 42 43
Ward 8, Precinct A:
Block 1 21 16
Block 2 15 9
Block 3 42 39
Block 4 16 10 42 41
Block 5 38 35 18 15
Block 6 14 3 44 43
Block 7 19 2 44 39
428 382 273 266
Net loss, 46 Net loss, 7
From the above it will be seen that Hathaway lost 46 votes and
Rounseville lost 7 — a net loss of 39 to Hathaway in Fall River.
The count in Westport shows a gain of 1 for Rounseville, making
a total loss of 40 for Hathaway. As his majority was only 34 it
appears from the tabulation of the above that Rounseville wins by
6 votes.
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The Committee in its conclusions finds that, in spite of the pres-
ence of fraud, the true intent of the voters of the Twelfth Bristol
District is shown by the following enumeration:—
Result of Recount by Committee on House Elections in Rounseville v. Hathaway.
Ballard. Hathaway. Rounseville. Theberge. Blank.
Fall Hirer.
Ward 6:
T*r<v*inpt AI it" l 1 1 < l cm • 389 367 446 628 404
Precinct B . 511 446 187 508 428
Precinct C . 478 409 143 315 307
Precinct D 345 354 297 349 307
Precinct E . • 469 332 [ 233 627 431
Ward 8:
Precinct A . 166 258 331 263 210
Precinct B . 144 210 428 350 192
Precinct C . 207 536 214 138* 373
Precinct D 271 539 276 166 370
Precinct E . 20t> 367 519 383 302
Precinct F . 303 485 884 696 478
West port.
Precinct A . 150 193 300 401 254
Precinct B . 98 93 337 307 221
3.737 4.589 4.595 5.131 4,277
The Committee therefore recommends the adoption of the fol-
lowing resolution : —
Resolved, That Cyrus C. Rounseville of Fall River was duly elected one
of the Representatives to the General Court from the Twelfth Bristol Repre-
sentative District at the election held November 6, 1934, and that he is
entitled to and is hereby given the seat now occupied by J. Dolan Hathaway.
Burt Dewar.
James M. McCracken.
Hiram N. Dearborn.
Jeremiah J. Healy.
Clarence S. Luitwieler.
James F. Tobin.
Anthony R. Doyle.
Report amended as follows: —
Resolved, That Cyrus C. Rounseville of Fall River was duly elected one of
the Representatives to the General Court from the Twelfth Bristol Repre-
sentative District at the election held November 6, 1934, and that he is en-
titled to and is hereby given a seat in this chamber.
[Report accepted March 11, 1935. — House Journal, p. 484.]
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House — 1935.
Committee on Elections. — Representatives Burt Dewar of Maiden, Clar-
ence S. Luitwieler of Newton, Jeremiah J. Healy of Natick, James
M. McCracken of Needhara, Hiram N. Dearborn of Somerville,
Anthony R. Doyle of Worcester and James F. Tobin of Salem.
Frederick B. Willis v. James M. McElroy.
House Document, No. 1963. April 3, 1935. Report by all the committee.
Recount of Votes. — Failure to comply with the statutory provisions pertaining
to petitions for recounts does not prevent the House of Representatives from
recounting the votes under the power given it in the constitution to judge of the
returns, election and qualifications of its own members.
Same. — Where evidence of mistake in the counting and tabulation of the votes
is sufficient to warrant the committee in recounting the same the committee may
do so.
Same. — Statutory provisions as to elections must be interpreted on the theory
that they are enacted to prevent fraud and mistakes and to secure freedom of
choice. They are not to be so construed as to make the right of voting and having
the votes ultimately counted with accuracy subject to technical obstructions not
affecting the merits of the election on ascertained facts.
Report of the Committee on Elections on the Petition of Frederick
Bancroft Willis for a Recount of Votes cast for Representatives
in the Tenth Essex District.
The Committee on Elections, to which was referred the petition
of Frederick Bancroft Willis that he be declared elected as repre-
sentative from the Tenth Essex District, which comprises Wards
1, 6 and 7 of Lynn and the towns of Saugns and Lynnfield (House,
No. 381), and the petition of James M. McElroy for a recount of the
votes cast in the entire Tenth Essex District in the event that a
recount is held in any part of said District and the status of said
McElroy as a member of the House of Representatives is in any
way affected thereby (House, No. 932), submit the following
report : —
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The petition, House, No. 381, is as follows: —
House No. 381
By Mr. Hays of Boston (by request), petition of Frederick Bancroft Willis for
a recount of votes cast for Representatives in the Tenth Essex District and that
he be declared one of the duly elected Representatives from said district (House,
No. 381). Elections (House).
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Thirty-Five.
To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts in General Court assembled.
The undersigned, a citizen of Saugus, Massachusetts, respectfully repre-
sents that at the state election held on November 6, 1934, the petitioner was
one of the Republican candidates for the office of Representative to the General
Court from the Tenth Essex Representative District from which district
three representatives are elected
;
That the first count of the votes cast in said representative contest gave two
Democratic candidates, and one Republican candidate in said district as
having received the three highest number of votes and your petitioner as
having received the fourth highest number of votes;
That upon a petition being duly filed, a recount of the votes cast in said
representative contest was duly made, and the result of said recount in pre-
cinct three of ward seven of the city of Lynn gave the Democratic candidates
substantial gains in votes and gave the Republican candidates substantial
losses in votes;
That your petitioner believes that the recount in said precinct was probably
erroneous in that two blocks of Democratic ballots may have been counted
twice while one block of Republican ballots may not have been counted in
said recount;
That another recount of the votes cast for representatives in said precinct
should be made in order that it may be definitely determined which of the
three candidates for the office of representative from said district actually
received the three highest number of votes;
Wherefore, Your petitioner prays that such action, including a recount as
above requested, be taken so that it may be determined whether your peti-
tioner was elected as representative to the general court from said Tenth
Essex Representative District, and that if it be determined that he was
so elected, he be seated as a representative from said district.
Frederick Bancroft Willis,
6 Willis Street, Saugus.
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The petition, House, No. 932, is as follows: —
House • No. 932
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By Mr. McDonald of Chelsea, petition of James M. McElroy for a recount of
votes cast for Representative in the entire Tenth Essex District in the event that
a recount is held in any part of said district (House, No. 932). Elections (House).
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Thirty-Five.
Petition of James M. McElroy for a Recount of Votes cast in the
Entire Tenth Essex District in the Event of a Recount in Any
Part of Said District.
To the Honorable House of Representatives of The Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts in General Court assembled.
The undersigned, a citizen of Lynn, Massachusetts, respectfully represents
that on Tuesday, November 6, 1934, he was duly elected as Representative
to the General Court from the Tenth Essex District, as one of its three Rep-
resentatives;
That the said Tenth Essex Representative District comprises Wards one, six
and seven in the city of Lynn, and the entire towns of Saugus and Lynnfield
;
That, on January 2, 1935, your petitioner was found duly qualified and
seated as a member of the House of Representatives from the district afore-
said; and
That subsequent to your petitioner being seated as aforesaid, one Frederick
Bancroft W7illis, a citizen of Saugus and a candidate at the last State election,
on November 6, 1934, for one of the three seats now occupied by your peti-
tioner, filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives, current House
document No. 381, seeking in substance that the House of Representatives
recount the votes cast in one precinct only of said Representative District,
namely, Precinct 3 of Wrard 7 in the city of Lynn, hoping thereby to change
the result of the election so as to acquire a seat in your Honorable Body.
Wherefore, Your petitioner prays that, if the Honorable House of Repre-
sentatives determines that a recount should be held of the individual precinct
as prayed for by said Willis, and if after such a recount the status of your
petitioner is in any way affected as a member of your Honorable Body, a
recount of the vote cast for said office in the entire district be held, in order
fairly to determine who is entitled to sit as Representative of the said Tenth
Essex District.
James M. McElroy,
410 Summer Street, Lynn.
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The Committee on Elections held a public hearing on February
7, 1935, at which the petitioner in House, No. 381, Frederick B.
Willis, hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner," and James M.
McElroy, the petitioner in House, No. 932, hereinafter referred to
as "the sitting member," were present.
The petitioner was represented by counsel, Myer Rubin, Esq., of
Boston, Massachusetts. The sitting member was represented by
counsel, Charles H. McGlue, Esq., of Boston, Massachusetts.
Mr. Rubin opened for the petitioner, claiming that at the re-
count held in the City Hall of Lynn, on November 15, 1934,
owing to the confusion existing there at that time, a mistake had
been made in the recounting of the ballots in Precinct 3 of Ward 7
of the city of Lynn; that Block 5 in this Precinct, a Democratic
block of 50 ballots, was counted twice, and that Block 13 in this
Precinct, a Republican block, was not counted at all; and that
there has been a loss to the petitioner of 66 votes in that one block.
No charges of fraud or other irregularities were made in either
petition or at the public hearings.
The sitting member raised a technical objection that inasmuch
as the petitioner had not complied with the statutory law applica-
ble in the city of Lynn in relation to petitions for contested elec-
tions (General Laws, chapter 54, section 134, as affected by Acts
of 1931, chapter 92), the Committee should not entertain his
petition.
Evidence was presented by the petitioner that, conforming to the
General Laws, chapter 54, section 134, he had written a letter to the
City Clerk of the city of Lynn, as follows: —
Saugus, Massachusetts, November 22, 1934.
Mr. Joseph Attwill, City Clerk, City Hall, Lynn, Massachusetts.
Sir: — Complying with section 134, chapter 54 of the General Laws, Ter-
centenary Edition, I hereby notify you that I claim election to the office of
Representative to the General Court in the Tenth Essex District at the elec-
tion held on Tuesday, November 6, 1934, it being my intention to contest the
election of any other person. I request that you retain the envelopes con-
taining the ballots cast for such office until such claim of mine is either with-
drawn or the contest determined.
Respectfully yours,
Frederick Bancroft Willis.
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The following is a copy of the reply sent to him by the City
Clerk: —
Mr. Frederick Bancroft Willis, Saugas, Massachusetts.
Dear Sir: — I am in receipt of your letter of November 22, wherein you
state it is your intention to contest the election of any other person as Repre-
sentative at the election held on November (3, 1934.
It is my opinion that you should also serve notice to this effect on the
Election Commissioners.
Mr. Joseph Attwill, City Clerk of Lynn, testified that he told
Mr. Wallace, Chairman of the Board of Election Commissioners
of the city of Lynn, that Mr. Willis had filed this letter with him
and was protesting the election.
Mr. Attwill further testified that he was not sure of his own
jurisdiction in this matter, and that no one at the City Hall in
Lynn was sure as to who had jurisdiction until the decision of the
Supreme Court was handed down on December 19, 1934, on the
Clancy v. Wallace writ of mandamus.
The Committee overruled this technical objection on the ground
that under chapter 1, section 3, Article X of Part 2 of the Con-
stitution of the Commonwealth the House of Representatives is
given full power to judge of the returns, election and qualifications
of its own members.
Section 134 of chapter 54 of the General Laws is a statute
enacted for the benefit of persons desiring to contest an election,
in order that they may have the ballots available to use in such
contests.
The failure to comply strictly with the provisions of a statute
cannot be held to divest the House of Representatives of the
foregoing power conferred by the Constitution. Under such
power the House of Representatives has full authority to demand
the ballots if they have not been destroyed.
In this particular instance the ballots were available.
In executing the power given by the Constitution the Committee
of the House should be governed by the principle set forth in the
case of Joseph B. Clancy v. John R. Wallace et als.: —
The object of election laws, both as to the preparation and casting of ballots
and as to the counting of them, whether by election officers or by recounting
officers, is to ascertain the popular will and to secure the rights of the duly
qualified electors. Statutory provisions as to elections must be interpreted
on the theory that they are enacted to prevent fraud and mistakes and to
secure freedom of choice. They are not to be so construed as to make the right
of voting and having the votes ultimately counted with accuracy subject to
technical obstructions not affecting the merits of the election on ascertained
facts.
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Moore v. Booth, on page 35 of Public Document, No. 37, entitled
"Reports of Contested Election Cases in the Senate and House
of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for
the Years 1903-1932," cited by the counsel for the sitting member
as authority for dismissing the petition numbered, House, No.
381, does not bear out his contention. In that case the House
Committee on Elections, in determining whether or not to recount
ballots in the remainder of an election district after having
recounted the ballots in a part thereof, stated as follows : —
It seems clear that the committee on elections ought not to recount the vote
of a town where the petitioner has not availed himself of his statutory right*,
unless he was prevented from doing so by the fraud of his opponent or by some
cause beyond his control.
In the matter now before this Committee a recount of ballots
was held by the local authorities upon the request of the petitioner.
There is no justification in extending the application of Moore v.
Booth to a mere technical violation of a statute enacted for the
benefit of a person desiring to contest an election in order that he
may have the ballots available at an election contest.
The Committee then proceeded to hear all evidence in support
of the contention of the petitioner that a mistake had been made
in the counting of the ballots at the recount held in the city of
Lynn on November 15, 1934.
All the witnesses were summoned through the Committee.
Strict rules of evidence were not adhered to.
Evidence was presented to show that at the recount held on
November 15, 1934, in the City Hall, Lynn, Mass., in the count-
ing of ballots in Precinct 3, Ward 7, all the Republican candidates
lost in the recounting of Block 13 as against the original count
of this block, while later, on December 22, 1934, as a result of a
recount held for the office of Secretary of State, no change in his
vote was shown in the recount figures of Block 13 from the figures
on that block at the original count.
The Committee held a further public hearing on February 11,
1935, where evidence was heard as to the existing confusion and
the methods of protesting ballots, and of recording of protests
at said recount.
Testimony by witnesses was concluded on this day, and closing
arguments were made for the petitioner by Mr. Rubin and for
the sitting member by Mr. McGlue.
The Tenth Essex District comprises Wards 1, 6 and 7 in the
city of Lynn and the entire towns of Saugus and Lynnfield. This
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District is entitled to three Representatives. At the State election
held on November 6, 1934, W. A. Cuffe, H. E. Dodge, F. A.
Hutchinson, W. J. Landergan, J. M. McElroy and F. B. Willis
were candidates for Representative.
Each received, according to the return made to the Secretary
of State after the recount had been held, the following vote: —
Lynn. Saugus. Lynnfield. Totals.
Cuffe 6,085 1,101 188 7,374
3,099 3,567 597 7,263
4,621 3,047 617 8,285
6,684 1,211 206 8,101
McElroy 6,369 1,055 173 7,597
Willis 3,413 3,609 544 7,566
On the face of the returns, Fred A. Hutchinson, William J.
Landergan and James M. McElroy were declared duly elected,
and a certificate of election was issued to each of them. McElroy,
whose election is being contested, was apparently elected by 31
votes.
At the conclusion of the public hearings the Committee went
into executive session on February 11, 1935, and, being convinced
that sufficient evidence of a mistake in the recount of ballots in
Precinct 3 of Ward 7 of the city of Lynn had been shown to war-
rant the counting of ballots in said precinct by the Committee,
as requested by the petitioner, voted to count the same in execu-
tive session. Although all parties in interest had been notified
during the public hearings that any count the Committee might
make would be made in executive session, no objection was raised.
On February 13, 1935, the Committee, in executive session, pro-
ceeded to count the ballots in this precinct. The tally sheet of
Block 13 was found in the Block 5 envelope and the Block 5 tally
sheet in the Block 13 envelope. This fact tends to bear out the
petitioner's contention.
After counting Blocks 5 and 13, the Committee was satisfied
that the contention of the petitioner that at the recount Block 5
had been counted twice and Block 13 not counted at all was fully
borne out. The recount results for Block 5 (a Democratic block)
and for Block 13 (a Republican block) showed 41 votes for the
sitting member and 6 for the petitioner in each case, making a net
plurality of 70 for the sitting member for these two blocks. The
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Committee's count for Block 5 was the same as at the recount, to
wit: 41 for the sitting member and 6 for the petitioner, but the
Committee's count for Block 13 was 8 for the sitting member
and 39 for the petitioner, making a net plurality of 4 for the sit-
ting member for these two blocks.
It is to be further noted that the said contention of the peti-
tioner is conclusively borne out by the testimony of Mr. Wallace,
the chairman of the Election Commissioners, that at the original
count of said Blocks 5 and 13 the sitting member and the peti-
tioner, respectively, received 41 and 6 votes in Block 5 and 8
and 39 votes in Block 13 (the same number of votes as found by
the Committee in its count), and that at the recount all the can-
didates for Representative in this District appeared to have re-
ceived substantially the same number of votes, respectively, in
each of these two blocks. The contention of the petitioner is
further borne out by the fact, which has already been referred
to, that at the recount of Block 13 for State Secretary there was
no change from the original count in the vote for him.
Original Count. Recount. Committee Count.
Block.
Sitting
Member.
Peti-
tioner.
Sitting
Member.
Peti-
tioner.
Sitting
Member.
Peti-
tioner.
5 41 6 41 6 41 6
13 8 39 41 6 8 39
82 12 49 45
82 minus 12 equals 70 — net plurality of sitting member at recount.
49 minus 45 equals 4 — net plurality of sitting member under Committee count.
This error in counting said Blocks 5 and 13 took away from
the petitioner 66 votes which should have been counted for him,
and this alone is sufficient to change the result of the election,
even though all questions relative to ballots or the counting
thereof are settled in favor of the sitting member. Notwithstand-
ing this fact, and notwithstanding that no doubts have been
thrown on the accuracy of the returns of the votes in the Dis-
trict elsewhere than in this one precinct, the Committee, out of
a desire to be fair to all parties concerned, decided to grant the
prayer of the sitting member set forth in House, No. 932, and
count all the ballots cast for Representative in this entire Repre-
sentative District, amounting to nearly 13,000 ballots.
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In the course of such further counting a number of errors were
found, all but two of which involved only one or two votes in
each instance. There was one error that involved a change of
three votes. In Precinct 2 of Ward 1 of the city of Lynn, an
error in the tabulation of Block 14 was made, whereby 21 votes
were set down for the petitioner instead of 41, as shown in the
original count. The Committee found that 41 was the true
count, thereby making a definite gain of 20 votes for the petitioner.
All losses and gains throughout the District are shown below : —
M( Elroy. Willis.
Loss. dam. .Loss. Gain
Lynn.
Ward 1, Precinct 1:
1
1 - -
Ward 1, Precinct 2:
- - - 20
- - 2 -
- 2 -
Ward 6, Precinct 1:
Block 1 1 - - -
Ward 6, Precinct 3:
- 1 - -
Ward 6, Precinct 4:
2 - - -
Ward 6, Precinct 5:
1 1
Block 12 1
Ward 6, Precinct 6:
Block 4 1
Block 9 1
Ward 6, Precinct 9:
Block 6
Block 12 3
Block 16 2
Block 19 1 1
Block 21 2
Sang us.
Precinct 1:
Block 17
Precinct 3:
Block 10 1
Block 16 i
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McElroy. Willis.
Loss. Gain. Loss. Gain.
Saugus — Con.
Precinct 4:
Block 3 1
Block 9 _ 1 _
Block 10 - - 2 -
2
Precinct 7:
Block 10 - - - 1
_ 1 _ _
Lynn.
Ward 7, Precinct 2:
Block 11 1
Ward 7, Precinct 3:
Block 1
. 1
Block 2 - 1
Block 12 1
Block 13 33 33
Block 15 1
Ward 7, Precinct 3:
Block 21 1
Block 22
. . . . 1
Total 46 12 12 60
McElroy Willis
46 60
12 12
34 loss 48 gain
34
82 total gain
McElroy won by 31
51 Willis wins
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The Committee in its conclusions finds that the true intent of
the voters in the Tenth Essex Representative District is shown
by the following tabulation : —
Recount Committee.
McElroy. Willis.
Lynn.
Ward 1:
371 624
Precinct 2 332 632
Ward 6:
Precinct 1 .......... 360 106
Precinct 2 . ......... 370 88
Precinct3........... 647 136
427 131
524 81
699 116
448 204
442 114
483 427
5,103 2,659
Ward 7:
370 211
323 273
541 324
1,234 808
Saugus.
170 450
111 478
191 563
96 407
136 318
144 403
59 392
150 596
1,057 3.607
Lynnfield.
82 337
91 207
173 544
Committee Count.
McElroy. Willis.
5.103 2.659
1,234 808
1,057 3.607
173 544
7,567 7,618
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It appears that the petitioner was elected by 51 votes.
The Committee therefore recommends the adoption of the fol-
lowing resolution : —
Resolved, That Frederick Bancroft Willis of Saugus was duly elected one
of the Representatives to the General Court from the Tenth Essex Repre-
sentative District at the election held on November 6, 1934, and that he is
entitled to, and is hereby given, the seat now occupied by James M. McElroy.
Burt Dewar.
Clarence S. Luitwieler.
Jeremiah J. Healy.
James M. McCracken.
Hiram N. Dearborn.
Anthony R. Doyle.
James F. Tobin.
[Report rejected, April 8, 1935. — House Journal, p. 715.]
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Senate — 1937.
Special Senate Committee on Elections. — Hon. George G. Moyse of Waltham,
Hon. Newland H. Holmes of Weymouth, Hon. Angier L. Goodwin of
• Melrose, Hon. Edward C. Carroll of Boston and Hon. Eugene H.
Giroux of Somerville.
Edward H. Nutting v. George W. Stanton.
Senate Document, No. 342. Feb. 17, 1937. Report by Senators Moyse,
Holmes and Goodwin. Minority report by Senators Carroll and
Giroux.
Ballots. — Where the cross upon the ballot appears between the name of the
candidate and the party designation and such informality appears throughout the
ballot such votes will be counted.
Same. — Where a cross appears against the name of one candidate and an
oblique line opposite the name of the opposing candidate, the intent of the voter
not being clear the ballot will be counted as a blank.
Same. — Where a cross appears in the square opposite the name of a candidate
and a cross in the square below and it appears from examination of the ballot
that a sticker bearing the name of another person had been pasted on such ballot,
the ballot will be counted as a blank as the voter voted for more persons than
were to be elected.
Same. — When ballots are marked with a cross for one candidate and an oblique
line or apparently accidental mark for the other candidate the ballots will be
counted for the candidate whose name is marked by the cross.
Same. — Where ballots are marked with a clear cross after the name of a candi-
date and the square opposite the name of the other candidate was marked and it
appears that the voter attempted to erase or obliterate the cross, the ballot will
be counted for the candidate opposite whose name appears the clear cross.
Same. — Ballots marked by a cross in the square opposite the blank space
below the names of the candidates will be counted as blanks.
Same. — Ballots upon which a name is written and the name appears to be
that of the voter will be counted as a blank, as the voter attempts to place identify-
ing marks on his ballot which is prohibited by law. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 56, § 31.
Same. — Where a cross filling the entire space of the two squares opposite both
candidates it will be counted as a blank as the intent of the voter is not clear.
Same. — Ballots marked with a T, Y or V will be counted if intent of voter is
clear.
Same. — Ballots marked by an oblique line where the rest of ballot is marked by
distinct crosses will be counted as a blank.
Same. — Where the marks on the ballot do not constitute a cross but are uniform
throughout the ballot, the intent of the voter is clear and such ballot will be counted.
This would include a check mark as here illustrated : y/'
.
Same. — Where unusual markings appear on a ballot as double crosses, with
evidence of erasure apparent upon examination of the ballot and the other crosses
upon the ballot are clear and distinct the vote will be counted as a blank.
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Re-port of the Special Senate Committee on Elections on the Petition
of Edward H. Nutting that he be declared elected and Seated
as the Senator from the Third Worcester Senatorial District.
The Special Committee on Elections, to whom was referred the
petition of Honorable Edward H. Nutting (Senate, No. 103)
that he be declared elected and seated as the senator from the
Third Worcester Senatorial District, submits the following re-
port:—
Public hearings were held on four days at which both parties
were present and were also represented by counsel, — the peti-
tioner by Frank G. Volpe, Esquire, and Alfred C. Walton, Es-
quire, and the sitting member, Honorable George W. Stanton,
by Charles H. McGlue, Esquire.
The Committee decided to visit the various cities and towns
in the Third Worcester Senatorial District and examine the pro-
tested ballots. We accordingly traveled to Ashburnham, Athol,
Fitchburg, Gardner, Leominster, Lunenburg, Phillipston, Royal-
ston, Templeton and Winchendon.
We found that one hundred and fifteen ballots had been duly
protested in the several cities and towns, and these ballots were
produced by local election officials and examined by your Com-
mittee. In addition to our own study of these disputed ballots
we had the benefit of having read into the record by counsel a
description of the several ballots, with comment upon the par-
ticular informalities alleged.
After arguments of counsel at a later hearing and after further
study with careful comparison and analysis of disputed ballots
we have made our decision as to each of them, and our findings
are hereinafter set out.
It should be noted that when we refer to the way a ballot was
"counted," reference is made to the action of the registrars of
voters at the official recount. Whenever we refer to the way a
ballot was "originally counted," reference is made to the action
of the election officials at the election.
The one hundred and fifteen protested ballots may be grouped
as follows: —
Nos. 7, 8, 10, 21, 24, 25, 26, 28, 40, 71, 72, 78, 79, 80, 81, 108,
110 and 113 are ballots concerning which protests were waived
during the hearings, and need not be further considered.
Nos. 4, 5 and 100 were marked outside the squares provided
therefor. Nos. 4 and 5 were marked by a cross between the
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name of the candidate, Stanton, and the party designation. These
ballots were uniform in informality, and following the rule in
Beauchemin v. Flagg, 229 Mass. 23, we find that both were cor-
rectly counted for Stanton. No. 100 had some marks in the
mottled margin separating the column containing the names of
candidates for senator from the column next on the right, with the
names of candidates for county offices. There was a cross in this
division margin opposite the Stanton line and an oblique mark
opposite the Xutting line. We cannot determine a clear intent
on the part of the voter, and accordingly find that the ballot
was properly counted as a blank.
No. 70 was protested for an alleged difference in mark charac-
teristics. We find no such difference and disallow the protest.
No. 20 was marked with a cross in the Stanton square and a
cross in the square below, opposite the blank space, in which
had been pasted a sticker bearing the name of another person.
This voter voted for more persons than were to be elected, and
the ballot was properly counted a blank.
Nos. 13, 19, 41, 48, 74, 77, 102 and 106 are ballots with a cross
for one candidate and an oblique fine or apparently accidental
mark for the other. We find that each of these ballots was cor-
rectly counted for the candidate in whose square was placed the
cross. Dennett v. Sullivan, Pub. Doc. 37, p. 40. Brewster v.
Sherman, 195 Mass. 222.
Nos. 1, 2, 6, 36, 47, 91, 92, 107, 112 and 115 show an erasure or
obliteration of a cross or mark in one square, but show a good
cross for the other candidate. We find each of these ballots to
have been correctly counted for the candidate in whose square
was the clean cross. Riley v. Aldrich, Pub. Doc. 37, p. 28.
Nos. 14, 53, 55, 56, 62, 63, 65, 84 and 114 are ballots marked
by a cross, over or connected with which is another mark or
marks not amounting to an obliteration. No 14, counted for
Stanton, and No. 114, for Nutting, show a good cross with lighter
line through the intersection. Nos. 55 and 56 for Nutting and
Nos. 65 and 84 counted for Stanton have an extra line across one
line of the cross. No. 62, counted for Nutting, has an extra fine
running out from the intersection. In each of these cases we
believe the voter intended to vote as his vote was counted. No. 53,
counted for Nutting, and No. 63, for Stanton, are both marked
by a cross apparently made by continuing the second downward
stroke upward across the first line and then down again. These
crosses appear to have been made by two strokes of the pencil,
and we do not find any intent to obliterate the marking.
90 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES— 1937.
Nos. 9, 11, 18, 23, 27, 29, 30, 35, 42, 46, 66, 67, 69, 76, 86, 88,
93, 98, 99 and 101 are marked by a cross in the square opposite
the blank space below the names of the candidates. Our Supreme
Court has decided in Flanders v. Roberts, 182 Mass. 524, that
these ballots must be counted as blanks. All excepting the first
two were so counted. Nos. 9 and 11 were counted for Stanton,
and the petitioner's protest on these two ballots is allowed.
Stanton loses 2; blanks gain 2.
Nos. 15 and 39 are ballots upon which a name was written,
and we find that the name in each instance is the name of the
voter who cast the ballot. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 80, provides
that " Except as authorized by this chapter, no voter, election
officer or other person shall place on a ballot any mark by which
it may be identified;" and G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 56, § 31, provides a
penalty for " Whoever, at a primary, caucus or election, places
any distinguishing mark upon his ballot. . . ." In a recent case,
Hall v. Barton, 290 Mass. 476, our Supreme Court says: " Every
implication of the statutes as to the conduct of elections is that
ballots illegally cast because containing identifying marks con-
trary to the mandate of said sections 80 and 31 should not be
countenanced by being counted." Both of these ballots were
originally counted blank, and at the recount were counted for
Stanton. We find these to be "identified" ballots, and further
find, under the language in Hall v. Barton, above quoted, that the
ballots should not have been counted for the sitting member.
Stanton loses 2; blanks gain 2.
Nos. 17, 37, 45, 50, 57, 58, 68, 73, 83, 85, 103 and 105 are ballots
marked by a cross or symbol partly outside the square. No. 17
shows a sticker in the blank line so pasted on that the right end
overlaps the Stanton line. The printed line on the ballot shows
through the sticker, and the intersection of the cross is above
this line, separating the Stanton square from the square below.
We believe the intent of the voter is clear and that this vote was
properly counted for the person whose name is on the sticker.
No. 37 was properly counted a blank, as the intersection and so
much of the cross is below the Stanton line as to make it impossible
to discover the intent of the voter. Nos. 50, 83, 85 and 105,
counted for Stanton, might be called borderline cases, but we
believe they should stand as probably showing a sufficiently
clear intent to vote for the sitting member. Nos. 45, 57, 68 and
73 were counted for Nutting and should stand. No. 58 is marked
by a cross filling the entire space of the two squares opposite
both candidates. The intent of the voter is not clear and the
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ballot was properly counted a blank. No. 103, counted for
Stanton, has a cross occupying the greater part of the Nutting
square but extending into the Stanton square slightly and inter-
secting there. We are satisfied that this ballot discloses a clear
intent to vote for Nutting. Stanton loses 1: Nutting gains 1.
Nos. 16, 31, 32, 38, 43, 44, 49, 51, 59, 60, 61, 87, 94, 96 and 104
are ballots marked by a T, Y or V or an imperfect cross. No. 38
was counted for Stanton. It is a Y mark intersecting on the line,
the upper half and greater part of the Y being in the Nutting
square. We find a clear intent of this voter to vote for Nutting.
No. 43 was counted blank and is marked by a V, practically all of
which is within the Stanton square. It was originally counted for
Stanton. We have no doubt as to the intent of this voter to vote
for Stanton, and are satisfied that it should not have been counted
blank at the recount. None of the other ballots in this group have
given us great difficulty. Stanton loses 1; Nutting gains 1;
Stanton gains 1; blanks lose 1.
Nos. 12, 22, 64, 75, 82, 90, 95, 97 and 111 are ballots marked by
a symbol other than an X, T, Y or Y. No. 12 shows such faint
and indefinite marking as to furnish no ground for establishing any
clear intent of the voter, and was properly counted blank. No. 22,
counted for Stanton, is marked by a single oblique line, while the
voter used good crosses in other places. Under the rule in the case
of Dennett v. Sullivan, supra, this ballot should have been counted
blank. Under the same decision, we allow the protest of the sit-
ting member on No. 90, counted for Nutting. This ballot was
marked with a single diagonal line with a hook at the lower end.
The voter used good crosses in other places. No. 64, counted for
Stanton, is marked with one heavy line which penetrated the bal-
lot with an indistinct cross line. WTe believe, however, that the
ballot discloses the intent of the voter. Nos. 75 and 111 are
marked by overlapping and intersecting lines which do not produce
a good cross, but in both cases the marking is the same in other
places on the ballot. There is no indication of any attempt at
obliteration and we find a clear intent to vote for Nutting. Both
ballots were so counted. No. 82, counted for Stanton, is marked
by two lines at right angles, which, if they had intersected, would
have* formed a T with oblique upright. Following the decision
in the case of Riley v. Aldrich, supra, we disallow the protest
of the petitioner on this ballot, as the other marks were good
crosses. No. 95, counted for Stanton, was marked by two curved
lines, parallel, not quite joining at the center, and appearing
roughly like the figures 76. This marking was somewhat uniform
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throughout the ballot, and we believe the vote was properly
counted. No. 97 was marked by a check mark for Nutting, this
marking being uniform over the ballot. The decision in Dennett
v. Sullivan, supra, is conclusive on this point and we find that
this ballot was correctly counted for the petitioner. Stanton
loses 1; blanks gain 1; Nutting loses 1; blanks gain 1.
Nos. 3, 33, 34, 52, 54, 89 and 109 are ballots showing erasure or
obliteration. No. 3 shows a clear erasure of a marking in the
Stanton square. Nos 33 and 34 have a cross in the Stanton square
and another cross in the square below opposite the blank space,
the crosses being smudged, so that we cannot be certain as to what
the intent of the voter was. No. 52 shows a cross for Stanton,
through the intersection of which is drawn a heavy line from left to
right. No. 54 is marked for Stanton by a cross to which has been
added other lines to destroy its character as a good cross. No. 89
is marked for Stanton with a cross the lower part of which has
been crossed again by two prominent lines, producing the effect
of a double cross, the center of which is on the lower line of the
Stanton square. All of these three ballots disclose other mark-
ings which are good crosses. We are unable to determine the real
intent of the voter. These six ballots were counted for Stanton.
We find that they should have been counted blanks. No. 109
shows the erasure of a mark in the Nutting square, but notwith-
standing the erasure, a cross therein which is clear cut and sharply
defined. We have no question that the cross was marked after the
erasure. We accordingly disallow the protest of the sitting mem-
ber. Stanton loses 6; blanks gain 6.
It appears that the petitioner was originally declared to have
been elected by a plurality of twenty-three votes. As a result of
the recount the sitting member was declared to have been elected
by a plurality of five votes, as shown by the following tabulation
of the official returns: —
Nutting 21,681
Stanton 21,686
All others 8
Blanks 3,508
Total 46,883
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We report the following changes in protested ballots: —
Stanton loses; blanks gain.
Nos. Nos.
3 39
9 52
11 54
15 89
22 —
33 11
34
Stanton loses; Nutting gains.
Nos.
38
> 103
2
Stanton gains; blanks lose.
No.
43
1
Nutting loses; blanks gain.
No.
90
1
Stanton net loss, 12; Nutting net gain, 1; blanks net gain, 11.
Giving effect to these changes, the Committee finds that a cor-
rected tabulation of the vote cast in the Senatorial District is as
follows:
Nutting 21,682
Stanton 21,674
All others 8
Blanks . . . 3,519
Total . 46,883
And your Committee finds that at an election held November 3,
1936, in the Third Worcester Senatorial District, Edward H.
Nutting received 21,682 votes, and George W. Stanton received
21,674 votes, and that Edward H. Nutting was elected senator by a
plurality of eight votes.
The Committee therefore recommends the adoption of the fol-
lowing resolution :—
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Resolved, That Edward H. Nutting of Leominster was duly elected senator
from the Third Worcester Senatorial District at the election held November
third, nineteen hundred and thirty-six, and that he is entitled to and is hereby
given the seat now occupied by George W. Stanton.
George G. Moyse.
Newland H. Holmes.
Angier L. Goodwin.
[Report accepted, March 9, 1937. — Senate Journal, page 381.]
Minority Report of the Special Senate Committee on Elections.
The undersigned, two of the five members of the Special Com-
mittee of the Senate to which was referred the petition of Edward
H. Nutting contesting the seat of Senator George W. Stanton of
the Third Worcester District, dissent from the report of the major-
ity of the Committee and submit the following report for accept-
ance by the Senate.
The petitioner, Edward H. Nutting, at the completion of the
original count of the ballots, was declared elected State Senator
from the Third Worcester District by a plurality of twenty-three
votes; a recount ensued, after which the sitting member, George
W. Stanton, was declared elected by a plurality of five votes;
whereupon the said Edward H. Nutting filed the petition that was
referred to this Special Committee, in which, chiefly, he alleges
irregularities in the recount in the cities of Leominster and Fitch-
burg, whereby adequate opportunity was denied for the inspection
of the ballots at the recount, and that in the city of Gardner and
the towns of Athol and Templeton the ballots were not properly
counted, and that in the town of Westminster the recount was not
conducted according to law.
The Committee after its organization went to the various towns
and cities of the Senatorial District concerned and inspected the
protested ballots, which had been identified as protested by the
election officials except in the city of Leominster, where there were
seven protested ballots, but the City Clerk had arbitrarily re-
fused to identify the protested ballots at the time of the recount,
so that the only way that your Committee can pass judgment
upon these seven protested ballots is to count all the ballots in the
city of Leominster, and this the majority of the Committee re-
fuses to do.
Likewise, although the protested ballots were identified in the
city of Fitchburg, nevertheless, in fairness to the petitioner,
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Edward H. Nutting, who in Ward 1, Precinct A, in that city lost
twenty votes during the process of the recount, the ballots should
be recounted, at least in that precinct, and the majority of the
Committee also refuses to count these ballots.
During the tour of inspection the Committee merely inspected
the protested ballots, and made notes thereon at their pleasure,
and listened to comment upon them by counsel for both the
petitioner and the sitting member, which was noted by the Com-
mittee's stenographer, and record thereof made for the use of
the Committee. Neither the protested ballots, nor photostatic
copies thereof, were available for the Committee during its execu-
tive sessions, to guide the Committee in passing upon the decisions
of the election officials. It is impossible for the Committee to
pass adequate judgment on the judgment of the election officials
made by them as they viewed the ballots, guided merely by
visualizing the ballot as they saw it weeks before, and by com-
ment of attorneys which, in most instances, was not accurate and
naturally biased in favor of their clients. If any of the decisions
of the election officials, who are experienced in passing judgment
on protested ballots, are to be altered by the Committee, it is
impossible to understand how the Committee can do this without
having the ballots, or at least photostatic copies of them, before
them when making their decisions. For the Committee, by such
means, to alter the decision of election officials, and to overturn
the will of the voters as expressed by the recount of the ballots,
would, to say the least, arouse suspicion and distrust by the
electorate. For undoubtedly the public has more faith in the
decisions of its disinterested election officials than in those of any
picked committee of elected office holders.
The petitioner's alleged irregularities in the town of West-
minster were not substantiated or pressed by the petitioner.
However, when the Committee visited the town of Royalston
it was disclosed that there were six absentee ballots cast in said
town in violation of section 59 of chapter 54 of our General Laws,
and yet the majority members refused by formal vote to investi-
gate the casting of these six ballots. In view of the fact that the
outcome of this contest hinges on so few votes, just decision in
this case is impossible without adequate investigation into the
matter of the casting and counting of these six ballots.
The allegations of improper counting by the election officials in
the towns of Athol and Templeton and the city of Gardner,
except in two instances in the town of Athol which are explained
below, are matters concerning, for the most part, irregular crosses,
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questionable obliterations and such, which as stated above can
only be adequately passed upon by having the ballots, or photo-
static copies thereof, before the Committee as it renders its final
judgment upon them, and in the absence of such procedure the
decision of the election officials should stand. Concerning the
two instances in the town of Athol, it is unanimously agreed by
the Committee that two ballots with crosses opposite the blank
space below the name of George W. Stanton should be counted
as blanks, instead of for the said Stanton. This is borne out by
many decisions, as cited in 182 Mass. 524, and decisions made
by the General Court in contested election cases.
In the instances of two other disputed ballots (Committee
exhibits Nos. 15 and 39) which were counted for Stanton, and
which the majority of the Committee change and count as blanks,
the law is equally clear that the decisions of the election officials
in counting these two ballots for Stanton are correct. In a deci-
sion rendered by Justice Sanderson of the Supreme Judicial Court
on November 23, 1929, in the matter of Beal v. Brown, et al., the
court in substance held: That a word or name so written on the
ballot that it might be found to be a distinguishing mark in viola-
tion of the statute, would not invalidate the ballot, notwith-
standing the penalty to which the voter may have subjected
himself. There is absolutely nothing to be found in statute law
or decisions in regard to the marking of ballots for the purpose of
identification to substantiate the opinion that such marking,
even though made for the purpose of identifying the ballots, in
any way invalidates or voids the ballot. Hence, the decision of
the majority invalidating these two ballots is, therefore, contrary
to law and in variance with the decision of the court on that very
point.
Concerning the remaining ballots in dispute among the Com-
mittee, the decisions of the majority in overturning the judgment
of the election officials are inconsistent, to say the least, as, for
example, in the exhibit numbered 52 by the Committee in which
the mark against the name of Stanton is an inverted "Y" the
majority members changed the decision of the election officials
and counted it as a blank, but in the exhibit numbered 87 where
the mark opposite the name of Nutting is likewise an inverted
"Y," the majority members in that instance counted the mark
as a vote for Nutting. The minority members consistently are
of the opinion that the decision of the election officials in both the
similar instances should be upheld.
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Similarly concerning Committee exhibit numbered 52, where
the mark against the Stanton name has one of the lines of the cross
crossed by a double line, and counted by the election officials for
Stanton, the majority changed that decision and counted it blank,
but in exhibits 53 and 55, where similar crosses are inscribed
against the name of Nutting, and so counted by the election
officials, the majority members in these instances concur with
the election officials. The opinions of the election officials should
be upheld in each of these instances, and there is absolutely no
reason to differentiate these exhibits, and accordingly the decisions
of the majority are inconsistent. These are but characteristic
of the decisions of the majority in overturning the decisions of
the election officials.
This matter should not be concerned with the personal interest
of either the petitioner or the sitting member, or with political
and partisan considerations; such are either merely consequential
or have absolutely no place in the decisions of the Committee.
The issue here is to ascertain the will of the majority of the voters
of the Third Worcester Senatorial District, and to see to it that
their will is given the effect that our laws and Constitution provide.
To any way set aside that will as expressed by the results of the
recount of the ballots without first making every possible effort
that can reasonably be made to ascertain whether or not that
expression is a correct one, would be to do violence to the funda-
mental principles of representative government. The Committee
has not exhausted all reasonable means to investigate the election
of State Senator in the Third Worcester District, and under such
circumstances to decide to overturn the decisions of the voters
of that district will tend to cause suspicion that the mandate of
the voters is being ruthlessly set aside, and in the interest of the
preservation of democratic government the creation of such a
suspicion should be scrupulously avoided, and especially by the
Massachusetts State Senate.
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that it was called to the atten-
tion of the Committee by petition filed by the sitting member,
George W. Stanton, that in compliance with the provisions of our
statutes in accordance with the provisions governing illegal,
improper and incorrect registration, petitions in proper form
were duly filed contesting the rights of certain persons to vote,
to wit: seventeen persons in the town of Royalston, sixty-three
persons in the town of Phillipston, one hundred and forty-eight
persons in the town of Templeton, and ninety-six persons in the
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town of Lunenburg,— all of said towns being in the Third Worces-
ter Senatorial District, — the Committee refused to investi-
gate or otherwise inquire into these matters, and the sitting
member has reason to believe and alleges that a sufficient number
of these three hundred and twenty-one persons to affect the result
of the election, not fully qualified as voters, were permitted to
vote, and thereby illegally influenced the result of the election.
The minority members of the Committee are of the opinion
that the Committee should not in any way limit its investigation,
and that in order to maintain public faith in the integrity of our
elections these matters should be adequately investigated, other-
wise the public may well be justified in feeling that the result of
the election was not a fair, legal and honest expression of the will
of the majority of those citizens who under the provisions of our
election laws are duly qualified to cast their ballots.
Therefore, in order that the Senate of the General Court may
properly, adequately and justly pass upon the election of the
member from the Third Worcester District, it is recommended
that its Special Committee on elections be ordered and directed:
—
1. To summon the ballots so that they may be had for inspec-
tion by the Committee when passing judgment thereon.
2. That photostatic copies of each ballot in dispute among the
Committee be made for the inspection of the Committee, and the
members of the Senate as well, so that adequate and honest judg-
ment may be passed thereon.
3. That all the ballots in the city of Leominster and in Ward 1,
Precinct A, in the city of Fitchburg be recounted.
4. To investigate the legality and the validity of the casting
and counting of the six absentee ballots in the town of Royalston.
5. To adequately investigate the petitions filed in connection
with alleged illegal, improper and incorrect registration in the
towns of Royalston, Phillipston, Templeton and Lunenburg.
6. To otherwise adequately investigate • any and all matters
which may have improperly affected the result of the election
concerned.
It is, therefore, accordingly recommended that the Senate either
adopt this order, which is the only course of action which will result
in justice to all, — to the petitioner, to the sitting member, to the
members of the Senate, and above all, to the citizens of the Com-
monwealth, — or, failing or unwilling to adopt this order, declare
that the decision of the election officials stand (except in regard to
the two votes in the town of Athol which the Committee unani-
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mously agrees should have been counted blank, instead of for
Stanton) and declare the sitting member, Hon. George W. Stanton,
to have been duly elected the Senator from the Third Worcester
District by a plurality of at least three votes.
Edward C. Carroll.
Eugene H. Giroux.
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House^ 1941.
Committee on Elections. — Representatives William J. Sessions of Hamp-
den, Joseph A. Milano of Melrose, John D. Pratt of New Bedford,
Paul A. McCarthy of Somerville, Thomas A. Barry of Lawrence,
Terrance J. Lomax of Fall River and Francis J. Southgate of
Worcester.
Petition of Frank J. Morrison — House, No. 1338.
Petitioner asked for a special election, claiming he was fraudu-
lently deprived of the nomination at the primaries.
[Report of all the committee. Leave to withdraw February 24,
accepted February 25. House Journal, p. 478.]
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House — 1941.
Committee on Elections. — Representatives William J. Sessions of Hamp-
den, Joseph A. Milano of Melrose, John D. Pratt of New Bedford,
Paul A. McCarthy of Somerville. Thomas A. Barry of Lawrence,
Terrance J. Lomax of Fall River and Francis J. Southgate of Worces-
ter.
Matthew J. Capeless v. Michael H. Coxdron.
House Document, Xo. 2050. Feb. 3, 1941. Report by all the committee.
The House Committee on Elections, to whom were referred the
following petitions —
House, Xo. 373, Petition of Matthew J. Capeless for a recount of votes cast
for representatives in the Third Berkshire District and that he be declared
one of the duly elected representatives from said District;
House, Xo. 374, Petition of Michael H. Condron for a recount of votes
cast for representatives in the Third Berkshire District and that he be de-
clared one of the duly elected representatives from that District;
submit the following report : —
The Committee held hearings on January 21, 23. 27, 28, 29 and
February- 3. At the first hearing of the Committee both of the
petitioners were present and were offered an opportunity to be
represented in person or by counsel at any of the Committee meet-
ings wherein ballots were to be counted. Both petitioners informed
the Committee that they were not to be represented by counsel
and that they probably would not attend the counting of ballots.
Subsequently they were not present when ballots were counted.
At the first meeting of the Committee it was decided to count all
of the ballots cast in the Third Berkshire Representative District.
Accordingly the Committee proceeded therewith in so far as the
vote for either of the petitioners was concerned. There were
24,731 ballots counted, and in the course of the counting the Com-
mittee employed four persons to assist in the tally. Your Commit-
tee supervised all counting which was done by noncommittee mem-
bers. Many blocks of ballots were counted several times to insure
an accurate count.
At the conclusion of the tally the Committee then considered
six ballots which had been sealed by order of the Superior Court,
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and rendered a unanimous decision upon five of the six ballots.
The sixth ballot was awarded to Capeless by a majority of the
Committee, while the minority favored calling the ballot a blank.
As this ballot would not affect the final decision of the Committee,
said decision was made unanimous.
Your Committee regrets the necessity of reporting against
either of these petitioners as it recognizes both petitioners as ex-
tremely likeable, capable and sincere public officials. However,
in the performance of its duties your Committee has done every-
thing within its power to grant and insure as accurate a count of
the ballots as was humanly possible to do and we find that in the
final analysis Matthew J. Capeless has received the total of
12,288 votes and that Michael H. Condron has received the total
of 12,286 votes.
Your Committee therefore recommends the adoption of the
following resolution : —
Resolved, That Matthew J. Capeless of Pittsfield was duly elected one of the
Representatives of the General Court from the Third Berkshire Representa-
tive District at the election held in November, 1940, and that he is entitled to
and is hereby given a seat as a member-elect of the House of Representatives.
William J. Sessions.
Joseph A. Milano.
John D. Pratt.
Paul A. McCarthy.
Thomas A. Barry.
Terrance J. Lomax, Jr.
Francis J. Southgate.
[Report accepted February 6, 1941. — House Journal, page 327.]
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Charles H. Andrews v. Board of Registrars of Voters
of Easton and Another.
(Reported in 246 Mass. 572.)
Bristol, Oct. 23, 1923. — Nov. 27, 1923. Present: Rugg, C.J., Braley,
DeCourcy, Pierce, and Jenney, JJ.
Board of Registrars of Voters. Easton. Mandamus. Pleading, Civil, Parties,
Abatement, Amendment in Supreme Judicial Court. Election. Practice, Civil,
Finding by trial judge, Exceptions, Mandamus proceedings. Supreme Judicial
Court.
Under G. L. c. 231, § 125, this court has jurisdiction and power, pending a hear-
ing of exceptions by the respondents in a petition for a writ of mandamus against
the registrars of voters of a town, to allow a motion by the petitioner to amend the
petition to admit as one of the respondents a town clerk who had been elected to
his office after the exceptions were filed in this court upon the death of his prede-
cessor in office and who under G. L. c. 51, § 15, by virtue of his office was a mem-
ber of the respondent board.
Since it was the intention of the Legislature by G. L. c. 51, § 15, to constitute
the board of registrars of voters of a town a continuous body, a petition for a writ
of mandamus directed to the board does not abate by the death of the town clerk,
who by virtue of his office is a member of such board, but upon a motion duly
made the successor of the deceased town clerk may be substituted in his place as
one of the respondent board.
A petition for a writ of mandamus is a proceeding at law and not in equity.
Where, after hearing a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the registrars of
voters of a town not to count certain votes which had been counted by them in
favor of the petitioner's opponent at an election, a single justice of this court finds
that such votes should not be counted for the petitioner's opponent and the op-
ponent, admitted as a party to defend the action, alleges exceptions, the full court
will not review nor revise the finding by the single justice, but may only determine
whether it can be supported in law or whether as a matter of law it must be re-
versed.
Where, at the hearing above described, it appeared that ballots which had been
counted by the respondents as in favor of the petitioner's opponent did not have
crosses in the space directly opposite the opponent's name but, opposite a blank
space immediately below the opponent's name, had crosses a small portion of
which extended above the line between such blank space and the space opposite
the name of the opponent, a finding by the single justice that such "ballots were
so marked as to make uncertain the intent of the voters, that the intention of the
voters who marked those ballots was left wholly to speculation and conjecture,"
and a ruling by him that the respondents were in error in counting such ballots
for the petitioner's opponent, were held to be warranted.
Petition, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court on April 14, 1923,
for a writ of mandamus requiring the respondents, Luther E.
Swift, Sigfred V. Ledin, George A. Lackey and Frederick Hanlon,
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town clerk of the town of Easton, who were made respondents as
"the duly constituted board of registrars of voters" of the town
of Easton, not to count certain five ballots cast in an election of an
assessor in the town, as described in the opinion, for Frank P.
Keith "and to make and sign a statement of the questions raised
by the application for a recount of the votes cast for assessor and
to return said statement to the town clerk of said Town of Easton."
Frank P. Keith was allowed to intervene and defend.
The petition was heard by Crosby, J. Material facts found by
him are described in the opinion. He ordered that a writ of man-
damus issue "as prayed for." Frank P. Keith alleged exceptions.
When the exceptions came on for hearing by this court, Frank
P. Keith filed a plea in abatement, based on the death of the
respondent Frederick Hanlon, who was the town clerk and by
virtue of his office a member of the board of registrars of voters,
and the petitioner filed a motion to amend his petition by includ-
ing in place of the deceased town clerk his successor in office,
Albert R. Wood.
S. P. Hall, for the respondent Keith.
D. F. Buckley, for the petitioner.
RuGG., C.J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. It in-
volves the election of assessor in the town of Easton at the annual
town meeting in March of the current year. A recount of votes
cast in the election was duly had by the board of registrars of
voters upon proper proceedings. G. L. c. 54, § 135. The present
petition was brought against that board by one of the candidates
claiming to have been elected. The other chief candidate, Keith
(who was found by the registrars to have received the same num-
ber of votes as the petitioner), was allowed to intervene as the real
party in interest and to conduct the defence. G. L. c. 249, § 5.
MacBrayne v. City Council of Lowell, 241 Mass. 380, 384. When
the case came on for argument before this court on exceptions
allowed by the single justice, a plea in abatement was filed by
Keith alleging that subsequent to the hearing before the single
justice the respondent Hanlon, town clerk and one of the regis-
trars of voters, had ceased to be town clerk and one of the regis-
trars of voters. G. L. c. 41, § 109. Appropriate certificates to
that effect were annexed to the plea. Thereupon the plaintiff
moved to amend his petition by substituting the present town
clerk, one Wood, in place of Hanlon. Counsel appeared repre-
senting Wood.
ANDREWS V. REGISTRARS, EASTON. SUP. JUD. CT., 1923. 105
These proceedings, if proper in their essentials, now may be had
before the full court, as well as in the trial court. G. L. c. 231,
§ 125.
The board of registrars of voters consists of four members.
The town or city clerk is one by virtue of bis office. The three
others are members for such terms that one goes out of office each
year and his successor is appointed for a term of three years.
G. L. c. 51, § 15. Except by some unusual occurrence, there will
always be three members of the board. Plainly the Legislature
intended that the board should be a continuous body. The case
at bar on this point comes within the principle of numerous de-
cisions. Fairbanks v. Mayor & Aldermen of Fitchburg, 132 Mass.
42, 44. Collins v. Mayor Aldermen of Holyoke, 146 Mass. 298,
306. Taintor v. Mayor & City Council of Cambridge, 192 Mass.
522, 523. Zeo v. City Council of Springfield, 241 Mass. 340, 345.
A writ of mandamus against a single public officer or the head
of department or bureau to enforce the performance of official
duty is a personal action founded on the fact that the defendant
has failed to discharge a personal obligation in connection with
his office. Therefore such action, in the absence of a statute to
the contrary, commonly must abate upon the death or retirement
from office of the original defendant. It cannot be amended by
the substitution of his successor, who is not his personal repre-
sentative and cannot be held responsible for his delinquencies.
Where, however, the writ is directed against a continuing munici-
pal board, with a constant official duty, with respect to a delin-
quency in the execution of such official duty, then, since the power
to perform persists in the board, a change of one or more of the
persons composing the board does not work abatement of the
petition but it may be prosecuted against those who are its mem-
bers, those newly chosen being brought in by amendment in place
of those who have vacated office. Knights v. Treasurer & Re-
ceiver General, 236 Mass. 336, 338, 339, 340, where cases are col-
lected and reviewed.
It follows that the petition did not abate on the retirement from
office of the town clerk, and that the present incumbent of that
office may be brought in as a party by amendment.
The facts with respect to the merits of the controversy, as found
by the single justice, are in substance as follows: — At an election
held in the town of Easton for the choice of assessor for the term
of three years and for the election of other town officers, the peti-
tioner and one Frank P. Keith were candidates for the office of
assessor for three years and their names were respectively printed
106 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES — 1923.
upon the official ballot used at the election. Upon the returns made
by the precinct officers of the various precincts of the town it ap-
peared that Andrews received three hundred and fifteen votes and
Keith received three hundred and seven votes. Thereafter a sworn
statement of grounds for a recount of the ballots cast for assessor
was duly filed with the town clerk and transmitted to the board of
registrars of voters, which recounted the ballots, determined the
questions raised, and completed their recount as required by law.
Upon the recount the registrars found and determined that An-
drews received three hundred and sixteen votes and that Keith
received three hundred and sixteen votes. The case was sub-
mitted to the single justice upon the pleadings, together with six
ballots cast at the election. On the ballots in the column of can-
didates for assessor, the name of the petitioner and the name of
Frank P. Keith and the names of four other candidates for that
office were printed. The name of Keith was the last printed name
of the candidates for assessor; immediately below was the blank
space designed according to law for a voter to write a name for
assessor other than any of the printed names. Upon four of the
six ballots a cross was marked in the square directly opposite the
blank space and below the space opposite the name of Frank P.
Keith. Upon the ballots so marked no name was written in the
blank space. These four ballots were counted by the registrars
for Keith. The cross on each of these ballots extended from the
bottom line of the space to a point slightly above the line between
the blank space and the space in the square opposite the name of
Keith. The single justice found that the ballots were so marked
as to make uncertain the intent of the voters, that the intention
of the voters who marked those ballots was left wholly to specu-
lation and conjecture, and accordingly ruled that the registrars
were in error in counting these votes for Keith. Of the remain-
ing two disputed ballots it was found that one showed plainly
the intent of the voter that it should be cast for Keith, and that
the marking upon the other did not disclose the intent of the
voter. Having thus found that five of the ballots counted for
Keith ought not to have been counted, the result followed that
the petitioner received a plurality of the votes cast and was
elected. The preemptory writ was ordered to issue. The re-
spondent Keith "excepted to the findings and order." The six
original ballots were made a part of the bill of exceptions.
This is a proceeding at law and not in equity. Although the
only evidence submitted to the single justice was the six dis-
puted ballots, this court does not stand with respect to the de-
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cision of the case where the single justice stood. That principle
applies in equity. The question presented to this court in an
action at law with full report of evidence, where the trial court
has made a decision, is whether that decision can be supported as
matter of law on any rational view of the evidence. We do not
review and revise that decision. We determine onl}r whether it
can be supported in law, or whether as matter of law it must be
reversed. Mansfield v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 228 Mass.
262. Atlantic Maritime Co. v. Gloucester, 228 Mass. 519, 522.
Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., ante, 139, and cases collected in each
decision.
The finding of fact that the intent of the voter was not shown
by the marking on the crucial ballots cannot be overturned by
asking us to make a different finding of fact on inspection of those
ballots. The question for us to determine is whether there was
any evidence to support the finding. Aradalou v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad, 225 Mass. 235, 239.
It is plain from the accurate description of the ballots set forth
in the exceptions as well as from inspection of them that the find-
ing was right to the effect that they do not disclose the intent of
the voter. The slight extension of the ends of the cross, unmis-
takably marked in the square opposite the blank, into the square
above opposite the name of Keith would not have warranted a
finding of a purpose to vote for Keith. O'Connell v. Mathews, 177
Mass. 518, 521. Flanders v. Roberts, 182 Mass. 524, 526. Brew-
ster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 226.
Plea in abatement overruled.
Amendment of petition allowed.
Exceptions overruled.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
William Madden v. Board of Election Commissioners of the
City of Boston.
(Reported in 251 Mass. 95.)
Suffolk, Jan. 13, 1925 — Jan. 28, 1925. Present, Rugg, C.J., Braley,
Crosby, Pierce, and Carroll, JJ.
Elections, Death of candidate. Mandamus. House of Representatives. Words,
"Persons."
Valid votes for election to an office cannot be cast for one who is no longer
alive.
A certificate, purporting to be issued under G. L. c. 54, § 128, by the election
commissioners of the city of Boston to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, cer-
tifying the election to the House of Representatives of one whom they knew to
have died before election, is an utter nullity, the word "persons" in the statute
meaning living human beings.
From facts agreed upon at the hearing of a petition for a writ of mandamus di-
recting the election commissioners of Boston to certify to the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth the election of the petitioner as a representative from a certain district
in the city, the following appeared: The district was entitled to choose two repre-
sentatives at the election, and there were two names printed on the ballot. One
of the candidates died early in the morning of the day before election. Newspaper
reports and persons stationed at the polls so effectively informed the voters of the
district of the fact of such death that it was generally known. The petitioner
caused stickers to be supplied to persons wishing to vote for him. The result of
the election was that the living candidate on the ballot received about fifty-three
hundred votes, twenty-nine hundred votes were cast for the name of the candidate
who had died, and eleven hundred for the petitioner. The petitioner caused the
election commissioners to be informed of the death of the candidate before elec-
tion. The commissioner certified as elected the two names printed on the ballot.
Held, that
(1) The petitioner received the second largest number of votes cast for any
candidate capable of being voted for and was elected by a plurality of the votes
susceptible of being counted under the law;
(2) It was the duty of the election commissioners under G. L. c. 54, § 128, to
certify the election of the petitioner;
(3) The duty of the election commissioners to certify was ministerial and not
political;
(4) Mandamus was the appropriate remedy ;
(5) G. L. c. 54, § 141, was inapplicable because a complete election was held;
(6) No opinion was expressed as to ti e rule of law which would be applicable
if a candidate on a ballot were ineligible or had died late on election day and the
voters did not appear to have exact knowledge as to the disqualifying facts.
Although the House of Representatives of the General Court had already as-
sembled and organized before the petition above described was argued before this
court, it was not too late tor the issuance of a proper certificate to the petitioner.
It was staled that the above decision affected merely the right of the petitioner
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to the certificate and did not trench in any degree upon the constitutional preroga-
tive vested exclusively in the House of Representatives by c. 1, § 3, art. 10, of the
Constitution to be the "judge of the returns, elections, and qualifications of its
own members."
Petition, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court on November
20, 1924, for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents
forthwith to certify conformably to G. L. c. 54, § 128, the election
of the petitioner to the office of Representative for the Fifteenth
Suffolk District in the Great and General Court.
The facts were agreed upon. Material facts are described in
the opinion. The case was reserved by Crosby, J., for deter-
mination by the full court.
A. D. Hill and F. Adams, for the petitioner.
No argument nor brief for the respondents.
Rugg, C.J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel
the respondents to certify the election of the petitioner to the
office of a representative in the General Court for the Fifteenth
Suffolk District. The case is submitted on agreed facts. They
show that the voters of the Fifteenth Suffolk District were en-
titled at the election on November 4, 1924, to elect two representa-
tives to the General Court. The names of William A. Canty and
Joseph M. Ward and no others were printed on the official ballot,
each name being followed by the word " Democratic." William
A. Canty died early in the morning of the day before election.
That fact was generally known throughout the district and notices
of his death were prominently printed in the newspapers of that
day. The specimen annexed to the record shows that there was
headline announcement covering six of the eight columns of the
first page of the newspaper and that an obituary filled more than
one fourth of a column of the first page running onto a later page.
On election day stickers carrying the name of the petitioner were
distributed. He was a member of the democratic party and was
generally known to be such by the voters and residents of said
district. The supporters of the petitioner, knowing that the
name of William A. Canty was still on the official ballot and for
the purpose of making certain that no votes should be cast for
him in ignorance of the fact that he was not living, stationed
two persons near each of the eleven polling places in the district.
These persons were instructed to inform each voter approaching
the polling booth of the fact that William A. Canty had died.
These persons would testify that each voter going to the polls
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was so informed. The result of the balloting was that five thou-
sand three hundred and seventeen votes were cast for Joseph M.
Ward, two thousand nine hundred and forty-two votes for William
A. Canty, one thousand one hundred and sixty-five votes for,the
petitioner and a much smaller number of votes for several others.
The petitioner, who contends that Joseph M. Ward and himself
were elected representatives, caused the respondents to be notified
of the fact that William A. Canty died on November 3, 1924, the
day before election. The respondents, knowing of the fact of
Mr. .Canty's death, refused to certify that the petitioner was
elected but did file a certificate with the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth to the effect that at the election on the fourth day of
November, 1924, " William A. Canty 430 Centre St. Boston and
Joseph M. Ward 38 School St. Boston were elected" as representa-
tives to the General Court from the Fifteenth Suffolk District.
It is plain from these agreed facts that in general the voters of
the district knew and those who went to the polls had in addition
specific notice that William A. Canty had died on the day before
election. He had ceased to exist before election day. He had
vanished as a possible participant in human affairs.
One who has died before election cannot be a candidate for an
office or elected to an office. Valid votes for election to an office
cannot be cast for one who is no longer alive. It is equivalent to
throwing away a vote knowingly to cast it for one who has passed
from earth to the great beyond. It is of no more effect than to
deposit a blank ballot, or one marked with a fictitious or historic
name. This is not a doubtful question. It requires no discussion
of legal principles. No process of reasoning is necessary to con-
vince the intelligence. It is axiomatic. It is not open to debate.
It is obvious to everybody.
It is equally plain that the respondents were doing a vain thing
and asserting an impossibility in certifying that William A. Canty
was elected to the office of representative in the General Court.
They were required to make a certificate to the Secretary of the
Commonwealth of "election of the persons appearing to be
elected." G. L. c. 54, § 128. The word "persons" means living
human beings. Sawyer v. Mackie, 149 Mass. 269. The respond-
ents ought to have stated in their certificate to the Secretary the
fact as to the decease of Mr. Canty before the day of election as
they knew it indisputably to be.
The question is whether the election for the second representa-
tive from the Fifteenth Suffolk District was a nullity or whether
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the petitioner was elected. It was said in the opinion in People v.
Clute, 50 N. Y. 451, 461 : " It is the theory and the general practice
of our government that the candidate who has but a minority of
the legal votes cast does not become a duly elected officer. But
it is also the theory and practice of our government, that a minor-
ity of the whole body of qualified electors may elect to an office,
when a majority of that body refuse or decline to vote for any one
for that office. Those of them who are absent from the polls, in
theory and practical result are assumed to assent to the action of
those who go to the polls; and those who go to the polls, and
who do not vote for any candidate for an office, are bound by the
result of the action of those who do ; and those who go to the polls
and who vote for a person for an office, if for any valid reason their
votes are as if no votes, they also are bound by the result of the
action of those whose votes are valid and of effect. As if, in voting
for an office to which one only can be elected, two are voted for,
and their names appear together on the ballot, the ballot so far is
lost. The votes are as if for a dead man or for no man. They are
thrown away ; and those who cast them are to be held as intending
to throw them away, and not to vote for any person capable of
the office. And then he who receives the highest number of earnest
valid ballots, is the one chosen to the office. . . . They who,
knowing that a person is ineligible to office by reason of any dis-
qualification, persistently give their ballots for him, do throw away
their votes, and are to be held as meaning not to vote for any one
for that office. . . . (At page 466.) We think that the rule is this
:
the existence of the fact which disqualifies, and of the law which
makes that fact operative to disqualify, must be brought home so
closely and so clearly to the knowledge or notice of the elector, as
that to give his vote therewith indicates an intent to waste it."
This is a succinct and clear statement of the law. Amplification
will not elucidate it. It is precisely applicable to the facts here dis-
closed. It is agreed that the death of Mr. Canty on November 3,
1924, was on that day generally brought home to the knowledge of
the voters of the Fifteenth Suffolk District. That is a district in
the city of Boston, where numerous daily papers are printed and
widely circulated. The attention of every voter who went to the
polls on election day was directed specifically to the fact of the
death of Mr. Canty. Therefore there is no room for doubt that
the votes nominally cast for Mr. Canty were deposited in the bal-
lot box with the knowledge that he had died the day before the
election day. The motives of those who thus cast ballots are not
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revealed on this record. We assume that they were unexceptional
as humane sentiments. It may have been done as a tribute of
respect to his memory or as some expression of sorrow for his
decease. Elections are not held for any such purpose. Purity
of motive cannot clothe with vitality an act which is in its very
nature a nullity. Elections are held at great public expense for the
single purpose of selecting those who are to hold public office and of
enabling voters to express their preference as to questions con-
cerning government lawfully placed upon the ballot. Those who
attempt to use the machinery of election to any other end, what-
ever it may be, are acting contrary to the whole theory of elections.
They cannot complain if those who resort to the polls and act in
conformity to the theory and right practice of elections accom-
plish the aim of the election by choosing the officers required by
law to be chosen.
No one would contend, if the votes cast for Mr. Canty had been
blank ballots or had contained three names for representative
properly marked, two only being capable of election, that the
petitioner would not have been elected. The same result follows
on the facts here disclosed. The petitioner received the second
largest number of votes cast for any candidate capable of being
voted for. He was elected by a plurality of the votes susceptible
of being counted under the law. Art. 14 of the Amendments to the
Constitution. Any other conclusion might in conceivable cir-
cumstances enable a cohesive and perverse minority to work much
mischief with elections. This conclusion is supported directly by
the well reasoned cases of State v. Frear, 144 Wis. 79, Gulick v.
New, 14 Ind. 93, and by the principle of People v. Clute, 50 N. Y.
451, already cited and of Gosling v. Veley, 7 Q. B. 406, Regina v.
Coaks, 3 El. & Bl. 249, Drinkwater v. Deakin, L. R. 9 C. P. 626,
Beresford-Hope v. Sandhurst, 23 Q. B. D. 79, State v. Bell, 169 Ind.
61, and cases there reviewed. See 9 R. C. L. 1126, and cases there
collected. It is contrary to the principle of Sheridan v. *S/. Louis,
183 Mo. 25, which relies in part on State v. Walsh, 7 Mo. App. 142.
There are numerous decisions, where a candidate has been in-
eligible, or has died late on election day, and the voters did not
appear to have exact knowledge as to the disqualifying facts, in
which the election has been declared void, and the candidate
receiving the next largest number of votes has been denied elec-
tion. We express no opinion upon such facts. The present de-
cision is of course confined to the issues presented upon this
record. In some of those decisions somewhat broad language has
been used. But the facts of all those cases are so different from
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those in the case at bar that it is not necessary to review them.
They are collected in a foot note. 1
It is apparent that all the pertinent facts were seasonably
known to the respondents. Since the votes cast for William A.
Canty must be treated as nullities consciously deposited as such
by the voters who put them in the ballot box, the petitioner,
having received the next largest number of votes, was elected to-
gether with Mr. Ward. It follows that it was the duty of the
respondents under G. L. c. 54, § 128, to certify the election of
the petitioner as one of the representatives to the General Court
from the Fifteenth Suffolk District. In view of the facts known
by the respondents, it was their ministerial duty to issue the cer-
tificate. It is an appropriate function of the writ of mandamus
to compel the performance of ministerial duties by public officers
where no other remedy is provided. Flanders v. Roberts, 182
Mass. 524, 529, 530. Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 225.
Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners,
224 Mass. 598, 609, 610. Mansfield v. Secretary of the Common-
wealth, 228 Mass. 262. Andrews v. Board of Registrars of Voters
of Easton, 246 Mass. 572, 574. The duty of the respondents upon
the facts found was ministerial or administrative as distinguished
from political. Hence decisions like Fitzgerald v. Mayor of Boston,
220 Mass. 503, are inapposite.
If no election had resulted on the fourth of November, it would
have been the duty of the respondents so to certify to the Secre-
tary of the Commonwealth in order that a new election might
have been held on the fourth Monday of November. G. L. c. 54,
§ 141. This provision of law is inapplicable because, as already
shown, a complete election was held.
The House of Representatives of the General Court had already
assembled and organized before this case was argued. It is not
however too late for the issuance of a proper certificate to the
petitioner. This is not an instance of the possibility of two out-
standing certificates held by different persons. In no right sense
has a certificate issued to William A. Canty. The act of the
respondents in going through the form of issuing such certificate
was an utter nullity. Of course there was no delivery of it to
• Chandler v. Wartman, 6 N. J. L. J. 301. Sublett v. Bedmell, 47 Miss. 266. Crawford v. Molitor,
23 Mich. 341. Gardner v. Burke, 61 Neb. 534. Haggard v. People, 130 111. App. 211. Fish v. Collens,
21 La. Ann. 289. McKeever v. Cameron, 179 Wis. 405. Commonwealth v. Chiley, 56 Penn. St. 270.
Heald v. Payson, 110 Maine, 204. Sanders v. Rice, 41 R. I. 127. Henry v. Jordan, 179 Cal. 24.
Sinepston v. Barton, 39 Ark. 549. Dryden v. Swinburne, 20 West Va. 89. State v. McGeary, 69 Vt.
461. Dobbs v. Buford, 128 Ga. 483. Batterton v. Fuller, 6 S. Dak. 257. W6U v. Jensen, 36 N. Dak.
250. Barnum v. Oilman, 27 Minn. 466. See Bouker, petitioner, Mass. Election Cases, 1853-1885
(Russell's ed.), 282, and note, page 285.
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him. It is provided by G. L. c. 3, § 4, that "A person having a
certificate or other documentary evidence of his election as a rep-
resentative who is not named on said lists may, after the house
has been called to order, present such certificate or evidence to
the presiding officer, or to the speaker if one has been chosen,
who shall communicate the same to the house for its action
thereon; but such person shall not take a seat as a member until
permitted by the house." The manifest purpose of this provision
is to permit an elected member to present a certificate of election
after the organization of the House, if for any reason he did not
receive it earlier. Therefore the case at bar is not moot; it is
real. The certificate has a genuine value now to the petitioner.
The decision of this case affects merely the right of the peti-
tioner to the certificate. This adjudication does not trench in
any degree upon the constitutional prerogative vested exclusively
in the House of Representatives by c. 1, § 3, art. 10, of the Con-
stitution to be the "judge of the returns, elections, and qualifica-
tions of its own members." There can be no invasion of that
field. Dinan v. Swig, 223 Mass. 516. But the petitioner is en-
titled to the certificate of election on the facts here disclosed.
The respondents in the exercise of the statutory duty imposed
on them ought to certify to that election. It is the function of
the court through the writ of mandamus to require the perform-
ance of that duty. We go no further than that.
Peremptory writ of mandamus
to issue as prayed for.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
John J. Moloney v. Selectmen of Milford and Another.
(Reported in 253 Mass. 400.)
Worcester, Sept. 21, 1925 — Oct. 14, 1925. Present, Rugg, C.J., Crosby,
Pierce, Carroll and Sanderson, JJ.
Statute, Acceptance by town. Municipal Corporations, Town meeting: vote
accepting statute, recount; Officers and agents. Election, Recount. Police.
Civil Service. Mandamus.
G. L. c. 54, § 104 ; applies only to compulsory statutes or questions which by
mandate of the Legislature must be submitted to popular vote, and does not apply
to optional or permissive statutes or questions such as are submitted for acceptance
by a city or town solely by reason of the voluntary action of an appropriate officer,
to a city council by proposal of some member and to a town meeting simply by
being inserted in the warrant on request of voters or by the discretion of the select-
men.
A town, which did not vote by precincts, legally accepted the provisions of G. L.
c. 31, §§ 48, 49, if it did so by vote at an annual town meeting under an appro-
priate article in the warrant, by voice vote and also by a vote by show of hands,
counted by tellers appointed for the purpose.
A town, which never had accepted the provisions of G. L. c 41, § 97, but had
accepted the provisions of G. L. c. 31, §§ 48, 49, adopted by-laws, providing that
the selectmen should annually appoint a chief of police at a fixed salary and em-
powering the selectmen to make such rules and regulations "for the government
and discipline of the Police Department as they may from time to time deem
necessary;" and, as a matter of custom, the selectmen annually appointed from
thirty to thirty-five police officers, and, through assignment by the chief of police,
regular routes, stated periods of service and specified compensation were fixed
for such officers. Held, that this arrangement constituted a "regular or permanent
police . . . force" and a chief of police within the terms of the civil service law,
G. L. c. 31, §§ 48, 49.
There is no provision that town officers declared elected according to law shall
suspend their functions pending a recount.
At an annual town meeting, three selectmen were to be chosen. Immediately
upon the announcement of the count by the tellers, the moderator, under G. L.
c 39, § 15, announced the result as stated by them, and the selectmen elect ac-
cepted their election and took the oath of office. Notice was forthwith given
orally that a petition for a recount would be filed, and such petition was filed. It
was a custom in the town for the selectmen to meet and organize immediately
after the election. They did so, although hearing of the pending recount, and
elected a chief of police. The recount showed that one of those, who had been
announced by the tellers as being elected, had not been elected. The new board
then organized, and, without complying with the requirements of the civil service
law, voted to remove the chief of police formerly elected, and he by a petition for
a writ of mandamus sought reinstatement. Held, that the petitioner's election
was legal, having been accomplished by a board which was competent to act
pending the result of the recount, and that he had not been removed lawfully.
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Petition, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of
Worcester on March 14, 1925, for a writ of mandamus directing
the board of selectmen of the town of Milford to reinstate the
petitioner as chief of police.
The petition was heard on an agreed statement of facts by
Braley, J. Material facts are described in the opinion. The
single justice was of opinion that the writ should issue but, at
the request of the respondents, reported the case to the full court
for determination.
The case was submitted on briefs.
J. E. Crowley and A. B. Cenedella, for the respondents.
W. A. Murray, J. C. Lynch and J. E. Swift, for the petitioner.
Rugg, C.J. The petitioner seeks, by this petition for a writ
of mandamus, to be reinstated ^as chief of police of the town of
Milford. The respondent selectmen passed a vote removing him
from office, refused to state reasons in writing therefor or to grant
him a public hearing, and appointed the respondent O'Brien chief
of police in his place.
The first point to be decided is whether the town of Milford
legally accepted §§48 and 49 of G. L. c. 31, so as to make appli-
cable to its police force the civil service law. Appropriate articles
were in the warrant for the annual town meeting of 1925, and by
voice vote and also by vote by show of hands counted by tellers
appointed for the purpose, those sections were adopted. The
record of the town clerk shows this. The town of Milford does
not vote by precincts but official ballots are used for the election
of town officers. The respondents contend that votes for such
acceptance, in order to be valid, must be by ballot and not other-
wise. The relevant statutes are G. L. c. 4, § 4, to the effect that
" Wherever it is provided that a statute shall take effect upon its
acceptance by a city or town, such acceptance shall, except as
otherwise provided in such statute, be, in a city, by vote of the
city council or, in a town, by vote of the inhabitants thereof at
a town meeting," and G. L. c. 54, § 104, to the effect that "The
blank forms and apparatus provided by the State secretary shall
be used in . . . taking the vote upon any proposed amendment
to the Constitution, upon any law or proposed law submitted to
the voters by referendum or initiative petition, upon the question
of granting licenses for the sale of certain non-intoxicating bev-
erages . . ., and upon any other question submitted by statute
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to the voters of any senatorial or representative district, or of
any city or town in which official ballots are used."
These two sections according to familiar rules of statutory con-
struction must, if reasonably possible, be interpreted so as to be
harmonious and not contradictory, and all the words of each
given some practical effect. It is plain that G. L. c. 4, § 4, applies
equally to cities and towns. It contains no requirement that
the vote be by ballot. According to its terms, the vote might be
by voice or by show of hands, as the town meeting may deter-
mine. It carries no implication that such vote by the city council
be by any other than the common method. No provision what-
ever is made for a vote by the inhabitants in a city. The vote
must be by the city council alone. The terms of G. L. c. 54,
§ 104, are equally applicable to cities and to towns in which offi-
cial ballots are used. The official ballot is used in elections in
all cities. There is no provision of law whereby an effective popu-
lar vote in cities can be taken except by ballot. If the construc-
tion contended for by the respondents were to be adopted, the
provision of G. L. c. 4, § 4, for acceptance of a statute by a city
council would be ineffective.
The right interpretation of G. L. c. 54, § 104, is that it applies
only to compulsory statutes or questions, which by mandate of
the Legislature must be submitted to popular vote, and does not
apply to optional or permissive statutes or questions such as are
submitted for acceptance by a city or town solely by reason of
the voluntary action of an appropriate officer, to a city council
by proposal of some member and to a town meeting simply by
being inserted in the warrant on request of voters or by the dis-
cretion of the selectmen. This construction is confirmed by pro-
visions of other statutes in terms authorizing acceptance by a
city council or by a town in town meeting. G. L. c. 40, § 13;
c. 41, § 82. If any other interpretation were given, some per-
missive acts, which may be accepted at any town meeting, could
in fact be accepted only at the annual meeting where alone official
ballots are used. G. L. c. 40, §§ 7, 11, 38, 44; c. 41, § 25. By
G. L. c. 41, § 103, permission is granted to cities and towns to
accept its terms requiring the establishment of a purchasing de-
partment; but by the following § 104 the city council with ap-
proval by the mayor may submit the acceptance of § 103 to the
voters at an annual city election. The provisions of § 104 would
be superfluous if the contention of the respondents is sound.
The acceptance of G. L. c. 41, § 82, must in cities be by vote of
the city council. The form of this section is imperative. It would
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be difficult to reconcile it with the proposed interpretation of
§ 104 of c. 54. Confirmatory arguments adduced from the terms
of other statutes have been presented by the plaintiff, but it is
not necessary to specify more.
The history of G. L. c. 54, § 104, indicates that it relates to
elections rather than to questions touching the ordinary transac-
tions of a town and having immediate connection with its internal
concerns. Without tracing the various mutations of this section
from its first appearance in St. 1891, c. 328, § 1, to the present,
it is enough to say that its evolution bears no indication that it
was intended to apply to such a case as the present vote, where
open discussion in town meeting as to the wisdom of adopting
the proposal of the article in the warrant might be beneficial and
informing to voters desirous of acting in the public interest.
Arguments based upon the large number of voters in Milford
and the smallness of its town hall have no relevancy to the inter-
pretation of statutes of State wide operation.
The conclusion is that the provisions of the civil service law
respecting the police force were accepted by the town of Milford
at its annual meeting on March 2, 1925, at the adjournment
thereof held on March 6, 1925.
The town of Milford has never accepted the provisions of G. L.
c. 41, § 97, or corresponding provisions of the earlier statute
touching the establishment of a police department. The town has,
however, adopted by-laws providing that the selectmen shall annu-
ally appoint a chief of police at a fixed salary, and empowering
the selectmen to make such rules and regulations "for the govern-
ment and discipline of the Police Department as they may from
time to time deem necessary." As matter of custom the select-
men annually have appointed from thirty to thirty-five police
officers and a chief of police. The assignment of patrolmen was
left with the chief of police. He designated certain elected con-
stables and appointed police officers and these men were given
regular routes, worked stated periods of time and received speci-
fied compensation.
This arrangement constituted a "regular or permanent police
... force" and a chief of police within the terms of the civil serv-
ice law, G. L. c. 31, §§ 48, 49. It was such a police force as the
town might organize and support under G. L. c. 41, § 96, without
accepting the provisions of the following § 97, whereby somewhat
rigid conditions are prescribed for the police department of such
municipalities as accept it. That point is settled by Adams v.
Selectmen of Northbridge, post, 408, decided this day.
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It was a regular police force within the meaning of G. L. c. 31,
§ 48. It was regular in the sense that it consisted of a considerable
number of men serving constantly throughout the year of their
appointment; it was organized and under discipline and its mem-
bers were appointed to specified duties; it was recognized by
town by-laws, and was supported by annual appropriations and
its members received stipulated compensation. The police force
was permanent, also, in that it was treated as a branch of the pub-
lic service of the town year after year. It need not also be per-
manent in the sense of having a number of members fixed by
by-law, nor an indeterminate tenure, in order to come within the
purview of that section.
At the annual town meeting of Milford on March 2, 1925, three
selectmen were to be elected. After the ballots had been can-
vassed by the tellers, the result of the vote for selectmen was
announced in the early morning of March 3, 1925, showing that
three persons had been elected, one of whom was Fred W. Fitz-
simmons. The moderator then declared that these three were
elected selectmen for the ensuing year and they immediately took
the oath of office and due record was made accordingly. The town
meeting was adjourned to March 6 and notice was given to the
moderator and town clerk by one voter that he would petition for a
recount of the votes cast for selectmen. Petition for such recount
in proper form was filed during the forenoon of March 3. The
three declared elected selectmen held a meeting on the afternoon of
March 3, at which time they all knew that the petition for a re-
count had been filed. It has been the custom in the town of Mil-
ford for a long period of years, with one exception, for the select-
men to meet and organize on the day following their election, to
make appointments including the chief of police, and to dispatch
other business properly coming before them. The petitioner at
that meeting on March 3, 1925, was appointed chief of police by
a majority vote, when much other business in the way of appoint-
ments of officers and approval of bills also was transacted. The
petitioner had been appointed chief of police on March 6, 1923,
again on March 4, 1924, and held office by virtue of that appoint-
ment on March 3, 1925.
The recount of votes for selectmen was completed on March 7.
It showed that Fitzsimmons, declared elected as one of the select-
men at the meeting of March 2, had not in truth been chosen, but
that another had received a larger number of votes and was elected.
The three thus declared to have been elected selectmen as the re-
sult of the recount met on March 9 and voted by a majority that
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"the present Chief of Police John J. Moloney be removed and
Ernest E. O'Brien was appointed acting Chief of Police." The
petitioner on the day following in writing requested a public hear-
ing upon his removal and also a legal notice of his removal. There
was no compliance with either request.
The action of the three, including Fitzsimmons, who were de-
clared elected selectmen on the early morning of March 3, in
choosing the petitioner as chief of police conferred upon him title
to that office. It is provided in G. L. c. 39, § 15, that the moderator
of a town meeting shall "make public declaration of all votes, and
may administer in open meeting the oath of office to any town
officer chosen thereat." In compliance with that mandate the
moderator announced the election of Fitzsimmons with the other
two indisputably elected. That declaration was in accordance
with the count made by the tellers. Fitzsimmons accepted the
election thus declared. That election would have stood as the
true result unless and until overturned in pursuance of provisions
of law. If there had been no provision of law for a recount, it
would have stood even though a mistake in the count had after-
wards been discovered. Eldridge v. Selectmen of Chatham, 192
Mass. 409. Fritz v. Crean, 182 Mass. 433. There is no provision
that town officers declared elected according to law shall suspend
their functions pending a recount. The absence of such provision
is significant in view of G. L. c. 54, § 137, which is in substance that
in elections of State and city officers the result shall not be de-
clared by the aldermen until after the time for filing a petition for
a recount has expired, and, if such petition has been filed, then
not until the recount has been had ; and that no person elected to a
city office shall act in an official capacity until this has been done.
Fitzsimmons was at least a de facto selectman when the peti-
tioner was elected, and the petitioner's election as chief of police
is not here open to successful attack. As was said in Attorney
General v. Crocker, 138 Mass. 214, 221, "Public necessity and
policy require that the acts of an actual incumbent of a public
office, in the performance of its duties, shall be held valid, although
the incumbent should not have a legal right to the office, and
though his right should be questioned and disputed." Fowler v.
Beebe, 9 Mass. 231. Petersilea v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465.
The case at bar is distinguishable from Attorney General v.
Simonds, 111 Mass. 256, and Putnam v. Langley, 133 Mass. 204,
in each of which there was irregularity in the election. Here
every step was in accordance with statute. Those cases also are
distinguishable on other grounds.
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Since the provisions of the civil service law were adopted by
the town at the meeting on March 6, and since the petitioner then
held appointment as chief of police, it follows that he now holds
office under the civil service law and cannot be removed except
as therein provided. See St. 1923, c. 242. This branch of the
case is governed by Barnes v. Mayor of Chicopee, 213 Mass. 1.
Confessedly no removal has taken place in accordance with the
laws regulating the civil service.
Since the selectmen did not give the petitioner specific reasons
for their action in attempting to remove him and refused to grant
any public hearing to the petitioner on his removal, the provisions
of G. L. c. 31, § 45, and the reasoning of McLaughlin v. Mayor of
Cambridge, ante, 193, do not afford him adequate remedy and the
petitioner is entitled to the mandatory writ.
Peremptory writ of mandamus to issue.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Edward E. Merrill v. County Commissioners of Essex.
(Reported in 257 Mass. 184.)
Essex, Sept. 17, 1926 — Oct. 13, 1926. Present, Crosby, Pierce, Carroll,
and Sanderson, JJ.
Constitutional Law, Apportionment of legislative districts. County Commis-
sioners. Mandamus.
An apportionment of representatives by county commissioners purporting to
act under art. 21 of the Amendments to the Constitution is a nullity if it does not
approximate as nearly as reasonably mny be to exactness in the number of legal
voters in any district when compared with the legal voters in other districts.
County commissioners are not justified in failing to make an apportionment
meet the requirements above described either by the fact that no legal voter ap-
peared to protest against the apportionment or to suggest a better one, or by the
fact that any change in the apportionment of districts would be against the wishes
of the representatives of the affected municipalities, or by the fact of the variant
characteristics of voters in the contiguous communities for the purpose of repre-
sentation; and that they acted in good faith and in the exercise of their best judg-
ment is' immaterial.
An apportionment by the commissioners of a county containing one hundred
seventy-nine thousand four hundred and thirty-nine legal voters into thirty-one
representative districts containing voters varying in number from eight thousand
two hundred and fifty-six in one district to four thousand one hundred and thirty-
five in another is not a compliance with the requirements of art. 21 of the Amend-
ments to the Constitution and is void.
A petition, alleging the apportionments above described and that the apportion-
ment thus made was void, and seeking a writ of mandamus directing a reappor-
tionment in accordance with the constitutional requirements, was granted.
Petition, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of
Essex on August 4, 1926, alleging that the division by the re-
spondents of the county of Essex into representative districts on
August 3, 1926, was in violation of constitutional requirements,
and seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondents "to
make the division and apportionment of said county of Essex into
representative districts in such manner that the said county shall
be divided into such districts of contiguous territory entitled re-
spectively to elect such number of representatives as will give, as
nearly as may be, one representative for every five thousand seven
hundred and eighty-eight legal voters, provided that no town or
ward of a city shall be divided therefor, nor shall any district be
made which shall be entitled to elect more than three repre-
sentatives."
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The petition was referred to an auditor. Material facts found
by the auditor are stated in the opinion. The case was heard by
Braley, J., upon the pleadings and the auditor's report. The
single justice found the facts as stated by the auditor, refused to
rule as a matter of law that a writ of mandamus should issue,
and reported the case to the full court for determination.
The case was submitted on briefs.
R. W. Hill, E. L. Howie and R. E. Blake, for the petitioner.
S. Parsons, A. G. Wadleigh and P. F. Crowley, for the respond-
ents.
Pierce, J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus brought
by a legal voter of "Ward Two in the city of Salem" and county
of Essex against the county commissioners of the county of Essex,
praying that the division of said county and apportionment of
representatives made by the said commissioners, while purporting
to act in accordance with art. 21 of the Amendments to the Con-
stitution and St. 1926, c. 372, should be declared null and void
because the action of the commissioners violates that part of art.
21 of the Amendments to the Constitution which reads, "the
county commissioners in each county . . . shall, on the first Tues-
day of August next after each assignment of representatives to
each county, assemble at a shire town of their respective counties,
and proceed, as soon as may be, to divide the same into repre-
sentative districts . . . so as to apportion the representation as-
signed to each county equally, as nearly as may be, according to
the relative number of legal voters in the several districts of each
county." The petition was referred to an auditor. A justice of
this court found the facts to be as stated by the auditor, and
reported the case for the determination by the full court.
The pertinent facts thus found in substance are as follows:
The number of legal voters in said county of Essex, as appears
by the decennial census of the Commonwealth taken in the year
1925, was one hundred seventy-nine thousand four hundred and
thirty-nine. The county of Essex is entitled, by virtue of said
census and by St. 1926, c. 372, § 4, to thirty-one representatives
to the General Court. The average number of voters for each
representative in such districts is five thousand seven hundred
and eighty-eight. With the exception of objections made as to
two of the districts in the city of Salem, designated as districts
numbered 15 and 18, and the request that the town of Saugus be
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made a single district, no objection was made by any person to
the districts as apportioned by the respondents.
District 12 has one representative for four thousand, six hundred
and eight}r-two legal voters. District 16 has one representative
for four thousand one hundred and thirty-five legal voters. Dis-
tricts 12, 13 and 14 contain in the aggregate forty-one thousand
four hundred and eighteen legal voters to which eight repre-
sentatives are assigned or one for every five thousand one hundred
and seventy-seven legal voters. Districts 15, 17 and 18, the three
Salem districts, contain in the aggregate twenty thousand and
eleven legal voters, to which three representatives are assigned
or one for about every six thousand six hundred and seventy legal
voters. In districts 3, 4, 12, 13, 14 and 16 the voters are entitled
to vote for a representative for a much less number of legal voters
than five thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, to wit, an
average of the four thousand nine hundred and thirty-eight. Com-
paring district 18, with one representative to eight thousand, two
hundred and fifty-six legal voters, with district 12, with one repre-
sentative to four thousand six hundred and eighty-two legal voters t
with district 16 with one representative to four thousand one hun-
dred thirty-five legal voters, with districts 12, 13 and 14, with one
representative to five thousand one hundred and seventy-nine
legal voters, with districts 15, 17 and 18, with one representative
to six thousand six hundred and seventy legal voters and districts
3, 4, 12, 13, 14 and 16, with one representative to an average of
four thousand nine hundred and thirty-eight legal voters, it is at
once obvious that the mathematical ratio of apportionment
adopted by the commissioners is grossly unequal and discrimi-
nating as applied to the several districts; and it is readily perceived
that their redistricting of the county does not apportion the repre-
sentatives assigned to the county of Essex equally as nearly as
may be according to the relative number of legal voters in the
several districts of that county.
This great inequality, while recognized by the respondents, is
defended on the ground that "The commissioners in the exercise
of their honest judgment, adopted the apportionment complained
of as the least objectionable solution of a difficult problem;" and
on the further ground that the "commissioners, acting in good
faith and exercising their best judgment, made what they be-
lieved to be the best apportionment of Essex County into repre-
sentative districts."
Of course the question for decision is not whether the commis-
sioners acted in good or bad faith, or whether the result reached
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by them is the "best apportionment of Essex County into repre-
sentative districts," but is, Does the apportionment made ap-
proximate as nearly as reasonably may be to exactness in the num-
ber of legal voters in any district, when compared with the legal
voters in other districts? If the apportionment does not thus
approximate, the action of the commissioners is a nullity, because
it transgresses the commands of the Constitution. Donovan v.
Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55. The
commissioners were bound to observe the limitations on their
action prescribed by the Constitution and could not justifiably or
legally make an unequal apportionment in representation because
no legal voter appeared to protest against the apportionment or to
suggest a better one. Nor were they excused from the performance
of their duty by the fact found by the auditor that any change
in the apportionment of districts would be against the wishes of the
representatives of the affected municipalities, or by the fact of the
variant characteristics of voters in the contiguous communities
for the purpose of representation. The finding of the auditor,
that "It is possible to divide and apportion Essex County so that
the numerical excess and shortage of the several districts com-
plained of . . . would be materially lessened," is justified by the
reported facts ; and the reasons given for or in explanation of the
action of the commissioners fail to show that they could not have
apportioned the representation in a way which would result in an
equality in the county, as nearly as may be, according to the rela-
tive number of legal voters in the several districts in each county.
Let the entry be in substance, that the present division and ap-
portionment of the county of Essex into representative districts
made and filed by the commissioners, is void as not in comformity
to the Constitution, and that the commissioners proceed "as soon
as may be" to divide the county of Essex into representative dis-
tricts so as to apportion the number of representatives assigned
to that county "equally, as nearly as may be, according to the
relative number of legal voters" in the several districts, and other-
wise in conformity to the Constitution and to art. 21 of the Amend-
ments to the Constitution, and to make due report thereof as
required by said article of amendment.
So ordered.
126 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES — 1926.
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Thomas C. O'Brien v. Board of Election Commissioners of
Boston.
Same v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Chelsea and
Others.
Charles G. Keene v. Board of Election Commissioners of
Boston.
Same v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Revere.
(Reported en 257 Mass. 332.)
Suffolk, Oct. 19, 1926 — Oct. 22, 1926. Present, Rugg, C.J., Crosby,
Carroll, Wait and Sanderson, JJ.
Primary. Ballot. Vote. Mandamus.
Petitions, by candidates at a party primary for nomination as district attorney,
seeking writs of mandamus giving directions to boards of election commissioners
and registrars of voters with respect to the counting of certain ballots, were re-
ferred to an auditor and were heard upon the auditor's reports by a single justice
of the Supreme Judicial Court, who confirmed the auditor's findings and reserved
and reported the cases for determination by the full court. Held, that
(1) The petitions being proceedings at law, the findings of fact, if warranted
upon any view of so much of the evidence as appeared in the record, must be ac-
cepted as true and could be set aside only if without support in the report
;
(2) The cardinal rule for guidance of election officers and courts in cases of this
nature is that, if the intent of the voter can be determined with reasonable cer-
tainty from an inspection of the ballot in the light of the generally known conditions
attendant upon the election, effect must be given to that intent and the vote counted
in accordance therewith, provided the voter has substantially complied with the
requirements of the election law;
(3) While the use of pasters in voting for candidates whose names do not appear
upon the official ballot is permissible under the statute, the statutory provisions
in G. L. c. 54, §§ 42, 65, 77, show that the Legislature intended pasters, where used,
to be ineerted under the designation of the office for which the voter seeks to nomi-
nate the candidate;
(4) The omission of the residence of one of the candidates, where there was sub-
stantial compliance with the statutory provisions and the intent of the voter could
be ascertained, did not invalidate a vote;
(5) Findings that a failure of a voter to place the paster in the space designated
for candidates for district attorney, whether containing a cross or not, made im-
possible the drawing of an inference of affirmative intent on the part of the voter
to vote for the person named on the paster, and that such a ballot did not manifest
the intent of the voter and should not be counted for the name on the paster, were
warranted; it could not be said as a matter of law that the placing of such a paster
on some other part of the ballot than under the designation, "district attorney,"
was a manifestation of purpose to vote for district attorney
;
(6) Findings, that a failure by a voter to make a cross or mark upon a paster
properly located in the space designated for the vote for district attorney rendered
impossible the drawing of an inference of affirmative intent on the part of the voter
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to vote for the name on the paster, and that such a ballot did not manifest the
intent of the voter and could not be counted for the name on the paster, were war-
ranted; such act did not as a matter of law disclose a purpose to vote;
(7) A finding that ballots containing the surname alone of a candidate written
in under the designation, "district attorney," either with or without the prefix
"Mr.," or a similar sounding surname, or the wrong Christian name, or the wrong
middle initial where the Christian or surname are both correctly written, did not
indicate with sufficient definiteness a purpose to vote for the candidate with that
surname, although there was only one candidate of that surname, could not be
said as a matter of law to be erroneous.
Four petitions, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
.
county of Suffolk respectively on September 23, 25, 27, and 28,
1926, for writs of mandamus directing the respondent boards to
count for the respective petitioners certain ballots, cast at the
State primary with respect to the republican nomination for the
office of district attorney for Suffolk County, which they had not
so counted.
By order of Pierce, J., Charles G. Keene was permitted to
intervene as respondent in the petitions brought by Thomas C.
O'Brien, and Mr. O'Brien was permitted to intervene as respond-
ent in the petitions brought by Mr. Keene, and the four cases
were consolidated and referred to the same auditor.
The four cases were heard together by Pierce, J., upon the
auditor's report. Material facts found by him and by the auditor
are stated in the opinion. The single justice reserved and re-
ported the cases for determination by the full court.
G. Alpert, for Thomas C. O'Brien.
S. Silverman, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Board of
Election Commissioners of Boston.
E. Adlow, for Charles G. Keene, submitted a brief.
J. A. Di Pesa, City Solicitor, for Board of Registrars of Voters
of Revere, submitted the case without argument or brief.
Rugg, C.J. These are petitions for writs of mandamus brought
against the Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Bos-
ton, the Board of Registrars of Voters of the City of Chelsea and
the Board of Registrars of Voters of the City of Revere. At the
hearing in this court the questions raised by the petition of Charles
G. Keene v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Boston
were waived, and, therefore, that petition need not be considered.
The remaining three petitions present for determination questions
touching the counting of ballots cast at the State primary with
respect to the republican nomination for the office of district at-
torney for Suffolk County. For convenience, Thomas C. O'Brien
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will be referred to as the petitioner, and Charles G. Keene as
the intervenor. The cases were referred to an auditor, who made
findings of fact, and later, on his report, were heard before a
single justice. The disputed ballots were offered and received in
evidence without objection. The evidence of the intervenor, re-
ported by the auditor for a limited purpose, was received by the
single justice for every competent purpose with additional evi-
dence which all counsel agreed would have been given by the
intervenor if he had been further examined. All the evidence
including the auditor's report was considered by the single justice
who followed the classification of votes adopted by the auditor,
having found it to be a reasonable and comprehensive method
for examination of the disputed ballots. He found the facts with
respect to the description of the ballots, the markings thereon,
the pasters, and the enumeration of ballots to be the same as
found by the auditor. The single justice found the facts and con-
clusions of fact to be as stated in the auditor's report and reserved
the petitions, on the facts thus found and the pleadings, for de-
termination by this court.
The relevant facts thus found are, that the name of the peti-
tioner and of one William J. Patron appeared upon the official
ballots as candidates for the office of district attorney; and be-
neath their names was a blank space with a square to the right
thereof wherein could be written the name of any other candi-
date desired by the voter. The name of the intervenor did not
appear upon the official ballot, but he was a candidate for nomi-
nation for the office of district attorney and resorted to the use
of pasters to secure votes. Upon these pasters, which were identi-
cal in size, form and substance, appeared the correct name and
address of the intervenor with a blank square to the right thereof
without other printing or designation. The electorate fully un-
derstood what it was necessary to do in order to signify their
choice of a candidate whose name appeared on the ballot, because
on substantially all the disputed ballots, except as to votes for
candidates for district attorney, a cross was invariably and uni-
formly used in the appropriate place, and that those who cast
these ballots clearly and plainly expressed their choice for all
candidates for various offices appearing upon the ballot other
than the office of district attorney. Only one paster was found
on any one ballot, but pasters were applied at various places
upon the disputed ballots. There was not a single designation of
office to be voted for where a paster had not been placed. Some
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were attached between the various groups for the different offices,
others in the corner, on the top, on the bottom, on the margin,
and on the back of the ballot. Some were put on horizontally,
others diagonally, vertically, upside down, and, in one instance,
a portion only of the paster was used. On many of the disputed
ballots there was no cross or mark at the end of the paster or on
the ballot at either end of the paster. As to all such ballots, the
auditor found that failure of the voter to locate the paster in the
space designated for candidates for district attorney, whether
containing a cross or not, and failure to make a cross or mark
where the paster was located in the space designated for district
attorney, rendered it impossible for him to draw any inference of
affirmative intent on the part of the voter to vote for the inter-
venor and also that, so far as it was a question of fact, such bal-
lots did not manifest the intent of the voter and that they ought
not to be counted in favor of the intervenor.
Further findings are, that the application of the paster under the
designation of some office other than that of district attorney,
or between the spaces for such designations tended to indicate that
the voter did not intend by the use of the paster to vote for the
office in question, and that the reason why the voter, if intending
to vote for the intervenor, did not use the blank space reserved
under the designation of the office, district attorney, rested upon
mere conjecture, and also that the reason why the voter, having
generally made crosses in the appropriate places in voting for all
other candidates, did not pursue the same course when employ-
ing a paster, could not be determined. Summarily stated, the
findings are that the intent of the voter could not be ascertained as
to pasters attached to other parts of the ballot, and as to pasters
attached under the designation of the office of district attorney
without any mark, and that the appearance of such ballots did not
afford any satisfactory foundation for determining the intent of
the voter.
Another group of ballots had a paster, accompanied or unac-
companied by a cross, located outside the space designated for
candidates for district attorney or had a paster unaccompanied
by a cross within the district attorney space, where a cross had been
made in the square opposite the name of the petitioner. The find-
ing as to these ballots is, that the voter had done everything neces-
sary or proper for him to do to express his choice for the petitioner
and that the use of the paster, as described, did not show a pur-
pose to vote for two candidates, but indicated more probably
that, after applying the paster by mistake, the voter changed his
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mind. Such ballots were found to express an intent to vote for
the petitioner.
After making these general findings, the different classes of ballots
were dealt with in detail by the auditor and the single justice.
Class A consists of ballots with pasters unaccompanied by a cross
and located upon the ballot in some place other than under the
designation district attorney, there being no cross in the district
attorney space. These ballots were found not to express any
ascertainable intent on the part of the voter and to be blank votes
as to the office of district attorney. Class B consists of ballots with
pasters under the designation district attorney without a cross
upon the paster or elsewhere under that designation. These bal-
lots were found not to disclose the intent of the voter and hence to
be blank votes as to district attorney. Class C consists of ballots
with pasters, accompanied by a cross, and located elsewhere upon
the ballot than under the designation district attorney, some
being under the designation of another office and some outside the
designation for any office, there being no cross for any candidate
under the designation district attorney. These also were found
not clearly to express the intent of the voter and to be blank votes
as to district attorney. Class D consists of ballots where the name
or a portion of a name without a street address was written under
the designation district attorney and there was a cross or mark
accompanying such writing. As to these the finding was that
where the correct name of the intervenor was used or a name sound-
ing substantially similar or the abbreviation of his Christian name
or the correct initial or initials when more than one used, or where
"Mr. Keene is referred to as Councillor" or as "Present Acting
Mayor, City of Boston" he in fact holding these offices, the voter
manifested an intent to vote for the intervenor; but that where
the surname alone of the intervenor was used, either with or with-
out the prefix "Mr.," or a similarly sounding surname, or the
wrong Christian name, or the wrong middle initial where the
Christian or surname are both correctly written, did not indicate
with sufficient definiteness a purpose to vote for the intervenor.
Class E comprises ballots with a paster unaccompanied by a cross
or mark in some place other than under the designation district
attorney and where a cross or mark is against the name of the
petitioner. These ballots were found to express the intent of the
voter to vote for the petitioner. Class F comprises ballots with a
paster, unaccompanied by a cross or mark under the designation
district attorney, and with a cross or mark opposite the name of the
petitioner. These ballots were found to express the intent of the
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voter to vote for the petitioner. Class G comprises ballots with a
paster accompanied by a cross or mark but placed upon some
other part of the ballot than under the designation district attorney
and where there was a cross or mark opposite the name of the
petitioner. These ballots also were found to express an intent of
the voter to vote for the petitioner.
It is not necessary to consider the votes under the group of
ballots entitled on the record Miscellaneous Class, because they
are few in number and do not affect the general result, and we do
not understand that any special argument has been directed to
overturning the findings with respect to them.
These petitions are proceedings at law. Therefore, these find-
ings of fact, if warranted upon any view of so much of the evi-
dence as appears in the record, must be accepted as true. They
can be set aside only if without support in the report. Brewster v.
Sherman, 195 Mass. 222, 226. Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co. 246
Mass. 139, 143.
The cardinal rule for guidance of election officers and courts in
cases of this nature is that if the intent of the voter can be deter-
mined with reasonable certainty from an inspection of the ballot,
in the light of the generally known conditions attendant upon the
election, effect must be given to that intent and the vote counted
in accordance therewith, provided the voter has substantially com-
plied with the requisites of the election law; if that intent cannot
thus be fairly and satisfactorily ascertained, the ballot cannot
rightly be counted. Strong, petitioner, 20 Pick. 484. Flanders v.
Roberts, 182 Mass. 524. Ray v. Registrars of Voters of Ashlarid,
221 Mass. 223, 225. Beauchemin v. Flagg, 229 Mass. 23, 24. Of
course the right to vote is a sacred privilege. Every rational in-
tendment is to be made in favor of its rightful exercise. But the
Legislature is clothed with power to enact appropriate laws to
regulate the orderly conduct of elections and to facilitate4 the
counting of votes. Where reasonable statutes have been enacted
to this end, the voters must observe their terms and exercise the
franchise under the law. Blackmer v. Hildreth, 181 Mass. 29.
The findings of the auditor and the single justice upon the facts
disclosed on this record were warranted under this rule. No
person can become a voter who is not able to read the Constitution
in the English language and write his name. It follows that he
must have sufficient intelligence to observe and understand the
physical arrangement of the ballot. That arrangement bears an
unmistakable meaning. O'Connell v. Mathews, 177 Mass. 518.
The use of pasters in voting for candidates whose names do not
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appear upon the official ballot is permissible under the statute.
A casual inspection of the ballot shows that votes for candidates
are designed to be made manifest by appropriate cross or mark
under the designation of the general offices. This is particularly
true with reference to the use of pasters. No political or other
designation can appear upon the pasters and no vote cast in viola-
tion of this provision can be counted. G. L. c. 54, § 65. By § 42
of the same chapter the names of candidates on the official ballot
must be arranged under the designation of office; and in § 77, it
is provided that the name of a candidate inserted by the voter
must be in the space provided therefor and a cross made in the
square at the right. The collective force of these statutory re-
quirements points to the conclusion that the Legislature intended
pasters, where used, to be inserted under the designation of the
office. Minor departures from the terms of the statute where
there has been substantial compliance with its provisions and
where the intent of the voter can be ascertained do not invalidate
the vote. Beauchemin v. Flagg, supra. Ray v. Registrars of
Voters of Ashland, supra. The omission of the residence of the
intervenor on some ballots rightly was found not to invalidate
such votes.
The crucial finding underlying the determination of the auditor
and single justice is that it was impossible for them to ascertain
the intent of the voter to vote for the intervenor for district
attorney unless the paster was under the designation district
attorney and was marked with a cross or other sign disclosing a
purpose to vote. That finding has support in reason. It cannot
be said that the placing of the paster on some other part of the
ballot than under the designation district attorney is a mani-
festation of purpose to vote for district attorney. Thus placing
the sticker may be by mistake or design but whatever may be
the cause, such a ballot does not disclose a purpose to vote for
an office designated on a part of the ballot where the sticker does
not appear. Keenan v. Briden, 45 R. I. 119, 125. Rutledge v.
Crawford, 91 Cal. 526. So also the placing of a sticker under the
designation district attorney without marking it does not neces-
sarily disclose a purpose to vote. When the sticker has been thus
attached, without more, the ballot is in the same condition in
effect that it would have been in if the name on the sticker had
been printed on the official ballot. The use of the sticker in the
circumstances disclosed, without more and without any cross or
mark, cannot be held as matter of law to indicate the purpose and
intent of the voter to cast his vote for the intervenor as a candi-
O'BRIEN V. ELECTION COMRS., BOSTON. SUP. JUD. CT., 1926. 133
date for district attorney. The findings in these respects cannot be
pronounced erroneous in law. People v. Fox, 114 Mich. 652.
Riley v. Trainor, 57 Col. 155. Hunt v. Campbell, 19 Ariz. 254,
289. Erickson v. Paulson, 111 Minn. 336. King v. McMahan,
179 Ky. 536, 540.
The findings as to the ballots where a name or portion of a
name was written under the designation district attorney cannot
be pronounced erroneous in law. The name of a person is the
distinctive characterization in words or words and initials by which
he is known and distinguished from others. The use of the name
commonly identifies a person. Where a description other than
his name is used it generally is a question of fact whether such
description identifies the particular person. Discriminative
abbreviations may or may not be sufficient. Certain descrip-
tions may leave no doubt as to the person intended. That is
illustrated in the case at bar by the use of the surname together
with an official title unmistakable in signification. But it cannot
be said as matter of law that a surname alone, a surname with a
different Christian name, or other incorrect or incomplete naming
such as appeared upon the disputed ballots, identifies the inter-
venor as the specified individual intended by the voter. There
is nothing inconsistent with this conclusion in Strong, petitioner^
supra. Where the name written was idem sonans with that of
the intervenor the ballots were rightly counted for him. People
v. Mayworm, 5 Mich. 146. The respondents have called our
attention to several decisions in other jurisdictions. It is not
necessary to review them. In general they do not seem to us
inconsistent in law with the conclusion here reached. See for
example Carpenter v. Ely, 4 Wis. 420, where the findings of fact
were held to control. But however that may be, we are clear
that the findings here made cannot be held erroneous as matter
of law.
The auditor and single justice each made his determination
in the light of all the extraneous evidence presented. Giving full
weight to that evidence, no sound ground appears for overturning
their determination on this point. It is not necessary to consider
further questions of evidence, even if it be assumed that they
are rightly before us on this record.
All questions of law which have been argued have been con-
sidered, but need not be discussed further. No reversible error
of law appears on the record.
It follows that the conclusions of the auditor affirmed and
adopted by the single justice as to the vote in Boston, Chelsea
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and Revere must be adopted by the respondents. In the case
against the Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Boston
there should be added two hundred and thirty-three votes to the
vote of the petitioner as found by the respondent board, namely,
ten thousand, six hundred and twenty-one, making his total
vote ten thousand, eight hundred and fifty-four. From the total
vote for the intervenor, as determined by the respondent board,
namely, twelve thousand, four hundred and ninety-one, there
should be deducted five hundred and fifty-one votes, leaving his
total vote eleven thousand, nine hundred and forty. In the case
against the Board of Registrars of Voters of the City of Chelsea
the vote for the petitioner should be nine hundred and sixty instead
of nine hundred and forty-three; and for the intervenor five
hundred and thirty-five instead of five hundred and sixty-nine.
In the petition of Charles G. Keene v. Board of Registrars of Voters
of the City of Revere, the vote for Mr. O'Brien should be two
thousand, one hundred and one, being the number determined
by the respondent board, and eight hundred and five for Mr.
Keene, instead of eight hundred and four as returned by the
respondent board.
Peremptory writs of mandamus
to issue accordingly.
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Charles E. Sevigny v. William B. Russell and Others.
(Reported in 260 Mass. 294.)
Bristol, March 22, 1927 — June 29, 1927. Present, Rugg, C.J., Pierce,
Wait and Sanderson, JJ.
Mandamus. Quo Warranto. Public Officer.
A petition for a writ of mandamus is not the proper process by which to try the
title to a public office which the petitioner does not claim for himself.
It seems that the proper process by which to try the title to a public office, except
in those cases where a private person claims the office, is by an information by the
Attorney General in the nature of a quo warranto.
Petition, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of
Bristol on January 20, 1927, and afterwards amended, for a writ
of mandamus.
The petition was heard by Carroll, J., and was denied. The
petitioner alleged exceptions.
J. W. Cummings, (J. T. Farrell with him,) for the petitioner.
A. E. Seagrave, for the respondents.
Rugg, C.J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. The
petitioner is a citizen and taxpayer of the city of Fall River.
He seeks by this proceeding to have declared illegal the election
of the respondent Russell as a member of the board of aldermen
of the city of Fall River. He makes no claim to that office himself.
"The use of the writ of mandamus to try the title to an office,
and to put one person out of and another person into an office,
is undoubtedly unusual, and opposed to the weight of authority
in other jurisdictions. But the nature of the proceedings in
mandamus under our statutes seems well adapted to accomplish
these results in a case like the present. The title of the incumbent
to the office is involved in the determination of the title of the
petitioner." Luce v. Board of Examiners of Dukes County, 153
Mass. 108, 111. Keough v. Board of Aldermen of Holyoke, 156
Mass. 403. Russell v. Wellington, 157 Mass. 100. Wheeler v.
Carter, 180 Mass. 382. That principle, recognized as an unusual
extension of the scope of the writ of mandamus, has never been
136 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES— 1927.
enlarged in its application beyond cases where a controversy
arises between two persons as to which one of the two is entitled
to office. It has not been the policy of the court to widen the use
of that writ to other more or less analogous cases. Fowler v.
Brooks, 188 Mass. 64. Longyear v. Hardman, 219 Mass. 405,
406. But as was said in Doherty v. Buchanan, 173 Mass. 338,
340, "we know of no case where a writ (of mandamus) has been
issued simply to command one to refrain from attempting to act
as a public officer, which is the only purpose for which the writ
is asked in the present case." The proper process by which to
try the title of one to a public office, except in those cases where the
petitioner claims the office for himself, is by an information in
the nature of a quo warranto. Attorney General v. Loomis, 225
Mass. 372. Attorney General v. Hutchinson, 185 Mass. 85. Prince
v. Boston, 148 Mass. 285, 287. G. L. c. 249, § 12. Attorney General
v. Sullivan, 163 Mass. 446. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 10 Mass.
290, 295. Attorney General v. Campbell, 191 Mass. 497. Such an
information cannot be filed by an individual without the inter-
vention of the Attorney General. Goddard v. Smithett, 3 Gray,
116, 124. Rice v. National Bank of the Commonwealth, 126 Mass.
300. These settled distinctions between the two processes would
be obliterated by broadening the function of the writ of mandamus
to include cases hitherto recognized as requiring an information
in the nature of a quo warranto. There is nothing in Brooks v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91, and the many cases
there cited, which affords support to the petitioner's contention.
Exceptions overruled.
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Charles E. Sevigny v. Alfred L. Lizotte and Others.
(Reported in 260 Mass. 296.)
Bristol, March 22, 1927 — June 29, 1927. Present, Rugg, C.J., Pierce,
Wait and Sanderson, JJ.
Mandamus.
It is a rule of general application that the title to a political office cannot be
impeached collaterally.
One who contends that he is entitled to hold the office of auditor of a city where
the auditor is elected by the board of aldermen cannot maintain a petition for a
writ of mandamus to oust from office one who was elected by a board, one member
of which the petitioner contended was not duly elected alderman or entitled to act
as such.
Petition for a writ of mandamus, filed in the Supreme Judicial
Court for the county of Bristol on January 20, 1927, and after-
wards amended.
The petition was heard by Carroll, J., and was denied. The
petitioner alleged exceptions.
J. W. Cummings, (J. T. Farrell with him,) for the petitioner.
A. E. Seagrave, for the respondents.
Rugg, C.J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. The
petitioner, a citizen and taxpayer of the city of Fall River, con-
tends that he is entitled to the office of auditor of that city. Con-
fessedly he held that office until the first Monday of March, 1927.
He brings this petition against the first named defendant, who
also contends that he is the auditor of that city by election for a
term beginning with said first Monday of March. The petitioner
joins as defendant one Russell and the members of the board of
aldermen of the city of Fall River. His contention is that, al-
though the defendant Lizotte was elected to the office 4 of city
auditor by a majority vote of the members of the board of alder-
men as shown by the records of that board, that election is illegal
for the reason that one of the votes for the defendant Lizotte was
cast by the defendant Russell who, the petitioner claims, was not
a member of the board of aldermen, and that therefore the elec-
tion of the respondent is void and that the petitioner is entitled
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to hold office until his successor is legally chosen. The sole basis
of the petitioner's claim is that Russell had no right to act as
alderman.
A judgment in favor of the petitioner would not remove Russell
from office. His right to the office of alderman can only be tried
in a proper proceeding brought to determine his title. It' is a
rule of general application that the title to a political office cannot
be impeached collaterally. It was said in Attorney General v.
Crocker, 138 Mass. 214, 221, "Public necessity and policy require
that the acts of an actual incumbent of a public office, in the
performance of its duties, shall be held valid, although the incum-
bent should not have a legal right to the office, and though his
right should be questioned and disputed." To the same effect are
Fmvler v. Beebe, 9 Mass. 231, Petersilea v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465,
Prince v. Boston, 148 Mass. 285, Moloney v. Selectmen of Milford,
253 Mass. 400. It follows that no inquiry can be had in this
proceeding into the validity of Russell's membership in the board
of aldermen.
Exceptions overruled.
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Leaxder Parrott v. Theodore R. Pluxkett and Others.
(Reported in 268 Mass. 202.)
Berkshire, June 25, 1929 — June 27, 1929. Present, Rugg, C.J., Pierce
Wait, Sanderson and Field, JJ.
Elections. Ballot. Municipal Corporations, Officers and agents. MandamuB.
It was stated that a petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate method
by which one should seek to have two of the selectmen of a town ordered to recog-
nize the petitioner as the third selectman and to have another person ordered to
cease pretending to be the third selectman.
In a town which previously had voted that one selectman should be elected
annually for a term of three years, the warrant for the town meeting of a certain
year called upon the voters to elect, among other officers, "one selectman for three
years." Each of two candidates was nominated for that office for three years and
each requested the voters to vote for him for that term. The official ballot pre-
pared by the town clerk for the election was regular in form except that, through
error of the printer, it contained, in conjunction with the names of each of such
two candidates, the caption, "Selectman for One Year." Such error was not dis-
covered until late in the afternoon of the day of voting. The candidate who re-
ceived a majority of the votes contended that he had been elected selectman for
three years; the other candidate contended that there had been no election. Held,
that
(1) Since the only term for which the voters had power to choose a selectman
was three years, the designation of the term on the ballot was unnecessary and
might be treated as surplusage: the clerical error in the designation of the term
was immaterial;
(2) The intention of the voters must be given effect in the circumstances;
(3) The candidate receiving a majority of the votes lawfully was elected select-
man.
Petition, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of
Berkshire on May 13, 1929, described in the opinion.
The petition was heard by Wait, J., upon the pleadings and a
case stated, and was reserved by his order for determination by
the full court.
The case was submitted on briefs.
C. H. Wright and H. L. Harrington, for the petitioner.
W. J. Donovan, for the respondents Plunketl and another.
E. K. McPeck and F. W. Cassidy, for the respondent Groves.
Rugg, C.J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. The
petitioner seeks to compel recognition of himself as member of
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the board of selectmen of the town of Adams by the two un-
doubted members of that board and to stop the third respondent
from pretending to be such member. The case was reserved for
the determination of the full court. The material facts are these:
The town of Adams, in 1891, accepted the provisions of law pro-
viding for the printing and distribution of ballots for town elec-
tions at public expense. In November, 1894, the town voted
that at its next annual meeting one selectman be chosen for one
year, one for two years and one for three years, and thereafter at
each annual meeting one for three years. At the annual meeting
in 1895, and at each succeeding annual meeting including that
for 1928, the town has elected one selectman for the term of three
years in compliance with this vote. At the annual town meeting
of 1926, the respondent Groves was elected a selectman for three
years; he qualified and served as such selectman and still claims
to hold that office as a holdover because of alleged failure to elect
his successor in 1929. The respondents Plunkett and Davis have
been duly elected and qualified as selectmen of the town and their
terms have not expired. The official ballots used at the annual
town meetings since 189G up to and including 1928 have been in
standard form and contained the following: "Selectman for Three
Years Mark One." Underneath this heading were listed the
names of candidates and their party designations. The warrant
for the annual town meeting in 1929 was in proper form and
amongst other matters called upon the voters "To bring in their
votes on one ballot for the following officers; . . . one Selectman
for three years" and for other named town officers. The official
ballot furnished for that meeting was in usual and regular form
except that it contained this:
"SELECTMAN FOR ONE YEAR Mark ONE
ROBERT GROVES Ind. Norn. Papers Dem.
LEANDER PARROTT Ind. Norn, Papers Rep."
The record of the annual town meeting for 1929 shows that the
petitioner Parrot t received a majority of all the ballots cast for
selectman, and that the printing on the official ballot of the term
"one year" instead of "three years" was an error. The peti-
tioner has duly taken the oath of office as selectman. "It is
agreed by all parties to these proceedings: that the warrant, call-
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ing said annual town meeting for 1929, was, among other things,
to elect a selectman for the term of three years; that the town
clerk submitted a form to the printer of an official ballot signed by
her, on which form the term of office for selectman was designated
as three years; that, through error of said printer, the official
ballot, was, as used by the voters in said election, printed 'Select-
man for one year,' . . . This error was not discovered by the
town officials until late in the afternoon of the day of voting.
That each candidate, by their political advertisement, asked to
be elected for the term of three years, and, at the caucuses and
the nomination papers each candidate was nominated for said
office for the term of three years. That each candidate and each
political party, by political advertising, circulated among the
voters and also published in the North Adams Transcript on the
evening of March first and March second, prior to said election,
respectively asked the voters of Adams to vote for their respective
candidates 'for Selectman for the term of three years.' "
In these circumstances the petitioner contends that he has been
elected selectman, at the annual town meeting for 1929. The
respondent Groves contends that there was no election of a select-
man at that meeting and that hence he holds over as selectman
in default of such election; and the two respondents, who con-
fessedly are selectmen, admit both the petitioner and Groves to
their meetings but, not knowing which of them is in fact a select-
man, refuse to recognize either as to matters requiring votes or
signatures of the selectmen, and make no argument on the merits
but desire the controversy settled.
Mandamus is the appropriate remedy. No question has be id
raised on this point. Luce v. Dukes County, Board of Examiners,
153 Mass. 108, 111. Keough v. Aldermen of Hohjohe, 156 Mass.
403. Sevigny v. Russell, 260 Mass. 294.
The purpose of election laws is to afford opportunity for the
orderly expression of preferences by the voters for those to be
elected to public office, and not to thwart or suppress such orderly
expression. The election laws of this Commonwealth providing
for official ballots have uniformly been interpreted to the end that
the will of the voter if ascertainable is to be given effect even
though there may have been omission to observe some subsidiary
and directory provisions of the law. In O'Connell v. Mathews, 177
Mass. 518, ballots prepared and delivered by the designated public
officers and cast by voters were received and counted which did
not have on the back and outside of them when folded the printed
words " Official Ballot of" followed by the designation of the vot-
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ing precinct, the date of the election and a facsimile of the sig-
nature of the city clerk as required by the election law. There
was a further provision of that law (St. 1898, c. 548, § 230) to the
effect that no ballot without the required official indorsement
should be deposited in the ballot box. In passing upon proceedings
to challenge the validity of those ballots actually deposited by
voters in the ballot box, it was held that they were rightly counted
because otherwise the voter would be disfranchised and that this
"result is not to be admitted without very clear words, and such
words would raise a constitutional question which we do not de-
cide." In Wheeler v. Carter, 180 Mass. 382, there was under re-
view an election in a town which had accepted the provisions of
law requiring members of the board of selectmen to be elected for
throe years. The warrant for that election contained the article
"to choose all necessary town officers for the ensuing year." It
was held that the article "To choose officers for the ensuing year"
meant "to choose them according to the law in force in that town.
This law required that the selectmen chosen for the ensuing year
should be elected for a term of three years." The article was held
to be sufficient and the selectman receiving a majority of the votes
was held to be elected for a term of three years. In Ray v. Regis-
trars of Voters of Ashland, 221 Mass. 223, question arose as to the
validity of an election of a selectman in a town where the term was
three years although no term was printed on the official ballot.
A candidate whose name was not on the official ballot ran for the
office and numerous voters at the election used pasters which they
attached to the official ballot. The printing upon these pasters
bore the name of the candidate in print but not in the kind or size
of letters required by the statute. It was expressly found that the
name on the pasters was not in conformity with the statute. The
pasters also bore the words "three years," although the official
ballot bore no such designation and it was not required. It was
held, however, that although these pasters were provided by the
voter himself, and not by the authorized public officials, and
failed to comply with the requirements of the statute, nevertheless
they ought to be counted because the ballots as used fairly and
unmistakably expressed the voters' purpose. In Beauchemin v.
Flagg, 229 Mass. 23, where the validity of ballots upon which
voters had marked a cross against the name of a certain candidate
between the square and the name but not in the square on the
official ballot, it was held that these votes ought to be counted on
the ground that the ballots upon inspection indicated with reason-
able certainty the candidate for whom the electors intended to
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vote and that the votes should be counted in accordance with that
intent since the voters had substantially complied with the requi-
sites of the election statute. Cases have arisen where there has
been failure to comply with vital requirements of the election law
and such ballots have not been counted. See, for example, Flanders
v. Roberts, 182 Mass. 524; Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222;
Andrews v. Registrars of Voters of Easton, 246 Mass. 572; Madden
v. Election Commissio?iers of Boston, 251 Mass. 95. In O'Brien v.
Election Commissioners of Boston, 257 Mass. 332, 338, it was said:
"The cardinal rule for guidance of election officers and courts in
cases of this nature is that if the intent of the voter can be deter-
mined with reasonable certainty from an inspection of the bal-
lot, in the light of the generally known conditions attendant upon
the election, effect must be given to that intent and the vote
counted in accordance therewith, provided the voter has sub-
stantially complied with the requisites of the election law; if that
intent cannot thus be fairly and satisfactorily ascertained, the bal-
lot cannot rightly be counted." The right to vote is a sacred
privilege. Every rational intendment is to be made in favor of
its rightful exercise. Unless in contravention of some positive and
essential mandate of the statute or of the law, the intention of the
voter must be given effect. That principle runs through our de-
cisions from first to last. If that principle be regarded, as it ought
to be, rather than casual remarks, colored as they generally are by
the circumstances of particular cases, all the authorities are con-
sistent and harmonious.
In the case at bar the only term for which a selectman could
have been elected under the law at the annual town meeting in
Adams in 1929 was for a term of three years. The warrant for
that. town meeting correctly stated that it was to be held for the
election of one selectman for the term of three years. Thus
the statute and the warrant declared and bounded the power of
the voter on that subject. The ballot was prepared under the
authority of law by public officers and furnished to the voters.
They could use no other ballots. The intention of the voter must
be expressed upon the piece of paper prepared and handed to him
by public officials. There was a clerical error on that ballot. It
was unnecessary that the term of office for the selectman should
be printed on the ballot. If nothing as to the term had been upon
the ballot the statute and the warrant would have made plain
that the term for which the selectman was to be elected was three
years. The voter was not responsible for the fact that the official
ballot contained this clerical error. The clerical error stating the
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term to be one year could in nowise be given effect. The select-
man in the circumstances disclosed could not have been elected
for the term of one year. This was not an error in the name of the
candidate or in the description of the office. It follows that this
clerical error concerned an immaterial and subsidiary point and
did not affect the substantial factors of the election; those were
fixed by the statute and by the warrant. To adopt the conten-
tion of the respondent Groves would be to annul the intention of
all the voters on account of a clerical error for which they were in
no degree responsible. That clerical error would not naturally be
seen or comprehended by the ordinary voter in the brief time in
which as a practical matter each voter is expected to be in the
voting booth. Apparently this clerical error was observed by only
one of the more than three thousand voters who cast ballots at the
annual meeting of 1929 in Adams. The specimen ballot publicly
posted as required by law, important as it is and may be under
other conditions, would not commonly be inspected by voters for
the detection of a clerical error of this nature. Voters are not re-
quired to make a critical examination of an official ballot for the
discovery of clerical errors. They have a right to accept the
official ballot handed them as being correct in form and furnishing
appropriate means for expressing their intention by merely making
a cross in the blanks designed to manifest their purpose. The
means to correct such clerical error as is here disclosed, without at
the same time violating some other provision of the statutes as to
elections, would not readily occur to the ordinary voter and might
involve difficult questions of law. In these circumstances the cleri-
cal error on the official ballot may be treated as surplusage.
Omitting the words constituting the clerical error, the ballots were
in proper form. It is not necessary to consider whether clerical
errors may exist of such a nature as to be fatal to a particular
election.
There is nothing at variance with this conclusion in the decision
in Attorney General v. Hutchinson, 185 Mass. 85. That case is
obscurely reported. An examination of the original papers shows
that in the town of Lexington, where that controversy arose,
official ballots were used in elections of town officers. In January,
1900, the town adopted the provisions of statute (which became
operative at the annual town meeting in March, 1900) requiring
the election of three selectmen, one for a term of one year, one for
a term of two years and one for a term of three years. At the an-
nual meeting in March, 1900, three selectmen were elected, one
for the term of one year, one for the term of two years and one for
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the term of three years. In January, 1901, at a town meeting held
more than thirty days prior to the annual town meeting for that
year (St. 1898, c. 548, §§ 335, 336, 361) upon a sufficient warrant,
it was voted that at the annual town meeting in March, 1901, one
selectman be elected for one j^ear; in March, 1902, two selectmen
for one year; and in 1903, three selectmen for one year. Thus, on
the face of the records of the town, it had been voted to return to
the former system of electing selectmen for terms of one year. At
the annual meeting in 1901, one Hutchinson was declared elected
a selectman for a term of one year but, controversy and litigation
having arisen, he resigned and thereafter at a special meeting held
in May, 1901, was declared elected selectman for a term expiring
in March, 1904. At the annual town meeting in 1902, one Taylor
was declared elected for a term of three years. At the annual town
meeting in 1903, one Spaulding was declared elected for a term of
three years. All three of these last described elections were held
and declared pursuant to a warrant for the town meeting calling
for election of selectmen for the stated terms. In March, 1903,
shortly after the annual town meeting, information in the nature
of a quo warranto was filed by the Attorney General against
Hutchinson, Taylor and Spaulding. The main point there in con-
troversy was whether the vote of the town at the meeting of Janu-
ary, 1901, to give up the three-year term for selectmen and to re-
turn to the one-year term was valid. That is the only question
discussed in the opinion. The case decided that that vote was
valid, and that the election of each respondent at a town meeting
held upon a warrant calling for an election on the basis of a three-
year term for selectmen not being in conformity to the governing
statute, in view of the vote of the town, was invalid. No question
was considered by the court in that case such as here is presented.
We do not discuss the merits of that decision but accept its full
value, and are of opinion that it has no bearing on the case at bar.
The conclusion follows that under well settled principles of elec-
tion law the petitioner was lawfully elected selectman of the town
of Adams at the annual town meeting of 1929 for the term of three
years.
Peremptory writ of mandamus to issue re-
quiring the respondent Groves to desist
from pretending to be selectman and re-
quiring the other two respondents to recog-
nize the petitioner as selectman.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
John E. Swift v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Milton
and Another.
Same v. Same.
(Reported in 281 Mass. 264.)
Norfolk, Dec. 15, 1932 — Dec. 22, 1932. Present, Rugq, C.J., Crosby,
Pierce, Field and Lummus, JJ.
Elections, Recount: destroyed ballots. Mandamus. Equity Jurisdiction.
The mere fact that, after the counting of votes cast in a town at a State election,
their return to the town clerk and the transmission of his record to the Secretary
of the Commonwealth and before the beginning of a recount had on application of
a candidate defeated on the face of the returns, over fifteen hundred ballots in one
precinct were innocently destroyed through accident and mistake so that the town
clerk could not deliver them to the board of registrars of voters for the purpose of
the recount, did not require that the ballots so destroyed, or the ballots for the entire
precinct, or the ballots for the entire town, should become a nullity; and it was
proper for the board to make return after recount that the ballots destroyed "had
been destroyed by mistake" and that "the figures turned in by the precinct officers
for the missing . . . ballots were added to" their count of the other "ballots (for
that precinct) and made no change in the original figures as compiled by the elec-
tion officers on the day of election."
The proper procedure for procuring relief respecting an improper count of ballots
by a board of registrars of voters after a petition for a recount is by a petition for
a writ of mandamus and not by a bill in equity.
Bill in Equity, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the
county of Norfolk on November 22, 1932, against the board of
registrars of voters and the town clerk of the town of Milton,
seeking to have the board of registrars enjoined from making and
signing any statement or certification of their alleged determina-
tion of the issues raised in the recount held on November 21,
1932, and described in the opinion and from returning such state-
ment to the town clerk; and to have the town clerk enjoined
from recording as the official returns the alleged recount of the
ballots delivered by him to the board of registrars and " ordered
to cancel and expunge any and all alleged records of tabulation
of the votes cast in the said town of Milton for the several candi-
dates for the office of Lieutenant Governor." Also a
Petition, filed in the same court on December 2, 1932, against
the same parties for a writ of mandamus directed to the clerk
of the town of Milton commanding him to certify that the vote
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of the said town of Milton cannot be determined; and to the said
board of registrars 'Ho amend the certificate of their determination
that the vote of said town of Milton cannot be determined."
A petition by Gaspar G. Bacon, who was the successful candi-
date against the petitioner on the face of the returns, for leave to
intervene as a party, was allowed in the mandamus proceedings
and was denied in the suit in equity, in which, however, he was
given leave to participate as amicus curiae.
The two proceedings were consolidated and were heard by
Wait, J., who reserved and reported them for determination by
the full court. Material facts are stated in the opinion.
¥. L. Simpson, (H. T. Tally with him,) for the plaintiff,
petitioner.
L. Bryant, for the defendants, respondents.
J. Hannigan, for Gaspar G. Bacon, intervening respondent in
proceedings for mandamus.
J. Hannigan, by leave of court, submitted a brief as amicus
curiae in the suit in equity.
Rugg, C.J. The petitioner seeks review of a recount made
by the board of registrars of voters in the town of Milton, and an
order that they be directed to reject certain ballots counted by
them.
The relevant facts are these: The petitioner was a candidate
for the office of Lieutenant Governor at the State election held
on November 8, 1932. The respondents constitute the board of
registrars of voters of the town of Milton. The returns of the
election officers in the several precincts in the town of Milton
showed a total vote of eight thousand seven hundred twenty-
seven, of which three thousand one hundred six were cast in
precinct 2. Copy of the original record of all .votes cast in the
town for that office was on or about November 10, 1932, trans-
mitted "to the State secretary" by the town clerk. G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 54, § 112. A petition for recount of the votes cast for
Lieutenant Governor was seasonably filed and recount was had.
At the time set for the recount the town clerk delivered to the
board of registrars of voters, of which he was a member, the used
ballots in his possession on that day for the purposes of the recount.
He was unable to hand to them fifteen hundred six of the ballots
cast for this reason: The precinct officers of precinct 2 duly
counted the ballots cast and made return of the result in proper
form. After the counting they filled with sixteen hundred used
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ballots, contained in envelopes or packages numbered one to
thirty-two inclusive, a wooden box, supplied them by the town
clerk as an envelope for the used ballots. This box was pad-
locked. Being unable to get all the used ballots into the box,
they put envelopes or packages numbered thirty-three to sixty-
three inclusive of used and canvassed ballots, containing in all
fifteen hundred six ballots, in one or two of the cartons in which
official ballots had been received, and which had been emptied
during the balloting. Only used ,ballots were so placed in the
carton or cartons. The carton or cartons were marked "used
ballots" and were securely tied. The wooden box, the ballot
box, the carton or cartons containing fifteen hundred six used
ballots, and other cartons containing ballots, delivered by the
town clerk to the precinct officers, which were not used or marked
in balloting, were duly delivered to the police in attendance and
returned to the town clerk. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 107. The
used and unused ballots from all the precincts were transferred
to the town clerk between 9 and 11 p.m. of November 8 and were
placed in an outer portion of his office to which any one had access.
The town clerk made no examination of the articles returned to
him by the police, and was ignorant that any used ballots were
in any of the cartons. In such ignorance, and believing that such
cartons and their contents were of no value or use, he permitted
and authorized the superintendent of the town hall to remove
and destroy all the cartons, and on Thursday, November 10, 1932,
not knowing what was in them, the superintendent burned the
cartons with their contents. The clerk of precinct 2 duly delivered
to the town clerk the copies of the records made by him and
certified by the precinct officers which are required by G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 54, § 105. The town clerk and selectmen pursuant to
§ 111 of the chapter examined said copies, found no error, and
made them part of the record of the election. The registrars of
voters duly made a recount of all the ballots cast in the other
precincts in the town and made return of their recount of the
votes cast for Lieutenant Governor. In that return they stated:
"In Precinct 2 we recounted 1,600 ballots out of a total of 3,106
ballots cast as the other 1,506 ballots had been destroyed by
mistake. The count on the 1,600 ballots was Bacon 1,030, Becker
3, Dawson 0, Hutchins 8, Swift 514, Blanks 45 and the figures
turned in by the Precinct Officers for the missing 1,506 ballots
were added to our count of 1,600 ballots and made no change in
the original figures as compiled by the Election Officers on the
day of election." The result of the entire recount according to
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the return was that there was no change in the total number of
votes cast, no change in the total number of votes cast for the
petitioner, the number of votes cast for each of two other candi-
dates was reduced by one, the number of votes cast for still another
candidate was increased by one, the number of blanks was in-
creased by one and no change was made in precinct 2. All the
defendants including the town clerk acted in good faith and the
destruction of the fifteen hundred six ballots used in the election
was by accident and mistake. These facts being either agreed
by the parties or found by the single justice without report of the
evidence must be accpeted as true.
The ballots cast in the election when returned to the town
clerk were not guarded from the possibility of unauthorized inter-
ference as Securely as is to be desired, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 109,
but there is no foundation for argument that in fact there was
any tampering with them. Except for the accidental destruction
of the fifteen hundred six ballots cast in precinct 2, all were turned
over to the respondents for recount in the same condition as when
first removed from the ballot boxes.
The question for decision is the effect upon the recount and the
result of the election in the town of Milton, so far as concerns the
vote for Lieutenant Governor, of the accidental destruction of a
part of the ballots cast in precinct 2 in the circumstances already
narrated.
Proceedings for a recount of votes cast at an election are strictly
statutory. They are of no effect unless authorized, begun and
conducted as provided by the statute. Eldridge v. Selectmen of
Chatham, 192 Mass. 409, 411. The function of the registrars
under the governing statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 135, in a
case like the present is to make the recount and sign "a statement
of their determination of the questions raised." It then becomes
the duty of the town clerk to " alter and amend, in accordance
with such determination, such records as have been found to be
erroneous." The record originally returned, as examined and
corrected under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 111, stands as the correct
statement of the vote except as changed by the report of the
registrars under § 135. The registrars have made no change in
the original return for precinct 2. They found no error in that
return.
The main purpose of the election statutes is to provide a con-
venient method for the voter qualified according to law to express
in secret his preference for persons to be elected to the several
offices to be filled and on the questions to be answered at an
150 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES— 1932.
election and to have that expression of preference counted fairly
and honestly, all in conformity to reasonable regulations. The
statutes of this Commonwealth contain in great detail require-
ments as to the preparation and distribution of ballots, the marking
and deposit of them in ballot boxes, the counting of those ballots
and the making of official returns of the results of the voting.
Cole v. Tucker, 164 Mass. 486. O'Brien v. Election Commis-
sioners of Boston, 257 Mass. 332, 338. " As stated by Andrews,
C.J., in People v. Wood, 148 N. Y. 142, 147, 'The object of elec-
tions is to ascertain the popular will and not to thwart it. The
object of election laws is to secure the rights of duly qualified
electors and not to defeat them.' This must be borne in mind
in the construction of such statutes, and the presumption is that
they are enacted to prevent fraud and to secure freedom of choice,
and not by technical obstructions to make the right of voting
insecure." Blackmer v. Hildreth, 181 Mass. 29, 31. Attorney
General v. Campbell, 191 Mass. 497, 502. Wheeler v. Carter, 180
Mass. 382.
The record in the case at bar discloses nothing irregular in
connection with the election. The ballots were lawfully cast and
counted and returned, and the results declared with all the safe-
guards required by the law and under all its presumptions as to
correctness. Thereafter but before the petition for recount was
filed, some of the ballots thus cast were innocently destroyed by
accident and mistake. No fraud is disclosed. No intent on the
part of anybody to interfere with a recount or to affect the opera-
tion and result of the election is revealed. To hold that these
entirely guiltless acts invalidate the votes of precinct 2 would
have the effect of disfranchising at least fifteen hundred six voters
or, according to other suggestions made in argument, all the voters
of that precinct or of the entire town. Such a result would be
unnatural. It would violate fundamental conceptions as to the
operation of democratic institutions and the safety of our form of
government.
The statutes do not require any conclusion of that nature.
The right to a recount is secured to specified numbers of voters
under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 135. That right must be given all
the protection accorded to it by the General Court. But it does
not mount higher than the election itself. It arises subsequently
to the election. It has no essential connection with the election.
The statutes cannot rightly be interpreted to accomplish the dis-
franchisement of hundreds and perhaps thousands of voters who
have complied with every provision of the law, who are entitled
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to have force and effect given to their votes and whose votes have
been once counted and returned under all the sanctions provided
by the election law. An innocent although unfortunate accident
and mistake has intervened to prevent the recount of all the
votes in precinct 2 of Milton as required by law. The statute
contains no express provision concerning such a situation. The
general principle of the law of elections is against disfranchise-
ment of the voter who has complied with the statute in these
circumstances. Every intendment of the law is to give effect to
the expression of the wrill of the voters, notwithstanding incidental
irregularities in the election, unless they are of such nature as to
render doubtful the true interpretation of that expression. Pevey
v. Aylward, 205 Mass. 102, 107. Parrott v. Plunkett, 268 Mass.
202, 205-206, and cases there reviewed. To press the right to a
recount established by said § 135 to the technical extreme here
urged would violate underlying ideas concerning free institutions.
It is not required or permitted by a reasonable construction of
the election statutes as a whole. The design of the recount is to
verify, not to destroy, the result of an election as previously de-
clared by the election officers. Where without culpability veri-
fication has become impossible as to any part of an election that
part of the election does not become a nullity.
The original count of the votes in the town of Milton as re-
turned by the precinct officers and corrected will stand as true
under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 111, except as amended by the
determination of the registrars of voters made under said § 135.
The respondents with respect to the recount acted in conform-
ity to law and no error is disclosed on this record.
The petitioner brought a suit in equity and also a petition
for a writ of mandamus, both to obtain the same relief. They
have been consolidated for the purpose of being heard together.
Lumiansky v. Tessier, 213 Mass. 182. It seems apparent that
the appropriate proceeding for an inquiry such as is here raised
is by mandamus and not in equity. Flanders v. Roberts, 182
Mass. 524, 529, and cases cited. Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass.
222, 225, and cases cited. Perry v. Hull, 180 Mass. 547, is there
distinguished. Those cases were decided when the statute was
so far as here material the same as that now in force. G. L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 56, § 69. Compare St. 1898, c. 548, § 417; R. L.
c. 11, § 421.
BtU dismissed.
Petition dismissed.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
John E. Swift u. Board of Registrars of Voters of Quincy
and Another.
(Reported in 281 Mass. 271.)
Norfolk, Dec. 15, 1932 — Dec. 22, 1932. Present, Rugg, C.J., Crosby,
Pierce, Field and Lummus, JJ.
Elections, Cancelling mechanism. Absentee voting. Statute, Construction.
Words, "Shall."
The provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 106, do not require that ballots which
were duly cast at an election should not be counted merely because, due to imperfect
working of the cancelling device in a ballot box which in good faith had been in-
spected as required by the statutory provisions preceding the election, when no
defect was discovered, such ballots were not cancelled by the machine.
The mere fact, that after the observance of all the formalities required of election
officers by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 95, respecting certain absentee ballots, the
envelopes in which they were received were not returned to the city clerk by the
election officers and therefore were not returned to the board of registrars of voters
for the purpose of a recount, where there was nothing to indicate fraud or tampering
with the ballots and records, did not invalidate the votes nor afford any ground for
nullifying the count.
In mandamus proceedings in this court raising questions touching a recount of
ballots cast in a city at a State election, findings by a single justice after an exami-
nation of facsimile reproductions of certain ballots to ascertain whether they should
be counted for one candidate or for another, cannot be reviewed or revised upon a
reservation and report by him to the full court.
Petition for a writ of mandamus, filed in the Supreme Judicial
Court for the county of Norfolk on November 23, 1932, and
afterwards amended, described in the opinion.
Gaspar G. Bacon subsequently was permitted to intervene as
a respondent. The petition was heard by Donahue, J. He made
certain findings of fact, described in the opinion, and reserved
and reported the case for determination by the full court.
F. L. Simpson, (//. T. Talty with him,) for the petitioner.
J. Hannigan, for the respondents and the intervening re-
spondent.
Rugg, C.J. This petition for a writ of mandamus raises ques-
tions touching the recount of ballots cast in the city of Quincy
for Lieutenant Governor at the State election held on November 8,
1932.
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1. One allegation in the petition is that a substantial number
of ballots "were not cancelled as required by law." The facts
pertinent to this allegation are that when the ballot presented
for deposit by the voter is inserted in the aperture on the top of
the ballot box and the handle on the outside of the box isjturned,
rubber rollers within the box grasp the ballot and draw it into
the box. The rubber rollers are so constructed that one of them
is intended to stamp upon the back of each ballot the name of
the city, the ward number and precinct number in which the
ballot is cast. The roller designed to do this stamping is inked
from a pad incorporated into the mechanism in the top of the
ballot box. The pad is also a roller which moves on a shaft
and is so placed and designed that it is in constant contact with
another roller upon whose surface are the stamping letters and
figures. The rollers and inking device are in the same separate
locked portion of the ballot box. There is no arrangement for
the mechanical or automatic replenishment of ink on the inking
roller and no replenishment is possible without opening the me-
chanical portion of the ballot box. During the voting period the
amount of ink on the pad can be determined only by opening the
upper part of the ballot box and inspecting the pad. The key
for such opening is in the sole possession of the police officer on
•duty at each precinct. The only means of ascertaining whether
the cancelling device is in fact stamping the ballots as deposited
in the box is by examination of the ballots after they have passed
into the box or by examining the cancelling device after opening
the mechanical portion of the ballot box. Each ballot box con-
tains on its face a numbering device designed to record the num-
ber of ballots passing into the box as deposited by the voters,
which operates by means of a counting mechanism set in motion
only when a ballot is actually passing into the box. Prior to the
election due examination as required by law was made of all bal-
lot boxes used in Quincy, and they were found to be in good con-
dition and the inking devices properly inked. No record was
made that it was impossible to use any of these ballot boxes as
required by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 66, and so far as could be
observed during the voting period no ballot box became impossible
of use. These ballot boxes were used exclusively during this ( lec-
tion. After the closing of the polls and after counting the ballots
removed from the ballot boxes, the election officers caused such
ballots to be placed in envelopes, some of which were not sealed;
some of the ballots were in envelopes placed in "fiberoid con-
tainers" which were then sealed and others were placed in un-
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sealed packages or containers. In other instances, where the
"fiberoid containers" were inadequate to hold the filled enve-
lopes, the election officers caused such ballots in unsealed enve-
lopes to be securely tied into bundles. All these "fiberoid con-
tainers" and tied bundles were duly delivered to the city clerk
of Quincy who immediately caused them to be placed in a steel
vault in the city hall and there securely locked, and no person
had access thereto except the city clerk and his assistants. The
election officers in the several precincts after the close of the
polls returned unused ballots, the number of which is unknown,
to the city clerk in unsealed packages. These packages were
placed by the city clerk in the cellar of the city hall in Quincy in
space or room which is not locked. So far as appears said pack-
ages have remained in said cellar from the time tfiey were placed
there until the present time. At the time of the recount the city
clerk turned over to the registrars of voters for counting the bal-
lots contained in the envelopes in his possession and received by
him from the election officers. The number of uncancelled bal-
lots is not disclosed on the record but it appears to have been an
appreciable number of the ballots that were duly cast and received
into the ballot box. Such uncancelled ballots were counted ac-
cording to their marking by the precinct officers, and it is the
intention of the respondents to count them according to their
marking on the recount.
The election law, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, contains ample safe-
guards as to the count of those who receive ballots and of those
who deposit ballots. It is provided by § 67 that one voting list
shall be delivered to the ballot clerks and another to the officers
in charge of the ballot box. When a ballot is delivered to a voter,
his name shall be checked on the first list and when he deposits
his ballot it shall be checked on the second list. Each voter on
receiving his ballot, § 76, and again on depositing it in the ballot
box, § 83, is required to give his name and, if requested, his
address to an election officer, who shall distinctly announce such
name. The ballot box is required to have mechanical devices for
registering the number of ballots cast. § 33. As soon as the
polls are closed, the clerk is required to record the number shown
by the register on the ballot box. The election officers are re-
quired to count audibly the number of names checked on each
voting list and announce the same. Then the presiding officer
shall open the ballot box, the ballots are counted audibly, one
by one, and the whole number is publicly announced. § 105.
All these acts precede the counting of the votes cast for the sev-
SWIFT V. REGISTRARS. QUINCY. SUP. JUD. (T., 1082. 155
eral candidates. The voting lists, records and ballots must be
carefully preserved. § 107. Thus there are four separate and
independent methods of ascertaining the number of votes cast.
Provision is made for equal representation of both the major
political parties in the appointment of election officers and their
participation in vital steps in the conduct of the election and the
counting of ballots. §§ 13, 14, 67, 105. Nothing in this record
suggests any disparity between the number of ballots in the bal-
lot box and the number of names of voters checked on the lists
and the number registered by the ballot box. There is no basis
for a suggestion that the uncancelled ballots were not actually
deposited in the ballot box by duly qualified voters in compliance
with all the requirements of the election laws. Manifestly each
of these ballots passed through the cancelling device and was
subject to its operation.
The question to be decided is whether as matter of law these
uncancelled ballots thus cast must be rejected and not counted.
The answer to this question depends upon the construction to
be given G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 106, the words of which so far
as here material are: "If the use of a State ballot box is required,
no ballot shall be counted unless it has been deposited in and
cancelled by such ballot box, or has been otherwise deposited in
accordance with section sixt}r-six. Only official ballots shall be
counted in any election for which they are provided. If a voter
marks more names than there are persons to be elected to an
office, or if his choice cannot be determined, his ballot shall not
be counted for such office." Section 66 is not relevant to the case
at bar.
It is provided by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 33, that "Ballot
boxes shall . . . contain mechanical devices for receiving, regis-
tering and cancelling every ballot deposited therein." There are
minute provisions as to the approval of ballot boxes and their
purchase, care, custody, repair and inspection by public officers.
§§ 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38. They must be inspected at the
opening of the polls and before the beginning of the balloting by
the election officers and publicly shown, as assurance that they
are empty, and then immediately be locked or fastened and not
thereafter removed from public view until after the polls are
closed. It is further provided by said § 66 that thereafter "The
ballot box shall not be opened . . . until the polls are closed
. . . but in order to make room for ballots, the presiding officer
may, in the presence of all the election officers, open the box and
pack and press down the ballots therein." Further provision is
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made if it becomes impossible to use the ballot box. Thus it
appears that there is no statutory provision to enable or permit
the election officers to ascertain during the progress of the voting
whether the internal mechanism of the ballot box is working.
The cancelling device might fail to cancel the ballots and the
most careful voter and the most alert election officers have no
knowledge of the fact. They are deprived by the statute of any
possibility of knowing of such defect in the operation of the ballot
box, if it occurs. The words of said § 106 as to counting uncan-
celled ballots in these circumstances must be interpreted in the
light of the main design of the election laws and the interpreta-
tion given to other more or less similar legislative mandates.
Whether an election statute couched in positive words of com-
mand is to be construed as intended to invalidate ballots actually
cast under all the sanctions of the law must be determined from
a broad view of the end and aim of elections and election law
rather than from resort to strict logomachy and syntax. It was
said by Chief Justice Shaw, in Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pick. 64,
67, respecting the meaning of "shall" in several sections of a
statute as to the assessment of taxes, that "many regulations
are made by statute . . . intended to promote method, system
and uniformity in the modes of proceeding, the compliance or
non-compliance with which, does in no respect affect the rights
of . . . citizens." The word "shall" as used in statutes, although
in its common meaning mandatory, is not of inflexible significa-
tion and not infrequently is construed as permissive or directory
in order to effectuate a legislative purpose. Cheney v. Coughlin,
\
201 Mass. 204. Rea v. Aldermen of Everett, 217 Mass. 427, 430.
In almost every section of our present election law the- word
"shall" is used. Manifestly, it could not have been intended
that non-compliance with any one of these provisions should
invalidate an election. The designation "mandatory" or "direc-
tory" often is convenient in discussing the meaning of "shall"
and "may" in statutes. It is an aid to interpretation to establish
tests by which to measure legislative intent. But all such tests
must yield to the underlying aim of all statutory interpretation,
which is to discern the legislative intent disclosed by the enact-
ment as an entirety in the light of its dominant purpose and !
to declare its appropriate application to particular facts. The
regnant design of all election laws is to provide expeditious and
convenient means for expression of the will of the voters free from I
fraud. The right to vote is a precious personal prerogative to be
j
sedulously guarded. Arts. 4, 7, 8, 9 of the Declaration of Rights.
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The public welfare demands that elections be protected from
fraud. If and when those interests conflict, troublesome problems
may arise, but presumably the public welfare must be held para-
mount. C. 1, § 1, art. 4 of the Constitution. Election laws are
framed to afford opportunity for the orderly expression by duly
qualified voters of their preferences among candidates for office,
not to frustrate such expression. The cardinal rule to be followed
by election officers and courts in election matters is to ascertain
the intent of the voter as disclosed by the official ballot actually
cast and to give effect to that intent by counting the ballot; but,
if that intent cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, then to reject
the ballot. The intention of the voter must be given effect unless
in contravention of some essential mandate of the law. The
right to vote is a sacred privilege guaranteed by the Constitution
to those lawfully qualified. Every rational intendment is to be
made in favor of the rightful exercise of the franchise. That
principle pervades and dominates all our decisions and har-
monizes them all. The design and purpose of election laws have
been stated in numerous decisions. It was said by Mr. Justice
Hammond, speaking for the court in Blackmer v. Hildreth, 181
Mass. 29, at page 31: "As stated by Andrews, C.J., in People
v. Wood, 148 N. Y. 142, 147, 'The object of elections is to ascertain
the popular will and not to thwart it. The object of election laws
is to secure the rights of duly qualified electors and not to defeat
them.' This must be borne in mind in the construction of such
statutes, and the presumption is that they are enacted to prevent
fraud and to secure freedom of choice, and not by technical obstruc-
tions to make the right of voting insecure." A considerable part
of this opinion was quoted and followed by Chief Justice Knowl-
ton, speaking for the court, in Attorney General v. Campbell, 191
Mass. 497, 502. This principle was somewhat amplified and
enforced in O'Brien v. Election Commissioners of Boston, 257 Mass.
332, 338-339, and Parrott v. Plunkett, 268 Mass. 202, 205-207.
In Commonwealth v. McGurty, 145 Mass. 257, at page 260, it was
said by the court speaking through C. Allen, J., respecting fcfee
trial of an indictment for alteration of a " ballot cast ... at
any election held for the choice of public officers" where it ap-
peared that the defendant made altering marks on a ballot duly
deposited in the ballot box: "It was not necessary to show that
the ballot had been cancelled by a mechanical device, as provided
in § 10 of the statute. Such cancellation is not essential to insure
the counting of a ballot, since § 12 makes provision for the case
where a ballot box containing such mechanical device cannot be
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furnished. Besides, the evidence showing that the ballot came
from the ballot box which was actually used in the election would
warrant the inference that it had been duly cast within the mean-
ing of § 43." Said § 10, St. 1884, c. 229, as to the device for can-
cellation of ballots in the ballot box, was in substance the same
as G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 33, and its § 11 as to counting ballots
in substance the same as G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 106. The
statute under consideration in O'Connell v. Mathews, 177 Mass.
518, St. 1898, c. 548, provided in § 194 that on the back and out-
side of each official ballot prepared by public authority " shall be
printed" certain words followed by "a facsimile of the signa-
ture" of the officer by whom the ballot was caused to be prepared,
and further, in § 230, that no "ballot without the official endorse-
ment . . . shall be deposited in the ballot box." It was held
that ballots deposited without the official indorsement, if pro-
vided for the voter by public authority, should be counted as
marked by the voter notwithstanding the statutory prohibition.
The court said through Chief Justice Holmes: "If (the ballot
is) allowed to be deposited and not counted, the voter is dis-
franchised. The latter result is not to be admitted without very
clear words, and such words would raise a constitutional question
which we do not decide." Irregularities in the conduct of an
election, not shown to violate the substantive end for which the
election was held, do not invalidate the result. Wheeler v. Carter,
180 Mass. 382. It appeared in Blackmer v. Hildreth, 181 Mass.
29, that a nomination paper for a candidate was filed two days
later than the date when by the statute it "shall be filed." It was
found that all the parties including the town clerk and registrars
acted in good faith in receiving the nomination paper and print-
ing the name of the candidate on the official ballot. It was held
that ballots prepared must be counted notwithstanding the viola-
tion of the legislative mandate expressed by "shall." In Attorney
General v. Campbell, 191 Mass. 497, the precept for a special
election to fill a vacancy in a single office at a regular State
election was not issued until the day on which caucuses were
held for election of delegates to a convention at which the candi-
date was nominated, as well as other candidates for other offices.
No call for caucuses for such nomination was issued. This was
an irregularity of some magnitude. But it was held that although
the provisions as to caucuses are binding upon officers to be guided
thereby, they may be disregarded in determining the validity of a
subsequent election, provided it appears that the will of the elec-
tors has been fairly expressed by their ballots. The facts before
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the court in Ray v. Registrars of Voters of Ashland, 221 Mass. 223,
were that a voter used on the official ballot in voting; for a single
candidate a printed paster not prepared in conformity as to type
to the positive requirement of the statute to the effect that the
type " shall be" of a designated size. This paster was prepared
and used by the voter, yet it was held that his ballot was not
invalid but must be counted notwithstanding through the act
of the voter alone the letters on the paster were not of statutory
size. It appeared in Beauchemin v. Flagg, 229 Mass. 23, that
the voter had placed a cross between the name of a candidate
and the square designed for such cross. It was held that although
the statute required that the voter " shall . . . prepare his
ballot by making a cross ... in the square at the right of the
name," the ballot must be counted. The facts in Parrott v.
Plunkett, 268 Mass. 202, were that under the law at an annual
town meeting one selectman was required to be elected for a
term of three years. By mistake the official ballot stated the
term to be for one year. It was held that the candidate receiving
the larger number of votes was elected for the term of three years
notwithstanding the unequivocal words of the official ballot to
the contrary. Innocent violation of the positive statutory man-
date as to preservation for purposes of a recount of ballots used
in an election has been held in Swift v. Registrars of Voters of
Milton, ante, 264, not to invalidate the election although a complete 1
recount was thereby rendered impossible.
Cases have arisen where the voter has failed on his own part to
conform to prerequisites of the law essential to express his prefer-
ence, and has thereby by his own act disfranchised himself.
Flanders v. Roberts, 182 Mass. 524. Brewster v. Sherman, 195
Mass. 222. Andrews v. Registrars of Voters of Easton, 246 Mass.
572. Madden v. Election Commissioners of Boston, 251 Mass. 95.
Those are instances where the voter failed to make clear his pur-
pose or tried to express an impossible purpose. The plaintiff in
Cole v. Tucker, 164 Mass. 486, although given the opportunity to
use the official ballot, insisted upon using a privately prepared
ballot, thus trying to set up his own will against the plain terms of
the statute. He was attempting to make a disorderly expression .
of his preference. All these decisions but illustrate the rule we have
stated.
This review of our decisions affords plenary examples where the
word "shall" in the election laws has not been given such impera-
tive effect as to circumvent the intent of a voter casting a ballot
expressive of his purpose in accordance with the provisions of law.
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It is plain that in the present case the presence of uncancelled
ballots in the ballot box was due solely to the failure of the mechan-
isms within the ballot box to operate as they were designed to
operate. The voters and election officers conformed to the require-
ments of the election statutes in every particular. They did every-
thing in their power to make every ballot effective. All their con-
duct was in order. The voters were blameless. They were and
doubtless still are unconscious of the defective mechanism in re-
pect to their particular ballots. The same is true of the election
officers. No human being has intermeddled in the matter. The
only thing contrary to the statute was that an inanimate mechan-
ism, concerning the care and repair of which nothing appears to
have been omitted, commonly and so far as appears theretofore
invariably set in motion by the turn of a handle accompanying
the act of deposit of the ballot by the voter, did not make the
stamp on the ballot which it was designed to make. The statute
forbade any opening of the ballot box to inspect the working of its
mechanism, and that was the only way in which its failure to
operate in this particular could be discovered. If and so far as
there is suggestion in argument that there was opportunity for
substitution of ballots by fraud, there is nothing in the record to
support it or to overcome the presumption of complete regularity.
Independent-Progressive Party v. Secretary of the Commonwealth,
266 Mass. 18. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 131. The question to be
decided, put in paraphrase of the graphic language used in Opinion
of the Justices, 178 Mass. 605, at page 618, and quoted with ap-
proval in Nichols v. Election Commissioners of Boston, 196 Mass.
410, 415, is whether the expression of the will of the voters is to
be nullified by defective " mechanical devices which have no
living intelligence, no conscience and no liability to punishment to
insure their going right." To refuse to count the uncancelled
ballots would lead to gross injustice to the voters who cast those
ballots and which without the fault of any person were not can-
celled because of some slip in a mechanism. It would thwart
and not secure true expression of the will of the voters. It would
tend to subject elections to perplexing technicalities immaterial
,
to the substantial merits of the controversy. It would counteract
the free action of the voters. It can hardly be thought that such a
result was intended by those who enacted the election laws. We
cannot bring our minds to believe that by the words used in said
§ 106 the General Court has made imperative such a result in the
facts here disclosed. In order to effectuate the main design and
to carry out the sole purpose of the election law, the absolute words
SWIFT V. REGISTRARS. QUINCY. SUP. JUD. CT., 1932. 161
of said § 106 must be held subject to an implied exception where as
here the uncancelled ballots were due to no act of man but to the
failure of a mechanism prepared with all the care prescribed by
law. Other parts of that section may be mandatory. That part
respecting cancellation may be mandatory whenever necessary to
nullify fraud, individual wrongdoing, or perhaps the strong sus-
picion or imminent possibility of fraud or wrongdoing. We do
not need to pass on those questions. Confining ourselves strictly
to the facts of the case at bar, where every human step was mani-
festly innocent and taken as directed by the statute and the only
default was by a machine, we are of opinion that the uncancelled
ballots ought to be counted. This conclusion is supported by the
principles already stated, the quotations from opinions delivered
by eminent justices of this court and by actual decisions already
summarized. It is confirmed by the numerous provisions of the
election law designed to prevent with seeming effectiveness the
possibility of unauthorized ballots finding their way into the ballot
box and being counted, by permitting only those entitled to vote
to receive each a single ballot, to deposit it in the ballot box under
close scrutiny, and by requiring triple counting of all persons vot-
ing to compare with and as a check upon the number of votes
found in the ballot box. This conclusion does not impair the safe-
guards for purity of elections established by the statutes. It does
not open the door to cheating or laxity of conduct. Fraud, stuff-
ing of the ballot box, or other wrongs can be dealt with when they
arise. The case at bar in its every aspect presents honesty on the
part of every individual concerned. This decision only holds that
in such circumstances the statute does not demand disfranchise-
ment of voters.
The decision on this point does not rest upon the provisions of
art. 9 of the Declaration of Rights securing the right to vote,
nor upon art. 38 of the Amendments to the Constitution as to
voting machines. It is an interpretation of the statutes as to
elections applied to the facts here disclosed. Constitutional ques-
tions which might arise from a rigid and inflexible construction
of said § 106 need not be considered. This conclusion is reached
having in mind the principle that statutes ought to be so applied
as to avoid grave doubts as to their constitutionality. Kennedy
v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 256 Mass. 426, 430.
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148.
Adjudications from other jurisdictions have been cited in argu-
ment. Some of them contain expressions more or less at variance
with what is here decided. Most, if not all, of them relate to
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statutes different in framework and in detail from the one with
which we have to deal. They cannot be regarded as persuasive
of the decision of the case at bar. It would serve no useful pur-
pose to review and distinguish or refuse to follow them.
2. A substantial number of absentee ballots were duly delivered
to the election officers of the several precincts of Quincy on elec-
tion day before the hour for closing the polls in the envelopes
in which they were received, each envelope containing a notarial
certificate. No contention is made that there was not compliance
with all the formalities required of election officers by G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 54, § 95. After these ballots were counted, they were
returned to the city clerk by the election officers, but the enve-
lopes in which they were received were not so returned. These
ballots were delivered by the city clerk to the board of registrars
for recounting; but no envelopes were so delivered and it is not
known where they are. It is provided by § 91 that the city clerk
shall mark upon the voting list opposite the name of each person
registered as an absent voter the letters in capitals A. V. By
said § 95 it is required that all envelopes " shall be retained"
with the ballots cast at the election, and preserved and destroyed
in the manner provided by law for the retention, preservation or
destruction of official ballots, and that the tally sheets in use at
elections shall provide in convenient form for the recording thereon
of all envelopes of absent voters. There is nothing in the record
to indicate fraud or tampering. This failure on the part of elec-
tion officers to perform the precise duty imposed on them with
respect to the envelopes does not invalidate the votes or afford
any ground for nullifying the count. This branch of the case
falls within the authority of severaL decisions. O^Connell v.
Mathews, 177 Mass. 518. Blackmer v. Hildreth, 181 Mass. 29.
Ray v. Registrars of Voters of Ashland, 221 Mass. 223. Swift v.
Registrars of Voters of Milton, ante, 1 264.
3. At the hearing before the single justice there were intro-
duced in evidence eighteen papers agreed to be facsimile repro-
ductions of such portions of eighteen ballots cast at the election
as were relevant to the present controversy. From an examination
of those reproductions he made findings of fact that some were
to be counted for one candidate and others were to be counted
blanks. This is a proceeding at law. Therefore the findings of
fact must stand if as matter of law susceptible of being supported
on any rational view of the evidence. They cannot be reviewed
' Editor's Note. — See page 146 of this report.
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or revised. The only question is whether as matter of law they
must be reversed. The decision as to the intent of the voter in
two or three instances appears on inspection of the papers to be
close and difficult. But it cannot be overturned. Andrews v.
Registrars of Voters of Easton, 246 Mass. 572. Brewster v. Sher-
man, 195 Mass. 222.
Petition dismissed.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Edmond P. Talbot v. Registrars of Voters of Somerset
and Another.
(Reported in 281 Mass. 284.)
Bristol, Dec. 15, 1932— Dec. 22, 1932. Present, Rugg, C.J., Crosby,
Pierce, Field and Lummus, JJ.
Elections: cancelling mechanism. Evidence, Relevancy.
Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, followed.
Petition for a writ of mandamus, filed in the Supreme Judicial
Court for the County of Bristol on November 30, 1932, and after-
wards amended, described in the opinion.
Patrick H. Dupuis was permitted to intervene as a respondent.
The petition was heard by Donahue, J., on an agreed statement
of facts. Material facts are stated in the opinion. The single
justice reserved and reported the case for determination by the
full court.
J. T. Farrell, for the petitioner.
E. T. Murphy, (F. L. Hanson with him,) for the respondents.
T. F. O'Brien, for the intervening respondent. •
Rugg, C.J. This petition for a writ of mandamus relates to
the recount of ballots cast in the town of Somerset for sheriff of
the county of Bristol at the State election held on November 8,
1932. The case was reserved by the single justice without deci-
sion upon an agreed statement of facts for determination by this
court. The relevant facts are these: State ballot boxes used at
the election in the three precincts of Somerset were inspected by
the town clerk on the day previous to the election. He then inked
the pads in the cancelling device inside the ballot boxes and passed
blank paper through the ballot boxes and found that they were in
proper working order. The cancelling device is so arranged that
it marks the ballots as deposited on one side only, and that if
two ballots, one on top of the other, were deposited at the same
time, the cancellation mark would appear only on the reverse
side of one of the ballots; there was no evidence that any ballots
were so cast. The counting device on the ballot boxes registered
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in exact accordance with the ballots cast as shown by the count.
The State ballot boxes were used through the election and there
was no record of resort to another manner of voting as permitted
by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 66, when it becomes impossible to
use the State ballot box. During the recount it appeared that
certain ballots bore no cancellation mark. All such ballots were
counted and returns made accordingly. All such ballots were
cast in the ballot boxes at the election and no ballots not so de-
posited were counted. The number of such uncancelled ballots
does not appear further than that the number in Somerset to-
gether with similarly uncancelled ballots cast in other voting
places in the county would affect the result of the election for
sheriff. The prayer is that the respondents be commanded not
to count the uncancelled ballots, to alter and amend their return
accordingly, and that the town clerk amend his records to con-
form to such changed returns.
In the agreed statement of facts is the clause that they "are
agreed to so far as admissible and relevant under the pleadings."
The facts already narrated are relevant to the inquiry here pre-
sented whether the action of the respondents was in conformity
to law. Parrott v. Plunkett, 268 Mass. 202, and cases reviewed*
Flanders v. Roberts, 182 Mass. 524. O'Connell v. Mathews, 177
Mass. 518. Keough v. Aldermen of Holyoke, 156 Mass. 403. Clark
v. Board of Examiners, 126 Mass. 282.
The only permissible inference from the agreed facts, in the
light of the many minute provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, as
to the preparation and distribution of official ballots, the conduct
of election officers representing equally the two major political
parties, and the use and operation of the State ballot box, is that
the mechanism in the interior of the ballot boxes failed to stamp
its cancellation on certain ballots duly cast therein. While the
agreed facts in the case at bar are not quite so explicit as to the
mechanism of the ballot box and the impossibility of external
observation of defective operation of its cancelling device during
the election, as in the case of Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy,
281 Mass. 271, it must be assumed in view of the requirement
that all ballot boxes must be provided by the Secretary of the
Commonwealth at public expense, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 26,
that those in use in Somerset were the same in design and type
as those there described. It is to be presumed in the absence of
anything indicating the contrary that all the public officers con-
cerned in the election acted with honest purpose and in conformity
to law. Independent-Progressive Party v. Secretary of the Common-
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wealth, 266 Mass. 18. It follows that the case at bar is governed
by Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, ante f l 271, and that
there was no error in counting the uncancelled ballots.
The counsel for the petitioner has cited in his brief a large
number of decisions from other jurisdictions having an appearance
of being more or less at variance with this conclusion. Many
of the statutes under consideration in those cases contained an
express provision that ballots lacking in some requirement "shall
be void and shall not be counted." Such language is stronger
than the words of § 106 of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54. All the decisions
in other jurisdictions were rendered under statutes differing in
greater or less degree from G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54. It would serve
no useful purpose to review and analyze those authorities and to
distinguish or disagree with them. They have all been examined
and considered.
Petition dismissed.
• Editor's S'ote. — See page 152 of this report.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Robert E. Greenwood and Another v. Board of Registrars
of Voters of Fitchburg and Another.
(Reported in 282 Mass. 74.)
^Worcester, Feb. 7, 1933 — Feb. 15, 1933. Present, Ruog, C.J., (Why,
Pierce, Donahue and Lummus, JJ.
Elections. General Court. Jurisdiction. Constitutional Law, General Court.
Separation of powers. Mandamus. Supreme Judicial Court, Jurisdiction,
Moot case. Evidence, Matters of common knowledge. Judicial notice.
Under c. 1, § 3, art. 10, and c. 1, § 3. art. 11, of the Constitution of the Common-
wealth, the House of Representatives has exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the
election and qualification of its members.
It was a matter of common knowledge, of which this court took cognizance, that
there had been presented to the House of Representatives a certificate showing the
election of a certain candidate to it; that the unsuccessful candidate had taken
steps to contest the election; and that the House of Representatives was proceed-
ing toward a final determination of the election.
In such circumstances, this court, upon a reservation and report by a single
justice of a petition for a writ of mandamus by the unsuccessful candidate, with
findings that the election of the successful candidate had been brought about by
improper changes in certain ballots after their deposit by the voters, could not
'grant to the petitioner relief sought by him by way of ordering the registrars of
voters in question to count the ballots in accordance with the facts so found, of
ordering the successful candidate to surrender the certificate ol election previously
issued to him, of ordering the issuance of a new certificate showing the election of
the petitioner, and of declaring that the petitioner was elected and that the can-
didate certified as elected was not elected.
Questions raised by the petitioner in the proceedings above described as to the
regularity of the issuance of the certificate of election to the successful candidate
and other cognate matters had become moot.
Petition for a writ of mandamus, filed in the Supreme Judicial
Court for the county of Worcester on November 18, 1932, by
Robert E. Greenwood and John J. Gilmartin against the board
of registrars of voters of the city of Fitchburg and the city clerk
of Fitchburg.
Louis N. M. DesChenes and Henry A. Estabrook were per-
mitted to intervene as respondents. Certain of the prayers of
the petition, as amended, were as follows: —
"1. That a writ of mandamus may issue . . . directing and
commanding the said board of registrars of voters of the city of
Fitchburg to count said disputed ballots in such a manner as to
give effect to the manifest intent of the voter as it appears . . .
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(thereon) prior to any alteration, erasure or mutilation thereof,
and to tabulate said votes in accordance with said count, and to
make and sign a statement of the questions raised by the applica-
tion for a recount of the votes cast for representatives in accordance
therewith and to return the said statement to the city clerk.
"2. That the court issue an order directing and commanding the
respondent city clerk to alter and amend his records in accordance
with the revised statement by the board of registrars of their
determination of the questions raised on said recount so that
his records as so amended shall stand as the true records of said
election."
"4. That the court issue a peremptory writ of mandamus,
commanding the intervenor, Louis N. M. DesChenes, to desist
from pretending to be a duly elected representative to the General
Court from the Eleventh Worcester District, and commanding
him to refrain from usurping the office of representative to the
General Court from the Eleventh Worcester District, and per-
forming or attempting to perform its duties.
"5. That the court issue a peremptory writ of mandamus
declaring the petitioner, John J. Gilmartin, to have been duly
elected as representative to the General Court from the Eleventh
Worcester District at the election held on November 8, 1932, and
declaring that the intervenor, Louis N. M. DesChenes, was not
elected to the office of representative to the General Court from
the Eleventh Worcester District at the election held on November
8, 1932.
"6. That the court issue a peremptory writ of mandamus
commanding the intervenors, Louis N. M. DesChenes and Henry
A. Estabrook, and each of them, to forthwith deliver up to
the respondent . . . (city clerk), the original certificates, or pur-
ported certificates, of their election to the General Court, as
representatives from the Eleventh Worcester District, which were
issued to them and each of them, by said . . . (city clerk), on
or about November 17, 1932, and on or about December 23,
1932.
"7. That the court issue a peremptory writ of mandamus
that upon the result of the election, as indicated by the returns
whioh have been amended in accordance with this petition,
having been declared by the council of the city of Fitchburg in
the manner set forth in G. L. c. 54, § 137, that the respondent . . .
(city clerk) forthwith notify the Secretary of the Commonwealth
to the effect that the petitioner, John J. Gilmartin, and the inter-
venor, Henry A. Estabrook, have been duly declared elected as
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representatives to the General Court from the Eleventh Worces-
ter District, at the election held on November 8, 1932, and
that said . . . (city clerk) forthwith issue to said petitioner,
John J. Gilmartin, and to said intervenor, Henry A. Estabrook,
certificates of their election as representatives, in the manner
required and provided for by law.
"8. That the court issue a peremptory writ of mandamus com-
manding the respondent . . . (city clerk) to forthwith notify the
Secretary of the Commonwealth that the intervenor, Louis N.
M. DesChenes, was not duly elected as representative to the
General Court from the Eleventh Worcester District, at the
election held on November 8, 1932, and that the petitioner,
John J. Gilmartin, was elected as representative to the General
Court from the Eleventh Worcester District, at said election."
The petition was referred to an auditor, and afterwards was
heard by Donahue, J., upon the auditor's report and additional
evidence. Material findings are stated in the opinion. The case
was reserved and reported by the single justice for determination
by the full court. The record did not show that the certificate
of election issued to the intervening respondent DesChenes had
been presented to the House of Representatives, or that the
petitioner had taken steps to contest the election of said respond-
ent, or that the matter of such election was under consideration
by a committee of the House of Representatives.
E. W. Baker, (S. M. Salny with him,) for the petitioners.
T. K. Ware, (E. H. Dudley with him,) for the intervening re-
spondents.
Rugg, C.J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. As the
issues now stand the case relates to a recount of votes cast at the
State election held on November 8, 1932, respectively for John
J. Gilmartin, hereafter called the petitioner, and Louis N. M. Des-
Chenes, who has been permitted to intervene and who will here-
after be called the intervenor. These two were rival candidates
for election as one of the two representatives to the General Court
from the Eleventh Worcester District, made up of certain wards
in the city of Fitchburg and of the town of Lunenburg. The
result of the original count of these votes showed that the inter-
vener was elected. On November 16, 1932, there was a recount
of the ballots cast in the city of Fitchburg. The result of that
recount, in combination with the votes cast in the town of Lunen-
burg which were not recounted, also showed that the intervenor
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was elected. Certificate of his election under date of November
8, 1932, was issued on November 17, 1932, signed among others
by the city clerk. Another similar certificate was issued on or
about December 20, 1932. The original of each certificate was
sent to the Secretary of the Commonwealth and a copy was sent
or delivered to the intervenor. The present petition was filed on
November 18, 1932. Hearings were had on it before an auditor
and before a single justice wherein certain facts have been found,
based chiefly on comparison of the markings and erasures on cer-
tain ballots, to the effect that at some time before thirty-seven
minutes past five o'clock in the forenoon of the day following the
election certain crosses were made, after the ballots had been de-
posited, on some of the ballots by a person other than the voters
who marked and deposited the ballots and that these crosses were
made for the purpose of aiding by fraud in procuring the inter-
venor election to the office of representative in the General Court;
and that enough ballots were so marked to change the result of
the election, according to the findings made, and to show that the
petitioner and not the intervenor was elected as representative to
the General Court.
On January 10, 1933, final findings of fact were made and the
case was reserved upon the facts found for determination by the
full court. It came on for argument before us on February 7,
1933.
In the meantime the General Court convened on January 4,
1933. By reason of the notoriety attaching to events of such
public interest, it has become matter of general knowledge, of
which the court take cognizance, that the certificate issued show-
ing the election of the intervenor has been presented to the House
of Representatives (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 3, §§ 1, 2; c. 54, §§ 128,
129, 135) and that the petitioner has taken action to contest the
election of the intervenor, that before a committee of the House of
Representatives hearings have been held, witnesses have testified
and arguments have been made, and that the subject is now being
considered by the committee,
It is provided by the Constitution of the Commonwealth, c. 1,
§ 3, art. 10: "The house of representatives shall be the judge of
the returns, elections, and qualifications of its own members, as
pointed out in the constitution ..." It is also provided by c. 1,
§ 3, art. 11: "And the senate and house of representatives may
try and determine all cases where their rights and privileges are
concerned, and which, by the constitution, they have authority
to try and determine, by committees of their own members, or
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in such other way as they may respectively think best." Jurisdic-
tion to pass upon the election and qualification of its own members
is thus vested exclusively in the House of Representatives. "No
other department of the government has any authority under the
Constitution to adjudicate upon that subject. The grant of power
is comprehensive, full and complete. It is necessarily exclusive,
for the Constitution contains no words permitting either branch
of the Legislature to delegate or share that power. It must remain
where the sovereign authority of the State has placed it." Dinan
v. Swig, 223 Mass. 516, 517. The House of Representatives is
"thus made the final and exclusive judge of all questions, whether
of law or of fact, respecting such elections, returns or qualifications,
so far as they are involved in the determination of the right of any
person to be a member thereof." Peabody v. School Committee
of Boston, 115 Mass. 383, 384.
It is manifest from the facts already stated that the House of
Representatives is exercising its jurisdiction over the entire sub-
ject of the returns, election and qualification of the member en-
titled to sit for the Eleventh Worcester District as between the
petitioner and the intervenor as rival claimants, and that it is
proceeding to a final determination of that subject.
The petitioner contends that this court should nevertheless
order that the respondents, the registrars of voters, count the
ballots in conformity to the facts as found on this record, that
certificate be issued in accordance with such recount, and that
the intervenor surrender the certificate of election previously
issued to him. This contention cannot be supported. The certifi-
cate to the effect that the intervenor has been elected was season-
ably issued, presented to the House of Representatives, and has
served its purpose in connection with the contest by the petitioner
of directing the attention of the House of Representatives to the
question whether the intervenor is entitled to be declared a repre-
sentative. The case at bar is distinguishable from .
J\fadden v.
Election Commissioners of Boston, 251 Mass. 95. In that case the
respondents had done the utterly futile act of issuing a certificate
to the effect that a man, who to the general knowledge of every-
body concerned had died before the day of election, had been
elected. Such certificate was an absolute nullity as matter of
law. It was the ministerial duty of the respondents to issue a cer-
tificate that that petitioner on indisputable facts had been elected.
The court ordered the respondents to perform that ministerial
duty. In so doing, however, it was carefully pointed out that the
adjudication did "not trench in any degree upon the constitutional
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prerogative vested exclusively in the House of Representatives"
by the article in the Constitution already quoted. The case at
bar also is distinguishable from Swift v. Registrars of Voters of
Quincy, 281 Mass. 271, and the numerous cases there reviewed
for reasons too plain to require discussion.
It is unnecessary to determine questions raised by the petitioner
as to the regularity of the issuance of the certificate to the inter-
venor. That and all cognate matters at this stage have come
within the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives. The
decision of such questions has become moot so far as this court is
concerned and therefore any decision would be nugatory or un-
availing. Sullivan v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 233 Mass.
543. It is not necessary to consider other questions which have
been argued. The result is that the order must be
Petition dismissed.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Joseph B. Clancy v. John R. Wallace and Others.
(Reported in 288 Mass. 557.)
Essex, Dec. 12. 1934 — Dec. IS, 1934. Present, Ruoo, C.J., Cboobt, Dona-
hue and Lummus, J J.
Elections, Recount. Mandamus. Lynn. Waiver.
Upon a report and reservation by a single justice of this court, without decision,
for determination by the full court of a petition for a writ of mandamus upon the
pleadings and an agreed statement of facts, no question of discretion is involved,
the sole question being, whether as a matter of law upon the record the writ should
issue.
By reason of the provisions of St. 1931, c. 92, creating the board of election com-
missioners of Lynn, a special act applying solely to that city, if the commissioners,
after receiving petitions for a recount, verify the signatures of the voters thereon
and find the proper number of signatures, they are not under a duty to make the
certificate prescribed by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 135, as amended by St. 1933, c. 270.
The election commissioners of Lynn gave to the applicant for a recount of votes
a notice in writing that a recount of the votes in certain wards would be held on a
certain day which was less than three days after the notice, and, during the recount
so held, orally gave notice of a recount of votes in the remaining wards. The
applicant protested that the notice given did not comply with the requirements
of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 135, as amended by St. 1933, c. 270, but he did not ask
for a delay nor seek to obtain relief in court under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 56, $ 69,
attended the recount throughout, and did not show that he suffered any harm
through the failure to give him the statutory notice. Held, that
(1) The applicant as a matter of law waived whatever informality there was
as to notice;
(2) The applicant was not entitled, upon a petition for a writ of mandamus, to
have the recount set aside because of the lack of statutory notice to him.
The recount above described was held in the council chamber of Lynn. Ten
tables were arranged in a semicircle two feet inside a rail. Two tellers were at
each table. One of them, seated with his back to the railing, inspected each ballot,
the ballots being within view of persons outside the railing, and called off the votes
recorded thereon, which were tabulated by the teller sitting on the opposite side
of the table. Tabulation from the block tally sheets to the total tally sheets was
performed upon a rostrum at the back of the council chamber within the railing
and twenty to twenty-five feet therefrom. Requests by the applicant for recount
that he or a representative be allowed within the railing and at the tables, and that
he be allowed to see the original tally sheets made by the election officers at the
election and the tally sheets made by the tellers at the recount, were refused. The
commissioners announced publicly that the original tally sheets might be examined
at their office after the recount was completed and that the candidates and their
representatives were entitled to be at the railing in the space outside. There were
many persons present at the recount, which was conducted by the commissioners
honestly and in good faith. Held, that
(1) The regulations adopted by the election commissioners in view of all the
conditions confronting them were reasonable and conduced to the orderly conduct
of the recount;
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(2) There was compliance with the requirements of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 135,
as amended by St. 1933, c. 270, that "each . . . candidate or person representing
petitioners . . . shall be allowed to be present and to witness such recount at
any table where a recount of the ballots affecting such candidate is being held,
either in person, accompanied with counsel if he so desires, or by an agent ap-
pointed by him in writing."
Failure of election commissioners to observe the requirements of G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 54, § 135, as amended by St. 1933, c. 270, that "blanks cast" respecting
an office which is the subject of a recount shall be counted did not render the re-
count invalid where such omission did not affect the accuracy ol the recount.
Statutory provisions as to elections must be interpreted on the theory that they
are enacted to prevent fraud and mistakes and to secure freedom of choice; they
are not to be so construed as to make the rights of voting and of having the votes
ultimately counted with accuracy subject to technical obstructions not affecting
the merits of the election. Per Hugo, C.J.
Petition, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of
Essex on November 19, 1934, averring invalid a recount in Lynn
of votes cast at the election on November 6, 1934, for State sena-
tor in the First Essex Senatorial District, upon which Albert Cole
was declared elected instead of the petitioner, who had been re-
ported elected by the original count, and seeking a writ of man-
damus directing the board of election commissioners of Lynn not
to alter and amend the original returns made by them on Novem-
ber 6 and 7, wherein the petitioner was declared elected, and that
the record then made should stand as the true record of the elec-
tion.
Albert Cole was allowed to intervene in the proceedings. Ma-
terial facts are stated in the opinion.
The petition was heard by Field, J., on the pleadings and an
agreed statement of facts, and was reported without decision and
reserved for determination by the full court.
The case was submitted on briefs.
F. L. Simpson and //. C. Mamber, for the petitioner.
P. F. Shanahan, City Solicitor, and J. M. Cashman, Assistant
City Solicitor, for the respondents.
H. Parker and //. Hormel, for the intervening respondent.
Rugg, C.J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. Without
decision or ruling the case was reserved by the single justice upon
the pleadings and agreed statement of facts for the determination
of the full court. On a reservation of this nature no exercise of dis-
cretion is involved. The question presented is whether upon the
facts and the pleadings the writ of mandamus ought to issue as
matter of law. School Committee of Lowell v. Mayor of Lowell, 265
Mass. 353, 354, and cases cited. Shawmut Mills v. Board of As-
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sessors, 271 Mass. 358, 360. Cochran v. Roemer, 287 Mass. 500,
502.
The pertinent facts are these: The petitioner and Albert Cole,
who has been allowed to intervene in this proceeding, were the
only candidates for the office of senator for the First Kssex Sen-
atorial District at the election held on November 6, 1934. That
district is composed of the city of Lynn and the towns of Nahant
and Swampscott. According to the returns of the election officers
the petitioner was shown to be elected. Petitions were filed on
November 8, 1934, by the intervener, Cole, with the election com-
missioners of the city of Lynn, who are the respondents, for re-
counts in the several wards of that city. According to the results
of that recount, in connection with the returns from the two towns,
the intervener was shown to be elected. Those petitions were on
forms furnished by the election commissioners and each bore the
signatures of ten or more voters together with their residences;
each was verified by the affidavit of one of the signers. Upon
receipt of those petitions the election commissioners compared
the names and addresses given thereon with the list of registered
voters and on each petition put a check mark opposite the name of
at least ten subscribers whom they found to be registered voters
in the ward for which the petition was filed. They did not annex
any certificate of the number of names of subscribers on each peti-
tion which were the names of registered voters. On Monday,
November 12, 1934, the election commissioners delivered to the
petitioner and to the intervener a written notice that the recount
would be held on the evening of Wednesday, November 14, 1934,
for wards 2, 3 and 4, and on Tuesday, November 13, 1934, the
election commissioners mailed to the petitioner and the inter-
vener a letter stating that the recount had been postponed and
would be held on Thursday, November 15, 1934. No other
written notice was given, and no written notice was given as to
the recount of votes to be held in wards 1, 5, 6 and 7. Recount
was had of the votes in wards 2, 3 and 4 on Thursday evening,
November 15, 1934, which was attended by both the petitioner and
the intervener. At that recount the election commissioners orally
announced publicly that a recount would be held of the votes in
wards 1, 5, 6 and 7 on the following evening and the recount was
so held. On November 15, 1934, the petitioner filed a written
protest with the election commissioners against the recount be-
cause the statutory notice had not been given him. Recounts were
actually held on the dates stated in the chamber of the city council
of Lynn. Two tellers were at each of ten tables in recounting the
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votes. These table were arranged in a semicircle approximately
two feet inside of a railing separating the space generally occupied
by the members of the city council when in session from an outer
space of the council chamber. This railing was approximately
sixty feet long and had a height of about three feet above the floor.
Each table was about four feet long. The recount was conducted
under the supervision of the election commissioners by twenty
tellers and two tabulators; of these there were equal numbers of
Democrats and Republicans. One teller sat with his back to the
railing and inspected each ballot, such ballots being within the
view of persons outside of the railing, and called off the votes
recorded thereon which were tabulated by the teller sitting on the
opposite side of the table. The ballots were counted in blocks of
fifty. The tabulation from the block tally sheets to the total tally
sheets was performed upon a rostrum at the back of the council
chamber within the railing and twenty to twenty-five feet there-
from. Although requested by the petitioner the election commis-
sioners refused to allow him to see the original tally sheets made
by the election officers at the election or the tally sheets made by
the tellers at the recount. Public announcement was made that
the original tally sheets might be examined at the office of the
election commissioners after the recount was completed. At times
ballots for thirteen candidates for several offices were being re-
counted as well as those for the petitioner and intervener. Those
candidates as well as the petitioner and intervener were present
throughout the recount. All the candidates, including the peti-
tioner and the intervener, and representatives of the candidates
and members of the public were required by the election commis-
sioners to remain outside of the railing, and at times that space
was congested by the number of persons attending the recount
including the several candidates and their representatives. Al-
though the petitioner requested that he or his representative be
allowed within the railing and at the tables, this request was
denied but the election commissioners made public announce-
ment that the candidates and their representatives were entitled
to be at the railing in the space outside. Approximately thirty-
five thousand ballots were counted in the several wards of Lynn.
The recount of the ballots was conducted by the election com-
missioners honestly and in good faith.
The prayer of the petition for a writ of mandamus is that the
election commissioners be directed not to alter or amend any
returns originally made with reference to the votes cast for State
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senator in the First Essex Senatorial District and that that origi-
nal record shall stand as the true record of the election.
The statutes pertinent to the questions to be decided are these:
The board of election commissioners of the city of Lynn was
established by St. 1931, c. 92. By § 1 it is provided: "The board
of registrars of voters of the city of Lynn shall be abolished on
November thirtieth of the current year or as soon thereafter as
the members of the board of election commissioners, which is
hereby established, shall qualify for office. Thereupon all the
powers, rights, liabilities and duties of said board of registrars,
either under general or special law, except as otherwise provided,
shall be transferred to and shall thereafter be exercised by the
said board of election commissioners, hereinafter called the board,
which shall be the lawful successor of said registrars. ..." By
§ 6 it is provided: "All the powers, rights, privileges, liabilities
and duties relating to primaries, caucuses or elections by law
vested in and imposed upon the mayor and city council or either
of them, the city clerk, the city solicitor or the board of regis-
trars of voters in cities, except the power and duty of giving
notice of elections and fixing the days and hours of holding the
same, shall in the city of Lynn be vested in and performed by the
board, who shall be subject to all the penalties prescribed by gen-
eral laws for failure to perform the said duties." It is provided
by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 135, as amended by St. 1933, c. 270,
that "If, on or before five o'clock in the afternoon on the third
day following an election in a ward of a city . . . ten or more
voters of such ward . . . shall sign in person, adding thereto
their respective residences on the preceding April first, and cause
to be filed with the city . . . clerk a statement, bearing a certifi-
cate by the registrars of voters of the number of names of sub-
scribers which are names of registered voters in such ward . . .
and sworn to by one of the subscribers" stating grounds for a
recount, a recount shall be had and "The registrars shall, before
proceeding to recount the ballots, give not less than three days'
written notice to each of the several candidates whose names
appear on the ballot for the office in question . . . and each such
candidate or person representing petitioners as aforesaid shall be
allowed to be present and to witness such recount at any table
where a recount of the ballots affecting such candidate is being
held, either in person, accompanied with counsel if he so desires,
or by an agent appointed by him in writing ... in the case of
a recount of the ballots cast for an office, the votes cast for all
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of the candidates for such office, including blanks cast, shall be
recounted."
1. The petitioner contends that the failure of the election com-
missioners to attach to the petitions for a recount a certificate
"of the number of names of subscribers which are names of regis-
tered voters in such ward" in conformity to G. L. (Ter. Ed.)
c. 54, § 135, as amended by St. 1933, c. 270, renders the recount
invalid. Proceedings for a recount of votes are strictly statutory
and are of no effect unless authorized by statute and in all essen-
tial particulars begun and conducted as the statute requires.
Eldridge v. Selectmen of Chatham, 192 Mass. 409, 411. Sioift v.
Registrars of Voters of Milton, 281 Mass. 264, 268. It is an agreed
fact that the petitions for recount in the case at bar each bore
the signatures of ten or more voters in each ward together with
their residences, and that the election commissioners compared
and verified those petitions with the list of registered voters and
found that ten signatures of such voters were actually attached
to each petition, and they checked such signatures. It cannot be
contended that there was any defect in the petitions. So far as
concerns essentials, the petitions were in entire conformity to
the requirements of the statute. It is to be observed that St.
1931, c. 92, creating the board of election commissioners was a
special act applying solely to the city of Lynn and that the elec-
tion commissioners thereby became vested with the duties, obli-
gations and powers respecting recounts theretofore vested in the
city clerk and the board of registrars of voters. The procedure
under this statute with respect to a recount in Lynn therefore is
different from that provided by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 135, as
amended by St. 1933, c. 270. Petitions for recounts in Lynn are
not required to be filed with the city clerk but are to be kept by
the election commissioners. The election commissioners, having
rightly received the petitions for recount and having verified the
signatures of the voters, were not under a duty to make the cer-
tificate for the records of any other office. If and so far as the
special statute with respect to Lynn is inconsistent with the pro-
visions of the general law, it is operative notwithstanding the
general law. Copeland v. Mayor & Aldermen of Springfield, 166
Mass. 498, 504, McKenna v. White, 287 Mass. 495, and cases
cited. Such is the express provision of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 50,
§ 6. The validity of the recount and the rights of the petitioner
were not adversely affected by a failure to annex the certificate.
2. The object of the statutory requirement as to notice of a
recount to candidates is to enable them to be present. If they
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attend, no notice is necessary. The election commissioners failed
to comply with the statutory requirement of giving three days'
written notice of the time for holding the recount to the petitioner
and intervener. Both received actual notice in writing when the
recount was to begin. Both were present at the recount. Actual
notice received by a party affected by proceedings, although not
in the form or through the channels prescribed, frequently has
been held to be enough. Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, 279
Mass. 486, 490, 491, and cases cited. Bradley v. Board of Zoning
Adjustment, 255 Mass. 160, 172. The petitioner protested against
the lack of legal notice to him. He did not ask for delay in the
recount. He did not then and does not now contend that he
suffered any harm through the failure of the election commis-
sioners to give the statutory notice. The agreed facts do not in-
dicate any harm sustained by him. He did not forthwith seek
to obtain relief in the courts according to the provisions of G. L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 56, § 69. He attended the recount throughout. So
far as appears, he has received in fact every advantage which the
technically legal notice would have given. It would seem also
that as matter of law, notwithstanding his protest, he may be
held to have waived whatever informality there was as to notice.
Shutte v. Thompson, 15 Wall. 151, 159. Paige v. Si?iclair, 237
Mass. 482, 484. Modist v. Lynch, 277 Mass. 135. In these cir-
cumstances the petitioner is not entitled to have the recount set
aside because of the lack of statutory notice to him.
3. There was no violation of the statutory requirement that
candidates shall be allowed to be present and to witness the re-
count at any table where the recount is being held. Recounts
ought to be so conducted that the possibility of interference with
the ballots and with those conducting the recount may be re-
duced to a minimum. Every right of the petitioner was preserved
by the decision of the election commissioners that all candidates
and their representatives should remain outside the rail. Those
standing outside the rail had every reasonable opportunity to
observe each ballot, to verify the recount as it progressed and to
see that no mistakes were made. They were near to and in plain
sight of the tables where the recount was in progress. It was the
duty of the election commissioners to safeguard in every practi-
cable way the accuracy of the recount, and to protect the tellers
from too close proximity to interested parties and their partisan
supporters to the end that the will of the voters as expressed by
the ballots might be accurately ascertained and correctly recorded.
The regulations adopted by the election commissioners in view
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of all the conditions confronting them were reasonable and con-
duced to the orderly conduct of the recount. There was com-
pliance with the statute in this regard.
4. The blank ballots for the office of State senator were not
counted although the statute requires the counting of such blanks.
The petitioner does not appear to have made any objection to
this procedure at the time of the recount although it must have
been apparent to any observer. The blanks ought to have been
counted in conformity to the terms of the statute. Its words so
far as concerns the duty of the election commissioners are manda-
tory. Milton v. Auditor of Commonwealth, 244 Mass. 93. McCarty
v. Boyden, 275 Mass. 91, 93. The omission to count the blank
ballots, however, did not affect the accuracy of the count of the
ballots actually cast for the competing candidates. So far as con-
cerns the candidates, the requirement of the statute (to para-
phrase slightly the words of Chief Justice Shaw in Torrey v.
Millbury, 21 Pick. 64, 67, respecting the validity of a tax) was
"intended to promote method, system and uniformity in the
modes of proceeding, the compliance or non-compliance with
which, does in no respect affect the rights of" the candidates.
As to them the statute as to counting blanks "may be considered
directory"; officers failing to observe it may be liable to ani-
madversion for not observing it but its "observance is not a con-
dition precedent to the validity" of the recount. Cheney v.
Coughlin, 201 Mass. 204, 211, 212, and cases collected. Ashley
v. Three Justices of the Superior Court, 228 Mass. 63, 70. Trus-
tees of Andover Theological Seminary v. Visitors, 253 Mass. 256,
280. Commonwealth v. Kossowan, 265 Mass. 436, 438. The stat-
ute does not mean that the omission on the part of the election
commissioners to perform this part of their duty, which is quite
disconnected with the accuracy of the count of the ballots actu-
ally cast for candidates, was intended to invalidate the recount.
The underlying reason for a recount is that the will of the voters
as manifested by the ballots actually cast shall be truthfully and
exactly found out and established. The object of election laws,
both as to the preparation and casting of ballots and as to the
counting of them whether by election officers or by recounting
officers, is to ascertain the popular will and to secure the rights
of the duly qualified electors. Statutory provisions as to elections
must be interpreted on the theory that they are enacted to pre-
vent fraud and mistakes and to secure freedom of choice. They
are not to be so construed as to make the right of voting and
having the votes ultimately counted with accuracy subject to
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technical obstructions not affecting the merits of the election on
ascertained facts. Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Milton, 281
Mass. 264, 269. Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, 281 Mass.
271, 277. Parrott v. Plunkett, 268 Mass. 202, 205-207. People v.
Hartwell, 12 Mich. 508, 523, 524. This objection to the validity of
the recount like the others is formal rather than substantial. See
also G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 131. The record bears no indication
whatever that the ballots for the petitioner and intervener were
not correctly counted according to law.
All the arguments of the petitioner have been carefully con-
sidered. Nothing is disclosed to warrant the issuance of the writ
of mandamus. J. H. Wentworth Co. v. French, 176 Mass. 442,
445.
Petition dismissed.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
John C. Hall v. Ralph P. Barton and Others.
(Reported in 290 Mass. 476.)
Suffolk, April 5, 1935 — April 29, 1935. Present, Rugg, C.J., Crosby
Pierce, Lummus and Qua, JJ.
Elections. Evidence. Presumptions and burden of proof.
A ballot cast in an election, upon which the voter has placed an identifying or
distinguishing mark in violation of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 80; c. 56, § 31, cannot
be counted.
The presumption of innocence and legality applies in the determination of the
question whether a ballot cast at an election contains an identifying or distinguish-
ing mark in violation of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 80; c. 56, § 31.
A mark upon a ballot cast at an election, to be an identifying or distinguishing
mark within the meaning of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 80; c. 56, § 31, must be made
on purpose, must be such in fact, and must be intended to be such.
Whether a mark on a ballot cast at an election is intended by the voter to be an
identifying or distinguishing mark within the meaning of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54,
§ 80; c. 56, § 31, is commonly a question of fact; and there was no violation of
§§ 80, 31, where it was found as a fact that certain words were irregularly written
on a ballot without intent of the voter that thereby it should be identified or dis-
tinguished as his.
Petition for a writ of mandamus, filed in the Supreme Judicial
Court for the county of Suffolk on March 18, 1935.
The case was heard by Lummus, J. Material facts are stated in
the opinion. The single justice reported the case for determina-
tion by the full court.
H. Hormel, for the petitioner.
J. T. Batchelder, for the respondents.
Rugg, C.J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel
the registrars of voters of Sudbury, hereafter called respondents,
to give to the petitioner a certificate of election as a selectman for
the term of three years. The rival candidate for that office,
Howard M. Goodnow, has been permitted to intervene as a party
respondent. At the election on March 4, 1935, Goodnow was de-
clared elected. Upon a recount, the respondents decided that each
candidate had received the same number of votes and that neither
was elected. The only question to be decided on this record re-
lates to a single ballot which the respondents refused to count.
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If it ought to have been counted, the action of the respondents
was erroneous and the writ must issue.
The petition was heard by a single justice, who inspected the
disputed ballot. Official ballots as defined in G. L. (Tor. Ed.)
c. 50, § 1, were used at the election. The ballots were arranged
in the form usual in this Commonwealth; the names of candidates
were grouped under the titles of the several offices with a small
square to the right of each name for the making of a cross to
indicate the candidate voted for. One part of the ballot was in
this form: ''Selectmen, for three years, vote for one." The names
of three candidates were arranged in alphabetical order and the
voter marked a cross in the square opposite the name of the peti-
tioner. He also marked in the usual way the ballot indicating his
choice of candidates for ten other offices. There was on the ballot
the name of but one candidate for town clerk. No mark was made
in the square opposite that name, but in the space below the name
of the candidate, left blank to permit the writing of the name of a
different candidate, the voter wrote: "Anyone else will do," and
made a cross in the square opposite that writing. The name of one
candidate for assessor was printed on the ballot and in the blank
space below that name the voter wrote "Mr. Punk" and placed
a mark in the square opposite that writing. The names of three
candidates for constable were printed with the instuction "Vote
for three." The voter marked in the proper square his preference
for the first two candidates, but opposite the name of the third
candidate he wrote "Nix" and made no mark whatever in the
square opposite that name.
The single justice found, in addition to the facts above stated,
that the voter did not place any marks on the ballot with the in-
tention that it should be identified as his, that the unusual marks
described made it easier to identify the ballot than it would have
been if the voter had expressed his choice by crosses in the squares
without more, but that it was no more easy to identify than it
would have been if the voter had exercised his privilege to write
by his own hand the name of some other candidate and to vote
for that candidate. Upon the facts as thus found the case was
reported for our determination.
The findings of fact must be accepted as true since the evidence
is not reported.
The pertinent provisions of statutes are these: G. L. (Ter. Kd.)
c. 54, § 80: "Except as authorized by this chapter, no voter,
election officer or other person shall place on a ballot any mark
by which it may be identified ; nor shall any person place a mark
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against any name upon a ballot not cast by himself"; § 106: "If
the use of a state ballot box is required, no ballot shall be counted
unless it has been deposited in and cancelled by such ballot box,
or has been otherwise deposited in accordance with section sixty-
six. Only official ballots shall be counted in any election for which
they are provided. If a voter marks more names than there are
persons to be elected to an office, or if his choice cannot be deter-
mined, his ballot shall not be counted for such office. Ballots cast
but not counted shall be marked 1 defective ' on the outside thereof,
and shall be preserved like other ballots; " c. 56, § 31 : " Whoever,
at a primary, caucus or election, places any distinguishing mark
upon his ballot, or makes a false statement as to his ability to
mark his ballot, or allows the marking of his ballot to be seen by
any person for any purpose not authorized by law, or gives a
false answer to or makes a false oath before a presiding officer,
shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months
or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars.
"
The only statutory provision forbidding the counting of a
ballot actually deposited by the voter in the ballot box is in said
§ 106, to the effect that a ballot containing more names than there
are persons to be elected, or a ballot not disclosing the choice of a
candidate, shall not be counted. Beauchemin v. Flagg, 229 Mass.
23, 25. It is manifest that the ballot in question does not fall
within the terms of this interdiction. No more names were
marked on the ballot than there were officers to be elected. There
is no doubt as to the candidate for selectman for whom the ballot
was intended to be cast. There has been no failure on the part of
the voter to express his preferences. O'Brien v. Election Commis-
sioners of Boston, 257 Mass. 332, 338. Swift v. Registrars of Voters
of Quincy, 281 Mass. 271, 280. There is no express prohibition
against counting a ballot cast in violation of said § 80 in that the
voter has placed upon his ballot a mark by which it may be identi-
fied and has thereby committed the crime denounced by said
§ 31 of placing a distinguishing mark upon his ballot. The pur-
pose of these two sections is to preserve the secrecy of voting and
to make difficult the corruption of voters. To count ballots cast
in direct contravention of these underlying principles of the elec-
tion law would tend to frustrate the aims designed to be accom-
plished by it. Ballots shown to be thus cast are illegal. To count
such ballots would tend to break down the barriers against bribery
of voters. The purpose of elections is to obtain a fair expression
of the preferences of the qualified voters in accordance with estab-
lished law. Every implication of the statutes as to the conduct of
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elections is that ballots illegally cast because containing identify-
ing marks contrary to the mandate of said §§80 and 31 should
not be countenanced by being counted. Only by excluding them
from consideration can the secrecy of elections be promoted and
the commission of the offence condemned by the statute be pre-
vented from polluting elections. Whittam v. Zahorik, 91 Iowa, 23,
35-36. Van Winkle v. Crabtree, 34 Ore. 462, 479-480. State v.
Fawcett, 17 Wash. 188, 193-194. See to the contrary, Doll v.
Bender, 55 W. Va. 404, 409-410.
The precise point remaining for decision is whether as matter
of law the marks upon this ballot in the light of the facts found
by the single justice rendered the ballot illegal under the govern-
ing statutes. Every presumption is in favor of innocency and
legality. Duffy v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 234 Mass. 42
50. Janevesian v. Esa, 274 Mass. 231, 233. This principle applies
to the counting of ballots challenged as having been cast in viola-
tion of the prohibition of the statute against containing identifying
or distinctive marks. Fullarton v. McCaffrey, 177 Iowa, 64, 72.
Murray v. Waite, 113 Maine, 485, 491. Brereton v. Canvassers
of Warwick, 55 R. I. 23, 36-37. If the intent of the voter can
be ascertained, the general purpose of election laws is to give
effect to that intent by counting the ballot, unless prevented by
some positive rule of law. Many provisions of statute may be
treated as directory in order to effectuate this general purpose.
Ray v. Registrars of Voters of Ashland, 221 Mass. 223, 225. Clancy
v. Wallace, 288 Mass. 557. The statute contains no definition
of an identifying or distinguishing mark upon a ballot. That
must be determined as to each case by considering its facts in
the light of the words and general design of the election law.
An identifying or distinguishing mark must be such in fact, made
on purpose and not accidentally, and intended according to its
appearance, place on the ballot and all attendant conditions to
be a distinguishing mark. Donlan v. Cooke, 212 Iowa, 771, 775-
776. Lilly v. English, 110 Maine, 449, 454. Whether that
which is on a particular ballot was intended as a means of iden-
tifying it must be ascertained from all the circumstances including
its adaptability, its relation to other markings on the ballot,
and similarity to other ballots. It has been held that all ballots
properly marked should be counted although containing casual,
accidental or unnecessary marks, provided the same do not appear
to be made fraudulently or with criminal intent. State v. Walsh,
62 Conn. 260, 287. Fullarton v. McCaffrey, 111 Iowa, 64, 71-72.
Murray v. Waite, 113 Maine, 485, 491. Brereton v. Canvassers of
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Warwick, 55 R. I. 23, 36-37. The words written on this ballot
appear not to have been made in an attempt to indicate the candi-
date to be voted for. They were not placed upon it inadvertently
or accidentally. They must have been written by deliberate
purpose. They are of a nature which conceivably might have been
agreed upon between the voter and another person as distinguish-
ing this from other ballots and identifying it as the one cast by
the voter. But, in addition to these features, there must be the
further factor that whatever appears in writing or by device was
intended to be a distinguishing mark. See Bartlett v. Mclntire,
108 Maine, 161, 171; Spaulding v. Romack, 185 Ind. 105, 112-113.
Whether irregular markings on a ballot import a dishonest
purpose commonly is a question of fact to be decided in connec-
tion with all the circumstances. Handwriting alone might be
sufficiently distinctive in certain conditions, although if the name
of a candidate is written in a blank space as expressly permitted
by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 42, it could not be an identifying
mark within the meaning of said §§80 and 31. Ray v. Registrars
of Voters of Ashland, 221 Mass. 223, 225. The finding of the single
justice is that the writings in the case at bar were not made with
an intent to identify or to distinguish the ballot of the voter.
That finding must be accepted as final and cannot be reviewed
or revised by us. Andrews v. Registrars of Voters of Easton, 246
Mass. 572, 576. Bianco v. Ashley, 284 Mass. 20, 26. The words
written on the ballot here in question disclose a frivolous, puerile,
or eccentric disposition; they manifest a tendency to trifle with
one of the most important duties of citizenship. No other ballot,
so far as appears, bore any markings or writings similar in kind
or in class. However strong the circumstances might seem to a
fact finding tribunal, they might be thought to indicate freakish-
ness rather than knavishness on the part of the voter. In our
opinion they cannot quite be said, as matter of law, to import a
dishonest purpose. There are decisions in other jurisdictions
doubtless going somewhat further in condemning ballots irregu-
larly marked. For example, it was said in Stevenson v. Baker,
347 111. 304, 318: "Any deliberate marking of a ballot by a voter
that is not made in an attempt to indicate his choice of candi-
dates, and which is also effective as a mark by which his ballot
may be identified, should be considered as a distinguishing mark."
James v. Stern, 44 Nev. 430, 434. Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn.
261, 270-271. See cases collected in 20 C. J., pages 162-168.
It is not necessary to review these and other decisions because
of the varying statutory provisions in the different States.
HALL V. BARTON. SI P. J I D. CT„ 1935. 187
The case at bar is very close to the line. Doubtless, a slight
element might have resulted in a different finding of facts. But
our conclusion is that the ballot ought to be counted for the peti-
tioner and that certificate of election ought to issue to him. This
result seems in harmony with the general trend of our decisions
as to the counting of ballots. Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy,
281 Mass. 271, 277-278. Parrott v. Plunkett, 268 Mass. 202, and
cases there reviewed.
Writ of mandamus to issue.
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Charles A. Ross v. Emery
Same v. Same.
L. Crane.
(Reported in 291 Mass. 28.)
Norfolk, April 29, 1935 — May 6, 1935. Present, Rugg, C.J., Pierce, Field,
Lummus and Qua, JJ.
Elections. Mandamus. Witness, Self-incrimination, Immunity. Constitutional
Law, Self-incrimination of witness, Assertion of constitutional rights. Statute,
Revision.
Where the parties to mandamus proceedings agreed upon the material facts
disclosed by the pleadings and the case was reported by a single justice without
decision, the sole question presented to the full court was whether on such facts
the writ ought to issue as matter of law.
The provision of art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights that "No subject shall . . .
be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself" does not deprive the
General Court of power to compel the giving of testimony which might incriminate
the witness provided immunity be accorded to him commensurate with the con-
stitutional protection. Per Rugg, C.J.
The respondent in an election petition instituted pursuant to G. L. (Ter. Ed.)
c. 55, § 37, who was voluntarily present at the hearing thereof and, although not
served with process to compel his testimony, took the witness stand without objec-
tion when called as a witness for the petitioners and testified at length concerning
the matters then in issue, without suggesting that his testimony might incriminate
him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, or asking to be excused from testify-
ing on any ground, was not "a person called to testify upon" the petition within
the meaning of subsection (h) of said § 37, and, after a decree voiding his election,
ousting him from office and declaring the office vacant, was not relieved by the
provisions of said subsection (h) of the disqualifications created by subsection (;')
and c. 56, § 54, rendering him ineligible for that office when the vacancy so created
was to be filled and ineligible to hold public office or vote for three years.
The immunity granted by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 37 (h), to a "person called to
testify upon an election petition" can be claimed only if he sought to be excused
from so testifying upon the ground of self-incrimination.
An election petition under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 37, is a civil, not a criminal,
proceeding, and the disqualifications attaching to the respondent therein in the
event of a decision adverse to him are merely remedial measures, not penalties or
forfeitures in any criminal sense; and therefore there was no merit in a contention
by such a respondent that because he testified as a witness for the petitioners at
the hearing of the petition such disqualifications did not attach to him under sub-
section (h) of said § 37 and that he was entitled to remain on the voting list and to
seek election to fill the vacancy created by his being ousted from office by the decree
on the petition, notwithstanding the express provision of subsection (» that "in
no case shall the candidate so excluded from the office be eligible therefor."
In a revision of the statutes, a placing of some provisions in a location different
from that in their original enactment did not disclose an intent to change their
meaning.
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Two petitions for writs of mandamus, filed in the Supreme
Judicial Court for the county of Norfolk on April 12, 1935, and
April 20, 1935, respectively.
The cases were reported, without decision, by FlELD, J., for
determination by the full court. Material facts are stated in the
opinion.
The cases were submitted on briefs.
W. P. Murray and W. P. Kelley, for the petitioner.
//. S. Davis, for the respondent
.
Rugg, C.J. These are petitions for mandamus against the
city clerk of Quincy; in the first the petitioner seeks to restrain
the respondent from striking his name from the roll of registered
voters of Quincy, and, in the second, to compel the respondent to
receive and file nomination papers appropriate to place the name
of the petitioner upon the ballot as a candidate for mayor at an
election to be held in Quincy on May 21, 1935. At the hearing
parties agreed upon the material facts as disclosed by pleadings
and the case was reported by the single justice without decision.
The question thus presented is whether on those facts the writs
ought to issue as matter of law. School Committee of Lowell v.
Mayor of Lowell, 265 Mass. 353, 354. Cochran v. Roemer, 287 Mass.
500, 502. Clancy v. Wallace, 288 Mass. 557.
The relevant facts are these: The petitioner, prior to the
events here in issue, was a registered voter in Quincy. He was
elected mayor of Quincy at an election held on December 4, 1934.
Thereafter, in conformity to G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, §37, an election
petition was instituted against the petitioner and hearing was
had before three judges of the Superior Court. During that
hearing the petitioner, who was voluntarily present and upon
whom no process to compel his testimony had been served, was
called as a witness by counsel for the petitioners and took the
witness stand without objection and testified at length concerning
the matters then in issue. He did not suggest that his testimony
might incriminate him or subject him to any penalty or forfeiture,
and did not ask to be excused from testifying on any ground.
As a result of that hearing, findings were made that the petitioner
committed corrupt practices in that (1) in order to promote his
election as mayor he expended a sum of money in excess of the
amount permitted by law (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 55, § 1) and (2) he
made a false return in the statement made and filed by him pur-
suant to G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, §§ 16 and 19, and that the defences
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allowed by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 37 (c), (1), (2), (3) and (4)
were not established. A final decree in the election petition was
entered on March 21, 1935, declaring the election of December
4, 1934, void, ousting the petitioner from the office of mayor
and declaring that office vacant. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 37 (g).
A copy of this decree was sent to the respondent by the State
Secretary and the petitioner was then notified that the respondent
in the performance of what he believed to be his official duty,
unless restrained by legal proceedings, would strike the name of
the petitioner from the roll of registered voters of Quincy on
April 16, 1935. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 56, § 55. The petitioner has
seasonably presented to the respondent for filing nomination
papers appropriate to place his name upon the ballot for election
as mayor at the election to be held on May 21, 1935. The respond-
ent has refused to receive such papers on the grounds that the
petitioner (1) is not qualified to vote for a candidate for that
office 1 and (2) is ineligible for that office because of the final decree
entered on March 21, 1935, in the election petition and the findings
on which it was based.
It is not now contended that the petitioner was not ousted
from the office of mayor and that that office was not declared
vacant in conformity to the provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55,
§ 37 (g). Other pertinent provisions of § 37 are as follows: "(h)
No person called to testify upon an election petition shall be
excused from testifying or producing any papers on the ground
that his testimony may tend to criminate him or subject him
to a penalty or forfeiture; but he shall not be prosecuted or
subjected to any penalty or forfeiture except forfeiture of election
to office, for or on account of any action, matter or thing concern-
ing which he may so testify, except for perjury committed in
such testimony, (i) No decree entered upon an election petition
shall be a bar to or affect in any way any criminal prosecution
of any candidate or other person, or any inquest in accordance
with sections thirty-nine to forty-five, inclusive, (j) A certified
copy of any final decree entered upon an election petition, as
provided by this chapter, shall forthwith be transmitted by the
clerk to the state secretary ; and any vacancy in any office created
by any such decree shall be filled in the manner provided by
law in case of the death of the incumbent, but in no case shall
the candidate so excluded from the office be eligible therefor."
In G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 56, § 54, are these words: "Whoever is
found by final judgment upon an election petition, as provided
in section thirty-seven of chapter fifty-five, to have committed
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a corrupt practice, and, in accordance with such finding, forfeits
the office to which ho has been elected
. . . shall be disqualified
as a voter for a period of three years following the date of such
judgment
. . .
and shall be ineligible to hold public office for
said period." Provision is made by § 55 of said c. 56 for striking
the name of a person found upon an election petition to have
committed a corrupt practice from the roll of registered voters
for a period of three years.
The petitioner states in his brief that "the single issue in both
cases is whether the disqualification created by the foregoing pro-
visions, particularly those contained in paragraphs numbered (g)
and (j) (of said § 37) and said § 54, do not attach to the petitioner
because of his having been called to testify upon the trial of said
election petition in which he was respondent, and having testified
as a witness therein." This is based on the provision of para-
graph (h) of said § 37 giving certain immunity to a witness " called
to testify upon an election petition." The constitutional guaranty
in art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights, to the effect that "No
subject shall ... be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence
against himself," is invoked. That provision is one of the funda-
mental rights of a citizen. That provision, however, does not
prevent the examination of a witness "where his answers will not
expose him to criminal prosecution, or tend to subject him to a
penalty of forfeiture, although they may otherwise adversely
affect his pecuniary interest." Bull v. Loveland, 10 Pick. 9, 14.
That provision does not deprive the General Court of power to
compel the giving of testimony which might incriminate the wit-
ness provided immunity be accorded to him commensurate with
the constitutional protection. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591.
Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139, 141. Emery's Case, 107
Mass. 172, 185. Attorney General v. Brissenden, 271 Mass. 172.
The petitioner does not fall within the terms of paragraph (h) for
the reason that he was not "called to testify upon an election
petition" within the meaning of those words as there used. The
constitutional guaranty which he invokes is a protection against
being compelled to testify. It is a personal privilege. It confers
an option to refuse to testify. It does not prohibit inquiry. It
does not prevent the voluntary giving of testimony. The peti-
tioner was not compelled to testify in the hearing on the election
petition. He did not object to being called to testify. He did not
ask the protection of the court. He responded to the call to the
witness stand without protest. He is precluded thereby from in-
voking in the present petitions whatever immunity might be
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afforded by paragraph (h) to "one called to testify upon an elec-
tion petition." Such immunity is not absolute : it can be claimed
only if a witness asks to be excused from answering questions on
the ground that he might thereby be subjected "to a penalty or
forfeiture." The immunity is given in return for the relinquish-
ment of a privilege, but the privilege must be asserted before
there can be basis for the immunity. It is given in exchange
for what would otherwise be a sufficient excuse for refusing to
answer; it cannot operate unless the excuse is set up. Regina v.
Coote, L. R. 4. P. C. 599, 607. State v. Duncan, 78 Vt. 364. State
v. Erlbacher, 270 S. W. (Mo.) 277. State v. Comer, 157 Ind. 611,
613. State v. Luquire, 191 N. C. 479, 481. State v. Backstrom,
117 Kans. 111. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 229 Penn. St. 609,
615-616. Wireman v. State, 146 Tenn. 676, 681. State v. Whalen,
108 Wash. 287. State v. Grosnickle, 189 Wis. 17. 4 Wigmore on
Evidence (2d. ed.) § 2270, § 2282.
An election petition under said § 37 is a proceeding civil and
not criminal in its nature. Ashley v. Three Justices of the Superior
Court, 220 Mass. 63, 75, 76, 77. See also Attorney General v.
Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 303, 304, 316. The disqualifications as to
being a candidate for office and being upon the voting list incident
to an adverse decision under an election petition are established
by the statute as remedial measures to promote the purity of elec-
tions; they are not penalties or forfeitures in any criminal sense.
They relate to civil proceedings alone. They are imposed by the
law as consequences of certain findings in the civil proceedings
upon an election petition. Hawley v. Wallace, 137 Minn. 183.
Radinsky v. People, 66 Col. 179. It has been held that disbarment
of an attorney by means of testimony required of him in a court
proceeding is not a "penalty or forfeiture'' within the meaning of a
statute protecting such witness from penalty or forfeiture be-
cause of testimony so given. Matter of Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81.
In re Biggers, 24 Okla. 842. See also People v. Lane, 132 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 406, affirmed in 196 N. Y. 520; Stanley v. Common-
wealth, 116 Va. 1028.
It is the express provision of said § 37 (j) that the petitioner as
the person excluded from the office of mayor by the decree in the
election petition shall be ineligible for election to fill the vacancy
thus caused. That mandate is explicit. Its design is clear. It
would frustrate the manifest purpose of the statute to adopt the
construction urged by the petitioner. It can hardly be thought
to have been the intention of the General Court to oust from
office 4 an incumbent because of violation of the sections touching
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corrupt practices and at the same time permit such ousted official
to be a candidate to succeed himself. Such a construction could
not be adopted except under the compulsion of imperative words
to that end. These provisions had their origin in St. 1914, c. 783,
§ 10. They should be construed as harmonious toward the accom-
plishment of a reasonable object if possible. Moloney v. Selectmen
of Milford, 253 Mass. 400, 402. Commissioner of Banks y.
McKnight, 281 Mass. 467, 472. The change in the location of
some of these provisions in the present revision of the statutes as
compared with the initial enactment discloses no intent to change
their meaning. Main v. County of Plymouth, 223 Mass. 66, 69.
Petitions dismissed.
194 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES — [936.
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Walter C. Wardwell and Others v. John C. Leggat and
Others.
(Reported in 291 Mass. 428.)
Middlesex, March 6, 1935 — July 1, 1935. Present, Ruoo, C.J., Crosby,
Donahue and Qua, JJ.
Mandamus. Practice, Civil, Parties. Elections. Public Officer.
Mandamus did not lie to compel a board of examiners, who had issued a certifi-
cate of election as county commissioner under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 122, to call
a new election for that office, and to restrain the person to whom the certificate
had been issued from attempting to act as county commissioner.
A public officer holding over after the expiration of his term has no standing to
try by mandamus the title to office of one certified to have been elected as his
successor.
Claimants to separate public offices cannot join in one petition for a writ of
mandamus to try the titles to such offices.
Petition for a writ of mandamus, filed in the Supreme Judicial
Court for the county of Middlesex on December 28, 1934.
The case was heard by Pierce, J.
S. Hoar, for the petitioners.
F. J. Carney, (J. J. Brennan with him,) for the respondents.
Crosby, J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus brought
to restrain the board of examiners for Middlesex County from
issuing certificates of election to Thomas B. Brennan as county
commissioner and to Edward L. Harley and Melvin G. Rogers
as associate commissioners, based on an election held on Novem-
ber 6, 1934, and to order the board of examiners to call a new
election to elect a county commissioner and two associate com-
missioners; to restrain Brennan from attempting to act as county
commissioner, and to restrain Harley and Rogers from attempt-
ing to act as associate commissioners.
The petitioners, when the petition was filed on December 28,
1934, were the three commissioners holding office; Victor F.
Jewett, candidate for county commissioner to succeed himself,
and who was defeated in the election held on November 6, 1934;
Robert D. Donaldson, an associate commissioner, who was a
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candidate to succeed himself, and was defeated in the election
held on the above date; and Donald P. Hurd, a duly qualified
voter in Middlesex County who voted in the election held on the
above date. The respondents were John C. Leggat, Loring P.
Jordan and Ralph N. Smith, the board of examiners for Middle-
sex County under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 122, Thomas B. Bren-
nan, successful candidate for county commissioner in the election,
and Edward L. Harley and Melvin G. Rogers, successful candi-
dates for associate commissioners at said election, Rogers to suc-
ceed himself in that office. On January 8, 1935, the petition to
intervene of Herbert Leslie Wanamaker, a duly qualified voter in
Middlesex County, who voted at said election, was allowed.
The respondents Leggat and Jordan filed an answer, from which
it appears that certificates of election were issued by the board
of examiners to Brennan on December 31, 1934, and to Harley
and Rogers on January 3, 1935. The facts alleged in the answer
were not traversed. Brennan, Harley and Rogers filed demurrers,
assigning among other causes (1) that there was misjoinder of
parties as petitioners and parties as respondents, (2) that man-
damus is an inappropriate remedy because the petitioners do
not claim title to the offices held by these respondents but that
an information in the nature of quo warranto filed with the in-
tervention of the Attorney General is the proper process, (3) that
this petition for mandamus is an attempt to impeach the title to
office collaterally, and (4) that the office of the respondents (board
of examiners) is purely ministerial, and the petition discloses
that there was no failure to elect either a county commissioner or
associate county commissioners. The demurrers were sustained
and an order was entered dismissing the petition as matter of
law. Exceptions of the petitioners bring the case here.
The demurrers were rightly sustained. Mandamus does not lie
at the instance of those joined as petitioners. One of the pur-
poses of the petition is to try title to public offices. A petition
for a writ of mandamus is not the proper process to try title to
a public office which a petitioner does not claim for himself.
Sevigny v. Russell, 260 Mass. 294. The petitioners Donaldson
and Jewett contend that they held over in office under G. L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 34, § 4, and c. 54, § 144, respectively, until suc-
cessors are elected and qualified, and therefore that they are such
claimants as could properly bring this petition. If these peti-
tioners are regarded as claimants to office, who seek to have their
right thereto determined in this proceeding, Jewett claims the
office of the respondent Brennan, and Donaldson claims the office
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of Harley, but it is difficult to determine which petitioner claims
the office of the respondent Rogers. As a petition to try title to
an office, it must be brought by the claimant to that office. Un-
less Donaldson be regarded as claiming the offices of both Harley
and Rogers, the petition must be considered as improperly brought
against Rogers, and for that reason defective. If it be assumed
that this difficulty is resolved in favor of the petitioners Donald-
son and Jewett, they are not to be deemed claimants to office
within cases which permit a writ of mandamus to be brought to
try the title to office between rival claimants. Their successors
have been declared elected and certificates of election have been
issued to them by the board of examiners in the performance of
the ministerial duties imposed by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 122.
Clark v. Board of Examiners, 126 Mass. 282. The issuance of
certificates of election is prima facie evidence of right to office.
Prince v. Skillin, 71 Maine, 361, 371. The orderly administra-
tion of government requires that such evidence of right to office
be accepted until the issue is otherwise determined in some appro-
priate proceeding. A holdover in office has no such right or in-
terest as would authorize him by an independent proceeding for
mandamus to contest the result as thus declared. When an in-
cumbent in public office is authorized to continue in office until a
successor is elected and qualified, the object is to prevent a vacancy
in the office and the suspension of official duty. The extension is
for the public benefit, and not to confer on the incumbent the
right to continue. It is not a part of the necessary tenure of his
office. See Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 575, 579. These
petitioners have no such independent claim or title to office as
will permit them to bring mandamus to try the title of those of
the respondents certified to be their successors. The petitioners
do not pray that their title to office be determined, but seek to
have an election declared invalid, and to have certain of the re-
spondents restrained from attempting to act as public officers. It
was said of a somewhat similar situation in Doherty v. Buchanan,
173 Mass. 338, at 340: "We know of no case where a writ (of
mandamus) has been issued simply to command one to refrain
from attempting to act as a public officer, which is the only pur-
pose for which the writ is asked in the present case." Quo war-
ranto is the proper proceeding to try the title of the respondents
Brennan, Harley and Rogers to office. Sevigny v. Russell, 260
Mass. 294, 295.
Even if the petitioners Donaldson and Jewett, as holders in
office with no independent claim of title, could separately bring
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to office, their joinder in one petition is not proper. The rule is
that persons having a common and joint interest in the contro-
versy may be joined as petitioners, while those having separate
and distinct interests may not be so joined, and that in case of
misjoinder the proceedings should be dismissed. Kimball v.
Metropolitan District Commission, 257 Mass. 55, 58. See cases
cited in 87 A. L. R. 528. Regarded as claimants to separate and
distinct offices, these petitioners are improperly joined. Rex v.
Chester, 5 Mod. 10.
The petitioners Wardwell, Bowditch, Hurd and Wanamaker
cannot properly bring such a petition. As they have no claim to
office, they have no right to try the title of Brennan, Harley and
Rogers to office in this manner. Sevigny v. Russell, 260 Mass. 294.
While, as citizens and voters and interested public officials, they
have in proper circumstances a right to bring mandamus to pro-
cure the enforcement of a public duty. (Brook's v. Secretary of
the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91), there is no such right in these
petitioners to have the board of examiners commanded to declare
an office vacant and to issue precepts for a new election. The
board has performed the ministerial duties incumbent on it by the
examination of the returns and the issuance of certificates of
election to those who appear to be elected. Clark v. Board of
Examiners, 126 Mass. 282. That is all that it is or could be re-
quired to do. If the persons to whom the certificates have been
issued are not entitled to office, that must be determined in a
direct proceeding. Independent-Progressive Party v. Secretary of
the Commonwealth, 266 Mass. 18, 23. Sevigny v. Russell, 260
Mass. 294. The joinder of the several possible rights and interests
of these parties in any view of the petition is improper. See
Kimball v. Metropolitan District Commission, 257 Mass. 55, 58.
State v. Cornell, 54 Neb. 158.
The orders sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition
were right.
Exceptio7is overruled.
198 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES — 1936.
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
James C. Coughlin v. Election Commission of the
City of Lowell.
Veronica Sullivan Dodge v. Same.
(Reported in 294 Mass. 434.)
Middlesex, April 8, 1936 — May 26, 1936. Present, Rugg, C.J., Crosby,
Pierce and Donahue, JJ.
Elections. Practice, Civil, Auditor: findings.
Statement by Rugg, C.J., of the governing principles of law as to the counting
of ballots.
Findings by an auditor, whose findings were to be final, as to the intent of the
voters casting certain ballots at an election, as shown by the ballots, which were in
evidence before him, must stand so far as warranted by examination of the ballots,
but could not stand so far as not warranted thereby.
Two petitions for writs of mandamus, filed in the Supreme
Judicial Court for the county of Middlesex on November 22, 1935,
and on November 26, 1935, respectively.
The petitioners and interveners alleged exceptions to "findings
and rulings and order" by Field, J.
J. D. O'Hearn, for the petitioner Coughlin.
M. G. Rogers, for the petitioner Dodge.
No argument nor brief for the respondents.
Rugg, C.J. These petitions for writs of mandamus relate to a
contested election for membership of the school committee in
Lowell. Each petitioner was a candidate for election as a member
of that committee. In each petition, the other petitioner was
allowed to intervene. Each petition was referred to the same audi-
tor. The parties agreed that his findings of fact should be final.
An identical report was filed in each case. Each petitioner filed
a motion to recommit the report, alleging errors of law in the find-
ings and rulings of the auditor. Each motion was denied. It was
agreed by all parties that the ballots marked as exhibits by the
auditor, so far as referred to in the motions to recommit, should be
considered in the same manner as if they had been reported by the
auditor. After describing these exhibits by number, there being
nineteen in all, the single justice ruled specifically as follows: —
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"With respect to Exhibit 111, I rule as matter of law that the
finding of the auditor that 'this was a Dodge vote' is not war-
ranted and the ballot should not be counted for cither Coughlin or
Dodge.
"With respect to Exhibit 162, I rule as a matter of law that the
finding 'that it was the intention of the voter to vote for Dodge'
is not warranted and that the ballot should not be counted for
either Coughlin or Dodge.
''With respect to Exhibit 213, I rule as a matter of law that the
finding of the auditor that this was a vote for Coughlin was not
warranted and that this ballot should not be counted for either
Coughlin or Dodge.
"With respect to Exhibit A for identification, I rule that the
auditor was not wrong in admitting this ballot as an exhibit and
was warranted in finding 'that this was a blank ballot/ and
Dodge loses one vote.
"I rule, therefore, as matter of law that the votes for Coughlin
and Dodge as counted by the auditor should be changed by re-
ducing the vote for Veronica Sullivan Dodge to 17,789, and the
vote for James C. Coughlin to 17,788."
No specific rulings were made on any of the other exhibits
considered, but each was allowed to stand as counted by the
auditor.
The ballots considered by the single justice, the pleadings, and
the auditor's report are made a part of the exceptions by reference.
In the Coughlin case the petition was dismissed as matter of law.
In the Dodge case it was ordered that a writ of mandamus issue
commanding the respondents to count the votes of the petitioner
and intervener in accordance with the findings and rulings of the
single justice. To the adverse "findings and rulings," both candi-
dates duly excepted; their several bills of exceptions are combined
in a single record.
It is provided by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, $ 77, that "The voter
on receiving his ballot shall . . . retire alone to one of the mark-
ing compartments, and . . . prepare his ballot by making a (X)
in the square at the right of the name of each candidate for whom
he intends to vote."
The governing principles of law as to the counting of ballots are
settled. In O'Brien v. Election Commissioners of Boston, 257 Mass.
332, at page 338, it was said with citation of supporting authori-
ties: "The cardinal rule for guidance of election officers and courts
in cases of this nature is that if the intent of the voter can be deter-
mined with reasonable certainty from an inspection of the ballot,
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in the light of the generally known conditions attendant upon the
election, effect must be given to that intent and the vote counted
in accordance therewith, provided the voter has substantially
complied with the requisites of the election law; if that intent
cannot thus be fairly and satisfactorily ascertained, the ballot
cannot rightly be counted." Parrott v. Plunkett, 268 Mass. 202,
207. Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, 281 Mass. 271, 277.
Clancy v. Wallace, 288 Mass. 557, 566. Hall v. Barton, 290
Mass. 476, 480. No conjecture can be invoked as to where the
cross was intended to be placed. The intent must appear with
ordinary assurance of certainty and be capable of being fairly de-
termined from inspection of the ballot; otherwise, it cannot be
counted. O'Connell v. Mathews, 177 Mass. 518. Beauchemin v.
Flagg, 229 Mass. 23. Within the general rules the question for
whom a ballot ought to be counted is one of fact unless some posi-
tive mandate of law has been violated.
These are proceedings at law. Hence the findings of fact made
by the auditor, which were to be final, must be accepted as final,
if susceptible of being supported on any rational view of the evi-
dence. They are not reviewed or revised by the court. When
the findings of fact of an auditor are to be final, they are conclusive
unless tainted by some error of law. Swift v. Registrars of Voters
of Quincy, 281 Mass. 271, 284. Andrews v. Registrars of Voters of
Easton, 246 Mass. 572, 576-577. Lunn & Sweet Co. v. Wolfman,
268 Mass. 345, 349. Hawkins v. Jamrog, 277 Mass. 540, 543.
Sojka v. Dlugosz, 293 Mass. 419, 422. Ray v. Registrars of Voters
of Ashland, 221 Mass. 223.
Tested by these principles, it appears that there was no error
of law in dealing with the ballots which, the petitioner Coughlin
contends were counted wrongly. The determination of the intent
of the voter in each instance presented a question of fact. On sev-
eral ballots the cross was not placed in precise conformity with
the statute, and in others the marking was not a clearly defined
cross, but we think that enough appears on inspection to ascer-
tain the intent of the voter. Flanders v. Roberts, 182 Mass. 524.
Brewster v. Sherman, 195 Mass. 222. A cross not in the square
but in the space between the name of the candidate and the
square provided for the cross may still be counted provided the
intent of the voter is clear. Beauchemin v. Flagg, 229 Mass. 23,
25. On one ballot a cross originally placed in the square opposite
the name of Coughlin was found to have been erased. This find-
ing cannot be pronounced unsupported by an inspection of the
ballot. The most doubtful is a ballot where the marking oppo-
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site the name was not a plain cross and resembled somewhat a V,
but there was a marking in addition and we think it cannot quite
be said as matter of law to have been wrongly counted.
The rulings of law by the single justice as to Exhibits 111, 162,
213 and " Exhibit A for identification" were not erroneous. In
three of these it is impossible to determine the intent of the voter
because the cross cannot be said to be in the square or space op-
posite either candidate but is equally in both, and the intersection
of the two lines made by the voter appears to be on the printed
line dividing the crucial spaces. In the fourth there were four
crosses where only three candidates could be voted for; one in a
square was very faint, and the other three, strong and clear,
were in spaces to the left of the square. A prevailing intent to
vote for a permissible number of candidates is not discernible.
Therefore, the ballot cannot be counted. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54,
§ 106. Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, 281 Mass. 271,
280. The decision as to the intent of the voter as disclosed by
several ballots appears on inspection to have been close and diffi-
cult. But there is not enough to warrant reversal of the result
as matter of law. Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, 281
Mass. 271, 284. Flanders v. Roberts, 182 Mass. 524. In each
case the exceptions of the petitioner and the intervener are
overruled.
So ordered.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Opinion of the Justices to the Governor and Council.
(Reported in 296 Mass. 599.)
Governor and Council. Elections, Corrupt Practices.
The Governor and Council, in the performance of their duties under art. 16 of the
Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth and G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54,
§§ 115, 116, 117, do not have jurisdiction or authority to hear, consider or deter-
mine questions of corrupt practices of any character; nor have they power or
authority to refrain from a declaration respecting the election of a candidate who
appears to be elected if no question is raised as to the accuracy of returns showing
such election.
The following order was adopted by the Governor and Council
on November 25, 1936, and was transmitted to the Justices of
the Supreme Judicial Court on December 1, 1936:—
To the Honorable the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court.
Whereas, A petition, attached hereto and marked Exhibit "A,"
of certain voters of the Fifth Councillor District of Massachu-
setts, has been submitted to His Excellency the Governor and
Council setting forth certain alleged violations of the Corrupt
Practice Act at the primary election in said Councillor District
on September 15, 1936, also at the state election held on Novem-
ber 3, 1936, by Bayard Tuckerman, Jr., one of the candidates for
Councillor at said primary and state elections;
Whereas, His Excellency the Governor and Council are peti-
tioned to refrain from issuing a certificate of election to said Bay-
ard Tuckerman, Jr., pending the hearing and determination of
certain allegations of illegal and corrupt acts in connection with
said elections by said Bayard Tuckerman, Jr.
;
Whereas, His Excellency the Governor and Council, in con-
formity with the provisions of Article XVI of the Amendments
to the Constitution of Massachusetts and the General Laws (Ter.
Ed.), Chapter 54, Sections 115, 116, 117, have examined the re-
turned copies of the records of the votes cast at said state elec-
tion, particularly the returns of votes cast for Councillor in the
Fifth Councillor District;
Whereas, The examination of the returns of votes for Council-
lor in said Fifth Councillor District show the following tabu-
lation: —
OPINION OF JUSTICES TO GOVERNOR. SI P. JUD. (T.. 1088. 203
Fifth District. Vote.
Julia Goldman of Lynn (Socialist Party) has .... 2,693
William G. Hennessey of Lynn (Democratic) has . . . 95,766
William T. Rodd of Topsfield (Prohibitionist) has . . 1,172
Bayard Tuckerman, Jr., of Hamilton (Republican) has . . 103,434
All others .......... 2
Whereas, His Excellency the Governor and Council entertain a
doubt as to their power and authority to issue a certificate of elec-
tion to said Bayard Tuckerman, Jr., or to hear and determine ques-
tions of corrupt practices as set forth in the petition hereto annexed
;
It is ordered that the opinion of the Justices of the Supreme
Judicial Court be requested by the Governor and Council upon
the following important questions of law
:
1. Whether His Excellency the Governor and Council, in the
performance of their constitutional and statutory obligations to
" examine the returned copies of the records for the election," as
provided in Article XVI of the Amendments to the Massachusetts
Constitution and General Laws (Ter. Ed.), Chapter 54, Sections
115, 116 and 117, or Chapter 55, General Laws (Ter. Ed.), en-
titled, "Corrupt Practices and Election Inquests," have jurisdic-
tion and authority to hear, consider, and determine questions of
corrupt practices of any character, and particularly those set forth
in the petition hereto attached and marked Exhibit "A."
2. Whether under the provisions of Article XVI of the Amend-
ments to the Constitution of Massachusetts or the General Laws
(Ter. Ed.), Chapter 54, Sections 115, 116 and 117, His Excellency
the Governor and Council have power or authority to refrain from
a declaration as to the candidate who appears to be elected in said
Fifth Councillor District, there being no question raised as to the
accuracy of the returns of votes cast in said district.
Exhibit "A."
To His Excellency the Governor, and to the Honorable Council of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Respectfully represents Howard J. Fleming, Catherine J. Ryan,
Joseph Broyderick, Simon Saunders, Gertrude Nicholson, William
Nicholson, John Brennan, Irene C. Long, Eastman S. Maclnner-
ney, who are inhabitants, taxpayers, and qualified voters, and who
had a right to vote for the office of the Executive Council for the
Fifth District within the said Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
at the primaries, which were held on September 15, 1936, and at
the Election, which was held on November 3, 1936.
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2. At the primaries, on September 15, 1936, and on election,
November 3, 1936, and prior to both of these dates, Bayard Tuck-
erman, Jr., violated provisions of the Corrupt Practice Act, in
connection with the nomination and election to the office of Execu-
tive Council from the said Fifth District of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts.
3. That it may appear, after the counting of ballots cast for the
office of Executive Council in said Fifth District, that one, Bayard
Tuckerman, Jr., received a majority of the votes cast for said office.
4. That the voters of the said Fifth District had the right to vote
for the said Bayard Tuckerman, Jr., candidate for the office 1 of Exec-
utive Council, and others who were also candidates for the same office.
5. The petitioners respectfully assert that the office of Execu-
tive Council is a constitutional office, created by the constitution
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
6. The petitioners further respectfully say that the duty im-
posed upon the Governor and the Executive Council of the Com-
monwealth by our constitution requires, "The Governor and the
Executive Council shall, as soon as may be, examine the return
copies of the records for the election of the councillors, and issue
a summons for them to appear to be qualified." That such ex-
amination and qualification by the Governor and the Governor's
Council is conclusive evidence of the determination of the Gover-
nor and the Governor's Council as to the election.
7. The petitioners respectfully contend that they have reasons
to believe and do believe, that the said Bayard Tuckerman, Jr.,
did commit a corrupt practice or corrupt practices, as defined by
Chapter 55, Section 1, in that the said Bayard Tuckerman, Jr.,
did expend by himself, or through person or persons, moneys far
in excess of '$1,500.00 at the primaries, and moneys far in excess of
$3,000.00 at the election.
8. That it is further contended by your petitioners that the
said Bayard Tuckerman, Jr., did violate Section 16, of Chapter
55 by the failure of the said Bayard Tuckerman, Jr., to disclose
fully and completely all of the moneys or other things of value
expended by him, and all of the moneys or other things of value
expended by persons in his behalf.
9. That your petitioners say and are ready to prove that the
said Bayard Tuckerman, Jr., by himself, or by another, commit ted
the following offences: —
1. Violation of the provisions of Section 1, relative to the ex-
penditure of money in excess of the amounts therein authorized.
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2. That the return filed by the said Bayard Tuckerman, Jr.,
is in violation of Provisions 16 and 19 of said Chapter 55.
3. Violation of Section 5, of Chapter 55, dealing with the
expenditures of monies for the purchase of intoxicating liquors.
10. The petitioners further allege that it is their intention to
file appropriate complaints with the Superior Court of this Com-
monwealth dealing with the Corrupt Practice Act, and to further
file proper petitions or complaints with the legislative body of the
Commonwealth, protesting the election of the said Bayard Tuck-
erman, Jr., on the grounds of corrupt practices.
11. It is respectfully submitted that the Governor and ( ouncil
are deemed, "The Board required by law finally to examine the
returns and issue certificates of election," and are consequently
authorized by the constitution to examine corrupt acts by those
who claim to have been elected.
12. It is further respectfully submitted that the purity and
freedom of elections is fundamental in our present form of gov-
ernment. Scarcely anything can be conceived of more vital to
the public welfare than free and honest elections.
Wherefore, your petitioners pray : —
1. That the Governor and Council do not issue a certificate of
election to the said Bayard Tuckerman, Jr.
2. That the Governor and Council make diligent inquiry at a
public hearing for the purpose of determining the illegal and
corrupt acts charged to have been committed by the said Bayard
Tuckerman, Jr.
3. That, pending such investigation and public hearing, this
Honorable Body refrain from issuing a summons to the said Bay-
ard Tuckerman, Jr., setting forth that he appears to have been
chosen Executive Councillor from the Fifth District of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts.
4. And for such further or other relief as to this Honorable
Body may deem fit and proper.
Joseph H. Brovderick.
William Nicholson.
John M. Brennan.
Simon Saunders.
Eastman S. McInnernbt.
Catherine J. Ryan.
Gertrude A. Nicholson,
[bene C. Long.
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Essex, ss. November 19, 193.6.
Before me personally appeared, the above named Eastman S.
Innerney, and made oath that he believes the foregoing state-
ments to be true.
(Sgd) Harry C. Mamber,
Notary Public.
On December 2, 1936, the Justices returned the following
answers : —
To His Excellency the Governor and the Honorable Council of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court have considered
the questions proposed in the order adopted November 25, 1936,
copy of which is hereto annexed. The following opinion is respect-
fully submitted.
The facts recited in the order show that a petition has been
presented to His Excellency the Governor and the Honorable
Council by certain voters of the Fifth Councillor District setting
forth alleged violations of the corrupt practices act by one of the
candidates for councillor at the recent election, that His Excellency
the Governor and the Honorable Council, in conformity with
the provisions of art. 16 of the Amendments to the Constitution
and G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, §§ 115, 116, 117, have examined the
returned copies of the records of the votes cast at the recent State
election, and particularly those cast for councillor in the Fifth
Councillor District, and find them to be as' stated in the tabulation
contained in the order, that thereby the candidate against whom
the petition has been filed appears to have been elected, that the
petition presented by certain voters of the Fifth Councillor Dis-
trict sets out the alleged violations of the corrupt practices act
and asks that the certificate of election be not issued to said
candidate, and that His Excellency the Governor and the Honor-
able Council hold a public hearing for the purpose of determining
the illegal and corrupt acts charged to have been committed, and
for further relief.
The duty imposed upon His Excellency the Governor and the
Honorable Council by art . 16 of the Amendments to the Constitu-
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tion is that "the governor, with at least five councillors for the
time being, shall, as soon as may be, examine the returned copies
of the records for the election of governor, lieutenant-governor,
and councillors; and ten days before the said first Wednesday in
January he shall issue his summons to such persons as appear to
be chosen, to attend on that day to be qualified accordingly. ..."
It is plain that, by this article of the Constitution, the Governor
and Council are made a board to examine the returns of votes.
The duty imposed is purely ministerial in its nature. It is in
no sense judicial. It confers power to tabulate the returns. It
does not confer powTer to make any examination beyond the copies
of the records of votes cast as presented by the Secretary of the
Commonwealth. It imposes no duty and confers no powers
respecting alleged corrupt practices or other conduct of the candi-
dates voted for. It does not authorize delay in the official tabula-
tion of the results of the examination of the returned copies pend-
ing any investigation or other proceeding with reference to alleged
corrupt practices. A board of public officers in the performance
of such ministerial duties is not authorized to go behind the
returned copies of the records of the election in order to hear
witnesses, weigh evidence, or render decisions respecting alleged
corrupt practices in the elections described in the returned copies
of the records of the election.
There is no provision of statute which amplifies or enlarges the
duty and power conferred upon the Governor and Council by
art. 16 of the Amendments. The performance of some details
respecting that duty is regulated by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, §§ 115,
116, 117.
This conclusion is required by Opinion of the Justices, 136
Mass. 583, where substantially the same question was answered.
To the same effect in substance is Luce v. Mayhew, 13 Gray, 83.
The subject of corrupt practices is covered by G. L. (Ter. Ed.)
c. 55. Ashley v. Three Justices of the Superior Court, 228 Mass.
63. By that chapter no jurisdiction is conferred upon the Governor
and Council to consider and determine questions of corrupt
practices of any nature. The provisions of that chapter do not
affect or expand in any way the duties imposed on the Governor
and Council by art. 16 of the Amendments to the Constitution.
Under art. 16 of the Amendments to the Constitution the duty
of examination of the returned copies of the records for the elec-
tion of councillors must be performed as soon as may be. No
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authority to delay such examination for any such reasons as are
stated in the petition addressed to the Governor and Council is
set forth in art. 16 of the Amendments.
Both questions in the order are answered in the negative.
Arthur P. Rugg.
John C. Crosby.
Edward P. Pierce.
Fred T. Field.
Charles H. Donahue.
Henry T. Lummus.
Stanley E. Qua.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
James J. Irwin v. Municipal Court of the Brighton
District of the City of Boston.
(Reported in 298 Mass. 158.)
Suffolk, April 9, 12, 1937 — Sept. 16, 1937. Present, Rugg, C.J., Field,
Donahue, Lummus and Qua, JJ.
Elections. Pleading, Civil, Demurrer. Certiorari. Words, "May."
Demurrer is a proper pleading to a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Whether or not to hold an election inquest in response to a complaint under G. L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 39, lies in the discretion of the District Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari respecting a refusal by a District Court to hold
an election inquest under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 39, was dismissed on demurrer
since its allegations did not show that the District Court did not exercise discretion
in reaching its decision.
Petition for a writ of certiorari, filed in the Supreme Judicial
Court for the county of Suffolk on May 18, 1936.
A demurrer to the petition was heard by Pierce, J.
J. J. Irwin, pro se.
J. J. Ronan, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.
Qua, J. This petition for a writ of certiorari sets forth a copy
of a complaint subscribed and sworn to by the petitioner before
the respondent, under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 39, alleging that
many corrupt practices were committed in violation of law in
connection with a special primary held on February 25, 1936,
and a special election held on March 10, 1936, to fill a vacancy
in the office of representative to the General Court, and praying
that the court hold an inquest in accordance with the statute.
The petition further avers that the respondent denied the prayer
of the complaint upon certain erroneous rulings of law. A single
justice of this court has sustained the respondent's demurrer to
the petition and dismissed the petition.
The demurrer was a proper pleading. Webster v. Alcoholic
Beverages Control Commission, 295 Mass. 572.
For the purposes of this decision it is unnecessary to recite in
further detail the charges of the original complaint or the alle-
gations of the petition for certiorari specifying the rulings of law
which are claimed to have been erroneous. We think it fairly
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appears from the petition itself that the alleged errors are all
based upon statements contained in a letter sent to the petitioner
under date of May 12, 1936, by the clerk of the respondent court.
A copy of this letter is annexed to the petition. In it the clerk
states that he is "directed by the Court to say that the complaint
for the most part has to do with the expenditures of money made
by the Campaign Committee and that inasmuch as the law places
no limitation upon the amount of money to be expended by the
said Committee that portion of your complaint appears to be
without foundation." The letter goes on to say that "The alle-
gation set forth in the remainder of the complaint is so general
and vague and unsupported by statements of any witnesses what-
soever that it would appear to be the Court's duty to decide not
to hold an inquest in the matter." It is further stated that if
certain violations of law have occurred, the remedy is by criminal
complaint.
G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 39, under which the original com-
plaint was filed, permits "any person" to institute before a dis-
trict court a complaint alleging reasonable ground to believe that
the election laws have been violated and provides that "such
court or justice may at once hold an inquest to inquire into such
alleged violation of law." It seems plain that this statute was
intended to give to the judges of the district courts power to hold
election inquests when the public interests seemed to require that
an inquest be held, but to leave it to their discretion, as judicial
officers, in each instance whether to hold such inquest or not. It
could not have been intended that "any person" could compel
the holding of an inquest whenever he saw fit. The word "may"
commonly imports discretion. Cheney v. Coughlin, 201 Mass.
204, 211-212. Dascalakis v. Commonwealth, 244 Mass. 568.
Dowling v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 268 Mass. 480, 488.
There is nothing to suggest that it has a different signification
here. On the contrary the words "may" and "shall" are both
used, apparently by way of contrast, in the immediately follow-
ing §§ 40-44, inclusive, which relate to the same subject matter.
It necessarily follows that the utmost relief which this court could
give to the petitioner in any form of proceeding would be to
require the respondent to exercise his discretion as to whether or
not he would hold an inquest. See Channell v. Judge of Central
District Court of Northern Essex, 213 Mass. 78.
But we think that the petition for certiorari fails to show that
he has not already exercised his discretion against the holding of
an inquest. We think it would be going too far to say that state-
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merits of the kind hereinbefore indicated contained in a letter
written by the clerk to the complainant at the direction of the
judge and so far as appears never filed or made a matter of record
in court in any way were rulings of law which constituted the
sole basis of the judge's decision and of themselves without more
proof that he did not deny the inquest on discretionary grounds.
In the view which we take of the case the petition for certio-
rari was demurrable for the reason stated, and it is unnecessary
to inquire whether the so called " rulings" contained in the letter
were erroneous.
It seems very doubtful whether in any event the interest of a
person bringing a complaint under § 39 extends beyond the bare
right to present the complaint to the district court. See §§ 40-44.
McGlue v. County Commissioners, 225 Mass. 59. Police Commis-
sioner of Boston v. Boston, 279 Mass. 577, 585. But on this we
express no opinion.
Exceptions overruled.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
N. Seelye Hitchcock v. Examiners for Hampshire County
and Others.
(Reported in 301 Mass. 170.)
Hampshire, Nov. 2, 1937 — Sept. 14, 1938. Present, Donahue, Lummds,
Qua and Dolan, JJ.
Board of Examiners. Elections.
The duties of a board of examiners are fixed by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 122, and
are ministerial only: in determining to whom to issue a certificate of election the
board has no power to ascertain whether election officers or town clerks properly
performed their duties respecting the election.
Petition, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of
Hampshire on December 29, 1936, for a writ of mandamus.
A demurrer was sustained by Field, J., and the case reported
to the full court.
The case was submitted on briefs.
N. S. Hitchcock, pro se.
K. H. Hemenway, H. F. Wood and J. L. Burns, for the respond-
ent Bisbee.
Donahue, J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. The
petitioner was a candidate for election to the office of county com-
missioner for the county of Hampshire at a State election. The
respondents are a majority of the board of county commissioners
of Hampshire County; Charles A. Bisbee, who was also a candi-
date for the office of county commissioner at the same election;
and the judge and the register of the Probate Court and the clerk
of courts of that county, who at the time of the election and of
the filing of the petition constituted the board of examiners of
the county (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 54, § 122). The board of exam-
iners issued to the respondent Bisbee a certificate of election to
the office of county commissioner. The petitioner alleges that he,
and not Bisbee, was duly elected county commissioner and that
the board of examiners erred in not so declaring, and in not issu-
ing to him a certificate of election to that office.
The petition contained prayers that the tabulations of the votes
for county commissioner in the town of Cummington, in precinct
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B in the town of Williamsburg and in precinct A in the town of
South Hadley, "be declared void and excluded in determining the
result of the election"; that the board of examiners be ordered to
recall its certificate of election issued to Bisbee and to issue a cer-
tificate of election to the petitioner; that the respondent county
commissioners be ordered to recognize the petitioner as county
commissioner; and that the respondent Bisbee refrain from "in-
truding himself as a county commissioner."
The case was heard by a single justice of this court on a demur-
rer filed by the respondent Bisbee. The single justice entered an
order sustaining the demurrer, and reported the case to the full
court at the request of the petitioner and on his agreement that,
if the order was rightly entered, the petition should be dismissed.
The petition alleges in general terms the failure on the part of
some of the election officers in precinct B of the town of Williams-
burg and in precinct A of the town of South Hadley and of the
clerks of those towns to perform their respective duties according
to law. It also alleges in general terms that subsequent investi-
gations disclosed irregularities and disregard of legal requirements
in the conduct of the town clerk and election officers of the town
of Cummington. These general allegations, stating conclusions
as to the conduct of the public officials referred to, without any
specification of acts or of facts, do not provide material for a ju-
dicial determination. They are not admitted by the demurrer.
Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 237 Mass. 403, 415. Berk-
witz v. Dunham, 269 Mass. 65. Wesalo v. Commissioner of Insur-
ance, 299 Mass. 495, 498.
The only specific allegations in the petition with respect to the
conduct of election officers or town clerks in any of the three towns
mentioned in the petition refer to officers in the town of Cumming-
ton. The petition alleges that, there, "the presiding officer" at
the counting of the votes, after the polls were closed on election
day, announced that the respondent Bisbee had received two hun-
dred sixty-nine and the petitioner two hundred sixty-five votes,
and that on the following morning the town clerk made the same
statement to the petitioner, but later in the day told other per-
sons that one hundred sixty-five and not two hundred sixty-five
votes were cast for the petitioner. The petition also alleges that
unused ballots were not sealed and certified by a majority of the
election officers as required by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 107, and
were taken away from the polling place by the town clerk.
After there had been a recount of the ballots cast for candidates
for the office of county commissioner in the three voting precincts
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named in the petition, the board of examiners made a tabulation
of the total number of votes cast in the county for each such can-
didate. This showed that the respondent Bisbee had received
thirteen thousand, nine hundred fifty-five votes and the petitioner
thirteen thousand, nine hundred sixteen. Thereupon the board
issued to Bisbee a certificate of his election.
The only specific allegations in the petition, which are earlier
herein recited, do not comprise matters which the members of the
board of examiners could properly consider in the performance of
their duties. Those duties are fixed by statute. G. L. (Ter. Ed.)
c. 54, § 122. See also §§ 112, 134. Their duties are merely minis-
terial. Wardwell v. Leggat, 291 Mass. 428, 430, 432, and cases
cited. The statutory functions of the board are to " examine . . .
copies" of the records of votes for county commissioners in each
voting precinct in the county, to " determine what persons appear
to be elected/' to " issue certificates of election to them," to give
notice to the State secretary of the name, residence, and number
of votes received by each candidate in each city and town, with
the name and term of office of every person so elected and to de-
posit said copies in the office of the clerk of courts. G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 54, § 122.
There is no allegation in the petition that the members of the
board of examiners failed to perform the ministerial duties which
the statute imposes. They could not be required to perform any
other duties. Wardwell v. Leggat, 291 Mass. 428, 432. Clark v.
Examiners of Hampden County, 126 Mass. 282, 284. The statute
contemplates that the board shall " determine what persons appear
to be elected" by an examination of the returns of votes cast for
county commissioners in the various voting precincts of the county.
Luce v. Mayhew, 13 Gray, 83. Its functions are not judicial and
it is not empowered to take extrinsic evidence in reaching the con-
clusion to issue a certificate of election to a candidate. It was
said of the duties of members of a board of examiners in Clark
v. Examiners of Hampden County, 126 Mass. 282, 284: "If one
result appears upon the returns, and another is the real truth of
the case, they can only act upon the former."
Therefore, statements alleged to have been made by an election
officer or the town clerk of Cummington, and the alleged fact
that the statutory requirements as to unused ballots were not
there followed, are matters of fact the truth of which the board
of examiners was not authorized to determine. Its issuance of a
certificate of election to a candidate must be based, not upon
findings of fact as to the conduct of election officers but upon the
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records of votes cast for county commissioner in the various vot-
ing precincts of the county.
As there was no error on the part of the board of examiners in
issuing a certificate of election to the respondent Bisbee, the order
of the single justice sustaining the demurrer was rightly entered.
In accordance with the terms of the report the petition must be
dismissed. 80 ordered.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Charles L. Manser v. Secretary of the Commonwealth.
(Reported in 301 Mass. 264.)
Suffolk, Oct. 7, 1938— Oct. 10, 1938. Present, Field, C.J., Donahue,
Lummus, Qua and Dolan, JJ.
Elections.
The time within which one nominated as a candidate for a State office by nomi-
nation papers may withdraw his name from nomination is governed by G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 53, § 13, as amended by St. 1937, c. 26; c. 77, § 4.
Petition filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of
Suffolk on October 4, 1938, for a writ of mandamus.
The case was reserved for the full court by Cox, J.
R. S. Wilkins, (J. L. Hurley with him,) for the petitioner.
E. 0. Proctor, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.
Field, C.J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus. The
respondent is the Secretary of the Commonwealth. The peti-
tioner has filed with the respondent nomination papers as a can-
didate for Governor of the Commonwealth to. be voted for at the
next State election. On or before September 26, 1938, he at-
tempted to file with the respondent a request for the withdrawal
of his name from such nomination. The respondent refused, and
still refuses, to accept such withdrawal, and intends to cause the
ballots for said State election to be printed showing the petitioner
as a candidate for Governor. The petitioner prays that a writ of
mandamus issue commanding the respondent "to receive the said
withdrawal and to treat said withdrawal as legal and effective,
and further commanding the respondent to omit the petitioner's
name as a candidate for the office of Governor of the Common-
wealth in the printing of the ballots for the election." The case
was heard by a single justice of this court who, at the request of
the parties, reserved it without decision "upon all questions of
law raised by the petition, answer, the traverse of the petitioner,
and the agreed statement of facts" for the determination of the
full court. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 211, § 6; c. 231, § 111; Camp-
bell v. Justices of the Superior Court, 187 Mass. 509, 510.
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It is the duty of the respondent to prepare ballots for use at the
State election, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 40, and this duty includes
placing the petitioner's name upon the ballot as a candidate for
Governor or omitting it therefrom as the law may require. The
respondent makes no contention that mandamus is not a proper
remedy to compel him to perform his duty in this respect, that the
petitioner is not a proper party to bring a petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel such performance, or that the petition in
this case is not adequate in form. See Prescott v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 299 Mass. 191. Bigney v. Secretary of the Com-
monwealth, ante, 1 107. Furthermore, it is not contended that the
petitioner's request for the withdrawal of his name from nomina-
tion is not in proper form. The sole question argued is whether,
in view of the time when the petitioner's request for withdrawal
was made, the respondent, as matter of law, is required to receive
the withdrawal and to omit the petitioner's name from the ballot
as a candidate for Governor.
It is clear that, if the petitioner's right to withdraw his name
from nomination is governed by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 13, as
amended by St. 1937, c. 26, and St. 1937, c. 77, § 4, his request for
withdrawal was not made seasonably and the respondent was
prohibited from receiving it. Material provisions of this section
are as follows: "A person nominated as a candidate for any state,
city or town office may withdraw his name from nomination by a
request signed and duly acknowledged by him, and filed with the
officer with whom the nomination was filed, within the time pre-
scribed by section eleven for filing objections to certificates of
nomination and nomination papers and no such requests for with-
drawals shall be received after such time has expired." The time
fixed by this section for withdrawal of a name from nomination
for a State office, expired on August 5, 1938. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.)
c. 53, § 10, as amended by St. 1938, c. 373, § 4; § U, as amended
by St. 1937, c. 212, § 1; G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 62, as amended
by St. 1935, c. 257, § 5. It does not appear that the petitioner's
attempt to file a request for withdrawal was made before Septem-
ber 26, 1938.
The petitioner contends that his right to withdraw his name
from nomination is not governed by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 13,
as amended, for the reason that this section is not applicable to a
person nominated as a candidate for a State office by nomination
papers. This contention cannot be sustained.
I Editor's Sote. — See 301 Mass.
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G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 13, as amended, purports to authorize
a "person nominated as a candidate for any state . . . office" to
withdraw his name from nomination in the manner and within the
time stated. The phrase quoted is broad enough to include any
person nominated, regardless of the mariner in which he was nom-
inated — even a person nominated at the State primary. But
G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 53A, makes a specific provision for with-
drawal by a person nominated at the State primary which is incon-
sistent with the provision of § 13, and such specific provision
necessarily controls the general provision of § 13. For this reason,
if not for others, persons nominated as candidates at the State
primary are excluded from the application of § 13.
There is, however, no specific provision for withdrawal by a
person nominated for a State office by nomination papers, apart
from § 13, which, as in the case of a person nominated at the State
primary, would exclude a person nominated by nomination papers
from the application of this section, and the phrase therein "A
person nominated as a candidate for any state . . . office"
naturally includes a person nominated by nomination papers.
Indeed there is nothing in the terms of § 13 indicating that it is
not as fully applicable to persons nominated by nomination
papers as to those whose' nominations are evidenced or made
effective by certificates of nomination. (The latter class of per-
sons does not include persons nominated at a State primary, but
obviously does include persons nominated at conventions of
parties which are not political parties. See G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 53,
§§ 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, and various amendments. See St. 1938, c. 373,
§ 4. Whether this class includes also any person nominated under
G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 53, § 14, to fill a vacancy we need not inquire.)
On the other hand, the fact that § 13 fixes the time within which
withdrawals must be made by reference to § 11, which fixes the
time for filing objections, not only to certificates of nomination
but also to nomination papers, is an indication that the provisions
of § 13, like those of § 11, extend to persons nominated by nomina-
tion papers. Moreover, an interpretation of § 13 as inapplicable
to persons nominated by nomination papers would leave such
persons without any express provision for withdrawal — a result
not lightly to be attributed to statutes of such comprehensive
nature as those relating to elections. And it would leave only a
narrow field for the operation of § 13. But an interpretation of
§ 13 as including within its scope, in accordance with its natural
meaning, persons nominated by nomination papers results in a
uniform application to all nominations for State offices of the
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principle that the right of withdrawal does not extend beyond the
time fixed for filing objections to nominations. See G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 53, § 53A. Finally, § 13, as here interpreted, is not even
remotely in conflict with any other statutory provision.
Ever since provision was first made for the use of official bal-
lots at State elections by St. 1888, c. 436, the statutes have pro-
vided for the nomination of candidates for State offices by nomina-
tion papers and for withdrawals from nomination. The provision
first made for withdrawals applied in terms to "Any person whoso
name has been presented as a candidate" and permitted with-
drawals up to ten days previous to the day of election. See St.
1888, c. 436, § 8; St. 1889, c. 413, § 8. This provision clearly ap-
plied to persons nominated by nomination papers. By St. 1890,
c. 436, § 9, however, it was provided that "Objections to certifi-
cates of nomination and to nomination papers, and withdrawals
by candidates from nomination, shall, under said chapter four
hundred and thirteen, be made within the seventy-two hours suc-
ceeding the last day fixed for the filing of such nomination papers."
And by St. 1893, c. 417, § 84, the provision for withdrawal was in
terms made applicable to a person "nominated as a candidate for
any state . . . office in accordance with the provisions of this
title" — a title which included provisions for nomination by
nomination papers. See Title III, § 77. The conclusion seems
inescapable, that these statutes provided for the withdrawal from
nomination of persons nominated by nomination papers. And
none of the statutory changes which have culminated in G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 53, § 13, in its present form discloses any intention on the
part of the Legislature to change the law in this respect.
It cannot rightly be said that the change in the statute by which
the time for withdrawal was much restricted, see St. 1890, c. 436,
§ 9, see now G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 13, shows that the statute
which is now G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 13, was not intended to apply
to withdrawals by persons nominated by nomination papers, for the
reason that the change was made in order that there might be
sufficient time for filling vacancies caused by withdrawals and
that no provision has ever been made for the substitution of
another candidate for a candidate nominated by nomination
papers who has withdrawn. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 14. It
is to be observed that the change of time for withdrawals was
made (St. 1890, c. 436, § 9) before there was any statutory pro-
vision for filling any vacancies caused by withdrawal. St. 1890,
c. 436, § 4; St. 1891, c. 278. We do not discuss the soundness of
the premise that there is no statutory provision for substituting
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a candidate for a candidate nominated by nomination papers who
has withdrawn, or enter upon a detailed analysis of the section of
the statute (now G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 53, § 14) providing for filling
vacancies caused by withdrawals. In any event, the little addi-
tional time provided in some circumstances by that section, and
the like sections in earlier statutes, for filling vacancies caused by
withdrawals can hardly have been the sole ground for so nar-
rowly limiting the time for withdrawals. We find nothing in that
section, or in its history, which impliedly excludes persons nomi-
nated for State offices by nomination papers from the application
of what is now G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 13, as amended.
The petitioner's contention that G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 13, is
inapplicable to a person nominated by nomination papers rests
in part upon arguments from its apparent purpose and from public
policy. Those arguments have force only as they affect the inter-
pretation of the section. Undoubtedly, as was said in Morrisson
v. Selectmen of Weymouth, 279 Mass. 486, 492: "A statute as a
whole ought, if possible, to be so construed as to make it an effec-
tual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound
reason." But full recognition of this principle does not lead to an
interpretation of § 13 contrary to that here made upon an examina-
tion of its language in the light of the election laws as a whole, and
of their history. The petitioner argues, in substance, that the
name of a person who does not wish to be a candidate ought not
to be placed upon the ballot, and that its presence there would
tend to confuse the voters and interfere with a free expression of
the popular will. See Blackmer v. Hildreth, 181 Mass. 29, 31;
Bordwell v. Williams, 173 Cal. 283, 287. The Legislature appears
to have recognized the force of these considerations by providing
expressly for withdrawals by persons however nominated. And
it was for the Legislature to determine at what time, in the orderly
conduct of elections, the right to withdraw should terminate.
The limitation upon the time for withdrawal fixed by § 13 is not
so clearly unreasonable as applied to persons nominated by nom-
ination papers that it is to be inferred that the Legislature did not
intend this section to apply to such persons. Such an inference
cannot rightly be drawn from the fact that the period before
election day within which withdrawal cannot be made is longer
than ordinarily would be required for printing the ballots. An
argument on this ground for excluding persons nominated by
nomination papers from the application of § 13 would apply with
almost as great force to persons whose nominations were evidenced
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or made effective by certificates of nomination and who un-
doubtedly are within the scope of § 13. We cannot, however,
rightly assume that the only actual or reasonable purpose of § 13
was to insure ample time for printing the ballots.
The petitioner contends that § 13 should not be interpreted
as applying to persons nominated for State offices by nomination
papers, because, under the section so interpreted, the time for
withdrawal expires before the result of the State primary can
be ascertained. Whether this is a desirable result was for the
Legislature to determine. Opinions may differ. In any event this
result is not so clearly unreasonable as to indicate that it was not
intended by the Legislature. Similar considerations apply to the
petitioner's contention that, since he "did not represent any
political or other group, no harm would be occasioned to any one
by allowing his name to be withdrawn." Neither the apparent
purpose of § 13 nor any ground of public policy warrants a de-
parture from the natural interpretation of § 13 that it applies to a
person, in the position of the petitioner, who has been nominated
for a State office by nomination papers.
The petitioner relies upon an opinion dated October 10, 1934,
of the then Attorney General given to the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth interpreting G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 13, in accordance
with the petitioner's contention, and upon the fact that this sec-
tion was thereafter amended by St. 1937, c. 26, and by St. 1937,
c. 77, § 4. This opinion was given after the statute, now said
§ 13, had remained in substantially the same form for many years.
See St. 1898, c. 548, § 148. It "was the sole interpretation, judi-
cial or administrative," of the section existing prior to September
23, 1938. It was not, so far as appears, made the basis of any
long continued and well known administrative practice. The
amendments of § 13 made in 1937 did not touch the statutory
words which are significant upon the question of construction
now presented or amount to a legislative use of these words in
the light of the opinion. The case does not fall within the authori-
ties cited by the petitioner, where under different circumstances
administrative construction and usage have been relied on in
determining the meaning of a statute.
Petition dismissed.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate.
(Reported in 303 Mass. 615.)
Constitutional Law, Apportionment of representation, Appointment of civil
officers, General Court, Separation of powers of government, Delegation of
powers, Referendum. Public Officer. General Court. Words, "Naming,"
"Office."
In the opinion of all the justices excepting Cox, J., a proposed act providing for
the choice of all, or of a part, of the members of boards of special commissioners
to divide into representative districts the several counties entitled to more than
one representative "by joint ballot of senators and representatives in one room,"
that members of the General Court who are residents of a county may be chosen as
members of a board for such county, and that the Governor may fill any vacancy
among members so chosen, would be a violation of art. 30 of the Declaration of
Rights and of art. 65 of the Amendments to the Constitution.
In the opinion of all the justices, such a bill, if enacted, would not be subject to
referendum.
On May 3, 1939, the Senate adopted the following order: —
Whereas, The joint special committee, appointed to recommend
a new division of the Commonwealth into councillor and senato-
rial districts and a new apportionment of representatives to the
several counties and to make recommendations relative to the
formation of representative districts, has filed a report in part,
Senate, No. 498, relative to the apportionment of representatives
and the formation of representative districts, a copy of which
report is herewith submitted; and
Whereas, In said report said committee recommends the pas-
sage of a bill, Appendix B, accompanying said report, also printed
as Senate, No. 500, a copy of which is herewith submitted, which
provides that each county other than Suffolk, Dukes and Nan-
tucket shall be divided into representative districts by a board
composed of the county commissioners and four other persons to
be chosen by joint ballot of the senators and representatives in
one room, that Suffolk County shall be so divided by a board of
seven persons chosen by such joint ballot, that any of the mem-
bers of any of said boards to be so chosen may be members of
the General Court and all of them shall be residents of the re-
spective counties for which they are chosen, and that the Gov-
ernor shall make appointments of persons qualified as aforesaid
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to fill any vacancies that may occur In any of said boards;
and
Whereas, Said bill contains no emergency preamble, but pro-
vides that it shall take effect upon its passage; and
Whereas, Grave doubt exists as to the constitutionality and
legal effect of said measure if enacted into law; and
Whereas, A solemn occasion and serious emergency exist, re-
quiring the opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court;
now, therefore, be it
Ordered, That the opinions of the Justices of the Supreme
Judicial Court be required by the Senate upon the following im-
portant questions of law:
1. In view of the provisions of Article XXX of Part the First
of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, in view of so much of
Article IV of Section I of Chapter I of Part the Second thereof
as authorizes the General Court "to name and settle annually, or
provide by fixed laws, for the naming and settling all civil officers
within the said commonwealth," except those established by the
constitution and chosen under its provisions, and in view of the
provision of Article XXI of the Amendments to said Constitu-
tion, as appearing in Article LXXI of said Amendments, that a
county shall be divided into representative districts by the " county
commissioners or other body acting as such or, in lieu thereof,
such board of special commissioners in each county as may for
that purpose be provided by law," is it constitutionally compe-
tent for the General Court
(a) To provide for the division of each of several counties into
representative districts by a board of special commissioners com-
posed of the persons who are county commissioners, and of other
persons, residents of such county, chosen by joint ballot of the
senators and representatives in one room, substantially as pro-
vided in section one of said bill,
(6) To provide for such a division of a county by a board o
special commissioners composed wholly of residents of such county
chosen in the manner aforesaid, substantially as provided in sec-
tion two of said bill,
(c) To provide in one bill for such a division of each of several
counties by a board composed as provided in said section one,
and of another county by a board composed as provided in said
section two?
2. Is it constitutionally competent for the General Court to
provide that any vacancies occurring, among members chosen as
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aforesaid, in boards established for the purpose of dividing the
aforesaid counties, respectively, into representative districts, shall
be filled by appointment by the Governor, substantially as pro-
vided in said bill?
3. In view of Article XXX of Part the First of the Constitution
of the Commonwealth, of Article LXV of the Amendments to said
Constitution, and of Article XXI of said Amendments, as appear-
ing in Article LXXI thereof, are the provisions of said bill, whereby
a board to divide a county into representative districts may be
composed in whole or in part of members of the General Court who
are residents of such county, valid and constitutional provisions?
4. In view of the provisions of said Article XXI, as appearing
in said Article LXXI, including those prescribing the time and
manner of the division of the several counties of the Common-
wealth into representative districts, and in view of the provisions
of Article XLVIII of said Amendments, The Referendum III,
Section 2, more particularly those excluding from the operation
of the referendum any "law . . . the operation of which is re-
stricted to a particular . . . political subdivision or to particular
districts or localities of the commonwealth," can said bill, Senate,
No. 500, if enacted into law, lawfully be the subject of a referen-
dum petition under said Article XLVIII?
On May 5, 1939, the order was transmitted to the Justices,
who, on May 24, 1939, returned the following answers:
To the Honorable the Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court respectfully submit
these answers to the questions set forth in an order adopted by
the Senate on May 3, 1939, and transmitted to them on May 5,
1939, a copy of which is hereto annexed. The questions relate
to a bill (Senate, No. 500), entitled "An Act establishing boards
of special commissioners to divide into representative districts
the several counties of the Commonwealth which are entitled
to more than one representative," now pending before the General
Court upon a report of the special committee on redistricting
(Senate, No. 498). Copies of the bill and report are annexed
to the order.
The bill provides, in substance, that each county other than
Suffolk, Dukes and Nantucket shall be divided into representative
districts by a board composed of the county commissioners and
four other persons to be chosen by joint ballot of the senators
and representatives in one room, that Suffolk County shall be
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so divided by a board of seven persons chosen by such joint
ballot, that any of the members of any of said boards may be
members of the General Court and all of them shall be residents
of the respective counties for which they are chosen, and that the
Governor shall make appointments of persons qualified as afore-
said to fill any vacancies that may occur in any of said boards.
The bill contains no emergency preamble, but provides that it
shall take effect upon its passage.
Four questions, one of them containing three subdivisions,
are submitted. Three of these questions present for consideration
matters relating to the constitutionality of the bill, if enacted
into law. The fourth question is whether the bill, if so enacted,
will be subject to a referendum petition under art. 48 of the
Amendments to the Constitution.
Article 71 of the Amendments to the Constitution, which was
adopted in place of art. 21 thereof, thereby annulled, provides
for a "special enumeration " of the legal voters of each city and
town; and provides further that "The house of representatives
shall consist of two hundred and forty members, which shall be
apportioned by the general court ... to the several counties
of the commonwealth, equally, as nearly as may be, according
to their relative numbers of legal voters, as ascertained by said
special enumeration," and that "The county commissioners or
other body acting as such or, in lieu thereof, such board of special
commissioners in each county as may for that purpose be pro-
vided by law, shall . . . assemble at a shire town of their respec-
tive counties, and proceed, as soon as may be, to divide the same
into representative districts of contiguous territory and assign
representatives thereto." There are other provisions in the
article which are not significant with relation to the questions
submitted.
Article 71 of the Amendments, by imposing the duty of dividing
counties into representative districts upon the "county commis
sioners or other body acting as such or, in lieu thereof, such board
of special commissioners in each county as may for that purpose
be provided by law," imports that such a board of special com-
missioners may be established or "provided by law," that is, in
the manner fixed by the Constitution for the enactment of statutes
generally. Constitution, Part II, c. 1, § 1. arts. 1.2; art. 56 of
the Amendments. By the bill submitted for our consideration,
if enacted and valid, such a "board of special commissioners"
will be "provided by law" for each of the counties other than
Dukes and Nantucket. The bill provides in its first section for a
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board of special commissioners for each of the counties other
than Suffolk, Dukes and Nantucket, and provides in its second
section for a board of special commissioners for the county of
Suffolk constituted in a manner different from that in which the
boards of special commissioners for other counties are constituted.
The matter for consideration is whether either or both of the
methods by which, according to the terms of the bill establishing
such boards of special commissioners, these boards are to be
constituted are open to any constitutional objection under the
provisions of said article, the provisions of art. 30 of the Declara-
tion of Rights of the Constitution, or any other provision of the
Constitution.
The board of special commissioners for each of the counties
other than Suffolk, Dukes and Nantucket under § 1 of the bill
is to consist "of the persons holding the office of county com-
missioner and four other persons, residents of the county, to be
chosen by joint ballot of the senators and representatives in one
room." Though county commissioners are not officers of the
Commonwealth within the meaning of Part II, c. 1, § 2, art. 8, of
the Constitution, undoubtedly they are civil officers. Opinion
of the Justices, 167 Mass. 599, 600. They are county officers.
Goodale v. County Commissioners of Worcester, 277 Mass. 144,148.
But for the establishment of boards of special commissioners they
would have the duty of dividing the counties into representative
districts. Obviously there is nothing incompatible in the duties of
county commissioners and of the boards of special commissioners
established by the bill, if enacted into law, and art. 71 imports that
county commissioners are proper persons to act in the matter of
dividing the counties into representative districts. We perceive
no reason why it may not be "provided 'by law" that county
commissioners shall be members of boards of special commis-
sioners. See Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 620. More-
over, it is clear that there is no constitutional objection to requiring
that the "four other persons" who are chosen to be members
of such a board shall be "residents of the county." The functions
to be performed by a board of special commissioners are dis-
tinctly matters of such local interest that this requirement is
reasonable. See Bradley v. Zoning Adjustment Board of Boston, 255
Mass. 160, 167.
The question arises, however, whether the method "provided
by law," if the bill is enacted, for choosing the " four other persons
"
is objectionable on constitutional grounds. Clearly art. 71 of
the Amendments, in authorizing provision "by law" for boards of
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special commissioners, not only authorizes creation "by law" of
such boards but also authorizes the fixing "by law" of the method
by which the members of such boards shall be chosen. The
amendment, however, does not specifically prescribe the method
of choice, and, consequently, the method of choice prescribed by
the bill is not in conflict with any specific provision of the amend-
ment. But the amendment does not permit a method of choice
that is not in conformity with other constitutional provisions.
The other constitutional provisions, therefore, must be considered.
The Constitution, Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, empowers "the said
general court," described in the first article of said section, "to
name and settle annually, or provide by fixed laws, for the naming
and settling all civil officers within the said commonwealth; the
election and constitution of whom are not hereafter in this form
of government otherwise provided for." The members of the
boards of special commissioners are "civil officers within the said
commonwealth." See Opinion of the Justices, 167 Mass. 599,
600; 302 Mass. 605, 620. See also Attorney General v. Drohan, 169
Mass. 534, 535; Bradley v. Zoning Adjustment Board of Boston,
255 Mass. 160, 165-166. It was said in Donovan v. Suffolk County
Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55, 58, of similar com-
missioners elected according to St. 1913, c. 835, § 390, enacted
under the authority of art. 21 of the Amendments, now super-
seded by art. 71, that "The commissioners act as independent
officers in the performance of a duty imposed by the Constitution."
The Constitution contains no provision for "the election and
constitution" of these civil officers — the members of boards of
special commissioners — apart from the authority implied by
said art. 71 and from the provisions of said art. 4 hereinbefore
quoted. And the bill under consideration would not be an exer-
cise of the power conferred by said art. 4 upon the General Court
"to name and settle annually ... all civil officers within the
said commonwealth." It does not purport to "name" the "four
other persons" who are to be members of each of these boards of
special commissioners. On the contrary, it purports to provide
by a fixed law for choosing or "naming" such civil officers. And
the method of choice so provided by the bill is not such a "nam-
ing" of these civil officers by "the said general court" as is au-
thorized by said art. 4. Article 1 of the section which includes
said art. 4 states: "The department of legislation shall be formed
by two branches, a Senate and House of Representatives: each
of which shall have a negative on the other . . . and shall be
styled, The General Court of Massachusetts." Therefore,
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when action by the General Court is required by the Constitution,
the action must be taken in such a manner that each branch
thereof " shall have a negative on the other," which means neces-
sarily that each branch shall act separately and not "by joint
ballot of the senators and representatives in one room" as is
provided by the bill. When action by such a joint. ballot is con-
templated by the Constitution, express provision is made therefor.
See art. 17 of the Amendments. The provision in the bill for the
choice of members of the boards of special commissioners by such
a joint ballot, therefore, is not a provision by a fixed law for the
"naming and settling" of civil officers by the General Court.
See Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 621. They are not to be
named by the General Court in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution.
It remains to consider whether, under the power conferred upon
the General Court by said art. 4 to "provide by fixed laws, for
the naming and settling all civil officers within the said common-
wealth," the General Court may provide by a fixed law for the
choice of members of boards of special commissioners by senators
and representatives acting in a manner other than that pre-
scribed by the Constitution for action by the General Court.
The power which, by this language of art. 4, is conferred upon
the General Court is very broad (see Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass.
14, 25), but its scope must be determined in the light of other
constitutional provisions, including the provision of art. 30 of
the Declaration of Rights that "the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive . . . powers." The general subject
was discussed rather fully in Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass.
605, 620-623, and the conclusion reached, with respect to a bill pro-
viding for the appointment, by the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of a commission or
committee created by said bill, that "to confer upon such purely
legislative officers the executive power of appointment of members
of the commission or committee provided for by the bill and an
amendment thereto, whether or not such members are required
to be chosen from among members of the General Court, would
be violative of said art. 30 as authorizing the legislative depart-
ment to exercise executive powers." Page 623. We see no sound
ground of distinction in this respect between the bill then under
consideration and the present bill. There is no substantial differ-
ence in the nature of the power to choose members of boards of
special commissioners provided for by the bill now under con-
sideration and of the power to appoint the commission or com-
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mittee provided for by the bill considered in the Opinion of the
Justices above referred to. Clearly, the appointment of members
of such boards is not merely incidental to the exercise of legis-
lative powers. See page 619. See also Opinion of the Justices,
10 Gray, 613, 616; Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment
Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55, 58. Moreover, the senators and
representatives who are to act in the choice of members of the
boards of special commissioners — though, as already pointed out,
not in the manner prescribed for action by the General Court —
are as purely legislative officers as are the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The power of
appointment conferred by the present bill is conferred upon the
senators and representatives solely by virtue of their offices, and
the "functions of such officers are exclusively legislative. ' ' Opinion
of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 623. But, as was said in that
opinion, pages 620-621, quoting from Murphy v. Webster, 131
Mass. 482, 488, and citing numerous cases, "The power to ap-
point and the power to remove officers are in their nature execu-
tive powers." Without implying that the General Court may
not by fixed law confer the power of choosing the members of
boards of special commissioners upon the people or upon the Gen-
eral Court acting under its constitutional power to "name and
settle . . . civil officers" (page 621) — questions which are not
presented by the bill under consideration — it is enough to say that
in our opinion the power of appointing members of such boards
is so far executive in nature that it cannot be conferred by fixed
law upon such purely legislative officers as senators and repre-
sentatives, acting in any manner other than that prescribed by
the Constitution for action by the General Court, without violat-
ing the provisions of art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights. But
even if the power of appointing members of such boards were to
be regarded as a legislative power, it could be exercised by the
General Court or its members only in the manner prescribed by
the Constitution for action by the General Court, and could not
be delegated to such members acting in a different manner. See
Attorney General v. Brissenden, 271 Mass. 172, 180; Opinion of
the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 621.
The first section of the bill — applicable to counties other than
Suffolk, Dukes and Nantucket — contains the provision that
" Members of the general court who are residents of a county may
be chosen as members of such board for such county." This
provision so far as it applies to a " person elected to the general
court" that enacts the bill " during the term for which he was
230 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES — 1939.
elected' ' — and we assume that the inquiry relates to such per-
sons— is in violation of art. 65 of the Amendments providing that
"No person elected to the general court shall during the term for
which he was elected be appointed to any office created .
. .
during such term." For reasons already stated, the members of
the boards of special commissioners would be civil officers. And
the position on such a board to which a person is appointed would
be an "office" within the meaning of said art. 65. Opinion of the
Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 623. Moreover, in our opinion, such
"office," if— apart from other constitutional objections — the
bill should be enacted, would be "created" thereby, within the
meaning of art. 65, and not by art. 71 of the Amendments, which
impliedly authorizes the creation of such an office "by law"
but does not itself create such an office. The conclusion here
reached renders it unnecessary to consider whether on any other
ground members of the General Court enacting the bill would
be precluded from membership on a board of special commis-
sioners.
The first section of the bill contains the further provision that
"Any vacancy occurring among the members chosen as aforesaid
(that is, 'by joint ballot of the senators and representatives in
one room') shall be filled by appointment by the governor."
Since members of boards of special commissioners cannot consti-
tutionally be "chosen as aforesaid," it seems unnecessary to con-
sider whether vacancies occurring among members so chosen can
be filled by appointment by the Governor.
The board of special commissioners for the county of Suffolk
under § 2 of the bill is to consist of "seven residents of said county,
to be chosen by joint ballot of the senators and representatives
in one room." This section contains provisions relating to the
choice of members of the General Court as members of said board
and to the filling of vacancies on said board by appointment by
the Governor which are substantially the same as those contained
in the first section of the bill. The principles already stated and
the conclusions reached with respect to the boards of special com-
missioners for other counties are applicable to this board of special
commissioners. For reasons already stated, all the boards pro-
vided by the bill would be constituted in an unconstitutional
manner. The fact that the board provided for the county of
Suffolk is to be constituted in a different manner from those pro-
vided for other counties is not in our opinion an additional ground
of invalidity. A form of government has been provided by the
General Court for the county of Suffolk different from the forms
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of government provided for the other counties, and the right of
the General Court to provide different forms of government for
different counties has been recognized. Goodaie v. County Com-
missioners of Worcester, 277 Mass. 144, 149. We think that, in view
of the difference in the form of government for the county of Suf-
folk from the form of government for the other counties, if not
apart from such difference, the General Court might, without con-
stitutional objection, provide for constituting the board of special
commissioners for Suffolk County in a somewhat different man-
ner from that provided for constituting the boards for other
counties if the method of constituting such boards was in each
instance free from other constitutional objections. The possi-
bility of such a difference apparently was contemplated by art. 21
of the Amendments and special provisions have been made by
law thereunder. See St. 1897, c. 287; St. 1913, c. 835, § 390;
G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 161. See also Attorney General v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Commissioners, 224 Mass. 598; Donovan
v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55;
Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass.
124. The language of art. 71 of the Amendments shows no in-
tention to effect any change in this respect
.
We are further of the opinion that the bill, even if it were con-
stitutional, could not be made the subject of a referendum peti-
tion under art. 48 of the Amendments to the ( Constitution but that
it would be excluded from the referendum as a "law . . . the
operation of which is restricted to a particular town, city or other
political division or to particular districts or localities of the com-
monwealth." Art. 48, The Referendum, III, § 2. This conclu-
sion, we think, follows from the reasoning in Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 254 Mass. 617, 619-620, though the point therein considered
was somewhat different. See also Christian v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 283 Mass. 98. Compare Mt. IVashitigton v. Cook,
288 Mass. 67, 74. The proposed law would not be general in its
operation throughout the Commonwealth. Its operation would
not extend to the counties of Dukes and Nantucket, and, accord-
ing to its terms, it would operate differently in Suffolk County
than in the remaining counties.
In view of the principles stated we answer the questions sub-
mitted as follows : —
The answer to the first question, subdivision (a), is "No."
The answer to the first question, subdivision (6), is "No."
The answer to the first question, subdivision (c), is "No," but
not for the reason that the boards composed as provided in £ 1
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are constituted in a different manner from the board composed
as provided in § 2.
In view of the answers to the preceding question no answer to
the second question appears to be required.
The answer to the third question is "No" so far as it relates to
members of the General Court by which the bill would be enacted.
The answer to the fourth question is "No."
Fred T. Field.
Charles H. Donahue.
Henry T. Lummus.
Stanley E. Qua.
Arthur W. Dolan.
James J. Ronan.
To The Honorable the Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Article 71 of the Amendments to the Constitution contains the
provisions by which the "county Commissioners or other body
acting as such or, in lieu thereof, such board of special Commis-
sioners in each county as may for that purpose be provided by
law, shall" divide the counties into representative districts. If
such boards of special commissioners are provided for by law,
this must be done in the manner fixed by the Constitution, for
the enactment of statutes generally. The power of providing by
law for such special commissioners under art. 71 of the Amend-
ments is manifestly a legislative power. Under Part II, c. 1, § 1,
art. 4, of the Constitution the General Court has power "to name
and settle annually, or provide by fixed laws, for the naming and
settling all civil officers within the said commonwealth; the elec-
tion and constitution of whom are not hereafter in this form of
government otherwise provided for." It seems clear that such
special commissioners are civil officers, and it follows that they
may be named by the General Court or the naming of them may
be provided by fixed law. Obviously the General Court as such
is not proposing under the pending bill to name all of the special
commissioners. The power to "provide by fixed laws, for the
naming and settling all civil officers within the said common-
wealth" is very broad (see Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 25),
and it seems that the General Court could provide for the elec-
tion of such commissioners by the voters, even to the extent of
providing that the voters of each county could elect the special
commissioners for that county. There appears to be no constitu-
tional objection to the General Court, in the exercise of this
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power, providing for either the election of such special commis-
sioners or their appointment.
It is true that under the provisions of Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 1,
"The department of legislation shall be formed by two branches,
a Senate and House of Representatives : each of which shall have
a negative on the other
. . . and shall be styled, The General
Court of Massachusetts." And it is also true that the pro-
posed bill could not be adopt.ed in any joint convention or by
any joint ballot of the senators and representatives. In other
words, no doubt exists as to the authority of the General Court
to fix by law, agreeably to the Constitution, the method by which
special commissioners shall be chosen. The General Court acting
as such may do one of two things: it may name the commis-
sioners directly, or it may provide by legislation for their naming.
If this power to provide by law for the naming of special commis-
sioners can be exercised so as to provide for their election by the
voters of any one county or by appointment by some appointive
power, it would seem that provision also may be made for their
choice "by joint ballot of the senators and representatives in
one room," as is provided for by the bill, without contravening
the provisions of art. 1. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 233. This is not accom-
plishing by indirection what may not be done directly but is
rather adopting an alternative method under the provisions of
art. 71. There is here no usurpation of executive power.
The choice of special commissioners by joint ballot is not an
"appointment" of them, and it is difficult to see the relevancy of
the discussion of the possible appointment of members of boards
of special commissioners or of the characterization of the pro-
posed election of such members by a joint ballot as an "appoint-
ment" of such members. The Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass.
605, among other things, dealt with the power of appointment
and the conferring of such power upon the President of the Sen-
ate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. That opin-
ion does not appear to be relevant to an inquiry as bo the power
of the General Court to provide by law for the naming of civil
officers by election. The power of electing by joint ballot, and
not the power of appointing, is sought to be conferred by the
present bill upon the senators and representatives in the same
manner as the power of choice of such commissioners might law-
fully be conferred upon the electorate of any county. Could it
be said that, if the latter power was conferred, the senators and
representatives living in that county would be barred from par-
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ticipating in the choice of the commissioners? Evidently not. It
probably would be said that the power was conferred upon them
in that instance as members of the electorate in their capacity
as voters.
It does not seem that the provision of art. 30 of the Declara-
tion of Rights, to the effect that "the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive . . . powers," is contravened by the
proposed legislation. The only provision for such boards of special
commissioners is found in art. 71 of the Amendments to the Con-
stitution. No other govermnental agency except the General
Court has any power whatever to name or provide by law for the
naming of such boards of special commissioners. In no sense can
this power be construed as in the nature of executive power. The
adoption of the proposed bill concerns the executive power, if at
all, only in so far as the Governor has the power to veto. If it is
assumed that the General Court could provide by law for the
"appointment" of boards of special commissioners, if such was
the purport of this bill, a discussion of the power of appointment
and the delegation of that power would be relevant and pertinent,
but the proposed bill does not look in the direction of any appoint-
ment of such commissioners.
Once having concluded that members of boards of special
commissioners would be civil officers and that the position on
such a board to which a person is appointed would be an "office"
within the meaning of art. 65 of the Amendments to the Constitu-
tion, it does not follow necessarily that such a conclusion renders
it unnecessary to consider whether on any other ground members
of the General Court enacting the bill would be precluded from
membership on a board of special commissioners. Article 65 of
the Amendments provides that "No person elected to the general
court shall during the term for which he was elected be appointed
to any office created . . . during such term." This is far from
providing that such a person cannot be elected to such an office.
If the General Court should in its judgment and within its power
confer upon the voters of any one county the duty and power of
electing special commissioners, could it be said that senators
or representatives who were members of the General Court so
providing would not be eligible to election to such offices? Or, if
the General Court should provide for the election of a board of
county commissioners for the county of Suffolk where no such
board now exists, could it be said that members of the General
Court so providing would be ineligible to election as such county
commissioners? It does not seem that this can be so. In this
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connection art. 65 of the Amendments relates only to the question
of the appointment, and not to the election, of members of the
General Court. To what extent, if any, the provisions of Part II,
c. 6, art. 2, of the Constitution and art. 8 of the Amendments
would apply to such a case is not before us.
It would seem that there is no objection to a provision that
any vacancies occurring among members of boards chosen under
the proposed act shall be filled by appointment by the Governor.
The opinion of the majority of the Justices is adopted to the
effect that the proposed legislation is not the subject of a
referendum petition under art. 48 of the Amendments to the
Constitution.
In the opinion of the undersigned the answers to the questions
submitted are as follows:
The several answers to subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of question
1 are "Yes."
The answer to question 2 is "Yes."
The answer to question 3 is "Yes."
The answer to question 4 is "No."
Louis S. Cox.
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supreme judicial court.
Attorney General vs. Secretary of the Commonwealth.
(Reported in 306 Mass. 25.)
Suffolk, April 5, 1940 — May 10, 1940. Present, Field, C.J., Donahue,
Lummus, Qua and Ronan, JJ.
Constitutional Law, Determination of senatorial districts, General Court. Juris-
diction. Justiciable question. Mandamus. Practice, Civil, Parties, Striking
out of pleadings. Attorney General.
The question, whether the division of the Commonwealth into senatorial dis-
tricts by St. 1939, c. 507, § 2, amending G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 57, § 3, conformed to
constitutional requirements, was a matter for judicial determination and was
properly presented by an information by the Attorney General in the nature of a
petition for a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of the Commonwealth
to refrain from preparing ballots in conformity with the statute.
In determining whether the legislative division of the Commonwealth into sena-
torial districts, effected by the amendment of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 57, § 3, by St.
1939, c. 507, § 2, conformed to those provisions of art. 22 in the form adopted by
art. 71 of the Amendments to the Constitution which require that each district
must "contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of legal voters" and that dis-
tricts must be "formed, as nearly as may be. without uniting two counties, or parts
of two or more counties, into one district," this court could not consider the ex-
pediency of the enactment or whether a better division could have been made, but,
applying the rule that all rational presumptions were to be made in favor of the
validity of the legislation, determined only whether variations from equality in
number of legal voters among the districts and combinations of units of different
counties in districts were so clearly unreasonable as not to be within the power given
to the Legislature to exercise its judgment and discretion in making the division.
The division of the Commonwealth into senatorial districts effected by St. 1939.
c. 507, § 2, amending G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 57, § 3, did not transcend the power given
the Legislature by art. 22, in the form adopted by art. 71, of the Amendments to
the Constitution, and was valid.
A motion to strike averments raising a nonjusticiable issue from an information
by the Attorney General in the nature of a petition for a writ of mandamus was
correct practice.
Whether the General Court was actuated by partisan motives in making a divi-
sion of the Commonwealth into senatorial districts was a question not open in
proceedings to test the constitutionality of the division.
Information, filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county
of Suffolk on February 28, 1940.
The case was reserved by Ronan, J., for determination by the
full court.
P. A. Dever, Attorney General and E. 0. Proctor, Assistant
Attorney General, (E. McPartlin, Assistant Attorney General,
with them,) for the petitioner.
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C. B. Rugg, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the
respondent.
Field, C.J. This is an information, in the nature of a petition
for a writ of mandamus, by the Attorney General on behalf of the
Commonwealth. It was filed February 28, 1940. The respondent
is the Secretary of the Commonwealth, who is charged with the
duty of preparing ballots to use in the election of State officers.
G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 40. The Attorney General seeks a writ
of mandamus to restrain the Secretary from preparing ballots in
conformity with the provisions of St. 1939, c. 507, approved
August 12, 1939, entitled "An Act to establish councillor and
senatorial districts," on the ground that this statute is uncon-
stitutional because of violation of art. 21 and art. 22 of the Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth^ as substituted
by art. 71 of said Amendments for the former articles so numbered.
The case was heard by a single justice of this court on the
amended petition; the respondent's demurrer, motion to strike
and answer; the petitioner's traverse and an agreed statement of
facts. He found the facts to be as stated in the agreed statement
of facts and, at the request of the parties, reserved and reported
the case, without decision, upon the pleadings, the agreed state-
ment of facts and his findings for the consideration of the full
court. On a report in this form no exercise of discretion is involved.
The question for determination by the full court is whether the
writ ought to issue as matter of law. Lowry v. Commissioner of
Agriculture, 302 Mass. 111.
St. 1939, c. 507, in its first section, purports to substitute for
G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 57, § 2, a new section whereby the Common-
wealth is divided for the purpose of choosing councillors into
eight councillor districts, each of winch consists of several sena-
torial districts. No question is raised as to the propriety of tins
division into councillor districts except as it may be affected by
the validity of the division of the Commonwealth into senatorial
districts by the same statute. St. 1939, c. 507, in its second sec-
tion, purports to substitute for G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 57, § 3, a new
section whereby the Commonwealth is divided for the purpose
of choosing senators into forty senatorial districts, which are de-
scribed therein. The Attorney General contends that tins division
into senatorial districts does not conform to the constitutional
requirements.
Article 21 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Com-
monwealth in its present form (see art. 71) provides, in part,
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that "In the year nineteen hundred and thirty-five and every
tenth year thereafter a census of the inhabitants of each city
and town shall be taken and a special enumeration shall be made
of the legal voters therein. Said special enumeration shall also
specify the number of legal voters residing in each precinct of
each town containing twelve thousand or more inhabitants
according to said census and in each ward of each city." This
article provides also for the division of counties into representa-
tive districts and the apportionment of representatives among
such districts. Article 22 of said Amendments in its present
form (see art. 71) is as follows: "Each special enumeration of
legal voters required in the preceding article of amendment shall
likewise be the basis for determining the senatorial districts and
also the councillor districts for the ten year period beginning with
the first Wednesday in the fourth January following such enumera-
tion; provided, that such districts as established in the year
nineteen hundred and twenty-six shall continue in effect until
the first Wednesday in January in the year nineteen hundred
and thirty-nine. The senate shall consist of forty members.
The general court shall, at its first regular session after the return
of each special enumeration, divide the commonwealth into forty
districts of contiguous territory, each district to contain, as
nearly as may be, an equal number of legal voters, according to
said special enumeration; provided, however, that no town or
ward of a city shall be divided therefor; and such districts shall
be formed, as nearly as may be, without uniting two counties,
or parts of two or more counties, into one district. The general
court may by law limit the time within which judicial proceedings
may be instituted calling in question such division. Each district
shall elect one senator, who shall have been an inhabitant of this
commonwealth five years at least immediately preceding his
election, and at the time of his election shall be an inhabitant of
the district for which he is chosen; and he shall cease to represent
such senatorial district when he shall cease to be an inhabitant
of the commonwealth."
First. The question whether the division of the Common-
wealth into senatorial districts by St. 1939, c. 507, conforms to
the constitutional requirements — like questions of constitu-
tionality of other statutes — is a matter for judicial determination
when the question is properly raised between litigants. See
Horton v. Attorney General, 269 Mass. 503, 507; Prescott v. Secre-
tary of the Commonwealth, 299 Mass. 191, 196. Indeed, this is
recognized as true by the provision of art. 22 that the "general
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court may by law limit the time within which judicial proceedings
may be instituted calling in question such division." (No such
limitation, however, has been imposed by the General Court.)
There is nothing in the nature of the statute that precludes such
judicial review, though the scope of such review presents a further
question. See Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178; Giddings v. Blacker
s
93 Mich. 1; SherriU v. O'Brien, 188 X. Y. 185; State v. Cunning-
ham, 81 Wis. 440; State v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90. Compare
Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners,
224 Mass. 598, 601-603.
Second. It is apparent that the duties of the Secretary of the
Commonwealth with relation to the preparation of ballots for
use in the election of State officers are affected by St. 1939, c. 507,
if it is valid. The respondent rightly makes no contention that
mandamus is not a proper proceeding whereby to raise the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the statute to the end that if the
statute is determined to be unconstitutional the respondent
may be restrained from acting thereunder. Since the purpose
of the proceeding is to control the conduct of a public officer in
the performance of his official duties and no special statutory
remedy is afforded, it is not fatal to the maintenance of the pro-
ceeding that the relief sought is an order commanding the respond-
ent to refrain from acting under the statute, and not an order
commanding affirmative action by him. See Larcom v. Olin,
160 Mass. 102, 110-111; Graham v. Roberts, 200 Mass. 152;
Cunningham v. Mayor of Cambridge, 222 Mass. 574, 580; Bancroft
v. Building Commissioner of Boston, 257 Mass. 82; Brooks v.
Secretary of the Commonn-eaWi , 257 Mass. 91; Ilorton v. Attorney
General, 269 Mass. 503. Compare Department of Public Utilities
v. Trustees of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 304
Mass. 664, 672. And the respondent rightly makes no contention
that the Attorney General is not a proper party to institute the
proceeding. Compliance with the constitutional requirements
governing the division of the Commonwealth into senatorial dis-
tricts obviously is a matter of public concern. " Where the public
interests are involved, the Attorney General may institute a
petition for mandamus to vindicate the public right." Attorney
General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 224 Mass.
598, 610.
Third. In considering the validity of St. 1939, c. 507, this
court cannot "consider the expediency of its enactments or the
wisdom of its provisions." Howes Brothers Co. v. Unemployment
Compensation Commission, 296 Mass. 275, 283. The court can
240 MASSACHUSETTS ELECTION CASES — 1940.
consider only the question whether the statute violates constitu-
tional provisions. In considering this question the court is bound
by the fundamental principles, frequently stated, expressed in
Perkins v. Westwood, 226 Mass. 268, 271, in the following terms:
"All rational presumptions are made in favor of the validity of
every act of the legislative department of government, and the
court will not refuse to enforce it unless its conflict with the
Constitution is established beyond reasonable doubt, It will not
be declared void unless it is impossible by any reasonable con-
struction to interpret its provisions in harmony with the Con-
stitution. These were early declared by this court to be
fundamental principles of constitutional law, and they have been
followed consistently for more than a century." See also Wellinton,
petitioner, 16 Pick. 87, 95; Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass.
264, 298-299; Attorney General v. Brissenden, 271 Mass. 172,
177. Cases analogous to the present case that have involved the
validity of divisions of counties into representative districts and
the apportionment of representatives among these districts have
been held to be governed by the same principle, though under the
applicable constitutional provision the divisions and apportion-
ments were made by commissioners and not by the General Court,
Referring to such a division and apportionment it was said in
Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225
Mass. 55, 58, that the report of the commissioners "is entitled
to all the presumptions which ordinarily are made in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute." See also Brophy v. Suffolk County
Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 124, 128.
Fourth. The duty imposed upon the General Court by the Con-
stitution, so far as it related to senatorial districts, was to divide
the Commonwealth into forty such districts. The constitutional
basis for such division was the "special enumeration of legal
voters" made in 1935, according to which enumeration the total
number of legal voters within the Commonwealth was 1,847,364.
The constitutional limitations upon the division into senatorial
districts are four: (a) ". . . no town or ward of a city shall be
divided." (It is to be observed that there is no prohibition
against the division of a city. The indivisible unit in the case
of a city is a ward thereof.) (b) Each district must consist of
"contiguous territory," and (c) must "contain, as nearly as may
be, an equal number of legal voters," and (d) districts must be
"formed, as nearly as may be, without uniting two counties, or
parts of two or more counties, into one district."
ATTY. GEN. V. SECRETARY OF COMWLTH. SUP. JUD. CT., 1940. 241
1. The first two limitations above set forth are stated in abso-
lute terms without suggestion of possibility of variation there-
from in the slightest degree. From an examination of the maps
submitted with the agreed statement of facts it appears that these
requirements were complied with absolutely by St. 1939, c. 507.
There is no contention to the contrary.
2. The Attorney General contends, however, that the statute
under consideration fails to comply with both the other require-
ments and for that reason is unconstitutional. The language of
these requirements, by the inclusion therein, in each instance,
of the phrase "as nearly as may be," recognizes that there may
be some variation among the senatorial districts from exact
mathematical equality of numbers of legal voters, and that in
forming such districts there may be some combinations of units —
towns or wards of cities — located in different counties without
violation of the constitutional requirements. It is apparent from
the facts agreed upon that in the division made by the statute
there is a variation from exact equality in the numbers of legal
voters" within the several senatorial districts, and that there are
several senatorial districts in which units from different counties
are combined. In accordance with fundamental principles the
question for our decision is whether it is established beyond
reasonable doubt that such a variation and such combinations are
beyond the scope of legislative power so that the legislative enact-
ment must be struck down. See Attorney General v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Commissioners, 224 Mass. 598, 607; McGlue
v. County Commissioners, 225 Mass. 59, 64; Brophy v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 124, 128-129.
The division of the Commonwealth into forty senatorial dis-
tricts in conformity with the constitutional requirements is a
matter of much complexity, particularly as the requirements that
towns and wards of cities shall not be divided, and that each
senatorial district shall consist of contiguous territory are abso-
lute. Obviously in view of the large number of towns and wards
of cities within the Commonwealth various combinations of such
indivisible units into districts of contiguous territory are pos-
sible. Yet the location of the several units with relation to other
units and the large numbers of legal voters in some of the units
limit greatly the possibility of combinations of units conforming
to the requirements of the Constitution. (At the time of the
special enumeration of legal voters in 1935 there were 316 towns
and 286 wards of cities within the Commonwealth, making a total
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of 602 indivisible units. The number of legal voters within a
unit ranged from 13 to 22,856.) Subject to the limitations im-
posed by the Constitution, however, the selection of the towns and
wards to be combined in a senatorial district is a matter for the
judgment and discretion of the General Court and, furthermore,
the phrase "as nearly as may be," used in connection with the
requirement of equality of numbers of legal voters in the several
districts and also in connection with the prohibition against
uniting counties or parts thereof in one district, does not import
that the General Court must make the division which is literally
the nearest to such equality and to the avoidance of county com-
binations that any ingenious mind can devise. See Brophy v.
Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 124, 128.
See also People v. Thompson, 155 111. 451, 480-481; People v.
Carlock, 198 111. 150, 160-161; Opinions of the Justices, 18 Maine,
458; Carter v. Rice, 135 N. Y. 473, 500-501. Such an interpre-
tation of the Constitution would make the statutory division
merely a problem in arithmetic, the solving of which would be
largely ministerial in nature, with little room for exercise by the
General Court of its judgment and discretion, and would subject
any division made to the risk of being declared invalid if the Gen-
eral Court failed to reach the conclusion which is the nearest one
possible to arithmetical exactness. It is not to be assumed that
the people in adopting the governing constitutional provision in-
tended to impose upon the legislative department a duty so
largely ministerial in nature. On the contrary, it is a necessary
conclusion that a statutory division, whereby the combinations
of towns and wards in senatorial districts reasonably approximate
equality of numbers of legal voters and the avoidance of county
combinations, cannot be overthrown by this court merely be-
cause it is demonstrated, or the court is of opinion, that a some-
what better division in these respects could have been made.
And while undoubtedly such approximate equality within the
several senatorial districts is an essential element of a constitu-
tional division of the Commonwealth into such districts, the fact
that both the provision requiring equality of numbers and the
provision requiring avoidance of county combination districts are
modified by the same phrase, "as nearly as may be," leaves some
scope for the exercise by the General Court of its judgment and
discretion in determining the extent to which either of these re-
quirements shall yield to the other. The Constitution does not
direct that either of them yield to the other, but does prohibit
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any departure from either of them that is unreasonable in the
light of all the limitations imposed upon legislative action.
The General Court in dividing the Commonwealth into sena-
torial districts can be held to no stricter standard than are com-
missioners upon whom is imposed the duty of dividing the seven]
counties into representative districts and apportioning representa-
tives among such districts. By the provisions of art. 21 of the
Amendments to the Constitution prior to the amendment of this
article by art. 71 of the Amendments (see also article 21 as so
amended) certain commissioners were directed to divide counties
into representative districts "so as to apportion the representa-
tion assigned to each county equally, as nearly as may be, accord-
ing to the relative number of legal voters in the several districts
of each county." With reference to a report of such commissioners
this court said in Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Com-
missioners, 225 Mass. 124, 128-129: "The division and appor-
tionment of the present report are not ideal. Doubtless a closer
approximation to equality might have been made. But the Con-
stitution has placed the duty of making the division and appor-
tionment upon the commissioners and not upon the court. There
is room for some diversity of honest opinion in selecting among
the various possible methods the best one for forming the dis-
tricts. Sagacity is demanded in reaching a right determination.
The division and apportionment is not a mere example in arith-
metic. It involves the exercise of sound judgment and practical
wisdom. When the report disregards a reasonable application of
sound judgment, acting within the positive command for equality
of voting power contained in the amendment to the Constitution,
then it is a nullity. Every reasonable presumption must be made
in favor of the report of the commissioners. The function of the
court is not to review or revise the exercise of official judgment
within its legitimate limits, but only to declare void a division
and apportionment so vicious in its nature as to transcend the
constitutional power of the commissioners. Something must be
left to the commissioners, unless in substance the division and
apportionment are to be made at last by the court." See also
Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners,
224 Mass. 598, 604-605, 606-607; McGlue v. County Commis-
sioners of Essex, 225 Mass. 59, 63-64.
3. The Attorney General, in support of his contention that the
division of the Commonwealth into senatorial districts made by
St. 1939, c. 507, is unconstitutional, has submitted for the con-
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sideration of the court three slightly different plans for division
of the Commonwealth into such districts as suggestions of pos-
sible alternatives to the division made by the statute. The com-
binations of towns and wards made in each of the suggested
divisions differ materially from those made by the statutory di-
vision so that comparison is difficult. But the proposed districts
in each of the suggested divisions in general vary somewhat less
from equality in numbers of legal voters than do the districts
created by the statute, and each of the suggested divisions makes
fewer county combination districts than does the statutory di-
vision. However, for reasons previously stated, this fact, in itself,
is not fatal to the statutory division. See also Matter of Baird,
142 N. Y. 523, 528-529; Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N. Y. 185, 198.
It has weight only so far as it bears upon the question whether
the statutory division departs from equality of numbers and
creates county combination districts to an extent so unreason-
able as to be "vicious in its nature." See Brophy v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 124, 128.
4. In our opinion the statutory division cannot rightly be said
to be so unreasonable in its departure from equality of numbers
of legal voters and in its creation of county combination districts
as to be unconstitutional.
A. We consider the question first on the basis of a general
analysis of the statutory division. If the legal voters within the
Commonwealth, according to the special enumeration of such
voters, were equally divided among forty senatorial districts the
number of such voters in each district would be 46,184. The
number of such voters in each of the senatorial districts accord-
ing to the statutory division is set out in a footnote. 1 According
to this division the average variation of the forty senatorial dis-
tricts from this standard — either above or below it — is 3,043
legal voters, or a little over 6J% of the standard. There are
seventeen districts in which the variation from the standard ex-
1 1. Berkshire, 48,205 ; 2. First Bristol, 46,981; 3. Second Bristol. 45,497; 4. Third Bristol,
48,025; 5. Cape and Plymouth, 43,238 ; 6. First Essex, 49,047 ; 7. Second Essex, 43.419; 8. Third
Essex, 47.797; 9. Fourth Essex. 43,585; 10. Fifth Essex, 45,694; 11. Franklin and Hampshire,
47.0S1: 12. First Hampden. 45,981; 13. Second Hampden. 49.603; 14. Hampden. Hampshire and
Berkshire, 49.739; 15. First Middlesex, 48.034; 16. Second Middlesex. 51.664; 17. Third Middle-
sex, 45,026; 18. Fourth Middlesex. 51.716; 19. Fifth Middlesex. 44.265 ; 20. Sixth Middlesex. 51.904;
21. Seventh Middlesex. 42,165 ; 22. Middlesex and Norfolk. 44,172 ; 23. Middlesex and Suffolk,
51,453 ; 24. First Norfolk, 43.809 ; 25. Second Norfolk, 43.476 ; 26. Norfolk and Plymouth, 45,915;
27. Norfolk and Suffolk, 42,110; 28. Plymouth. 40,493 ; 29. First Suffolk. 38.281; 30. Second Suf-
folk. 51.703 ; 31. Third Suffolk. 43.795 ; 32. Fourth Suffolk. 49.678; 33. Fifth Suffolk. 51.263;
34. Sixth Suffolk, 51.988; 35. Seventh Suffolk, 45.862; 36. First Worcester, 43.885 ; 37. Second
Worcester. 42.803 ; 38. Third Worcester, 46,521; 39. Fourth Worcester, 40,633 ; 40. Worcester and
Hampden, 40.859.
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ceeds the average variation and seven other districts in which
the variation from the standard exceeds 5% of such standard.
The greatest variation from the standard in an oversize district
is in the Sixth Suffolk District which exceeds the standard by
5,804 legal voters, or 12.56% of the standard, and the greatest
variation from the standard in an undersize district is in the First
Suffolk District which falls below the standard by 7.903 legal
voters, or 17.11%. It is recognized by the Attorney General
that special difficulties arise in forming districts in the county of
Suffolk by reason particularly of the large size of the wards —
indivisible units — of the city of Boston. See Brophy v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 124, 126. In
the nine districts including parts of the county of Suffolk the
average variation from the standard is 4,428 legal voters, or 9.58%
of the standard. In the remaining thirty-one districts the aver-
age variation from the standard is 2,641 legal voters, or 5.71% of
the standard. There are twelve county combination districts, of
which one includes the whole or parts of four different counties;
three include the whole or parts of three different counties, and
eight include parts of two different counties.
It may fairly be assumed that divisions suggested by the Attor-
ney General are as favorable to his contention as any division
that can be devised. The variations from equality of numbers
of legal voters differ only slightly in the three plans. According
to the division most favorable to the contention of the Attorney
General the variations from the standard number of legal voters
in a district comparable to such variations in the statutory divi-
sion are as follows: average variation from this standard in the
forty districts, 1,494 legal voters, or 3.23% of the standard;
average variation from the standard in all districts — eight in
number— including any part of the county of Suffolk, 3,477 legal
voters, or 7.53% of the standard; average variation from the
standard in the thirty-two remaining districts, 998 legal voters,
or 2.16% of the standard. The greatest variation from the stand-
ard in an oversize district is in the Norfolk and Suffolk District,
which exceeds the standard by 6,206 legal voters, or 13.41% of
the standard; and the greatest variation from the standard in
an undersize district is in the First Suffolk District which falls
below the standard by 7,903 legal voters, or 17.11%. Though,
as above set forth, the average variation — however computed
— from the standard number of legal voters is somewhat greater
in the statutory division than in the divisions proposed by the
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Attorney General, the disparity in number of legal voters be-
tween the district having the largest number of such voters and
that having the smallest number is slightly greater in the divi-
sions proposed by the Attorney General than in the statutory
division. Furthermore, in two of the suggested plans for division
there are five combination county districts of which one includes
the whole or a part of four different counties; two include parts
of three different counties and two include parts of two different
counties. In the third suggested plan there are six county com-
bination districts, of which one includes the whole or a part of
four different counties; one includes parts of three different
counties, and four include parts of two different counties. The
county combination districts in each of these plans are, there-
fore, fewer in number than in the statutory division.
There have been no decisions of this court with respect to
statutory divisions into senatorial districts. The decisions have
related to the division of counties into representative districts
and the apportionment of representatives among them. In one
of those cases, Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commis-
sioners, 225 Mass. 124, the court refused to declare invalid a
division of a county into representative districts and the appor-
tionment of representatives thereto, though there were numerous
substantial variations in the number of legal voters from the
standard number for each representative. In seventeen of the
twenty-seven representative districts the variations from the
standard exceeded 9.20% of the standard, running as high in four
districts respectively as 24.24%, 25.50%, 26.64% and 31.43%.
And in McGlue v. County Commissioners, 225 Mass. 59, 64, a
variation of slightly over 5% in the number of legal voters to
whom a representative was allotted from the standard representa-
tive unit was described as " comparatively insignificant." On the
other hand, in Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commis-
sioners, 225 Mass. 55, an apportionment was declared invalid
where three representatives were allotted to a district having
fewer legal voters than a district to which two representatives
were allotted, and two representatives were allotted to a district
having fewer legal voters than a district to which only one repre-
sentative was allotted. In one instance a variation from the
standard number of legal voters exceeded 71% of such standard,
in another instance a variation exceeded 32% of such standard,
and in other instances variations from the standard were large.
In Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commission-
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ers, 224 Mass. 598, an apportionment was declared invalid where,
in one instance, the variation from the standard exceeded 89%
of such standard, and there were numerous other large varia-
tions from the standard, including one of 64% and one of 77%
therefrom. And in Merrill v. County Commissioners, 257 Mass.
184, 188, an apportionment was declared invalid where it ap-
peared that the variation from the standard in one instance ex-
ceeded 42% of such standard, and there were numerous other
large variations from the standard; and it was found as a fact
that it was possible "to divide and apportion Essex County so
that the numerical excess and shortage of the several districts
complained of
. . . would be materially lessened."
Of course no precise rule can be laid down as to the extent of
permissible variations from the standard number of legal voters
measured in percentages of such standard. The extent of such
permissible variations depends upon particular facts, especially
the size of the indivisible units that are to be combined into dis-
tricts of contiguous territory. It may well be that larger varia-
tions from the standard, measured in percentages of such stand-
ard, are permissible in representative districts than are permissible
in senatorial districts — by reason, in the case of representative
districts, of the smaller standard and the impossibility of uniting
counties or parts of counties, though the difficulty of attaining
equality resulting from these limitations is in some degree offset
by the possibility of allotting one, two or three representatives
to a single representative district. See Brophy v. Suffolk County
Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 124, 128. Yet the deci-
sions in the cases above referred to dealing with representative
districts show, at least, that under the constitutional provision
relating to senatorial districts — which is similar in language to
that relating to representative districts governing these cases —
somewhat substantial variations from the standard number of
legal voters in a senatorial district are not necessarily fatal to a
statutory division of the Commonwealth into senatorial districts.
And the conclusion follows, though more remotely, that a statu-
tory division is not necessarily invalid because it unites parts of
different counties in one district to an extent not unreasonable
though not absolutely unavoidable. Moreover, the average vari-
ation from the standard number of legal voters in the statutory
division is much smaller than many of the variations from the
standard in Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commission-
ers, 225 Mass. 124, where the apportionment of representatives
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was upheld. And even the extreme variations in the statutory
division measured in percentages are considerably less than the
extreme variations from the standard in that case.
In the light of the decided cases, therefore, the general analy-
sis of the statutory division fails to demonstrate that the General
Court, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion in dividing
the Commonwealth into senatorial districts, acted unreasonably
in uniting counties or parts of counties in one district or departed
to an unreasonable extent from equality of numbers of legal voters
among the districts. The cases from other jurisdictions that have
been brought to our attention are in accord with the general prin-
ciples above stated, but furnish little assistance in the application
of those principles. They are not in conflict with the conclusion
here reached. Consequently, if the statutory division is to be de-
clared invalid it must be so declared by reason of particular in-
stances in which the requirements of the Constitution are not
observed.
B. We proceed, therefore, to consider the specific districts with
reference to the variations therein from the standard number of
legal voters and to the combinations in districts of the whole or
parts of different counties. Such particular instances, however,
must be considered as parts of a unitary plan for division of the
Commonwealth into senatorial districts, with recognition of the
fact that correction of an apparent fault in one district may
require a substantial change of one or more other districts, or even
rearrangement of a substantial part of the entire plan of division.
(1) Berkshire, Franklin, Hampshire and Hampden Counties. —
Clearly some county combination districts are required in this
area, since the number of legal voters in the county of Berkshire
considerably exceeds the standard for one senatorial district, but
falls considerably below twice the standard, and the number of
legal voters in each of the counties of Franklin and Hampshire
falls considerably below that standard. Furthermore, the aggre-
gate number of legal voters in these three counties is considerably
less than three times the standard so that combination with part
of the county of Hampden, of the county of Worcester, or of both
counties, is required. The statutory division providing for one
district wholly in the county of Berkshire, two districts wholly in
the county of Hampden, a district composed of parts of each of
the counties of Berkshire, Hampshire and Hampden, a district
composed of the whole of the county of Franklin, part of the
county of Hampshire and one town (Ludlow) in the county of
Hampden, and a district composed of part of the county of
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Hampden and part of the county of Worcester cannot rightly be
said to be unreasonable. Criticism is made of the inclusion of the
Hampden County town of Ludlow in the Franklin and Hampshire
District. The location of this town, however, is such that, apart
from the existence of the county line, it might naturally be in-
cluded in this district. Moreover, inclusion therein does not in-
crease the number of county combination districts, but treats the
town in a manner somewhat similar to the treatment accorded to
other towns in the county of Hampden, which are combined with
parts of the county of Hampshire and of the county of Berkshire,
and brings the Hampshire and Franklin District somewhat nearer
to the standard number of legal voters. And the natural alter-
native to this treatment of the town would be to include it in
another county combination district — the Worcester and Hamp-
den District. (This district is considered later in connection with
the Worcester County districts.) In three of the other five dis-
tricts referred to there is closer approximation to the standard
number of legal voters, and in two of them that standard is ex-
ceeded respectively by 7.409c and 7.69% of such standard. In
view of the locations of the several units — towns and wards —
with relation to each other these variations do not appear to be
unreasonable.
(2) Worcester County. — This area presents no question with
relation to county combination districts — apart from the com-
bination of the Worcester County town of Blackstone with parts
of Middlesex and Norfolk counties — unless, indeed, a further
combination of units in one or more other counties with Worcester
County units should have been made by reason of the number of
legal voters in the county of Worcester. This county has a
sufficient number of legal voters to form four standard districts
with an excess of nearly half enough voters to form another dis-
trict of the standard number of such voters. The statutory divi-
sion, as is natural, combines a part of the county of Hampden
with a part of the county of Worcester to form a fifth district —
the Worcester and Hampden District. This district falls short of
the standard by 11.52% of such standard and three wholly
Worcester County districts are deficient in number of legal voters
respectively by 4.97%, 7.32%: and 12.01 r; of the standard. Two
of these four variations are extreme and perhaps could have been
corrected to some extent by rearrangement of units within the
county of Worcester, but a substantial correction would have re-
quired considerable modification of the statutory division, includ-
ing combination of more units from another county or counties
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with units from the county of Worcester. We cannot quite say
that the failure to make such modification and combination is so
unreasonable as to vitiate the statutory division. The inclusion
of the town of Blackstone in the Worcester County District near-
est it would have somewhat reduced the variation of that district
from the standard number of legal voters, and the failure to do so
is not easy to justify, though the inclusion of that town in a county
combination district — the Middlesex and Norfolk District —
brings that district nearer to the standard and does not increase
the number of county combination districts.
(3) Bristol County. — This area presents no serious problem of
variation from standard number of legal voters in a senatorial
district, and no problem of county combination districts except
by reason of the inclusion in one of the districts of the Norfolk
County town of Plainville with 769 legal voters. This would be a
natural inclusion, so far as location is concerned, apart from the
existence of the county line, but does nothing toward securing
closer approximation to equality of numbers of voters among
the districts.
(4) Essex County. — This area presents no serious problem
as to variation from standard number of legal voters, though
some variations are greater than any in the Bristol County area.
But the greater variations seem to have some justification. This
area presents no problem of county combination districts except
in the instance of the inclusion of the Middlesex County town of
North Reading in the Fourth Essex District creating an addi-
tional county combination district. This inclusion, by reason
of the location of the town, would be natural, apart from the
existence of the county line, and materially reduces the variation
from standard of the Essex County District in which the town
is included, though at the expense of increasing the variation
from standard of the nearest Middlesex County District and the
average variation from standard of the two districts affected.
(5) Middlesex, Suffolk and Norfolk Counties. — A principal
ground of attack upon the statutory division is the treatment
of the county of Middlesex, particularly with reference to the
fact that wards of the city of Cambridge are included in five
different senatorial districts. The larger part of this city, however,
is included in one such district. Doubtless the General Court
in the exercise of its judgment and discretion may give weight
to the desirability of treating a city as an entity, but it is not
required to do so by the Constitution, which makes the ward, and
not the city, the indivisible unit.
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The county of Middlesex has almost exactly enough legal voters
to form nine senatorial districts. The statutory division creates
seven wholly Middlesex districts and distributes the remainder
of the county among five county combination districts. Three
of the wholly Middlesex districts are substantially oversize, being
respectively 11.86%, 11.97% and 12.38% of the standard of
variation of legal voters above such standard, and one is sub-
stantially undersize, being 8.70% below that standard. Some
reason for such variation is to be found in the very large number
of legal voters in several towns constituting indivisible units,
as well as in the rather large number of legal voters in some
wards of cities. The Attorney General's proposed plans show that
these grounds did not absolutely require such extreme varia-
tions. Avoidance thereof, however, would necessitate consider-
able rearrangement of towns and wards of cities.
The five county combination districts in which parts of the
county of Middlesex are included are the Fourth Essex District,
already mentioned, the districts in which combinations are made
with parts of the county of Suffolk — the Middlesex and Suffolk
District, the Second Suffolk District and the Third Suffolk Dis-
trict— and a district in which combination is made with parts
of the county of Norfolk and of the county of Worcester — the
Middlesex and Norfolk District.
The combinations of parts of the county of Middlesex with
parts of the county of Suffolk require consideration of the division
of the latter county. It is conceded that the First Suffolk Dis-
trict, consisting of the town of Winthrop and the cities of ( !helsea
and Revere, though falling 17.11% below the standard number
of legal voters, is properly constituted. The numbers of legal
voters in the several wards of the city of Boston constituting
the remainder of the county — ranging from 10,787 to 19,254 —
render particularly difficult the formation of districts approxi-
mating the standard of legal voters. No suggestion is made of
correction of the Seventh Suffolk District, which is .69?? below
the standard, nor of the Fourth Suffolk and Sixth Suffolk districts,
though they are respectively 7.56% and 12.56% in excess of the
standard. There remain for combination into districts twelve
wards having an aggregate number of legal voters aearly three
and three fourths times the standard number of legal voters for
a district, so that combination with a part of some other county
would be required to create a fourth district. Such combination
either with part of the county of Middlesex or with the town of
Brookline in the county of Norfolk would be permissible, and
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that town, wholly separated from other parts of the county of
Norfolk, could be combined either with part of the county of
Suffolk or with part of the county of Middlesex. By the statutory
division, combinations are made with the town of Brookline in
one district — the Norfolk and Suffolk District — and with parts
of the county of Middlesex in three different districts— the
Middlesex and Suffolk District, the Second Suffolk District and
the Third Suffolk District — so that four county combination
districts result. The Middlesex and Suffolk District is pre-
dominantly a Middlesex County district, including one ward
of the city of Cambridge, the entire city of Newton, and a large
ward of the city of Boston. The Second Suffolk and Third Suffolk
districts are predominantly Suffolk districts, each including
three large wards of the city of Boston and one comparatively
small ward of the city of Cambridge. The combination in each
instance, so far as location of the units is concerned, is natural
except for the existence of the county line. Two of the districts
including parts of the county of Middlesex are considerably
oversize, and the district including the town of Brookline is
undersize.
The alternative division proposed by the Attorney General
would substitute for the four combination districts in which parts
of the county of Suffolk are included three districts wholly withiD
that county, no one of them varying greatly from the standard
number of legal voters, and a county combination district — the
Norfolk and Suffolk District— having a number of legal voters
13.20% in excess of the standard number— a somewhat larger
excess than in any district formed by the statutory division—
and would leave the parts of the county of Middlesex placed
by the statutory division in county combination districts for re-
arrangement in Middlesex County districts. While the alterna-
tive division possesses obvious advantages it has, at least, one
obvious disadvantage; and, in our opinion, the choice of the stat-
utory division as against the proposed or any other alternative
division was not so clearly unreasonable as to fall outside the
scope of exercise by the General Court of its judgment and
discretion.
The fifth county combination district in which parts of the
county of Middlesex are included is the Middlesex and Norfolk
District. In this district the county of Middlesex is predominant,
having nearly three fourths of the legal voters of the district. It
is somewhat, but not seriously, deficient in number of legal voters.
The occasion for such a county combination district will be con-
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sidered in connection with the area comprising Norfolk, Plymouth,
Barnstable, Dukes and Nantucket counties.
(6) Norfolk, Plymouth, Barnstable, Dukes and Xanturket Coun-
ties. — The counties of Barnstable, Dukes and Nantucket together
lack a sufficient number of legal voters to constitute a senatorial
district. Consequently a county combination district including
part of the adjoining county of Plymouth was required. The
statutory division forms such a district — the Cape and Plymouth
District. This district is slightly, but not seriously, undersize,
being 6.37% below the standard number of legal voters. There
remain in the count}7 of Plymouth too many legal voters for one
district, but not enough for two districts, so that combination
with a part of some other county was required. The statutory
division forms (apart from the Norfolk and Suffolk District al-
ready considered) one wholly Plymouth district, a county combi-
nation district including part of the county of Norfolk and part of
the county of Plymouth, and two wholly Norfolk districts, with
part of the county of Norfolk remaining to be combined with
part of the county of Middlesex. Each of these four districts is
somewhat deficient in number of legal voters — the Plymouth
District having the greatest deficiency, 12.32% of the standard,
of any district other than the First Suffolk District. Apparently
a rearrangement of these four districts could have been made
that would have brought each of them nearer to the standard
number of legal voters and rendered unnecessary a combination
of any part of the county of Norfolk with a part of the county of
Middlesex, so that another wholly Middlesex District could have
been formed. The part of the Middlesex and Norfolk District
left to be included in such a wholly Middlesex County district,
however, would be insufficient to form a district, and combination
with other Middlesex units would be required. The method by
which this could be done without a considerable rearrangement
of the districts in the county of Middlesex is not obvious since the
nearest of these districts is itself deficient in numbers. (The di-
vision proposed by the Attorney General involves such a consider-
able rearrangement.) The treatment of this area by the statute,
though fairly open to criticism, is not so clearly unreasonable as
to invalidate the statutory division.
C. From a general analysis of the statutory division and an
examination of specific districts created thereby we conclude —
somewhat paraphrasing the opinion in Brophy v. Suffolk County
Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 124, 128 — that the
statutory division is not "ideal," and that doubtless a closer ap-
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proximation to equality of number of legal voters among the dis-
tricts and avoidance of county combination districts could have
been made. No very convincing grounds appear for including in
a senatorial district a single town in one county with parts of an
other county, or of other counties, as is done in several instances.
And apparently it would have been possible to avoid the forma-
tion of some of the other county combination districts with-
out creating unnecessary variations from the standard number of
legal voters in any district. But in general such avoidance would
have required substantial rearrangements of districts. Apparently,
also, by such rearrangements many of the larger variations from
the standard number of legal voters in a district could have been
avoided. Nevertheless, recognizing, as we must, that the duty
of dividing the Commonweath into senatorial distrcts is imposed
by the Constitution upon the General Court, to be exercised in
accordance with its judgment and discretion, and that every rea-
sonable presumption of validity attaches to a statutory division
made in performance of this duty, we cannot rightly say that the
division made by St. 1939, c. 507, is so unreasonable in its appli-
cation to any specific district or districts, considered as a part of
the unitary plan of division of the Commonwealth, that this
statutory division transcends the constitutional power of the
General Court and should be declared void.
Fifth. The respondent has argued that the information should
be dismissed on the ground of laches of the Attorney General
because of his failure to file his information with due diligence —
since the act was approved by the Governor on August 12, 1939,
and the information was filed on February 28, 1940— resulting
in interference, by reason of the pendency of the proceeding, with
the orderly conduct of elections affected by the statute. In view
of the conclusion reached on another ground this defence need
not be considered.
Sixth. The respondent filed a motion to strike from the in-
formation certain allegations in considerable detail to the effect
that in making the statutory division the General Court was ac-
tuated by partisan motives. The report of the single justice is
to be interpreted as reporting the question of law whether this
motion should be allowed. A motion to strike was correct prac-
tice. See Lane v. J. W. Lavery & Son, Inc. 294 Mass. 288, 295,
and cases cited. And the motion was well founded. Not only
could no evidence be received of facts tending to show that the
General Court was actuated by such motives (Donovan v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55, 58), but the
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question whether the General Court was so actuated is not a
proper subject for judicial inquiry. Merrill v. County Commis-
sioners, 257 Mass. 184, 187. See also Arizona v. California, 283
U. S. 423, 455. People v. Thompson, 155 111. 451, 469. People v.
Carlock, 198 111. 150, 157. Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N. Y. 185. The
motion, therefore, is to be allowed.
It follows from what has been said that an order is to be entered
allowing the respondent's motion to strike, and that the informa-
tion is to be dismissed.
So ordered.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Peter J. Graham v. Special Commissioners of Suffolk
County and Another.
Chester A. Dolan v. Same.
William E. Mooney v. Same.
Susan K. Donovan and Another v. Same.
George F. McMahon v. Same.
David M. Owens v. Same.
Thomas F. McCready v. Same.
Alfred J. Moore v. Same.
(Reported in 306 Mass. 237.)
Suffolk, May 10, 1940— June 8, 1940. Present, Field, C.J., Lummus, Dolan,
Cox and Ronan, JJ.
Constitutional Law, Apportionment of representation. General Court. Suffolk
County Apportionment Commissioners. Mandamus.
Statement by Field, C.J., of the scope of the power of the court to review a divi-
sion of a county into representative districts and assignment of the number of
representatives thereto under art. 21 of the Amendments to the Constitution in
the form appearing in art. 71.
A petition for a writ of mandamus to strike down an apportionment of repre-
sentative districts and assignment of the number of representatives thereto by
commissioners under art. 21 of the Amendments to the Constitution in the form
appearing in art. 71 cannot be maintained unless there is invalidity in the respond-
ents' action respecting the district in which the petitioner is a legal voter.
The division of Suffolk County into representative districts and the assignment
of the number of representatives thereto by commissioners appointed under St.
1939, c. 467, § 2, disclosed no unreasonable discrimination as to districts 1, 8, 9,
10, or 11.
Eight petitions for writs of mandamus, filed in the Supremo
Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on sundry dates between
December 28, 1939, and January 19, 1940.
The cases were reserved and reported by Donahue, -J.
R. J. Muldoon, for the petitioners.
A. Marshall, for the respondent commissioners.
No argument nor brief for the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
Field, C.J. These are eight petitions for writs of mandamus
brought against the board of special commissioners appointed
under the provisions of St. 1939, c. 467, § 2, to divide Suffolk
County into representative districts, and to assign representa-
tives thereto. In each case the respondent commissioners filed
an answer and the petitioner filed a replication thereto. The
Secretary of the Commonwealth is referred to in each of the peti-
tions as a respondent. And he has answered admitting the facts
alleged in the petitions, alleging that his duty in the premises is
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purely administrative, and submitting himself to th<> jurisdiction
of the court.
An agreed statement of facts was filed to which the Secretary
assented. From that statement it appears that the respondent
commissioners have acted to divide the county into representa-
tive districts and to assign representatives thereto, and, under
date of December 20, 1939, filed a report of their action with the
Secretary and with the registrar of voters, or other body having
similar powers or duties, in each city or town in said county.
The petitioner in each case is a legal voter in a ward of the city
of Boston in said county. Three of these petitioners are legal voters
in ward ten, two of them are legal voters in ward eleven, and one
each is a legal voter in wards one, eight and nine respectively.
Each petition is based on the ground that the division of the county
into representative districts and assignment of representatives
thereto made by the respondent commissioners is invalid under the
Constitution of the Commonwealth. The prayer of each petition
is for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent commis-
sioners to make a new division and assignment, and commanding
the Secretary to refrain from taking any action toward putting into
effect the representative districts as set forth in said report.
The cases came on to be heard before a single justice of this
court. He ordered them consolidated for the purpose of being
heard together, found the facts to be as stated in the agreed
statement of facts and reported the cases for the consideration
of the full court upon the pleadings and the agreed statement
of facts. On a report in this form no exercise of discretion is
involved. The question for determination by the full court is
whether the writs ought to issue as matter of law. Lowry v. Com-
missioner of Agriculture, 302 Mass. Ill, 112. Attorney General
v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, ante, 25, 27. 1
Article 21 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Com-
monwealth in its present form (see art. 71) provides in part: "In
the year nineteen hundred and thirty-five and every tenth year
thereafter a census of the inhabitants of each city and town shall
be taken and a special enumeration shall be made of the legal
voters therein. . . . The house of representatives shall consist of
two hundred and forty members, which shall be apportioned by
the general court, at its first regular session after the return of
each special enumeration, to the several counties of the common-
wealth, equally, as nearly as may be, according to their relative
numbers of legal voters, as ascertained by said special enumera-
1 Editor's Xote. — Bm 306 Mam.
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tion.
. . .
The county commissioners or other body acting as
such or, in lieu thereof, such board of special commissioners in
each county as may for that purpose be provided by law, shall
. . . assemble at a shire town of their respective counties, and
proceed, as soon as may be, to divide the same into representative
districts of contiguous territory and assign representatives thereto,
so that each representative in such county will represent an equal
number of legal voters, as nearly as may be; and such districts
shall be so formed that no town containing less than twelve thou-
sand inhabitants according to said census, no precinct of any
other town and no ward of a city shall be divided therefor, nor
shall any district be made which shall be entitled to elect more
than three representatives."
By St. 1939, c. 467, § 1, substituting a new section for G. L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 57, § 4, the number of representatives apportioned
to Suffolk County was forty-six. Suffolk County consists of the
city of Boston divided into twenty-two wards, the city of Chelsea
divided into five wards, the city of Revere and the town of Win-
throp. It appears from the agreed statement of facts that the
number of legal voters in Suffolk County at the time of the special
enumeration of legal voters in the year 1935 was 358,083, and that
the county was divided by the commissioners into twenty-six rep-
resentative districts. The number of legal voters for each repre-
sentative if apportioned with exact equality would be 7,784. The
manner in which such districts are constituted, according to the
report of the commissioners, the number of legal voters in each
of these districts and the number of representatives assigned to
each district by the commissioners are set out in a footnote. 1
1 The districts numbered from one to twenty-two, inclusive, are located in the city of Boston:
Dis-
trict. Ward. Voters.
Repre-
sentatives.
Dis-
trict. Ward. Voters.
Repre-
sentatives.
1 1 18,857 2 12 12 15,127 2
2 2 13,300 2 13 13 12,532 2
3 3 15,478 2
!
14 14 18,180 2
4 4 12,375 2 15 15 12,495 2
5 5 12,213 2 16 16 17.210
6 6 13.391 2 17 17 16.157 2
7 7 12.968 2 18 18 18,681 2
8 8 10,787 1 19 19 14,890 2
9 9 11,660 1 20 20 19,254 3
10 10 12,427 1 21 21 15.166 2
11 11 12.286 1 22 22 14.368 2
District No. 23 consists of wards 1, 2 and 3 of Chelsea, with a population of 8,389 and 1 repre-
sentative; district No. 24 consists of wards 4 and 5 of Chelsea, with a population of 6,283 and 1
representative; district No. 25 consists of the city of Revere, with a population of 15,028 and
2 representatives; district No. 26 consists of the town of Winthrop, with a population of 8,581
and 1 representative.
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A petition for a writ of mandamus against the commissioners
is a proper method of attacking the validity of the division of the
county into representative districts and the assignment of repre-
sentatives thereto. Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment
Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55. McGlue v. County Commissioners,
225 Mass. 59. Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commis-
sioners, 225 Mass. 124. Merrill v. County Commissioners, 257
Mass. 184. See also Attorney General v. Suffolk County Appor-
tionment Commissioners, 224 Mass. 598, 610-611. No question is
raised as to the propriety of treating the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth as a party respondent. Compare Faulkner v. Lowell
Trust Co., 285 Mass. 375, 377; Attorney General v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, ante, 25, 30. 1 A legal voter in a representative dis-
trict is a proper party to bring such a petition if he is aggrieved
by the division and assignment, but he can be aggrieved only by
reason of the effect of the division and assignment upon the rep-
resentative district in which he is a voter and then only if in that
district the ratio between voters and representatives is higher
than the right ratio. McGlue v. County Commissioners, 225 Mass.
59, 61-62. The respondents make no contention that the peti-
tioners are not proper parties to bring the several petitions. But
no one of the petitions can be maintained unless there is invalidity
in the action of the commissioners respecting the representative
district in which the petitioner is a legal voter.
The inquiry in these cases, therefore, is limited to the first,
eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh districts, except as, in deter-
mining whether there is discrimination against any of these
districts, other districts are to be considered.
The constitutional provision under which the present con-
troversy arises is the requirement that the commissioners shall
proceed "to divide the . . . (county) into representative dis-
tricts of contiguous territory and assign representatives thereto,
so that each representative in such county will represent an
equal number of legal voters, as nearly as may be." The require-
ment that each district shall consist of "contiguous territory"
was complied with. And there was no violation of the provisions
that "no town containing less than twelve thousand inhabit-
ants * . . (according to the special enumeration) and no ward
of a city shall be divided therefor, nor shall any district be made
which shall be entitled to elect more than three representatives."
The sole contention of the petitioners is that the commissioners
failed to comply with the requirement of equality of representation.
' Editor's Note. — Seo 30G Mass.
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In assigning the forty-six representatives apportioned to Suf-
folk County to the twenty-six districts, three representatives
were assigned to one district, two representatives to each of
eighteen districts, including the first district, and one representa-
tive to each of the seven remaining districts, including the eighth,
ninth, tenth and eleventh districts. No two wards of the city of
Boston were combined in a single district. In each of the five
districts in controversy the number of voters for each representa-
tive exceeds the unit of representation for the county of 7,784
voters: in the first district by 21% of the representative unit,
in the eighth district by 39% of such unit, in the ninth district
by 49% of such unit, in the tenth district by 59% of such unit,
and in the eleventh district by 57% of such unit. In no other
district does the number of legal voters exceed the representative
unit by more than 20% thereof or fall below it by more than 21%
thereof. In six districts the divergence from such unit is less
than 5% and in two others less than 10%. The average divergence
in the districts, other than those in controversy, from the repre-
sentative unit is 11.88% of such unit. The average divergence
in all districts in the county is 18.25%.
The limitations upon the power of the court to review a division
of the county into representative districts and assignment of repre-
sentatives thereto have been stated in earlier cases and need not
be restated in detail. See, especially, Attorney General v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Commissioners, 224 Mass. 598, 607-608;
Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass.
124, 126, 128-129. See also Attorney General v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, ante, 25, 31-32, 34. 1 It is the function of the com-
missioners, and not of the court, to make the division and assign-
ment. And the constitutional requirement of equality of repre-
sentation "as nearly as may be" imports that the problem to be
solved by the commissioners is not purely mathematical, but
rather that it involves the exercise of their judgment and dis-
cretion. The court cannot substitute its judgment and dis-
cretion for that of the commissioners. It cannot strike down a
division and assignment made by them merely because it is not
literally the nearest approximation to equality of representa-
tion among the districts that an ingenious mind can devise.
Every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the action
of the commissioners. The division and assignment cannot be
struck down on the ground of inequality of representation unless
the "inequalities . . . are . . . so great and the means for avoid-
• Editor's Note. — See 306 Mass.
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ing them ... so clear as to leave fair-minded men in no reasonable
doubt that there is a grave and unnecessary inequality between
the different districts," and that the " division
. . . (and assign-
ment is) so vicious in its nature as to transcend the constitutional
power of the commissioners." Brophy v. Suffolk County Appor-
tionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 124, 128-129.
The petitioners, in support of their contentions, have submitted
for consideration of the court a plan of division of the county
into representative districts and the assignment of representatives
thereto that avoids some of the inequalities in the division and
assignment made by the commissioners. For reasons already
stated, the possibility of such a division and assignment is not in
itself fatal to the division and assignment actually made. The
suggested plan has weight only so far as it tends to show
that the division and assignment actually made is unreasonable.
See Attorney General v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, ante,
25, 35. 1
In the light of these governing principles, and of the facts pre-
viously stated, we proceed to a consideration of the districts in-
volved in the petitions.
It may fairly be assumed that the plan of division and assign-
ment proposed by the petitioners is as favorable to their conten-
tions as any that can be devised. No suggestion is made therein
that any change with relation to the districts in Chelsea, Revere
and Winthrop would tend to avoid discrimination against the dis-
tricts in controversy, and we do not discuss these districts outside
the city of Boston. The wards of the city of Boston — which are
indivisible units under the Constitution — are large, ranging from
ward eight, with 10,787 legal voters, to ward twenty, with 19,254
legal voters: in each instance, therefore, considerably exceeding in
size the unit of representation. This fact, even though under the
constitutional provision one, two or three representatives may be
assigned to a representative district, presents an inherent difficulty
in attaining a close approximation to equality among the dis-
tricts and may justify greater divergence from the unit of repre-
sentation than would be permissible in other circumstances.
Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass.
124, 126. See also Attorney General v. Secretary of the Common-
wealth, ante, 25, 36. 1
In the first district — which is involved in one of the petitions —
the number of legal voters for each representative, according to
the division and assignment made by the commissioners, exceeds
' Editor's Note. — See 306 Mass.
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the unit of representation for the county by 21% of that unit.
This divergence is smaller, measured in percentages, than the
divergences in several of the districts under a previous apportion-
ment of Suffolk County that was held valid in Brophy v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 124. See Attor-
ney General v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, ante, 25, 38. 1 The
petitioners suggest no method by which this divergence could have
been avoided. No such method is apparent. Without further
discussion we conclude that no unreasonable and unavoidable
discrimination against the petitioner living in the first district is
shown, and that his petition cannot be maintained.
The other districts — the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh —
involved in one or more of the petitions present more serious
questions. The divergence from the unit of representation in each
of these districts in excess of such unit is large, being, as already
stated, respectively, 39% of that unit in the eighth district, 49%
thereof in the ninth district, 59% thereof in the tenth district and
57% thereof in the eleventh district. The largest divergence from
the unit of representation below such unit is in the fifth district
where such divergence is 21% of the representative unit. And
in some other districts the divergences below the representative
unit are nearly as great. As a result of these divergencies, the
voting power of a legal voter in the eighth district is slightly under
57%, that of a voter in the ninth district slightly over 52%, that
of a legal voter in the tenth district slightly over 49%, and that
of a legal voter in the eleventh district slightly under 50% of the
voting power of a legal voter in the fifth district. There are other
substantial, though somewhat lesser, inequalities unfavorable to
the legal voters in the districts in question between the voting
power of such legal voters and that of legal voters in several dis-
tricts other than the fifth district. The question for decision is
whether, by reason of these divergences and inequalities, the divi-
sion of the county into representative districts and assignment
thereto of representatives made by the commissioners so un-
reasonably discriminates against any of the petitioners that the
division and assignment must be declared invalid.
The cases relating to previous apportionments of Suffolk County
naturally deal with situations closely similar to that here pre-
sented, and comparison of these cases with the present case is
instructive. In Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportionment Com-
missioners, 225 Mass. 124, where the apportionment was held
1 Editor's Note. — See 306 Mass.
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valid, the greatest divergence in any district in excess of the
representative unit was 31.43^ of the unit, and the greatest
divergence in any district below the unit was 25.50^ thereof.
The voting power of a legal voter in the former district was slight ly
over 59°; of the voting power of a legal voter in the latter district.
And there were other substantial inequalities in voting power
among the districts. On the other hand, in Donovan v. Suffolk
County Apportionment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 55, where the
apportionment was held invalid, the greatest divergence in any
district in excess of the representative unit was 71.7^. and the
greatest divergence in any district below the unit was 25*50%
thereof. The voting power of a legal voter in the former district
was slightly over 43^ of the voting power of a legal voter in the
latter district. And there were other substantial inequalities
in voting power among these districts. In Attorney General
v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners, 224 Mass. 598.
where the apportionment was held invalid, the divergences and
inequalities were much greater than in the Donovan case. In
Merrill v. County Commissioners. 257 Mass. 1S4. where an ap-
portionment of Essex County was held invalid, the voting power
of a legal voter in the district having the greatest divergence
in excess of the representative unit was slightly over 50°^ of the
voting power of a legal voter in the district having the greatest
divergence below such unit, and there were other substantial
inequalities in voting power among the districts. It was found,
however, that it "Is possible to divide and apportion Essex County
so that the numerical excess and shortage of the several districts
complained of . . . would be materially lessened."
It is apparent from the above analysis that the present case
falls between the Brophy case, where the apportionment was
held valid, and the Donovan case, where the apportionment was
held invalid. Doubtless such large divergences from the repre-
sentative unit as exist in the districts involved in the petitions and
such inequalities in voting power between the legal voters in these
districts respectively and those in other districts cannot be justified
if there was any reasonable method of avoiding them.
The only method suggested by the petitioners of avoiding these
divergences and inequalities to any substantial extent is the com-
bination, in several instances, of two wards of the city of Boston
in a single district. And no other possible method of such avoid-
ance is apparent. Apart from the districts composed of parts of
the county outside the city of Boston and apart from the twen-
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tieth district, consisting of ward twenty of that city, to which
three representatives were assigned — districts as to which no con-
tention is made — there are twenty-one districts, each composed
of a single ward of the city of Boston, to which thirty-eight repre-
sentatives were to be assigned. Necessarily at least four of these
districts would have only one representative each. The four
districts to each of which only one representative was assigned
by the commissioners are the districts involved in these petitions.
The petitioners suggest that two of these districts, consisting of
wards eight and nine respectively, should have been combined
in one district and three representatives should have been assigned
thereto, and that in like manner two of these districts, consisting
of wards ten and eleven respectively, should have been combined
in one district and ' three representatives should have been as-
signed thereto. In order, however, to gain the two additional
representatives required to carry out this arrangement the peti-
tioners suggest two other double districts, one of them a combina-
tion of two districts consisting of wards four and five respectively,
and the other a combination of two districts consisting of wards
thirteen and fifteen respectively, and the assignment to each of
the double districts so created of three representatives instead
of two representatives each to the four districts as now constituted.
In no one of the four proposed double districts would there be a
divergence from the representative unit of more than 7.5% of
such unit, and in no one of them would a legal voter have less
than 76.9% of the voting power of any other legal voter in the
city of Boston. Obviously the creation of four double districts,
as suggested by the petitioners, would have avoided in a sub-
stantial degree the discrimination against the legal voters in the
districts involved in these petitions.
It was said, however, in Brophy v. Suffolk County Apportion-
ment Commissioners, 225 Mass. 124, 127, that there "are obvious
objections which may be urged against combinations of wards
into double or triple districts. The avoidance of them has some-
thing in its favor." The respondent commissioners, in dividing
Suffolk County into representative districts and assigning repre-
sentatives thereto, have consistently avoided throughout the city
of Boston the creation of double or triple districts. In the exer-
cise of their judgment and discretion they were warranted in giv-
ing some weight to the objections to the creation of such districts.
The question for our determination is whether the commissioners
have given unreasonable weight to such objections in view of the
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resulting divergences from the representative unit and inequali-
ties of voting power among the districts that affect the petitioners
adversely. Considering the extent of the divergences and in-
equalities in the apportionment held valid in the Brophy case
and recognizing that the duty of dividing Suffolk County into
representative districts and assigning representatives thereto is
imposed by the Constitution upon the commissioners, to be exer-
cised in accordance with their judgment and discretion, and that
every reasonable presumption of validity attaches to a division
and assignment made in performance of this duty, we cannot
rightly say that the failure of the commissioners to avoid diver-
gencies from the representative unit and inequalities in voting
power by creating double districts was so unreasonable in its
effect upon any of the petitioners that the division and assign-
ment, for this reason, transcends the constitutional power of the
commissioners and should be declared void. See Attorney General
v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, ante, 25, 47. 1 It follows that
the petitions relating to the eighth, ninth and eleventh districts
cannot be maintained.
What has previously been said disposes also of the petition re-
lating to the tenth district, apart from one other consideration.
Naturally the four districts to each of which only one repre-
sentative should be assigned would be the four districts having
the smallest number of legal voters. These districts are the
eighth, ninth, fifth and eleventh. The tenth district — having
12,427 legal voters— to which one representative was assigned
by the commissioners is slightly larger than the fifth district—
having 12,213 voters — to which two representatives were as-
signed by the commissioners. On a strictly mathematical basis
two representatives, instead of one representative, should have
been assigned to the tenth district, and one representative, in-
stead of two representatives should have been assigned to the
fifth district. The excess in number of legal voters in the tenth
district over the number of such voters in the fifth district, how-
ever, is so slight — 214 voters — that an assignment of two repre-
sentatives to the former district and one representative to the
latter district would make no substantial change in the inequali-
ties in voting power among the districts throughout the county.
The effect would have been merely to substitute a district in
which the voting power of a legal voter was 50.66%, for a district
in which such power was 49.13% of the voting power of a voter
1 Editor's Note. — Sec 300 Mass.
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in the district in which such voting power was the greatest. We
cannot rightly say, according to the principles already stated,
that the failure of the commissioners to make such a substitution
was so unreasonable as to invalidate the division and assignment
made by them. The petitions relating to the tenth district,
therefore, cannot be maintained.
It follows that the petition in each case must be dismissed.
So ordered.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Henry F. Brennan and Others v. Election Commissioners of
Boston.
(Reported in 310 Mass. 784.)
Suffolk, Jan. 8, 1942 — Feb. 5, 1942. Present, Field, C. J., Qua, Dolan and
RONAN, JJ.
Elections. Words, "May."
The provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 108; c. 50, § 1, that election commis-
sioners upon written application of ten voters in a ward "may" open the envelope
containing a voting list sealed up under § 107, and "may make a copy of the list
as checked," are not mandatory, and do not entitle the applicants as of right to be
furnished with such a copy.
Petition, filed in the Superior Court on November 29, 1941,
for a writ of mandamus.
The case was heard by Giles, J., upon the petition as amended
and an answer admitting the allegations of fact in the amended
petition but stating reasons why the petitioners should not have
relief. The judge ruled as matter of law that the petitioners were
not entitled to the issuance of the writ and dismissed the petition.
The petitioners appealed and alleged exceptions.
E. E. Fuchs, (F. E. Kelly and A. West with him,) for the peti-
tioners.
R. H. Hopkins, Assistant Corporation Counsel, (N. Moger,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, with him,) for the respondents.
Qua, J. The question in this case, presented upon an answer
in the nature of a demurrer to a petition for a writ of mandamus
by more than ten voters of Ward 22 of the city of Boston, is
whether the petitioners have a right, upon written application
under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 108, to compel the respondents to
furnish them copies of the voting lists showing the names of the
persons checked as having voted in that ward at the city election
held on November 4, 1941. The petition states that similar
applications have been filed for all the wards of the city.
In our opinion the petitioners have not the right to compel the
furnishing of the lists, and the trial judge rightly sustained the
demurrer.
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General Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 107, provides for the sealing
up, after the count has been recorded, of the ballots cast at each
polling place at State and city elections, and of the voting lists,
and for their delivery to the city clerk. Then follows § 108 in
these words: "Upon written application, signed by at least ten
voters in the town or ward of which the precinct forms a part,
or upon written request signed by the chairman of any ward,
town or city committee, the city or town clerk may open the
envelope containing such voting list and may make a copy of the
list as checked. After any such voting list has been so copied,
said clerk shall at once enclose the list in an envelope and seal
up the same and certify thereon to the identity of such lists."
By various provisions of law the references in §§ 107 and 108
to the city or town clerk are made applicable in Boston to the
board of election commissioners. 1 The petitioners contend that
the word "may" in § 108, where it occurs in the expressions "may
open the envelope" and "may make a copy of the list," is to be
construed as the equivalent of shall, and that the section is man-
datory and absolutely requires the commissioners, upon receiv-
ing an application in writing by ten voters, not only to open the
envelope and make a copy of the list as checked, but also to deliver
the copy to the applicants. They cite many instances in other
jurisdictions where "may" in a statute has been construed as
equivalent to "shall" and as importing a command.
We concede the principle of these decisions and would apply
it ourselves in proper instances. See, for example, County of
Worcester v. Schlesinger, 16 Gray, 166, and O'Connell v. Cam-
bridge, 258 Mass. 203, 205. This construction is particularly
appropriate in cases where the statute confers upon a public
officer power in certain circumstances to take action necessary
in the public interest or for the enforcement of individual rights,
and where it cannot be supposed that it was intended to confer
upon him a discretion to refuse to act in the precise circumstances
which call for the exercise of the power. Attleboro Trust Co. v.
Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 257 Mass. 43, 51, 52.
Nevertheless it remains true that "may" is not an apt word to
express a positive mandate. It is a word of permission and not
of command. It should be construed, if possible, in accordance
with its true signification. Commonwealth v. Haynes, 107 Mass.
194, 197. Phillips v. Fadden, 125 Mass. 198, 201. Commonwealth
v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 247. Rosenthal v. Nove, 175 Mass.
i See St. 1913, c. 835, § 8; G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 50, § 1.
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559, 560. Hampden Trust Co. v. Leary, 186 Mass. 577, 581.
Cheney v. Coughlin, 201 Mass. 204, 211, 212. Commonwealth
v. Mekelburg, 235 Mass. 383, 384. Dascalakis v. Commonwealth,
244 Mass. 568, 569. Irwin v. Municipal Court of the Brighton
District, 298 Mass. 158, 160. In general, throughout our statutes,
the distinction between words of permission or discretion and
words of command, including the distinction between "may"
and "shall," has been carefully observed. Dowling v. Assessors
of Boston, 268 Mass. 480, 488. We should not in any case lightly
conclude that the distinction has been overlooked. And it is
particularly difficult to come to that conclusion in c. 54, § 108,
when we note that in almost every section throughout the chapter
the word "shall" is consistently employed where a command is
intended, sometimes in direct contrast with the word may in the
same section; 1 that "shall" is used throughout § 107 which directs
the sealing up and depositing of the ballots and voting lists; and
that the use of "shall" is resumed in the sentence in § 108 im-
mediately following the sentence which we are now called upon
to construe.
There is further significance in the history of § 108. The section
originated in St. 1874, c. 376, § 43. This required the used check
lists to be sealed and secured in the same manner as the ballots
and then contained this proviso: "provided, that nothing in
this act shall be construed to prevent the clerk of any city from
furnishing a copy of the check-list after it has been used in any
ward, upon the application of not less than ten legal voters resident
therein: and immediately upon such copy being furnished, the
check-list shall be again sealed up." In the Public Statutes of
1882 the provision found its place in § 29 of c. 7, but no longer
in the form of a proviso. It there reads: "The city clerk may
furnish a copy of a check-list after it has been used in any ward,
upon the application of not less than ten legal voters resident
therein; and immediately upon such copy being furnished, the
check-list shall be again sealed up." It thus appears that the
word "may" in the present statute resulted from a recasting and
abbreviation of the proviso in the statute of 1874. That proviso
took the form of a permission to the clerk, when backed by the
application of ten legal voters, to do what he was otherwise alto-
gether forbidden to do, i.e., open up the lists after they had been
sealed. To say that he was compelled to do so would be to read
into the statute something not there expressed and not necessarily
« See, for example, §§ 1, 2, 6, 7, 9. 12, 13, 19, 21, 23, 24. 42, 43, 45. 74, 81. 83. 86. 92, 98, 102. 109,
119, 123, 134. 143. 144.
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implied. It is not as if an absolute right had first been given to the
ten voters and the clerk had then been given jurisdiction to enforce
that right. In such a case the decisions cited by the petitioners
to which reference has already been made might be pertinent. It
would seem, therefore, that the word "may " was advisedly used in
its accurate sense in the 1882 revision to express the true purport
of the act of 1874. That word has remained in the section through-
out subsequent revisions. The specific provision for the furnish-
ing of a copy was omitted from the section by St. 1893, c. 417,
§ 175, and has not appeared in the section since that time.
There is also a significant contrast between G. L. (Ter. Ed.)
c. 54, § 108, and the somewhat similar provisions relating to
voting lists used at caucuses found in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 111.
The latter section reads thus: "The city or town clerk, upon
written application signed by at least ten voters of a ward or
town, for a copy of a list as checked, shall open the envelope con-
taining the voting list used at any caucus in such ward or town and
shall furnish to them a certified copy thereof as checked." Here
the word "shall" is used throughout instead of "may." But this
section did not originate in a permission similar to that which we
have seen gave rise to c. 54, § 108. It apparently originated in
St. 1896, c. 435, § 7, which provided that the board of election
commissioners, upon the application of ten voters, "may unseal
and open the envelope containing such voting list and shall fur-
nish to such applicants a certified copy of the list as checked."
Although "may" was used with reference to unsealing the en-
velope, "shall" was used from the beginning with reference to
furnishing the copy. The seeming inconsistency in the use of the
two words in the same section attracted the attention of the
commissioners to consolidate the general laws, who recommended
that "may" be changed to "shall," on the ground that it could
not have been intended that there should be a discretion as to
opening the envelope containing the list when the furnishing of
the copy was mandatory. Preliminary Report of the Com-
missioners to Consolidate and Arrange the General Laws, Appen-
dix B, vol. 1, page 79. The Legislature approved the change by
St. 1918, c. 257, § 15, and it subsequently passed into the General
Laws. No corresponding change was needed or made in the
section which afterwards became G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 108
(then St. 1913, c. 835, § 305), which had always been permissive
in form, and which then no longer contained any specific provision
for the furnishing of a copy.
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There is also a provision in mandatory form (" shall") in G. L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 37, relative to the furnishing of a certified
copy of the voting lists used in primaries upon written request of
the chairman of any ward, town or city committee, or of at least
ten voters. This was first enacted by St. 1916, c. 179, § 7, and was
reenacted with amendments by St. 1920, c. 493, § L The last
mentioned statute in § 2 also amended what is now G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 54, § 108, but did not change "may" to "shall" and did
not insert any provision specifically referring to the furnishing of a
copy. Whatever reason may exist for a difference between the
section relating to elections (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 54, § 108) and
those relating to caucuses (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 53, § 111) and
primaries (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 53, § 37), it would seem that the
former has always been permissive and the latter have always
been mandatory; that a provision for the furnishing of a copy
has been omitted from the former and has been included in the
latter; and that the Legislature has recognized and perpetuated
this distinction. We must construe the statutes as they are writ-
ten. Commonwealth v. S. S. Kresge Co. 267 Mass. 145, 148.
Exceptions overruled.
Appeal dismissed.
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SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT.
Commonwealth vs. James F. O'Rourke and Others.
(Reported in 311 Mass. 213.)
Plymouth, Feb. 2, 1942 — March 30, 1942. Present, Field, C.J., Qua,
Cox and Ronan, JJ.
Elections. Conspiracy. Evidence, Failure to produce Evidence. Practice,
Criminal, Venue.
A finding of guilty of conspiring to make, sign, file and use false nomination
papers for a certain candidate for public office was warranted against a defendant
who was in charge of a headquarters for the candidate from which there had been
sent out to be certified a considerable number of wholly forged nomination papers,
which, to a person without special experience but having occasion to examine them
might be found to have the appearance of being forged, and who employed and
directed the other persons working at the headquarters and took charge of the papers
until they were turned over to the candidate for filing; but evidence did not war-
rant a finding of guilty against a defendant who was an employee of the first defend-
ant in charge of circulating the papers in a certain territory and who delivered and
called for some of the papers; nor against a defendant who was employed merely
as a messenger to deliver and call for the papers, although he was told by certifying
officials that they doubted the validity of the papers; nor against a defendant who
was employed merely as a chauffeur by the first defendant.
Venue of an indictment for conspiracy to make, sign, file and use false nomina-
tion papers for public office was properly laid in a county wherein was situated
one of several cities to which forged papers were taken for certification from the
defendants' headquarters in another county, even though an agent of the defend-
ants who took them there was innocent.
Evidence that a defendant charged with conspiracy to make, sign, file and use
false nomination papers for public office had knowledge of the statutes which he
conspired to violate was not necessary in order to prove his criminal intent.
At the trial of an indictment for conspiracy to make, sign, file, and use false
nomination papers for public office, after the Commonwealth had introduced evi-
dence that a number of papers were wholly forged, and testimony by several pur-
ported signers that they had not written their names on the papers, an inference
adverse to the defendants could be drawn from their failure to call any of the pur-
ported signers as witnesses.
Indictment, found and returned on October 10, 1940, and tried
before Forte, J.
J. P. White, for the defendants.
J. R. Wheatley, Assistant District Attorney, for the Common-
wealth.
Qua, J. The four defendants O'Rourke, Wallace, James S.
Kerrigan, and Thomas J. Kerrigan, were indicted jointly, together
with "John Doe and Richard Roe," whose true names and more
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particular descriptions are stated to be unknown to the grand
jurors, in four counts for conspiracy to (1) file, (2) make, (3) sign,
and (4) use false nomination papers to secure the placing upon
the ballot of the name of William H. McMasters as a candidate
for Governor. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 56, § 13, and G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 53, § 6, as amended, § 7, as amended, § 9. All four of
the defendants specifically named have been convicted on each
count.
A basic question is whether there was evidence to warrant the
verdicts of guilty. The substance of the evidence tending to
show the falsification of papers as it appears in the printed record
and as it comes to us in the form of original nomination papers
and photostatic copies of papers submitted to the jury and in-
corporated by reference in the bill of exceptions is now set forth.
A group of nomination papers in behalf of McMasters, certified
by the registrars of voters of Quincy, was filed in the office of the
Secretary of the Commonwealth. A second group of papers in
behalf of McMasters, certified by the election commissioners of
Boston, was filed in the same office. A third group of papers in
behalf of McMasters was produced from the office of the city
clerk in Brockton. The papers of this group were never certified
and had remained in Brockton. Each of the papers in the three
groups bore a printed number before which was printed the letter
"G." All the signatures purporting to be those of voters on the
Quincy, Boston and Brockton papers marked "G" were forgeries.
The same handwritings appeared many times in different names
on these papers and on papers filed from other places, but the
same writing appeared only once or twice on each paper. The
same group of handwritings, with some exceptions, appeared on
the Quincy papers that appeared on the Brockton papers, and
when the same handwriting appeared more than once on any par-
ticular paper it appeared on lines separated from each other by
a number of other signatures. It could have been found that the
same handwriting sometimes appeared in the names of both men
and women voters. Five persons testified that signatures on the
Brockton papers purporting to be theirs had not been made by
them. Plainly this evidence warranted a finding that the three
groups of papers marked "G" were false and fraudulent, and
that they had been corruptly prepared by a number of persons
who had conspired together for that purpose.
The next question is whether there was evidence to warrant
the finding that the several defendants were members of the con-
spiracy. There was evidence of these facts: In the latter part
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of June, 1940, the defendant Wallace was introduced to the can-
didate McMasters. Wallace hired " a headquarters " in South Bos-
ton, and after the latter part of June was circulating McMasters's
papers. On July 5 he hired an office in the Foresters' Build-
ing at K and 4th streets, stating that he wanted it "for the pur-
pose of circulating nomination papers" for McMasters for Gov-
ernor as the candidate of the "Old Age Pension Party." Wallace
paid the rent and took a receipt in the name of the "National
Old Age Pension Party." About July 15 or 16 Wallace hired a
hall in the same building, which he occupied for three days, stat-
ing that he needed it "to check up on nomination papers coming
back." There were in the hall two tables which the judge in his
charge referred to as eight feet long. About fifteen or twenty
men and girls went in and out. There were on the premises
"election books" put out by the Boston election commissioners
and "precinct books." On July 13, five hundred nomination
papers were printed for Wallace who, when he ordered them, told
the printer to call when they were ready either one of two tele-
phone numbers, one of which was the number of the telephone at
the Foresters' Building and the other of which was the number of
a telephone installed in July, 1940, at "Forester's Hall" at the
application and under the direction of the defendant O'Rourke,
to be listed under the name of the "National Pension Party."
When the printer did call one of these numbers "a man" came
for the papers and left an order to print an additional five hun-
dred. These were marked "E" and were called for by "a man,"
who gave an order to print a third five hundred papers. The
papers of this third lot were the papers marked "G," of which the
jury could find that the Quincy, Boston and Brockton papers in-
troduced in evidence had been forged. Wallace paid for the first
lot of papers. The two other lots were paid for by "the man"
who called for them. On the night before the last day for filing
papers McMasters received two hundred and fifty papers from
Wallace.
As to the defendant O'Rourke there was evidence that, besides
arranging for the telephone, he was present when Wallace made
inquiries about hiring the office, but "Wallace did all the talking;"
that on fifty or seventy-five occasions O'Rourke had left McMas-
ters's papers in the office of the Boston election commissioners,
and he had signed receipts for them after they were certified.
As to the defendant James S. Kerrigan there was evidence that
he assisted in carrying the tables upstairs to the hall; that his
signature had been placed across the corner of the "G" papers
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from Quincy introduced in evidence; that he called at the office
of the city clerk in Quincy, presented a receipt, and asked for the
McMasters papers mentioned in it; that an assistant registrar
of voters told him that "the papers did not look genuine" and
that Kerrigan " should look them over;" and that he replied that
he had nothing to do with getting the names and that to the best
of his knowledge the people who had circulated the papers were
getting proper signatures; that about July 24 James S. Kerrigan
came for papers to the city clerk's office at Brockton in order to
deliver them to McMasters's office; that James S. Kerrigan's
name had been written on them by an employee in the city clerk's
office as that of the person who had brought in the papers; that
the city clerk told him that he did not like the looks of the papers
and that they had not been certified; and that Kerrigan said
he did not circulate them.
As to the defendant Thomas J. Kerrigan there was evidence
(admitted against him alone) that he had stated in September,
1940, that in July he had taken a job " driving the defendant
Wallace and others," and had received $200 for a month's work;
and that he had driven the defendant O'Rourke to Boston City
Hall on numerous occasions and had gone with him to a printing
establishment to get papers.
There was evidence that all four of the defendants were seen
daily at the Foresters' Building "until the tenancy was up the
last part of July."
The defendant Wallace testified in substance that he agreed to
circulate nomination papers for McMasters, hired the headquar-
ters in the Foresters' Building, organized the circulation of papers
in different parts of the State, employed O'Rourke at $40 a week
for three weeks "to take charge of wards 6 and 7 of Boston,"
hired James S. Kerrigan as a messenger at $20 for one week and
$25 a week for two weeks, hired Thomas J. Kerrigan at $8 a day
as chauffeur and for the use of his car, employed "several other
men and women throughout the city of Boston and the State to
solicit signatures," paying some by the week and others five cents
apiece for each certified signature, directed O'Rourke to apply
for the telephone, hired additional space in the building for three
days, and employed several men and girls to check papers as they
were brought in; that there were also volunteer workers; that
he paid the bills out of his own funds; that he received at
the start two hundred papers from McMasters and bad five hun-*
dred more printed; that he directed O'Rourke to take the Boston
papers as they came in to the office of the Boston election com-
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missioners and to collect them upon certification; that he received
the certified papers from O'Rourke and put them in a safe; that
he sent James S. Kerrigan to Quincy, Brockton, New Bedford,
and other cities to collect papers and to return them to the "head-
quarters;" that other papers were sent in by mail and still others
brought in personally by workers; that he kept "these papers"
at the "headquarters" until the night before the last day for filing,
at which time he turned them over to McMasters; that he did
not personally check or file any papers and did not enter into
any agreement for signing, making or filing false nomination
papers; and that he spent between $1,500 and $1,700 "for signa-
tures, expenses and workers."
The defendant O'Rourke testified that Wallace employed him to
solicit signatures; that he was given charge of the South Boston
district; that persons soliciting in that district were paid three
cents for each signature that "passed certification" by Wallace;
that he himself took no part in the checking of signatures; that
he spent part of his time out in the district and part of his time
at "Forester's Hall;" that he did on numerous occasions take
papers for certification to the office of the Boston election com-
missioners and signed his name in the receipt book ; that he called
for the papers that had been left for certification and delivered
them to Wallace; and that he had applied for the telephone at
Wallace's direction. He denied any part in the printing of any
papers and denied entering into any agreement to make, sign or
file false nomination papers. On cross-examination he gave the
names of three people who had worked for him soliciting signa-
tures but could recall no others.
In the foregoing paragraphs we have endeavored to state the
substance of all the evidence against the several defendants.
From this it could have been found that many completely filled
and wholly forged papers marked "G" (the Brockton papers
alone containing approximately two thousand one hundred seventy
forged names) had been sent out from the South Boston "head-
quarters" for certification by the local election officers; but there
was no evidence that any of the forgeries was in the handwriting
of any of the defendants or of any of those employed at the For-
esters' Building; and there was no direct evidence that any of
the defendants or anyone at the building knew that the papers
were to be or had been forged. The question then is whether
*the evidence as a whole was such that it would support circum-
stantially a reasonable inference that any of the defendants in
any manner procured the false signatures or participated with
COMMONWEALTH V. O'ROURKE. SUP. JUD. CT., 1942. 277
those who made the false signatures in the filing, making, sign-
ing, or use of the forged papers; and in this connection the ap-
pearance of the papers themselves may be considered. There is
nothing about them that would lead a casual and inexperienced
observer to believe them forged, but in our opinion the jury could
find that even a person without special experience in such matters
and not an expert in handwriting (see Priorelli v. Guidi, 251 Mass.
449), having occasion to examine these papers would be likely
to notice the striking similarities in the handwritings of supposedly
different persons recurring through the papers, sometimes at short
intervals. There was also a certain appearance of regularity and
uniformity about the "G" papers which it might be thought
could scarcely be expected if they were signed at different times
and places, when different kinds of pens, inks, and pencils might
be expected to be used by different signers.
In our opinion there was evidence to warrant the verdict against
the defendant Wallace. He could be found to have been at the
head of the enterprise at South Boston. He hired the office and
the hall and employed, paid, and directed the other defendants
and hired the persons employed to do the " checking," if checking
was what they were doing. He took charge of the papers until he
turned them over to the candidate for filing. Although Wallace
denied that he personally checked any papers, it could have been
found from the testimony of O'Rourke that he did pass upon the
signatures from South Boston for the purpose of paying those
who had secured them, and we think it permissible to infer that
with so many persons employed by him ''checking" signatures
at one place, where he also was present, he must have become
familiar with the character of the signatures and the appearance
of the papers. We think that the jury could infer that, if Wallace
did not himself commit or procure the forging of the signatures,
at least he became aware of what was going on upon so large a
scale and joined in the conspiracy with persons unknown who
committed the forgeries. The jury might find the crime proved
beyond a reasonable doubt as against Wallace, " although the in-
ference of guilt from the facts established was not unescapable or
necessary." Commonwealth v. Bader, 285 Mass. 574, 577.
There is less evidence against O'Rourke. He was merely an
employee, although he had charge of "the circulation" of papers
in South Boston. He is not shown to have had any connection
with forged papers beyond taking them (so far as appears, with
other papers not forged) to the office of the Boston election com-
missioners, and calling for them after they had been certified. It
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would be difficult to infer from this that O'Rourke ever examined
the forged papers. He was seen at the Foresters' Building daily,
but this adds little in the absence of evidence as to what he was
doing there. In our opinion this evidence does not bridge the gap
between suspicion and proof and did not warrant the conviction
of O'Rourke. See Commonwealth v. Connelly, 163 Mass. 539, 543.
So far as appears the duties of James S. Kerrigan were merely
those of a messenger. Although he too was seen at the Foresters'
Building daily, he is not shown to have had any closer contact
with the forged papers than O'Rourke had. The fact that when
he called for papers that had been left for certification at Quincy
and at Brockton he was told by the local officers of their 'doubts
about the papers does not prove that he joined in the conspiracy
charged.
There is still less against Thomas J. Kerrigan. Being employed
by Wallace as a chauffeur and being seen at the Foresters' Build-
ing daily, with no evidence of any contact with the papers, does
not suffice to show complicity in the alleged conspiracy.
Venue was properly laid in the county of Plymouth, since
the jury could find that the conspiracy involved the presentation
of forged papers for certification at Brockton in that county.
Commonwealth v. Pettes, 114 Mass. 307. Commonwealth v. Saul,
260 Mass. 97. Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347. Brown v.
Elliott, 225 U. S. 392. The King v. Brisac, 4 East, 164. See cases
collected in Wharton's Criminal Law (12th ed.) § 1666, and in
15 C. J. S. 1116, § 83. And the act of presenting them was the
act of the conspirators if performed by their agent, even if the
agent was himself innocent. Commonwealth v. Glover, 111 Mass.
395. Commonwealth v. White, 123 Mass. 430, 433, 434. Fore
River Shipbuilding Corp. v. Commonwealth, 248 Mass. 137, 140,
141. Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 31, 32.
The judge rightly declined to rule as requested by the defend-
ants in substance that in order to prove the intent necessary for
a criminal conspiracy there must be evidence that the defendants
had knowledge of the law which they conspired to violate. The
ruling requested involved a misapplication of the principle dis-
cussed in Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 134, 135.
That principle is a narrow one. It has no application where there
is anything inherently wrong or inimical to the public interest
in that which the defendants have combined to do. The making
and use of false nomination papers is in its very nature wrong-
ful and detrimental to the public interest. The doing of these
acts can almost never be consistent with an innocent purpose.
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See Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323. One who joins in a
conspiracy to that end may be found to entertain a criminal
intent regardless of his knowledge of the statutes. Common-
wealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. Ill, 123. Commonwealth v. Waterman,
122 Mass. 43, 56, 57. Commonwealth v. Dyer, 243 Mass. 472,
483, 485. There is nothing to the contrary in Commonwealth v.
Connelly, 163 Mass. 539.
Other requests for rulings, in so far as they have been argued,
require no further discussion. To have granted them to any
greater extent than they were in substance given would not have
been consistent with the grounds on which this opinion rests.
The defendants objected and excepted to a portion of the
district attorney's argument, which they construe as an argu-
ment that the jury should draw inferences against the defendants
for their failure to call as witnesses persons whose signatures
purported to be affixed to the papers. Whether or not this is
the true construction of the argument, there was no error in allow-
ing it or in the charge of the judge wherein he permitted the jury
to draw from this circumstance an inference adverse to the defend-
ants as to the forging of the papers. It is frequently held that
where a witness is equally available to either party no inference
can be drawn against either for not calling Mm. Fletcher v.
Willis, 180 Mass. 243, 244. Jones v. Boston & Northern Street
Railway, 211 Mass. 552, 555. Mikkelson v. Connolly, 229 Mass.
360, 362, 363. Cutler v. Jordan Marsh Co. 265 Mass. 245, 247,
248. But there is no hard and fast rule to that effect. Whether
an inference can be drawn from the failure to call witnesses neces-
sarily depends, as with inferences generally, upon the posture of
the particular case and the state of the evidence. Wigmore on
Evidence (3d ed.) § 288. See Commonwealth v. Finnerty, 148 Mass.
162, 166, 167; Harriman v. Reading and Lowell Street Railway,
173 Mass. 28, 35, 38; Commonwealth v. Peoples Express Co.
201 Mass. 564, 581; Little v. Massachusetts Northeastern Street
Railway, 229 Mass. 244, 246-248; Mumford v. Coghlin, 249
Mass. 184, 186, 187, 191; Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass.
369, 441-443. Compare Heina v. Broadway Fruit Market, Inc.
304 Mass. 608, 611, 612. Here the district attorney had already
called five witnesses who had testified that their names on the
papers were not written by them. He had therefore done his
part and had offered the challenge. The issue was vital to the
case. So many names, with the corresponding addresses, were
on the papers that if they were genuine it would seem an easy
matter to call in a fewr of the signers. Yet the defendants, faced
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with the sweeping testimony as to the forgery of all the names,
called none. We cannot say as a matter of law that this omission
was wholly without significance.
The result is that the exceptions of the defendants O'Rourke,
James S. Kerrigan, and Thomas J. Kerrigan are sustained, and
the exceptions of the defendant Wallace are overruled.
So ordered.
INDEX DIGEST.
APPORTIONMENT COMMISSIONERS.
On petition for a writ of mandamus, the writ was issued where it appeared
that the County Commissioners of Essex so apportioned the county into rep-
resentative districts that the apportionment showed districts varying from
8,256 voters in one district as compared with 4,135 voters in another dis-
trict. Merrill v. County Commissioners of Essex (257 Mass. 184), p. 122.
An apportionment of representative districts by county commissioners pur-
porting to act under Art. 21 of the amendments to the Constitution is a nul-
lity, if it does not approximate as nearly as reasonably may be to exactness
in the number of legal voters in any district when compared with the legal
voters in other districts. Ibid.
County Commissioners when apportioning the county to representative
districts are not justified in failing to make the apportionment meet the re-
quirements of the Constitution either by the fact that no legal voter appeared
to protest against the apportionment or to suggest a better one, or by the
fact that any change would be against the wishes of the representatives of the
affected municipalities, or by the fact of variant characteristics of voters in
the contiguous communities for the purpose of representation; and that they
acted in good faith and in the exercise of their best judgment is immaterial.
Ibid.
Large divergences from the representative unit in districts involved and
inequalities in the voting power between the legal voters in such districts and
those in other districts cannot be justified if there is any reasonable method
of avoiding them. Graham v. Special Commissioners of Suffolk County (306
Mass. 237), p. 256.
It is the function of the commissioners, and not the court to make the
division and assignment of representative districts. The constitutional re-
quirement of equality of representation "as nearly as may be" imports that
the problem to be solved by the commissioners is not purely mathematical,
but rather that it involves the exercise of their judgment and discretion. Ibid.
"The court cannot substitute its judgment and discretion for that of the
commissioners. It cannot strike down a division and assignment made by
them merely because it is not literally the nearest approximation to equality
of representation among the districts that an ingenious mind can devise."
Ibid.
Every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the action of the
commissioners. A division and assignment cannot be struck down on the
ground of inequality of representation unless the inequalities are so great and
the means of avoiding them so clear as to leave fair-minded men in no reason-
able doubt that there is a grave and unnecessary inequality between the dif-
ferent districts. Ibid.
No petition for a writ of mandamus can be maintained unless there is in-
validity in the action of the commissioners respecting the representative dis-
trict in which the petitioner is a legal voter. Ibid.
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APPORTIONMENT OF SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES.
It would be unconstitutional for the General Court in the attempt to pro-
vide new representative districts to provide for the division of the several
counties into representative districts by a board of special commissioners
composed of the persons who are county commissioners and other persona
residents of the county chosen by joint ballot of the senators and representa-
tives in one room. (LXXI of the Amendments to the Constitution.) Opinion
of the Justices (303 Mass. 615), p. 222.
It would be unconstitutional for the General Court in the attempt to pro-
vide for the division of the various counties into representative districts to
enact a law which would create a board to divide the counties into representa-
tive districts composed in whole or in part of members of the General Court
who are residents of the county. Ibid,
Senatorial Districts.
See Constitutional Law.
ATTORNEY GENERAL.
Where the public interests are involved, the attorney general may institute
a petition for mandamus to vindicate a public right. Attorney General v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth (306 Mass. 25), p. 236.
(Editor's Note. — The above case questioned the constitutionality of a legis-
lative act establishing senatorial districts.)
,
See Constitutional Law.
Qoo Warranto.
BALLOTS.
BALLOT BOXES.
CANCELLING DEVICES.
Where the cancelling device in a ballot box fails to work due to some defect
which was not discovered before the election ballots were deposited in the
ballot box, the ballots will be counted even though the provisions of G. L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 106, require that they be cancelled. Swift v. Registrars of
Voters of Quiacy (281 Mass. 271), p. 152.
Where the ballot box cancelling device failed to mark the ballots cast and
deposited therein, the ballots will be counted where there is no evidence of
fraud or of attempt to invalidate the count. The provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.)
c. 54, § 106, are directory and not mandatory. Ibid.
Where a ballot was cast and deposited in the ballot box and did not have
printed on the back thereof the official endorsement required by G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 54. § 42 to wit: a facsimile of the signature of the secretary of the
Commonwealth or of the city or town clerk as the case might be, it was held,
"that ballots deposited without the official endorsement, if provided for the
voter by public authority, should be counted as marked by the voter, not-
withstanding the statutory prohibition." Ibid.
(See also Parrott v. Plunkett (268 Mass. 202), p. 139.)
Uncancelled ballots will be counted where the state ballot box cancelling
device fails to work. Evidence showed that the device was inspected before
the election and at the time worked properly, and that the election was other-
wise conducted according to law. Talbot v. Registrars of Voters of Somerset
(281 Mass. 284), p. 164.
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CANCELLING DEVICES— Concluded.
Mere failure to count unused ballots does not affect the validity of the count.
Cahill v. Moyse (Senate, 1935), p. 30.
Ballots, absentee.
See Recount of Votes.
Mere failure of a ballot to show a cancellation mark does not invalidate
the ballot. Cahill v. Moyse (Senate, 1935), p. 30.
See Mandamus.
Marking of Official Ballots.
Pasters on Official Ballot.
Recount of Votes.
CERTIORARI.
See Election Inquest.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The question whether the division of the Commonwealth into senatorial
districts conforms to constitutional requirements is a proper question for
judicial determination. Attorney General v. Secretary of the Commonwealth
(306 Mass. 26), p. 236.
In considering the validity of an act the court cannot consider the expedi-
ency of its enactment or the wisdom of its provisions, the court can consider
only the question whether the statute violates Constitutional provisions.
Ibid.
All rational presumptions are made in favor of the validity of every act of
the legislative department of the government, and the court will not refuse
to enforce its provisions unless its conflict with the Constitutional provisions
is established beyond reasonable doubt. Ibid.
Art. 14 of the amendments to the Constitution provides ; "in all elections
of civil officers by the people of this commonwealth, whose election is pro-
vided for by the Constitution the person having the highest number of votes,
shall be deemed and declared to be elected". The word "person" means
living human beings. On the Election of William F. Madden (House, 1925),
p. 9.
Senatorial Districts.
The question whether the division of the Commonwealth into senatorial
districts conforms to the provisions of the Constitution may properly be
determined by the court but such districts will not be overthrown merely
because the court may be of the opinion that a better division might be made.
Attorney General v. Secretary of the Commonwealth (306 Mass. 26), p. 236.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the selection of the
towns and wards of cities to be combined in a senatorial district is a matter
for the judgment and discretion of the General Court and, furthermore, the
phrase "as nearly as may be" used in the Constitution in connection with
the requirement of equality of numbers of legal voters in the several districts
and also in connection with the constitutional prohibition against uniting
counties or parts thereof in one district, does not import that the General
Court must make a division which is literally the nearest to such equality
and to the avoidance of county combinations. Ibid.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW— Concluded.
Senatorial Districts— Concluded.
While approximate equality within the several senatorial districts is an
essential element of a constitutional division of the Commonwealth into such
districts, the fact that both the provision requiring equality of numbers of
legal voters in the several districts and also the prohibition against uniting
counties or parts thereof in one district are modified by the phrase in the
Constitution, to wit: "as nearly as may be" which leaves some scope for the
exercise by the Genera) Court of its judgment and discretion. Attorney General
v. Secreary of the Commonweal h (306 Mass. 26), p. 236.
The function of the court is not to review or revise the exercise of official
judgment within its legitimate limits, but only to declare void a division and
apportionment so vicious in its nature as to transcend constitutional power.
Ibid.
Representative Districts.
The method provided by law for the division of counties into representa-
tive districts does not necessarily have to be uniform. Opinion of the Justices
(303 Mass. 615), p. 222.
Apportionment Commissioners.
See Apportionment of Senators and Representatives.
CORRUPT PRACTICE.
The governor and council, in the performance of their duties under Art. 16
of the amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth and under
general law when tabulating the vote, do not have jurisdiction or authority
to hear, consider or determine questions of corrupt practices of any character;
nor have they the power or authority to refrain from a declaration respecting
the election of a candidate who appears to be elected if no question is raised
as to the accuracy of returns showing such election. Opinion of the Justices
(296 Mass. 599), p. 2Q2.
The immunity granted by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 37 (h), to a person
called to testify upon an election petition, can be claimed only if he sought
to be excused from so testifying upon the ground of self-incrimination. Ross
v. Crane (291 Mass. 28), p. 188.
The distribution of a circular letter to the voters criticising the personal
character or political action of a candidate for election which contains a
false statement and is designed or tends to injure or defeat such candidate
and which letter does not bear the name and residence of a duly registered
voter as required by law will warrant the unseating of a member of the House
of Representatives. Bradbury v. Sullivan (House. 1929) p. 15.
The making and filing of a false return of moneys contributed or expended
for the purpose of securing an election will warrant the unseating of a mem-
ber of the House of Representatives. Ibid.
Non-Political Committee.
The mere fact that a candidate for election was a member of a voluntary
organization to promote his election does not penalize him for the neglect of
the committee to observe the requirements of the corrupt practice act. TFar-
rcn v. Daly (Senate. 1935). p. 47.
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
See Apportionment Commissioners.
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ELECTIONS.
Death of Candidate.
Valid votes for election to an office cannot be cast for one who is no longer
alive. Madden v. Board of Election Commissioners of Boston (251 Mass. 95),
p. 108.
The word "persons" in the statute means living human beings. Ibid.
See On the Election of William F. Madden (House, 1925), p. 9.
Where a candidate dies on election day and the voters did not appear to
have exact knowledge of the fact the court expressed no opinion. Ibid.
In the above cited case the court in its opinion stated the following: —
"We think the rule is this tin cases of this type— Editor's Note], — the ex-
istence of the fact which disqualified, and of the law which makes that fact
operative to disqualify, must be brought home so closely and so clearly to
the knowledge or notice of the elector, that his vote therewith indicates an
intent to waste it." Ibid.
(Editor's Note.— In connection with the above case the court in its decision
cites the following cases: Chandler v. Wartman, 6 N. J. L. J. 301. Sublctt v.
Bedwell, 47 Miss. 266. Crawford v. Molitor, 23 Mich. 341. Gardner v. Burke,
61 Neb. 534. Haggard v. People, 130 111. App. 211. Fish v. Collens, 21 La
Ann. 289. McKeever v. Cameron, 179 Wis. 405. Heald v. Payson, 110 Maine,
204. Commonwealth v. Cluley, 56 Penn. St. 270. Sanders v. Rice, 41 R. I.
127. Honey v. Jordan, 179 Cal. 24. Swepslon v. Barton, 39 Ark. 549. Dryden
v. Swinburne, 20 West Va. 89. State v. McGeary, 69 Vt. 401. Dobbs v. Buford,
128 Ga. 483. Batterlon v. FulUr, 6 S. Dak. 257. Woll v. Jensen, 36 N. Dak.
250. Barnum v. Gitman, 27 Minn. 466. See Bowker, petitioner, Mass. Elec-
tion Cases, 1853-1885 (Russel's ed.), 282, and note, p. 285.)
Irregularities in.
The election laws of this commonwealth providing for official ballots have
uniformly been interpreted to the end that the will of the voter if ascertain-
able is to be given effect even though there may have been omission to ob-
serve some subsidiary and directory provision of the law. Parrott v. Plun-
kett (268 Mass. 202), p. 139.
Destroyed Ballots.
The mere fact, that, after the counting of the votes cast in a town at a
state election, their returns to the town clerk and the transmission of his record
to the Secretary of the Commonwealth and before the beginning of the re-
count had on application of a candidate defeated on the face of the returns,
over 1,500 ballots in one precinct were innocently destroyed through accident
and mistake so that the town clerk could not deliver them to the board of
registrars of voters for the purpose of the recount, did not require that the
ballots so destroyed, or the ballots for the entire precinct, or the ballots for
the entire town should become a nullity. Swift v. Registrars of Voters of
Milton (281 Mass. 264), p. 146.
Irregularities in.
Destroyed Ballots.
Where ballots were destroyed by accident and mistake before a recount;
and no fraud is disclosed or any intent to interfere with a recount or to affect
the operation and result of the election — the record of the original count of
the election officers should be taken. Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Milton
(281 Mass. 264), p. 146.
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ELECTIONS— Concluded.
Irregularities in— Concluded.
Destroyed Ballots— Concluded.
To hold that entirely guiltless acts invalidate the votes would have the effect
of disfranchising voters. Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Milton (281 Mass.
264), p. 146.
Every intendment of the law is to give effect to the expression of the will of
the voters, notwithstanding incidental irregularities in the election, unless they
are such a nature as to render doubtful the true interpretation of that expres-
sion. Ibid.
The cardinal rule to be followed by election officers and courts in election
matters is to ascertain the intent of the voter as disclosed by the official ballot
actually cast and to give effect to that intent by counting the ballot. Ibid.
Irregularities in the conduct of an election, not shown to violate the sub-
stantive end for which the election was held, do not invalidate the result.
Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy (281 Mass. 271), p. 152.
Irregularities in the voting lists when officials fail to comply with the statutes,
in the absence of fraud cannot operate to disfranchise the voters. Cahill v.
Moyse (Senate, 1935), p. 30.
Voting Lists.
Under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 108, the election commissioners cannot be
compelled to make a copy of the voting list as checked at an election. The
law is permissive and not mandatory. Brennan v. Election Commissioners of
Boston (310 Mass. 784), p. 267.
Withdrawals.
The time within which one nominated as a candidate for a state office by
nomination papers may withdraw his name from nomination is governed by
G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 53, § 13.
The purpose of election laws is to afford opportunity for the orderly expres-
sion of preferences by the voters for those to be elected to public office, and
not thwart or suppress such orderly expression. Parrotl v. Plunkett (268 Mass.
202), p. 139.
The election laws of this commonwealth providing for official ballots have
uniformly been interpreted to the end that the will of the voter if ascertainable
is to be given effect even though there may have been omission to observe some
subsidiary and directory provisions of the law. Ibid.
ELECTION INQUEST.
A petition for a writ of certiorari respecting a refusal of a district judge to
hold an election inquest under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 39, was dismissed on
demurrer since its allegations did not show that the district court did not exer-
cise discretion in rendering its decision. Irwin v. Justice of the Municipal
Court of the Brighton District of the City of Boston (298 Mass. 158), p. 209.
ELECTION OFFICERS.
Where there is no evidence of fraud or tampering with the ballot, failure of
the election officers to perform the precise duty imposed on them in respect to
"returning absentee voter ballot envelope does not invalidate the votes or
afford any ground for nullifying the count." Swift v. Registrars of Voters of
Quincy (281 Mass. 271). p. 152.
See Registrars of Voters.
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ELECTION PETITIONS.
An election petition brought under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 55, § 37 is a proceed-
ing civil and not criminal in its nature. Ross v. Crane (291 Mass. 28). p. 188.
The disqualifications as to being a candidate for office and being on the vot-
ing list incident to an adverse decision under an election petition are estab-
lished by the statute as remedial measures to promote the purity of elections;
they are not penalties or forfeitures in any criminal sense. Ibid.
EVIDENCE.
The presumption of innocence and legality applies in the determination of
the question whether a ballot cast at an election contains an identifying or
distinguishing mark in violation of the statutes. Hall v. Barton (290 Mass.
476), p. 182.
Evidence that a defendant charged with conspiracy to make, sign, file and
use false nomination papers for public office had knowledge of the statutes
he conspired to violate was not necessary in order to prove his criminal intent.
Commonwealth v. O'Rourke (311 Mass. 213), p. 272.
EXAMINERS, BOARD OF.
The duties of a board of examiners are fixed by statute and are ministerial
only; in determining to whom to issue a certificate of election the board has
no power to ascertain whether election officials or town clerks properly per-
formed their duties respecting the election. Hitchcock v. Examiners for
Hampshire County (301 Mass. 170), p. 212. See alsO Wardwell v. Lcggat (291
Mass. 428), p. 194.
See Corrupt Practices.
Mandamus.
FRAUD.
A finding of guilty of conspiring to make, sign, file and use false nomination
papers for a certain candidate was warranted against a defendant who was in
charge of a headquarters for the candidate from which there had been sent
out to be certified a considerable number of wholly forged nomination papers,
the forgery of which, to a person of ordinary experience, would be apparent
upon examination of such papers, and who had general supervision of the
headquarters and of the employment and direction of the other persons work-
ing there; but the evidence did not warrant findings of guilty against a de-
fendant who was employed by the first defendant to deliver and call for some
of the papers; nor against a defendant who was employed merely as a messen-
ger to deliver and call for the papers although he was told by certifying offi-
cials that they doubted the validity of the papers; nor against a defendant
who was employed merely as a chauffeur. Commonwealth v. O'Rourke (311
Mass. 213), p. 272.
GENERAL COURT.
The allegation in a petition for a writ of mandamus that the General Court
by an act dividing the Commonwealth into senatorial districts was actuated
by partisan motives is not a proper subject for judicial inquiry. Attorney
General v. Secretary of the Commonwealth (306 Mass. 25), p. 236.
See Constitutional Law.
The power to pass upon the election and qualification of its own members
is vested exclusively in each branch of tl e Great and General Court.
No other department of the Government has any authority under the
constitution to adjudicate upon this subject. On the Election of William F.
Madden (House, 1925), p. 9.
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
Jurisdiction to pass upon the election and qualification of its own members
is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the House of Representatives.
Greenwood v. Registrars of Voters of Fitchburg (282 Mass. 74), p. 167.
The House of Representatives shall be the judge of the returns, elections,
and qualification of its own members. See Constitution of the Common-
wealth, ch. 1, § 3, Art. 10.
The House of Representatives shall be the judge of the returns, elections
and qualifications of its own members. On the election of William F. Madden
(House, 1925), p. 9.
Where evidence is produced to show that a sufficient number of ballots
were tampered with to affect the result of an election the House will recount
the ballots. Gilmartin v. DesChenes (House, 1933), p. 26.
Failure to comply with the statutory provisions pertaining to petitions for
recounts does not prevent the House of Representatives from recounting the
votes under the power given it in the constitution to judge of the returns,
election and qualifications of its own members. Willis v. McElroy (House
1935), p. 75.
Where evidence of mistake in the counting and tabulation of the votes is
sufficient to warrant the committee in recounting the votes the committee
may do so. Ibid.
Where evidence of fraud in the marking and counting of ballots appears
to be extensive the House committee will proceed to recount the ballots.
Rounseville v. Hathaway (House, 1935), p. 67.
See Apportionment of Senators and Representatives.
MANDAMUS.
The court has jurisdiction and power, pending a hearing on exceptions by
the respondents in a petition for a writ of mandamus against the registrars of
voters of a town, to allow a motion by the petitioner to amend the petition
to admit one of the respondents a town clerk who had been elected to his
office after the exceptions were filed in this court upon the death of his prede-
cessor in office and who under G. L. c. 51, § 15, by virtue of his office was a
member of the respondent board. Andrews v. Board of Registrars of Voters
of Easton (246 Mass. 572), p. 103.
Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to determine the election of a can-
didate in the event of the death before election of a person whose name was
on the official ballot. Madden v. Board of Election Comynissioners of the City
of Boston (251 Mass. 95), p. 108.
The appropriate function of the writ of mandamus is to compel the per-
formance of ministerial duties by public officers where no other remedy is
provided. Ibid.
Mandamus is not the proper process by which to try the title to a public
office which the petitioner does not claim for himself. Sevigny v. Russell (260
Mass. 294), p. 135.
It is the rule of general application that the title to a political office cannot
be impeached collaterally. Sevigny v. Lizotte (260 Mass. 296), p. 137.
A petition for a writ of mandamus is the appropriate method by which one
should seek to have two selectmen of a town ordered to recognize a person as
the third selectman and to have another person ordered to cease pretending
to be the third selectman. Parrott v. Plunkett (268 Mass. 202), p. 139.
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MANDAMUS— Continued.
The proper procedure for procuring relief respecting an improper count of
ballots by a board of registrars of voters after a petition for a recount, is by
a petition for a writ of mandamus and not by a bill in equity. Swift v. Board
of Registrars of Voters of Milton (281 Mass. 264), p. 146.
In mandamus proceedings raising questions touching a recount of ballots
cast in a city at a state election, findings by a single justice after an examina-
tion of facsimile reproductions of certain ballots to ascertain whether they
should be counted for one candidate or for another, cannot be reviewed or
revised upon a reservation and report by him to the full court. Swift v.
Registrars of Voters of Quincy (281 Mass. 271), p. 152.
Talbot v. Registrars of Somerset (281 Mass. 284), page 164, reaffirms de-
cision in Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, page 152.
Where a petition for a writ of mandamus was brought to force election
officials to alter the count in a contest for election to the House of Representa-
tives the court will not intervene when the House is conducting hearings to
determine who is entitled to the seat. Greenwood v. Board of Registrars of
Voters of Fitchburg (282 Mass. 74), p. 167.
A writ of mandamus will not be issued even though the petitioner shows
that certain statutory provisions in respect to the recount were not complied
with when it appears that he was present at the recount and fails to show that
he suffered any harm through failure to comply strictly with the statutory
notice in respect to notice of the recount. Clancy v. Wallace (288 Mass. 557)
,
p. 173.
Where the parties to mandamus proceedings agreed upon the material facts
disclosed by the proceedings and the case was reported by a single justice
without decision, the sole question presented to the full court was whether
on such facts the writ ought to issue as a matter of law. Ross v. Crane (291
Mass. 28), p. 188.
A public officer holding over after the expiration of his term of office has
no standing to try by mandamus the title to office of one certified to have
been elected as his successor. Wardwell v. Leggat (291 Mass. 428), p. 194.
Claimants to separate public offices cannot join in one petition for a writ
of mandamus to try the title to such offices. Ibid.
Mandamus does not lie to compel a board of examiners, who have issued a
certificate of election to a county commissioner under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54,
§ 122, to call a new election for that office or to restrain the person to whom
the certificate has been issued from attempting to act as county commissioner.
Ibid.
Mandamus is not the proper process to try the title to a public office which
the petitioner does not claim for himself. Ibid.
A writ of mandamus will not issue where it is agreed that the findings of
fact of an auditor are to be final, unless such findings are tainted by some error
of law. Coughlin v. Election Co?nmissioners of Lowell (294 Mass. 434), p. 198.
Mandamus is the proper remedy to restrain the Secretary of the Common-
wealth from printing the ballots for an election or a primary. Manser v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth (301 Mass. 264)
,
p. 216. See also, to same effect,
Attorney General v. Secretary of the Commonwealth (306 Mass. 25), p. 236.
Where a single justice has found the facts to be as stated in an agreed state-
ment of facts, and at the request of the parties reports the case to the full
court, on his report no exercise of discretion is involved and the only question
for determination of the full court is whether the writ ought to issue as matter
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MANDAMUS— Concluded.
of law. Attorney General v. Secretary of the Commonwealth (306 Mass. 25).
p. 236. See, to same effect, Graham v. Special Commissioners of Suffolk County
(306 Mass. 237), p. 256.
A writ of mandamus will not issue to compel election commissioners to
make a copy of a voting list as checked at an election as the statute is permis-
sive and not mandatory. Brennan v. Election Commissioners of Boston (310
Mass. 784), p. 267.
A petition for a writ of mandamus against the special commissioners is a
proper method of attacking the validity of the division of a county into rep-
resentative districts. Graham v. Special Commissioners of Suffolk County (306
Mass. 237), p. 256.
A legal voter in a representative district is a proper person to bring a peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus if he is aggrieved by the division, but he can be
aggrieved only by reason of the effect of the division and assignment, upon
the representative district in which he is a voter and then only if in that
district the ratio between voters and representatives is higher than the right
ratio. Ibid.
See Apportionment of Representatives.
House of Representatives.
MARKING OF OFFICIAL BALLOT.
Where the ballot did not have a cross in the space directly opposite the
candidate's name but opposite a blank space immediately below the candidate's
name a small portion of the cross extending above the line and into the blank
space for crosses opposite the candidate's name, it was held that the ballot
was so marked as to make uncertain the intent of the voter and therefore
should not be counted. Andrews v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Easton
(246 Mass. 572), p. 103.
Where the ballot is so marked that the intention of the voter is left "wholly
to speculation and conjecture" the ballot should be counted a blank. Ibid.
Where the trial court has made a decision on a question of fact the full
court will not review and revise the decision, it will simply determine whether
such decision can be supported as law or "whether as a matter of law it must
be reversed." Ibid.
The slight extension of the ends of a cross, unmistakably marked in the
square opposite the blank, into the square above and opposite the name of
a candidate would not have warranted a finding of a purpose to vote for
such candidate. Ibid.
A ballot cast in an election, upon which the voter has placed identifying
or distinguishing marks in violation of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 80, cannot
be counted. Ibid.
A mark on a ballot cast to be a distinguishing or identifying mark within the
meaning of the statutes must be made on purpose, must be such in fact and
must be intended to be such. Ibid.
If the intent of the voter can be ascertained, the general purpose of the
election laws is to give effect to that intent by counting the ballot, unless
prevented by some positive rule of law. Many provisions of statute may be
treated as directory in order to effectuate this general purpose. Ibid.
The statute contains no definition of an identifying or distinguishing mark
upon a ballot. That must be determined as to each case by considering its
facts in the light of the words and general design of the election laws. Ibid.
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MARKING OF OFFICIAL BALLOT— Continued.
In the marking of the official ballot the intent of the voter must appear
with ordinary assurance of certainty and be capable of being fairly deter-
mined from inspection of the ballot. No conjecture can be invoked as to
where the cross was intended to be placed. Coughlin v. Election Commis-
sioners of Lowell (294 Mass. 434), p. 198.
Within the general rule the question for whom a ballot ought to be counted
is one of fact unless some positive mandate of law has been violated. Ibid.
A cross not in the square but in the space between the name of the candi-
date and the square provided for the cross will be counted if the intent of the
voter is clear. Ibid.
Where the cross cannot be said to be in the square or space opposite either
candidate, but is equally in both, and the intersection of the two lines made
by the voter appears to be on the printed line dividing the spaces, the intent
of the voter is not clear and the ballot should not be counted for either
candidate. Ibid.
Where four crosses appeared on the ballot when three candidates only
could be voted for: one in a square was very faint but showed no evidence
of attempted erasure, and the other three were strong and clear and were
in the spaces to the left of the square provided therefor, a prevailing intent
to vote for the permissible number of candidates is not discernible and the
ballot should not be counted. Ibid.
The omission of the residence of one of the candidates where the name is
written in on the ballot, where there is otherwise substantial compliance with
the statutory provisions and the intent of the voter could be ascertained does
not as a matter of law invalidate the vote and it will be counted. O'Brien v.
Board of Election Comjnissioners of Boston and Keene v. Board of Election Com-
missioners of Boston (257 Mass. 332), p. 126
Where the cross upon the ballot appears between the name of the candidate
and the party designation and such informality appears throughout the ballot
such votes will be counted. Nutting v. Stanton (Senate, 1937), p. 87.
Where a cross appears against the name of one candidate and an oblique
line opposite the name of the opposing candidate, the intent of the voter not
being clear, the ballot will be counted as a blank. Ibid.
Where a cross appears in the square opposite the name of a candidate and a
cross in the square below and it appears from examination of the ballot that a
sticker bearing the name of another person had been pasted on such ballot,
the ballot will be counted as a blank as the voter voted for more persons than
were to be elected. Ibid.
Where ballots are marked with a cross for one candidate and an oblique line
line or apparently accidental mark for the other candidate the ballots will be
counted for the candidate whose name is marked by the cross. Ibid.
Where ballots are marked with a clear cross after the name of a candidate
and the square opposite the name of the other candidate was marked and it
appears that the voter attempted to erase or obliterate the cross the ballot will
be counted for the candidate opposite whose name appears the clear cross.
Ibid.
Ballots marked by a cross in the square opposite the blank space below the
names of the candidates will be counted as blanks. Ibid.
Ballots upon which a name is written and the name appears to be that of the
voter will be counted as a blank as the voter attempts to place identifying
marks on his ballot which is prohibited by law. Ibid. G. L. (Ter. Ed.)
c. 56, § 31.
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Where a cross filling the entire space of the two squares opposite both can-
didates it will be counted as a blank as the intent of the voter is not clear.
Nutting v. Stanton (Senate, 1937), p. 87.
Ballots marked with a T, V or Y will be counted if the intent of the voter is
clear. Ibid.
Ballots marked by an oblique line where the rest of the ballot is marked by
distinct crosses will be counted as a blank. Ibid.
Wherever the marks on the ballot do not constitute a cross but are uniform
throughout the ballot, the intent of the voter is clear and such ballot will be
counted. This would include a check mark as here illustrated: "\/- Ibid.
Where unusual markings appear on a ballot as double crosses, with evidence
of erasure apparent upon examination of the ballot and the other crosses upon
the ballot are clear and distinct the ballot will be counted as a blank. Ibid.
Uncompleted crosses on ballots, check marks instead of crosses and crosses
between candidates' names and party designations do not constitute fraud.
Rounseville v. Hathaway (House, 1935), p. 67.
See Mandamus.
Recount of Votes.
PASTERS ON OFFICIAL BALLOT.
Failure of a voter to locate a paster in the space designated for the candi-
date for whom he intends to vote, whether containing a cross or not, renders
it impossible to draw an inference of affirmative intent and the paster should
not be counted. O'Brien v. Board of Election Commissioners of Boston, and
Keene v. Board of Election Commissioners of Boston (257 Mass. 332), p. 126.
Where the voter fails to put a cross on the paster it will be counted as a
blank. Ibid.
(Editor's Note. — Where paster was counted though not complying with
statutory provisions as to size of type, etc. See Ray v. Registrars of Voters
of Ashland, 221 Mass. 223. Howard's Election Cases, 1903-1922. p. 155.)
PUBLIC OFFICERS.
There is no provision in the statutes that town officers elected according
to law shall not perform their functions and duties pending a recount. Moloney
v. Selectmen of Milford (253 Mass. 400), p. 115.
A petition for a recount where no irregularities in the election occurred does
not affect the legality of the official acts of the officer declared elected even
though later found by the recount not to have been elected, to the office.
Ibid.
Public necessity and policy require that the acts of an actual incumbent
of a public office, in the performance of his duties, shall be held to be valid,
although the incumbent should not have the legal right to the office, and
though his right should be questioned and disputed. Sevigny v. Lizotte (260
Mass. 296), p. 137.
Selectmen.
Where by vote of the town one selectman was to be elected for a term of
three years each year and where the warrant called for the election of one
selectman for the term of three years but through error of the person who
printed the ballots as used by the voters in the election, the official ballot had
printed thereon "Selectman for one year", it was held that since the only
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term for which the voters had power to choose a selectman was for three
years, the designation of the term on the ballot was unnecessary and might
be treated as surplusage and the clerical error in the designation of the term
immaterial. Parrott v. Plunkelt (26S Mass. 202), p. 139.
Mandamus is not the proper process to try the title to a public office which
the petitioner does not claim for himself. Setigny v. Russell (260 Mass. 294),
p. 135.
See Mandamus.
Town Clerk.
QUO WARRANTO.
The proper process to try the title to a public office, except in those cases
where a private person claims the office, is by information by the Attorney
General in the nature of a quo warranto. Setigny v. Russell (260 Mass. 294),
p. 135. Wardwell v. Leggat (291 Mass. 428), p. 194.
RECOUNT OF VOTES.
The cardinal rule for guidance of election officers and courts in election
cases is that, if the intent of the voter can be determined with reasonable
certainty from an inspection of the ballot in the light of the generally known
conditions attendant upon the election, effect must be given to that intent
and the vote counted in accordance therewith, provided the voter has sub-
stantially complied with the requirements of the election law. O'Brien v.
Board of Election Commissioners of Boston (257 Mass. 332), p. 126.
(Editor's Note. — This case arose because of the fact that the pasters used
at the primary did not strictly comply with the statutory requirements as to
pasters as appearing in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, §§ 42. 65 and 77.)
Proceedings for a recount of votes cast at an election are strictly statutory.
They are of no effect unless authorized, begun and conducted as provided
by the statute. Swift v. Reffistrars of Voters of Milton (281 Mass. 264), p. 146.
The design of the recount is to verify not to destroy the result of election as
previously declared by the election officials. Ibid.
Absentee Ballots, Count of.
The mere fact, that after the observance of all the formalities required of
election officers by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 95, respecting certain absentee
ballots, the envelopes in which they were received were not returned to the
city clerk by the election officers and therefore were not returned to the board
of registrars of voters for the purpose of a recount, where there was nothing
to indicate fraud or tampering with the ballots and records, did not invalidate
the votes nor afford any ground for nullifying the count. Swift t. Registrars
of Voters of Milton (281 Mass. 264), p. 146.
The election commissioners of the city of Lynn gave to an applicant for
a recount of votes a notice in writing that a recount of the votes in certain
wards would be held on a certain day which was less than the three days
after the notice as required by the statute, and during the recount so held
orally gave notice of a recount in the remaining wards of the city. The appli-
cant protested that the notice given did not comply with the requirements of
the law but did not ask for delay nor seek to obtain relief in court under
G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 56, § 69. The applicant attended the recount throughout
and did not show that he suffered any harm through the failure to give him
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the statutory notice. In this case the court Held, The applicant for the
recount as a matter of law waived whatever informality there was as to notice,
and therefore was not entitled, upon a petition for a writ of mandamus, to
have the recount set aside because of lack of statutory notice to him. Clancy
v. Wallace £288 Mass. 557), p. 173.
Where a petitioner for a recount failed to receive the statutory notice of
the holding of the recount, but attended the same and the facts show that he
suffered no harm thereby, he will be held to have waived whatever informal-
ity there was as to the notice. Clancy v. Wallace (288 Mass. 557), p. 173.
The intent of the voter is the determining factor in the counting of any ballot-
Gilmartin v. DesChenes (1933), p. 26.
The fact that the original official count was close does not of itself justify
a recount by the House of Representatives. Bergeron et al. v. Ames et al.
(House, 1923), p. 1.
Under the provisions of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 54, § 135, the registrars of voters
themselves are not required to do the actual counting of the ballots at recounts
but may employ assistants whom they deem qualified to assist them. Ibid.
The committee on elections of the House of Representatives is permitted
or allowed to recount only when there is satisfactory preliminary proof of
such substantial facts or well grounded suspicion as would induce strong
conviction that a fraud or mistake prejudicial to the contestant might appear
from such examination. Ibid.
Eraud.
On a recount of the ballots it appeared that crosses and other irregularities
on the ballots appeared to have occurred after the voter marked the same and
where evidence satisfactory to the committee of the House showed that
persons other than those authorized to count the ballots had access to the
same prior to the final count, and where over marked crosses appeared on certain
ballots, and marks were made on the ballots that appeared to have been made
after the voter marked the same, sufficient evidence of fraud existed to justify
a recount by the committee of the House. Rounseville v. Hathaway (1935),
p. 67.
Loss of tally sheets and other irregularities in the conduct of an election
must be so extensive as to warrant the assumption that the will of the voters
has not been truly recorded to justify a recount by the Senate. Warren v.
Daly (Senate, 1935), p. 47.
Blank Ballots.
The omission to count the blank ballots does not affect the accuracy of the
official count of the ballots actually cast for competing candidates. Clancy v.
Cole (Senate, 1935), p. 39.
The underlying reason for a recount is that the will of the voters as mani-
fested by the ballots actually cast shall be truthfully and exactly found out
and established. Ibid.
The Senate will not recount the votes unless satisfactory preliminary proof
of such substantial facts or well grounded causes of suspicion as would induce
a conviction that fraud or substantial mistakes existed. Cahill v. Moyse (Sen-
ate, 1935), p. 30.
See Elections, Destroyed Ballots.
Mandamus.
Marking of Official Ballots.
Registrars of Voters.
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REGISTRARS OF VOTERS.
The Board of Registrars of voters is a continuous body and the death of the
town clerk who is a member of the board under the provisions of G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 51, § 15, does not abate a writ of mandamus against the Board. Andrews
v. Board of Registrars of Voters of Easton (246 Mass. 572), p. 103.
It is proper for the board of registrars to make a return after a recount that
the ballots destroyed "had been destroyed by mistake" after the return of the
orig'nal count by the precinct officers and before the recount by the registrars
and that "the figures turned in by the precinct officers for the missing ballots
were added to" the count of the other ballots for that precinct and that the
registrars made no change in the original figures as compiled by the election
officers on the day of election. Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Milton (281
Mass. 264), p. 146.
Proceedings for a recount by the Board of Registrars are strictly statutory.
They are of no effect unless authorized, begun and conducted as provided by
statute. Ibid.
See Elections.
Mandamus.
Marking of Official Ballot.
Recount of Votes.
SELECTMEN.
See Elections.
Mandamus.
Public Officers.
SENATE.
After an official recount has been held, a further recount by the Senate will
not be made unless and until there is error or fraud shown of a type that
would change the result. Unless such is shown, the will of the voters must be
presumed to have been carried out. Clancy v. Cole (Senate, 1935), p. 39.
While the powers of the Senate are plenary in determining election contests
affecting membership therein, the comity and respect due to the decisions of a
co-ordinate department of the government require it to follow the decisions
of the Supreme Judicial Court. Cahill v. Moyse (Senate, 1935), p.- 30.
See Apportionment of Senators and Representatives.
Constitutional Law.
STATUTE, INTERPRETATION OR ACCEPTANCE OF.
The word "Persons" in the statute means living human beings. Madden
v. Board of Election Commissioners of Boston (251 Mass. 95), p. 108.
Acceptance of optional or permissive statutes by towns not operating on
limited form of town government should be by vote in open town meeting
under appropriate article in the town warrant. Moloney v. Selectmen of
Milford (253 Mass. 400), p. 115.
Statutory provisions as to elections must be interpreted on the theory
that they are enacted to prevent fraud and mistakes and to secure freedom
of choice; they are not to be so construed as to make the rights of voting and
of having the votes ultimately counted with accuracy subject to technical
obstructions not affecting the merits of the election. Clancy v. Wallace (288
Mass. 557), p. 173. Willis v. McElroy (House, 1935), p. 75.



